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INTRODUCTION 
Preserving the constitutional rights of individuals against abridg-
ment by popular majorities is probably the most frequently voiced -
and, in my judgment, is the most soundly based - justification for the 
Supreme Court's exercising the awesome power of judicial review. 1 
But to state this as a matter of theory falls far short of demonstrating 
that the Court's efforts in this regard have had truly meaningful 
impact. 
Indeed, distinguished observers have contended during most peri-
ods of our history that reliance on the Court for the task of safeguard-
ing personal liberties is misplaced. Henry Steele Commager 
complained in 1943 that the judicial record in the field of individual 
rights "is practically barren . . . as far as federal legislation is con-
cerned. "2 Four years later John Frank, considering judicial review of 
state actions, observed that "for the most part, the civil rights limita-
tions on the states have been a collection of magnificent trifies."3 Even 
during the heyday of the Warren era, Robert Dahl concluded in 1967 
that "it is doubtful that the fundamental conditions of liberty in this 
country have been altered by more than a hair's breadth"4 as a result 
of the judiciary's invalidation of congressional action, and he reiter-
ated this view with but the slightest qualification in 1972.5 And in 
1975 another commentator opined that overall "[t]he traditional con-
cept of the Court as the champion of minority rights . . . is largely 
incorrect. " 6 
Moreover, whatever the usually more favorable conclusions con-
cerning the Justices' endeavors during the relatively short period of 
the Warren Court, the product of its successor has regularly been 
found sorely wanting in its protection of personal freedoms. Thus, 
commenting on the.Burger Court's 1972-1973 efforts, Norman Dor-
sen, then general counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, ob-
1. See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS 
60-70 (1980). 
2. H. CoMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 47 (1950). 
3. Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME CoURT AND SUPREME LAW 109, 139 (E. 
Cahn ed. 1954); see also Ulmer, Judicial Review as Political Behavior: A Temporary Check on 
Congress, 4 AD. SCI. Q. 426 (1959). 
4. R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 
166 (1967). 
5. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 203·04 
(2d ed. 1972). 
6. Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 809 
(1975) (emphasis in original). 
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served that "[a]n entire generation of young Americans has come of 
age accustomed to looking to the Supreme Court to protect individual 
rights," but that "the first full year of the Burger Court reveals quite 
distinctly that this period has ended."7 Similarly, in the preface to his 
influential treatise, published in 1978, Laurence Tribe declared 
that the course of the Burger Court, at least in its first years, will eventu-
ally be marked not as the end of an era of exaggerated activism on behalf 
of individuals and minorities, but as a sad period of often opposite activ-
ism, cloaked in the worn-out, if well-meant, disguise of judicial 
restraint. 8 
More harshly, in 1974, Leonard Levy complained that a majority of 
the Justices "vote for the rights of the criminally accused about as 
often as snarks are sighted alighting on the roof of the Supreme Court 
building."9 In 1978, Henry Steele Commager was reported to have 
"condemned the current Supreme Court for what he called a 'tragic' 
lack of protection of individual rights,"10 an expansion of his criticism 
of nearly thirty years earlier. And these pessimistic appraisals have 
continued unabated into the 1980's.11 
One must be hesitant to distill too precise a meaning from these 
many broadly phrased value judgments.12 There is considerable un-
certainty as to the core emphasis of the criticism - whether it is that 
the number of decisions rendered in favor of individual rights has been 
too few; or that, regardless of how man) such rulings the Justices have 
issued, the number of people involved has been insignificant; or that, 
no matter how many people have been affected, the actual conse-
quences for them have been relatively trivial; or that, in any event, the 
Court's total impact on conditions of freedom in the nation has been 
minimal at best. Further, the extent to which the reprovers of the 
Burger Court are merely comparing its output to that of its immediate 
predecessor rather than making an absolute evaluation is somewhat 
unclear, although the tone of the disapproval strongly implies the lat-
ter intent. 
These ambiguities notwithstanding, it is fair to infer a common 
message from the critical assessments: the Court's holdings in behalf_ 
7. Dorsen, The Court of Some Resort, 1 Clv. LIB. REv. 82, 82 (1974). 
8. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW V (1978). 
9. L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 439 (1974). 
10. Historian Attacks High Court, San Francisco Chron., Oct 18, 1978, at 36, col. 1. 
11. See, e.g., Court Swings to the Right, Gives Reagan Major Victories, 42 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY 
REP. 1709 (1984). 
12. For example, Commager's opinion of the Court's usually substantial deference to acts of 
Congress as of 1950 must surely be appraised differently from his much more far-reaching con-
clusion nearly three decades later about the Justices' record in reviewing actions taken at all 
levels of government. 
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of personal liberties have not been very important. In response, this 
Article seeks to examine the record - at considerable length and in 
some depth 13 - by reviewing a large number of cases from shortly 
after the Civil War through the 1980-1981 Term in which the Court 
has held government action unconstitutional on the ground that it 
abridges individual rights (as distinguished from violating the consti-
tutional precepts of federalism or separation of powers). 14 The purpose 
of this inquiry is not to ask whether the Justices' rulings were substan-
tively "right" or "wrong" as a matter of doctrine or policy. (Although 
I approve of most of the results in these terms, I do not agree with 
them all.) Nor does it intend to answer the imponderable question (to 
be discussed somewhat below15) of whether the effects of the Court's 
decisions in favor of personal liberties have been "good" or "bad" for 
society overall (as distinguished from their particular beneficiaries). 
Rather, the thrust of this Article is to attempt to ascertain just 
what differences the Court's judgments upholding individual constitu-
tional rights have made for those who fall within the ambit of their 
protection. It seeks to address such questions as: What were the con-
ditions that existed before the Court's ruling? How many people were 
subject to the regime that was invalidated by the Justices? Was the 
Court's mandate successfully implemented? What were the conse-
quences for those affected? At a subjective level, were the repercus-
sions perceived as salutary by those (or at least most of those) who 
were the beneficiaries of the judicial decrees? At a more objective level 
- although the line between the subjective and objective on a matter 
like this is quite ethereal - were those effects understood by others as 
working to the advantage of the recipients, apart from their impact on 
society as a whole? Some of the "case studies" - and I use the term 
with trepidation16 - set forth below attempt to respond to most or all 
of these issues, while others (because of the nature of their subject) are 
more confined. 
Many of the decisions reviewed (such as those concerning racial, 
religious, and political minorities and people accused of crimes) deal 
with personal liberties or civil rights as traditionally perceived. Other 
13. The research bas been done irregularly since 1974 and was orginally intended for J. 
CHoPER, supra note 1. Since I felt that comprehensive treatment there would have unduly 
lengthened the book and diverted readers from its main themes, see id. at 91 & n.150 at 429, only 
some of the results - which are also contained in this Article - were included therein. See id. 
at 83-122. I have attempted to bring all the research up to date, but continually unfolding events 
on so large and diverse a subject have undoubtedly frustrated that ideal. 
14. See J. CHOPER, supra note l, at 1-2. 
15. See text following note 27 infra. 
16. See text following note 31 infra. 
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rulings (such as those involving property interests and commercial ad-
vertising) are also included because, like the more conventional exam-
ples, they, too, fall within the designated category of constitutional 
decisions that limit all government power - that of the three federal 
branches and of the states - vis-a-vis the individual.17 
I. COMPLEXITIES OF MEASUREMENT 
Before p·roceeding to inspect the data, several important qualifica-
tions concerning the breadth and significance of this undertaking must 
be noted. First, any attempt to measure the societal effects of judicial 
holdings - which this Article seeks to do - is an enormously compli-
cated task which must necessarily be incomplete and open-ended.18 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty - addressed in context at several points 
in the substance of this Article19 - is that the repercussions of all 
government actions ramify indefinitely and interrelate with other phe-
nomena, both public and private, many of which simply cannot be 
quantified and indeed often cannot even be identified. Thus, 
the decisions of the Supreme Court are part of a general milieu in which 
later events take place and part of a set of multiple causes of such events. 
If several factors are operating in the same direction, how does one "sep-
arate out" the impact the Court's decision has by comparison with other 
elements of the situation?20 
When libertarian reforms do occur in the aftermath of pronounce-
ments by the Justices requiring them, how can it be confidently said 
that such advances would not have come about in any event, if not as 
quickly then at least eventually? The Court's ruling may have done no 
more than reflect, or perhaps anticipate, or at best reinforce, what 
would have ultimately happened anyway. "Even the most careful 
study cannot establish whether alleged changes were not merely coin-
cidentally but actually consequentially related."21 Indeed, there is 
good reason to believe that, at least in some instances, laws held inva-
lid by the Supreme Court would have soon fallen at the hands of the 
political process even without judicial intervention.22 On the other 
17. See J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
18. There is a voluminous social science literature on the subject. See, e.g., R. MERTON, 
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOClAL STRUCTURE (1968); S. W ASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME CoURT 32-42 (1970). 
19. See, e.g., text at notes 490, 1386-88, 1507-10 infra. 
20. S. W ASBY, supra note 18, at 32. 
21. s. KlusLOV, THE SUPREME CoURT AND PoLmCAL FREEDOM 166 (1968). See gener-
ally Feeley, Approaches to the Study of Court Impact, in 2 SCHOOLS & THE CoURTS 1, 4-7 (M. 
Feeley, P. Piele, E. Hollingsworth & W. Clune eds. 1979). 
22. For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court rejected a 
1922 Oregon statute that forbade children from attending private elementary and secondary 
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hand, the extent to which the symbolic impact of a judicial ruling or a 
series of related decisions acts as a direct or indirect catalytic force is 
generally incapable of scientific measurement,23 as will also be noted in 
specific situations herein.24 
Second, even if we assume that nothing other than a Supreme 
Court decision upholding individual rights will result in their being 
secured, there is no assurance that all constitutional pronouncements 
of the Justices will be complied with in practice. One of the complex 
set of variables that contribute to this variation in compliance25 is the 
effort necessary to effectuate the ruling. Some decisions in favor of 
personal liberties are relatively "self-enforcing," such as those estab-
lishing certain rights of the accused. For example, a person charged 
with a crime and faced with a prison sentence has every incentive to 
assert his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer. Trial 
judges ordinarily have a comparable motivation to respect the claim, 
whether or not they are in sympathy with it, because they recognize 
that their failure to do so will result in reversal of the conviction. On 
the other hand, effectuation of some judicial rulings in behalf of indi-
vidual rights against recalcitrant public officials may demand much 
greater commitment and fortitude on the part of their beneficiaries. 
This may be exemplified by the school prayer controversies. If a pub-
lic school wishes to continue voluntary Bible-reading programs despite 
schools. The legislation was enacted in a post-World War I "outburst of patriotism and national· 
ism,'' R. McLAUGHLIN, A HlsrORY OF STATE LEGISLATION AFFECTING PRIVATE ELEMEN· 
TARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870-1945, at 84 (1946), but was 
specifically "inspired by the Ku Klux Klan and directed primarily against the parochial schools 
of the Roman Catholic Church," The March of Events, SO THE WORLD'S WORK 243 (1925); R. 
McLAUGHLIN, supra, at 106-07. Catholic leaders perceived the law as "the first movement in an 
attack which will find Catholics in the United States 'suffering from disabilities with which the 
Catholics of England were afllicted three generations ago.'" Oregon's Outlawing of Church 
Schools, LITERARY DIG., Jan. 6, 1923, at 34. But even before the Justices' ruling, efforts to 
promulgate similar rules in Michigan and Washington were resoundingly defeated by the electo· 
rate. Klan Victories and Defeats, LITERARY DIG., Nov. 22, 1924, at 16; R. McLAUGHLIN, 
supra, at 111-13. 
Similarly, in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S 618 (1978), the Court invalidated Tennessee's rule 
forbidding members of the clergy from being legislators. Although at one time in our early 
history, 13 states had such disqualifications, 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 622 (1950), by the end of the nineteenth century, 11 had voluntarily abandoned their 
exclusion, 435 U.S. at 625, and by mid-twentieth century, the remaining two laws appeared to be 
no more than historical relics. Thus, when a federal district court held Maryland's prohibition 
unconstitutional in 1974, Kirkley v. Maryland, 381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974), in the only other 
reported case on the question, the challenging minister had been permitted to file as a candidate 
and the state "for all intents and purposes, adinitted the unconstitutionality of the provision." 
381 F. Supp. at 329. And, in McDaniel the state did not participate in the litigation, the minis-
ter's political opponent having sued to strike his name from the ballot. 435 U.S. at 621. 
23. See generally s. SCHEINGOLD, THE PoLmcs OF RIGHTS (1974). 
24. See, e.g., text at notes 125-32 (racial equality), 345 (children's rights) & 367 (rights of the 
accused) infra. 
25. For fuller discussion, see J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 129-70. 
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the Justices' proscription of the practice, vindication of the constitu-
tional right requires objecting parents and students to initiate litiga-
tion. They must risk the social obloquy that is likely to result from 
their preventing the majority from engaging in a much desired activity 
from which it is already willing to permit dissenters to be excused. 26 
Third, even if we assume literal compliance with the Court's man-
dates, the degree to which they are truly meaningful (or beneficial) to 
the individuals affected - measured either subjectively or objectively 
- varies considerably. For example, there is little doubt about the 
significance for prisoners on death row of the consequences - desired, 
or sometimes undesired - of a judicial decision invalidating capital 
punishment. But even if counsel is appointed at state expense for all 
indigent criminal defendants because of a ruling by the Justices -
which, in itself, must be scored as a substantial judicially produced 
success - this does not insure that the quality of the representation 
afforded will be of any value to many of the accused or, even if only 
very talented lawyers are assigned, that their participation will make 
any real difference in the verdict of most cases.27 
Fourth, even if we assume that the Court's decisions upholding 
26. See Choper, Comments, 23 J. LEGAL Eouc. 143, 145-46 (1970). 
27. This same problem may be illustrated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It 
appears that prior to Miranda, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was the only civilian police 
force in the United States that afforded the substance of the Miranda warnings for custodial 
interrogation. See 384 U.S. at 483-90 (majority opinion), 384 U.S. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
While some of the empirical studies immediately following the Court's promulgation of its new 
rules disclosed pockets of significant resistance by law enforcement officials, others revealed 
prompt and full compliance. Compare N. MILNER, THE CoURT AND LoCAL LA w ENFORCE· 
MENT 229 (1971) (four Wisconsin cities); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interro-
gation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1347, 
1365-66 (1968) (Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Medalie]; Note, Interrogations in New 
Haven: The Impact a/Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1614 (1967) (New Haven), with Seeburger & 
Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 U. Pm. L. R.Ev. 1, 8 (1967) (Pitts-
burgh). However, substantial acceptance was rapidly achieved and adherence improved immea-
surably through a brief transitional period. See N. MILNER, supra, at 211; Medalie, supra, at 
1362; Note, supra, at 1640. In a subsequent investigation, public defenders in a rural area of 
Massachusetts reported that "the police were assisting in enforcement of the spirit of Miranda by 
making it easier for those in custody to contact lawyers." S. W ASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND 
THE SUPREME CoURT 117 (1976). By 1979, a questionnaire survey of the chief prosecuting 
attorneys in the nation's 300 largest counties showed that only 17% of the respondents disagreed 
with the Justices' edict (and only 4% disagreed "very much"). Gruhl & Spohn, The Supreme 
Court's Post-Miranda Rulings, 3 LAW & POLY. Q. 29, 35 (1981). In the absence of any recent 
on-site studies suggesting the contrary, it is fair to conclude that the Miranda warnings are now 
given in a very high percentage of instances, a view confirmed by a litigation record indicating 
comparatively few deviations from the core of the Miranda holding, cf. Gruhl & Spohn, supra, at 
43, and a relatively generous application of its principle to unresolved issues by the state courts, 
see Romans, The Role of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy-Making: Escobedo, Miranda 
and the Use of Judicial Impact Analysis, 27 W. POL. Q. 27 (1974), and even on occasion by the 
Burger Court, see Choper, The Burger Court: Misperceptions Regarding Judicial Restraint and 
Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 767, 775-77 (1979). Cf. Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984) (holding that alleged drunk driver's statements at the station 
house were inadmissible because he was in custody and had not been read his rights). But see 
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individual rights do in fact produce important benefits, it must be rec-
ognized that virtually all such gains for some persons may simultane-
ously retard the welfare of others. This may be most dramatically 
illustrated by the inherent collision of interests between pregnant wo-
men and unborn fetuses in the abortion setting, a conflict that is im-
possible to reconcile because, inter alia, the data as to exactly how 
those concerned would fare in all relevant respects if the issue were 
resolved otherwise are either nonexistent or unobtainable or, even 
more importantly, there is simply no acceptable scale on which to 
weigh the antagonistic values. Most other constitutional controversies 
raise this problem as well - whether they involve the rights of those 
accused of crime versus the rights of law-abiding citizens not to be 
deprived of their life or property, or the competing goals of different 
groups in respect to such issues as racial segregation, reapportionment, 
affirmative action, or just compensation for takings (to mention but a 
few). This aspect of the problem is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Indeed, even when there is consensus on certain general propositions 
concerning the commonweal - such as the view that robust debate on 
public issues will enhance the successful operation of the political pro-
cess - there is no assurance that granting constitutional protection to 
defamatory criticism of political candidates will make a positive or 
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (public safety exception to the Miranda warnings 
rule). 
This result, in itself, should be recognized as an important achievement by the judiciary, 
especially in terms of the significant (albeit intangible) value of government respect for individual 
dignity. At the next level of inquiry, however, further problems arise. Empirical studies have 
disclosed that a substantial number of suspects fail to understand the content of the warnings 
they receive. See Leiken, Police Inte"ogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 
DEN. L.J. 1, 14-16 (1970); Medalie, supra, at 1374 (15% to 24%); see also Faculty Note, A 
Postscript to the Miranda Project: Inte"ogation of Draft Protestors, 11 YALE L.J. 300, 313-14 
(1967). This incomprehension, in turn, has been shown to influence many to waive the proffered 
rights to silence and counsel, cf. N. MILNER, supra, at 211, a process not uncommonly abetted by 
subtle (and sometimes heavy-handed) police suasion. See Leiken, supra, at 22, 27; Faculty Note, 
supra, at 308-09; Note, supra, at 1545-46. Thus, although many of the studies were conducted 
soon after the Supreme Court's decision and before the longer run educative effect that the Jus-
tices' pronouncements may have on the citizenry's awareness of their rights at the stationhouse, 
see Note, supra, at 1615, the data strongly suggest that giving the Miranda warnings has no 
significant impact on suspects' decisions to talk to police interrogators. See Leiken, supra, at 18; 
Medalie, supra, at 1372, 1376-79; Note, supra, at 1563-64, 1571, 1578. 
The statistics appear to be otherwise, however, in respect to the assistance of a lawyer. The 
District of Columbia study showed that while almost two-thirds of arrestees who were informed 
of their right to counsel requested assistance, more than three-fourths of those who were not so 
advised failed to exercise the right. Medalie, supra, at 1371-72. But again, the ultimate benefit of 
the fulfillment of this right for most persons potentially subject to police questioning is seriously 
clouded because of their tendency to cooperate in any event, see supra, and because of the very 
limited utility of custodial interrogation in most cases - various empirical projects finding it to 
be usually unnecessary and often unsuccessful when really needed. See Reiss & Black, Interroga-
tion and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47, 55-56 (1967); Note, supra, at 1549, 1585 (table 
20), 1590 (table 21), 1592 (table F-8), app. I, at 1639-43 . 
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negative contribution to the ideal. 28 
Fifth, even if we were to assume - after measuring all the gains 
and losses - that the Court's holdings of unconstitutionality have on 
balance effectively negated substantial political abridgments of per-
sonal liberty, history reveals that other decisions of the Justices -
which refused to hold unconstitutional claimed violations of individual 
rights - have exacerbated the infringement of the interests for which 
protection was sought. For, at least in some instances, it can be ex-
pected that the Court's validation of the position of a political majority 
may prompt it to work its will more broadly.29 
Furthermore, as recently illustrated by the activities of the Moral 
Majority, continued vigorous judicial enforcement of personal liberties 
may stimulate powerful reaction among the populace and officialdom 
that seeks not simply to reverse direction but to move things back 
from the point where the trend began. On the other hand, the exist-
ence of judicial review and the mere possibility that the Court will 
invalidate a governmental practice may have caused political officials 
and institutions to adjust their behavior and refrain from impinging on 
individual interests, perhaps to an even greater extent than the Justices 
would have demanded. Jo 
At least as yet, there appears to be no way to conduct a scientifi-
28. See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. ll05, ll13-16 (1979). 
29. For example, after the Court reluctantly upheld the compulsory flag salute rule in Mi-
nersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), "the West Virginia legislature enacted a 
comparable statute for the state as a whole, and other states quickly joined the repressive band-
wagon." Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or 
Restraint?, 54 CoRNELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1968). Within one year of Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629 (1968), in which the Court ruled that states have broad regulatory power over distribu-
tion of sexually related materials to minors, "at least twenty city councils across the country were 
found to have passed statutes like that validated." S. WASBY, supra note 18, at 142. More 
speculatively, and subject to the same imponderable factors discussed above, it has been observed 
that as a result of the Court's sanctioning of the separate-but-equal precept in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896), "racial segregation came to dominate virtually all areas of Southern life," D. 
BERMAN, IT Is So ORDERED: THE SUPREME CoURT RULES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 5 
(1966), and the doctrine became "the linchpin of Jim Crow jurisprudence in America." Levy, 
Introduction, in THE SUPREME CoURT UNDER EARL w ARREN 3, 21 (L. Levy ed. 1972). 
For the extent to which some states courts, interpreting their own constitutions, may halt the 
contagion within their borders, see text at notes 1610-ll infra. 
30. "[T]he Post Office often mooted cases involving restrictions on receipt of mail when an 
irate individual threatened to go to court, in order to avoid a court decision on its practices of 
holding mail." S. W ASBY, supra note 18, at 37. Congress's rejection of legislation in 1940 to 
deport Harry Bridges by name "was heavily, though not exclusively, influenced" by fears that the 
Court would find this to be a bill of attainder. Frank, supra note 3, at 126. Similar concerns 
about judicial invalidation caused proposed provisions of the McCarran Act of 1950 (directly 
outlawing the Communist Party) and the Smith Act of 1940 (prohibiting civilian military organi-
zations) to be stricken in committee. Id. 
Indeed, it may be that the host of strenuous constitutional objections to the numerous recent 
proposals in Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts have ultimately tipped the 
balance against them. 
12 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
cally controlled inquiry to determine whether, all things considered, 
the state of freedom within the nation is "better" than it would have 
been without the Justices' involvement,31 and this Article makes no 
effort to do so. But that all of the five sets of imponderables sketched 
above may be incapable of systematic resolution should not deter us 
from determining what is and can be known about some things. 
The empirical studies that have been specifically directed to the 
impact of the Court's efforts in behalf of personal liberties are rela-
tively few in number and methodologically uneven in thoroughness 
and quality. Some of the material presented below is drawn from 
these studies. But, in the main, the data for this Article have been 
obtained from disparate, already published sources that have assem-
bled evidence for entirely different purposes. As is true of most of the 
more detailed empirical surveys that have been made of specific 
problems, some of the following "case studies" are based on more 
complete statistics and information than others and some are 
grounded more in opinion than on actual observation and hard facts. 
Indeed, some are either so brief or inconclusive that I have included 
them only because of their possible cumulative value as part of the 
larger enterprise. 
I want to make it clear (1) that this work was undertaken to show 
that the Court's decisions upholding personal rights secured by the 
Constitution - whether "right" or "wrong" doctrinally, or "good" or 
"bad" for society as a whole - have nonetheless enhanced the liberties 
of many individuals and produced substantial consequences, and (2) 
that, contrary to conventional social science precepts, I have occasion-
ally resolved certain doubts to make that point. Therefore, the effort 
may, at least in part, be fairly characterized as being not only method-
ologically deficient but tendentious as well. Nonetheless, the evidence, 
especially when viewed collectively, plainly suggests that the Justices' 
rulings in favor of individual rights have, at a minimum, unplugged 
serious blocks and made important contributions to social change 
meaningfully affecting the lives of many people. It therefore clearly 
points in a direction opposite to that implied by the broadly phrased 
pessimistic judgments expressed by the eminent critics above. 
II. SOME ILLUSTRATIONS PRIOR TO 1935 
A. The Post-Civil War Period 
As early as 1867, the Court's invalidation of post-Civil War federal 
and state loyalty oaths, which had prevented Confederate "sympathiz-
31. See J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 65-66. 
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ers" from acting as lawyers or ministers, 32 meaningfully furthered the 
cause of individual liberty. Although national oaths for federal office, 
employment, and jury duty persisted, within months of the Justices' 
rulings, "ex-rebel attorneys could practice in all the courts of the na-
tion."33 "The boon presented by the Court to dispossessed lawyers in 
the Garland case, was of inestimable benefit to Southerners of the legal 
fraternity . . . . [I]t made possible the financial recuperation of great 
numbers of former Confederates . . . ."34 Futhermore, several state 
courts (although not all) followed the Garland and Cummings man-
date to abrogate similar impediments to voting and teaching, thus free-
ing additional Southerners from the loyalty oaths' political and 
economic shackles. 35 
B. The ''Lochner" Era 
The decisions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in 
which a majority of the Justices acted under several clauses of the 
Constitution to preserve economic interests, also spoke in behalf of 
personal rights. Although these rulings benefited persons of property 
and affluent minorities rather than unpopular individuals and down-
trodden groups and, hence, may be disapproved by many under con-
temporary libertarian standards, the fact is that they served the ideal 
of limited democracy and secured interests that were originally re-
garded as fundamental. 36 Because the state of empirical methodology 
was nascent during the first third of this century when the Court re-
jected governmental attempts to regulate various economic relation-
ships on nearly two hundred occasions,37 "[t]here is no way of 
estimating reliably the restraining effect of this cloud of negativism on 
state legislators and congressmen who might otherwise have made 
haste more speedily along the road to the welfare state." And it may 
be "highly questionable" that this course of decisions was "a major 
factor in determining the drift of American economic policy during 
32. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866). 
33. H. HYMAN, ERA OF THE OATH, 115 (1954) (footnote omitted). 
34. Russ, The Lawyer's Test Oath During Reconstruction, 10 MISS. L.J. 154, 165 (1938). 
35. H. HYMAN, supra note 33, at 116-18. 
36. It is well known that one of Alexander Hamilton's primary concerns respecting judicial 
protection of personal liberties was that majority tyranny in state legislatures would subvert the 
vested rights of the creditor cl!15s. See Dietze, Hamilton's Federalist - Treatise for Free Govern-
ment, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 307, 310, 511 n.232 (1957). And, as viewed by Henry Maine, the 
Court's very early interpretations of the contracts clause proved to be "the bulwark of American 
individualism against democratic impatience and Socialist fantasy." H. MAINE, POPULAR Gov-
ERNMENT 248 (1886). 
37. See generally W. LocKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CASES - COMMENTS - QUESTIONS 433-41 (5th ed. 1980). 
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this period." Nonetheless, Robert McCloskey found "no doubt" that 
"the pace of social change was moderated"; that "a respectable 
number of 'excesses' were prevented"; that "a respectable amount of 
money was saved for the businessman"; and - underlining this Arti-
cle's attempt to avoid value judgments as to consequences - that "a 
good many laborers were left a little hungrier than they might have 
been if the Court had not been there to defend economic liberty."38 
III. THE HUGHES, STONE, AND VINSON COURTS 
Even in the period before the advent of the Warren Court, a host 
of decisions overruled government action that prejudiced racial, reli-
gious, and political minorities and rejected federal and state practices 
that disregarded critical rights of the accused. Again, rigorous empiri-
cal data measuring the effect of the Court's civil liberties rulings dur-
ing the quarter-century stewardship of Chief Justices Hughes, Stone, 
and Vinson is unavailable. Some of the specific results - such as for-
bidding Congress to withhold salaries of named federal employees 
whom it found to be "subversive,"39 prohibiting municipal officials 
from denying speaking permits in censorial fashion, 40 restricting 
judges from too easily holding critics of the judiciary in contempt,41 
barring conviction of controversial public advocates on too sweeping 
charges, 42 and protecting activities of persons with sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs no matter how aberrant or unbelievable43 - may have 
had no greater immediate force than the vindication of the personal 
constitutional rights of the particular litigants involved. But this con-
sequence in itself is by no means unimportant, wholly apart from the 
possible deterrence of other repressive state action. 44 In addition, 
there is sundry evidence - some factual, some inferential - cor-
roborating the broader effectiveness of a number of other decisions 
that may be gleaned from scattered sources. 
38. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 151 (1960). 
39. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
40. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
41. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
42. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
43. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
44. See note 30 supra. 
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A. Rights of the Accused 
1. Coerced Confessions. 
15 
In 1936, five years after the Wickersham Commission disclosed 
that police use of "physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to 
obtain involuntary confessions or admissions" was "widespread" in 
the United States,45 the Court for the first time held that state convic-
tions based on such confessions violated due process.46 No responsible 
person would contend that Brown v. Mississippi and its progeny have 
resulted in the complete eradication of all such crude conduct by law 
enforcement officers.47 And it may well be that the Justices' unani-
mous and consistent condemnation of bodily violence and explicit in-
timidation to obtain confessions has simply produced a shift in police 
tactics to more subtle techniques. Nonetheless, as reported by the 
Civil Rights Commission in 1961, "it is noteworthy that, with two 
exceptions [one concerning the use of a stomach pump48 and the other 
actually occurring before the Brown denunciation of the practice had 
time to be absorbed at the grass roots49] all Supreme Court confession 
cases since 1942 have involved psychological coercion alone."50 And, 
in a more recent survey of prosecutors, defense attorneys, police mag-
istrates, and trial judges, "it was generally agreed that [the Court's] 
decisions were instrumental in directing critical public attention to the 
more extreme forms of 'third degree' methods of interrogation, long 
practiced but previously taken for granted in this country."51 
2. Appointed Counsel 
a. Federal prosecutions. Prior to 1938, it was "common practice" 
in the federal district courts not to assign counsel to indigent criminal 
defendants who wished to plead guilty; and, even when the accused 
asserted his innocence and went to trial, "some district courts did not 
appoint counsel for a defendant who appeared without an attorney, 
unless the defendant affirmatively and expressly requested that a law-
45. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, No. 11, at 4 (1931). 
46. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 
(1897), the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination barred the 
use of involuntary confessions in federal courts. 
47. See Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th 
Cir. 1977) (allegations of police brutality). 
48. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (actually not a confession case but one involv-
ing a search for tangible evidence). 
49. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (confession obtained a month after Brown decision). 
50. U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BOOK 5: JUSTICE 17 (1961) (footnotes omitted). 
51. 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 15 (1973). 
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yer be designated to represent him."s2 Both of these conditions were 
remedied for all federal criminal prosecutions by Johnson v. ZerbstS3 
and Walker v. Johnstons4 in which the Court required counsel to be 
assigned to all indigent federal defendants who plead guilty or go to 
trial unless this sixth amendment right is intelligently and competently 
waived.ss 
The significance of these safeguards for the accused, both quantita-
tively and qualitatively, is especially obvious for those indigent defen-
dants who go to trial in federal court where criminal cases tend to be 
more complex than in the state systems. Quantitatively, in 1977, for 
example, more than eighty percent of the 53,000 federal criminal de-
fendants were represented by appointed counsel.s6 Qualitatively, at-
torney representation is especially important in a system in which a 
large number of cases are plea bargaineds7 because unrepresented de-
fendants are seriously disadvantaged in that setting because of their 
lack of knowledge of the history and details of the negotiating and 
sentencing process in their judicial districts and of the practice of in-
formal discovery that is utilized routinely by prosecutors and defense 
lawyers.ss 
b. State prosecutions. In 1942, when the Court decided Betts v. 
Brady, s9 the laws of Maryland and Texas flatly forbade the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants in noncapital cases 
and dicta by the highest courts in Alabama and Mississippi strongly 
suggested that the same situation existed there; in nine additional 
states, the matter was unclear. 60 Whatever the deficiencies of the Betts 
doctrine, at a minimum it did assure that a greater number of poor 
52. Holtzolf, The Right of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 1, 8 
(1944). 
53. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
54. 312 U.S. 275 (1941). 
55. In 1945, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codified this mandate and further stip-
ulated that defendants be specifically advised of their right to the assistance of a lawyer. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 44(a). 
56. National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 72 (1979) 
(43,178 defendants represented by appointed counsel); National Criminal Justice Information 
and Statistics Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 458 (1982) (total of 53,188 criminal defendants). 
57. Approximately "90 percent of all felony criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas 
and ... the vast majority of these are the result of some form of plea-bargain." Rossman, 
McDonald & Cramer, Some Patterns and Determinants of Plea Bargaining Decisions, in PLEA 
BARGAINING 77 (W. McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980). 
58. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1206-314 
(1975). 
59. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
60. 316 U.S. app., at 480. 
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persons charged with serious crimes in at least some of these thirteen 
states would be afforded a lawyer.61 In addition, over the succeeding 
two decades, the number of states making assignment of counsel 
mandatory in all felony cases if requested by the defendant increased 
from thirty-five to forty-five. 62 Although there is no way to prove that 
the Court's ruling was the cause, it is wholly reasonable to infer that it 
was a substantial contributing factor. 
B. Free Speech: Labor Picketing 
In the last few years of the 1930's, a number of states and munici-
palities, responding to toughened antilabor sentiments, adopted a se-
ries of new laws against peaceful picketing and other forms of 
advertisement and communication in respect to labor controversies. 
The adverse impact of these laws on the labor movement was mark-
edly reduced by the Court's holdings in Thornhill v. Alabama, 63 Carl-
son v. California, 64 and AFL v. Swing, 65 which brought peaceful 
picketing under the protective umbrella of the first amendment and 
limited employers' ability to enjoin such activity. Whether these judi-
cial pronouncements really constituted the "Magna Charta of Labor" 
(as they were often heralded at the time) or whether they were "of 
even greater value than the enactment by legislatures of state Norris-
LaGuardia acts"66 (as the counsel to the American Federation of La-
bor then believed) is highly speculative. We do know that the Court 
hastened to qualify the broadest reaches of the newly articulated doc-
trines67 and that subsequent judicial development proceeded under the 
head of federal preemption rather than free speech. 68 However, the 
fact remains that many state and lower federal courts followed the 
61. A survey of 139 reported state court decisions applying the Betts "special circumstances" 
rule as of 1962 revealed that counsel was ordered in only 11 of the cases although a number of 
others appeared clearly to qualify. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union at 8-11, 50 (app. 
III), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). No systematic study, however, was made of 
the number of trial court appointments of counsel in those states that did not require automatic 
assignment in all felony prosecutions. 
62. Brief for Petitioner at 30, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
63. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
64. 310 U.S. 321 (1940). 
65. 312 U.S. 321 (1941). 
66. Padway, History in the Making, 48 AM. FEDERALIST, Apr. 1941, at 22. 
67. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local No. 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Hotel & 
Restaurant Employees' Intl. Alliance Local No. 122 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 
315 U.S. 437 (1942); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 
315 U.S. 740 (1942); Carpenters & Joiners Union Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315. U.S. 722 
(1942). 
68. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Youngdahl v. 
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 
(1953). 
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lead of the celebrated rulings to invalidate various prohibitions on 
peaceful picketing69 and that labor's legal spokesmen were convinced 
that "[c]omplete familiarity with them [was] as important to labor as 
tools to the craftsman. "70 
C. Religious Freedom: Jehovah's Witnesses 
During the 1930's, the young religious sect known as the Jehovah's 
Witnesses generated widespread public hostility. The most formidable 
legal barriers to its practice of engaging in door-to-door canvassing on 
Sundays - which resulted in a wave of arrests - were local ordi-
nances that forbade peddling without a permit (submission to which 
the Witnesses believed to be an insult to the Almighty) and barred 
leaflet distribution on the public streets. 71 These impediments to the 
Witnesses' exercise of their religion were greatly ameliorated by a se-
ries of Supreme Court rulings commencing in 1938.72 Although it un-
doubtedly would be an oversimplification to attribute the subsequent 
decline in the group's conflicts with local police officials - and the 
dramatic increase in its American membership73 - exclusively to 
these decrees, it appears that, as stated by one of the sect's leading 
chroniclers, "[t]he Lovell and Schneider decisions . . . put the anti-
Witness forces once and for all on the defensive."74 
The Jehovah's Witnesses' most serious clash with the established 
order was over the flag salute. By one count, as of 1940, Jehovah's 
Witness children who refused to salute the flag because of their reli-
gious beliefs were faced with actual or impending expulsion "in at 
least thirty-one states. According to Witness sources, expulsions took 
place in all forty-eight states and totaled more than 2,000 by 1943."75 
Furthermore, in some states, "there were attempts to have the chil-
dren declared delinquent or dependent and removed from their par-
ents. Prosecutions were brought against parents for school law 
violation or for contributing to the delinquency of their offspring, or 
for 'obstructing' the ceremony."76 This grave threat to the faith's sur-
69. See Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REV. 180, 185-90 (1942). 
70. Padway, Shackling Labor by Legislation, 41 AM. FEDERALIST, Aug. 1940, at 10. 
71. See D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 26-
28 (1962). 
72. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
73. D. MANWARING, supra note 71, at 20. Membership increased from about 28,000 in 1938 
to over 72,000 in 1943. By 1955, membership had grown to 187,000. 
74. Id. at 28. 
75. Id. at 187. 
76. Id. at 190. 
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vival was held unconstitutional by the Court in 1943.77 Although 
"[a]ttempts to enforce the [flag] salute requirement did not die out 
altogether immediately after Barnette, " 78 on the whole - owing in 
no small measure to a vigorous offensive by the Department of Justice 
(as well as to a weakened public enmity toward the witnesses)79 -
state and local compliance with the Barnette ruling was immediate and 
substantial . . .. [T]he dearth of Witness complaints to the Justice De-
partment about flag-salute expulsions, together with the almost total ab-
sence of new litigation, strongly suggests that Witness children were 
being readmitted to school in most localities without incident. so 
D. Company Towns 
In 1922, it was estimated that over 300,000 soft-coal miners were 
deprived of "institutions of civil liberty that characterize the ordinary 
American urban center," because they resided in "company towns" in 
which "[p]eaceful and lawful attempts to exercise the right of public 
assembly are often violently opposed" and "[h]ouses are searched 
without warrants or with false warrants for lawful literature . . . and 
men are discharged for circulating such literature." And six years ear-
lier, a national commission had found such communities not only in 
the mining areas but in the lumbering, turpentine and plantation types 
of agriculture industries as well. Furthermore, "striking examples ex-
isted also in manufacturing, particularly in textiles and steel."81 
There appears to be no hard data demonstrating that the complete 
or nearly complete elimination of these conditions was a result of the 
1946 ruling in Marsh v. Alabama, 82 which imposed fourteenth amend-
ment responsibilities on company towns. But, because of the virtual 
disappearance of the issue after that time, it is fair to infer that the 
Court's influence - as well as that of strengthened unions and the 
Wagner Act - was of real consequence. 
E. Racial Discrimination 
1. Voting 
As of 1932, the problem of disenfranchisement of black citizens 
77. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville 
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
78. D. MANWARING, supra note 71, at 242. 
79. Id. at 250. 
80. Id. at 242. 
81. Bowden, Freedom for Wage Earners, 200 ANNALS 185, 188-89 (1938). 
82. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
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was largely confined to twelve southern states. 83 In that year, fewer 
than 100,000 blacks voted in general elections in these states, and vir-
tually no blacks were permitted to vote in the primaries. 84 No more 
than 2.5% of voting-age blacks in the deep south cast ballots in the 
presidential election of 1940. 85 Although literacy tests and poll taxes 
were significant contributing factors, the most formidable barrier was 
the "white primary" whose proscription by the Court in 1944,86 ac-
cording to V.O. Key, "precipitated a crisis in southern politics."87 
Within four years of Smith v. Al/wright, it was reported that "remarka-
ble changes have taken place both in the practical voting arrangements 
and in the viewpoints of many people within the South, and, as a re-
sult, large numbers of Negroes were admitted to the Democratic 
primaries of 1944 and 1946."88 Blacks were also appointed poll tax 
deputies and precinct chairmen, 89 and voter registration of blacks was 
heavy.90 
There is no disputing that it was only aggressive congressional and 
executive enforcement, culminating in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
that finally fulfilled the :fifteenth amendment's promise. But the fact is 
that, within three years of the outlawing of the white primary, the 
number of registered black voters in the twelve southern states had 
83. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 
84. U.S. CoMMN. ON ClvIL RIGHTS, BooK 1: VOTING 21 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 
VOTING]. 
85. R KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 218 (1975). 
86. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
87. V. KEY, SOUTHERN PoLmCS IN STATE AND NATION 619 (1949). Despite manifold 
efforts of varying success to negate the decision's mandate in a number of states, those "around 
the rim of the Deep South accepted the new order more or less as a matter of course." Id. at 625. 
88. Weeks, The White Primary: 1944-1948, 42 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 500 (1948). For exam-
ple, in Texas, "since 1944, Negroes have been paying their poll taxes in greater numbers and have 
been admitted to Democratic primaries more or less freely in many counties." Id. at 503. In 
1946, "[f]or the first time, Negro delegates were selected to county Democratic conventions in 
Dallas, Travis (Austin), and Harris (Houston) counties." Strong, The Rise of Negro Voting in 
Texas, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 510, 512 (1948). 
89. Negro poll tax deputies were appointed by the county tax collector's office in Dallas, 
Tarrant (Fort Worth), Harris, and Travis Counties. Dallas had no fewer than 28 Negroes 
deputized to collect poll taxes, Houston 18. Finally, some Negro Democratic precinct 
chairmen turned up in colored precincts of the big cities - three in Dallas, five in Houston, 
two in Galveston, and one in Port Arthur. 
Strong, supra note 88, at 512. 
90. In Arkansas, "[r]egistration of Negroes for 1946 was reported as heavy, although at-
tempts were made, it is alleged, to dissuade many from voting." Weeks, supra note 88, at 505. 
Even in Georgia, where there was extensive opposition to implementation, "[t]he state Demo-
cratic executive committee let down the bars for the primary of 1946, and nearly 125,000 Ne-
groes were registered (100,000 are supposed to have voted)"; the black vote "helped elect a 
congresswoman from the fifth Congressional district whose opponent had declared for 'white 
supremacy.' " Id. at 506. 
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risen to 645,000 and by 1952 this figure exceeded one million.91 "The 
most important change," observed the Civil Rights Commission, "was 
the virtual elimination of 'white primaries' in 1944."92 
2. Housing 
In the first years following World War II, just before the Court's 
1948 ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer93 - holding that judicial enforce-
ment of racially restrictive covenants was unconstitutional - large 
numbers of black citizens throughout the nation "who had money to 
rent, buy, or build superior housing to live at a standard equal to their 
income"94 "were ready and willing, but unable, to move to new 
homes."95 Although plainly not the exclusive mechanism,96 the cove-
nant - widespread from east to west97 and almost universally en-
forced by the courts98 - had become a major weapon for the 
perpetuation of racial separation in urban residential areas,99 espe-
cially since 1917 when the Court had invalidated official racial segre-
gation housing ordinances.100 When many blacks, assured by the 
NAACP of legal support, purchased homes despite the covenants, "at 
least a hundred injunctions to evict Negroes and dissolve their titles 
were brought by Caucasians."101 
Of course, the Justices' edict in Shelley did not eliminate all devices 
to maintain housing segregation. In particular, "white property own-
ers in all parts of the country received the co[ o ]peration of real-estate 
91. VOTING, supra note 84, at 22. 
92. Id. at 21. 
93. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
94. Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 W. REs. L. REV. 101, 116 (1955). 
95. Id. at 104-05. 
96. See, e.g., G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 619 (1944); c. VOSE, CAUCASIANS 
ONLY 77, 100-07 (1959). 
97. Covenants existed in such cities as Columbus, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, St. Louis 
and Washington. C. VosE, supra note 96, at 155. 
98. C. VOSE, supra note 96, at 1-29. 
99. For example, a 1944 study found that in St. Louis, "559 block areas, or 5 1/2 square 
miles ofland space and housing, were withdrawn from the use of Negroes through the operation 
of restrictive covenants and agreements. More than 11 square miles were covered in Chicago." 
Id. at 9 (citing H. LONG & c. JOHNSON, PEOPLE vs. PROPERTY: RACE REsTRICTED CovE-
NANTS IN HOUSING 32 (1947)). 
100. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
101. Vose, supra note 94, at 105. Thus, it was reported in 1946 that 
more than twenty covenant suits, probably affecting a hundred Negro families, have been 
entered in Los Angeles alone. Chicago had about sixteen such suits pending at the end of 
1945, which affected about fifty Negro families. A dozen or more have been instituted in 
Washington, D.C., several in St. Louis and Detroit, and others in scattered cities in the 
North. 
F. MURRAY, THE NEGRO HANDBOOK 33 (1946-1947). 
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boards in keeping Negroes from buying homes in residential areas tra-
ditionally reserved for whites."102 But within three years of the deci-
sion, a United Press survey showed that "[t]housands of Negro 
families have moved into white residential neighborhoods across the 
country since the Supreme Court cracked down on anti-Negro hous-
ing restrictions in 1948."103 For example, "[i]n Chicago, it was esti-
mated by the local Commission on Human Relations that within four 
years of the Shelley decision, 21,000 colored families purchased or 
rented homes in areas formerly barred to them."104 Although no study 
has been found revealing the long-range integrative impact in these 
areas, there is no doubting the consequences of improved living condi-
tions for many racial minorities. Finally, even those blacks who would 
have managed to evade restrictive covenants by using a "straw man" 
white broker in the transaction reportedly "saved millions of dollars 
by the Supreme Court's ruling" - "probably as much as $2,000 per 
house on the average" 105 - by eliminating a dual brokerage 
commission. 
3. Education 
Commencing with its decision in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada 106 in 1938 and ending with Sweatt v. Painter1°1 and McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma State Regents108 in 1950, the Court put teeth into the 
separate but equal doctrine in respect to public education by ordering 
black students to be admitted to state graduate and professional 
schools when no comparable segregated facilities existed. The re-
sponse of the southern states was twofold - integration and parity. 
First, by the fall of 1950, in compliance with the Justices' man-
dates, eleven states with segregation laws "lowered the racial bar in 
professional and graduate schools." It was reported "that 1,000 or 
more Negroes were attending classes with white students in the 17 Jim 
Crow states."109 Second, and more consequential, in order "to remedy 
102. C. VOSE, supra note 96, at 223. 
103. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1951, at 19, col. 8. 
104. R. KLUGER, supra note 85, at 255 (1975). Similar information came from such cities as 
Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and St. Louis, C. VosE,supra note 96, at 227, 
and in the District of COiumbia, "[a]ccording to the 1950 census, of the 3,887 residential blocks 
... non-white accommodations had spread into 459 more than in 1940." R. KLUGER, supra, at 
255. 
105. N.Y. Times, supra note 103. 
106. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
107. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
108. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
109. Konvitz, The Courts Deal a Blow to Segregation, 11 COMMENTARY 158, 162 (1951). 
Thus the University of Oklahoma enrolled 60 Negroes; the University of Texas, 21; the 
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a hundred years of neglect" - as Governor James E. Byrnes of South 
Carolina frankly confessed110 - and concededly to ward off the 
threatened demise of the· school segregation principle altogether lest 
the Court "take matters out of the state's hands,"111 the states of the 
deep south engaged in "frenzied spending campaigns and gigantic ef-
forts ... to equalize the educational opportunities of white and Negro 
pupils."112 A modest illustration is found in the record of the Sweatt 
case itself: Texas opened its School of Law of the Texas State Univer-
sity for Negroes only after the trial court had held that the state must 
supply substantially equal facilities. More dramati9 examples were 
South Carolina's $75 million school bond effort, 113 Virginia's $60 mil-
lion "Battle Fund,"114 Mississippi's $46 million school "overhaul" 
program, us and Georgia's $30 million "equalization" plan.116 But 
probably the best evidence of the impact of these decisions on civil 
rights lies in the statistics compiled in the Biennial Survey of Educa-
tion in the United States which quantify the extraordinary increases in 
expenditures for the education of blacks in the South, both in terms of 
expenditure per pupil and average teachers' salaries.117 
University of Arkansas, 12; the University of Kentucky, 15; the University of Missouri, 9; 
the University of Virginia, 3. The University of Louisville admitted 18 Negroes ...• [Two 
hundred] Negro students were engaged in graduate and professional studies at the Univer-
sity of Arkansas; the University of Kansas City had 54. 
Other sources disclosed the attendance of blacks in state universities in Tennessee, Co=ent, 
Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of the Laws - Segregation of Negroes in Public Schools, 
24 s. CAL. L. REV. 74, 82 (1950), and Louisiana, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Sept. 3, 1954, at 
13, col.I. 
110. See Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE 
CoNSTITUTION 243, 256 (J. Garraty ed. 1964). 
111. Id. at 256. 
112. R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 139 (1960). 
113. See Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 531 (E.D.S.C. 1951). 
114. See ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME CoURT IN BROWN v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 at 83, 89 (L. Friedman ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as 
ARGUMENT]. The "Battle Fund" was named coincidentally after the incumbent governor . 
. 115. See Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools - 1953, 61 HARV. L. REv. 377, 
421 n.144 (1954). 
116. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1951, at 58, col. 3. 
117. The statistics are as follows: 
COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURES FOR THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS AND WHITES 
Expenditure per Pupil 
Average Teachers' Salaries 
Black as a Black as a 
Black/White percentage Black/White percentage 
of white of white 
State 1945-46° 1953-54b 1945-46 1953-54 1945-46a 1953-54b 1945-46 1953-54 
884/ 2681/ 
Alabama 38/85 105/112 45% 94% 1451 2834 - 61% 95% 
711/ 2008/ 
Arkansas 35/74 72/99 47 73 1163 2360 61 85 
1278/ 3613/ 
Florida 62/135 161/176 46 91 1862 3836 69 94 
651/ 2444/ 
Georgia 31/83 115/19CJC 37 61d 1279 2649C 51 92d 
948/ 2864/ 
Louisiana 44/136 122/165 32 74 1797 3248C 53 88d 
427/ 1302/ 
Mississippi 15/75 43/98 20 44 1165 2261 37 58 
a. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, BIENNIAL SURVEY OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1944-46, ch. 1, at 29 (1950). 
b. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, BIENNIAL SURVEY OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1952-54, ch. 2, at 
114 (1950). 
c. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, BIENNIAL SURVEY OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1950-52, ch. 2, at 97 
(1953) (Figures for 1951-52). 
d. Calculated for 1951-52. 
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IV. THE WARREN COURT 
A. Racial Separation 
1. Segregation 
25 
The subject of official hostility against the nation's black and eth-
nic minorities provides the most direct bridge to the period between 
1953 and 1969. It plainly fell to the Warren Court ultimately to fulfill 
the promise of the equal protection clause by repudiating racial segre-
gation in 1954 for, at least until then, the national and state political 
organs remained silent. As Justice Jackson remarked during oral ar-
gument in the Virginia and South Carolina suits, "I suppose that real-
istically the reason this case is here was that action couldn't be 
obtained from Congress."118 
The pervasiveness of the American system of apartheid may be il-
lustrated by the fact that 
In May of 1951, the state of Texas did not allow interracial boxing 
matches. 
Florida did not permit white and black students to use the same edi-
tions of some textbooks. 
In Arkansas, white and black voters could not enter a polling place 
in the company of one another. 
In Alabama, a white woman was forbidden to nurse a black man in a 
hospital. 
North Carolina required racially separate washrooms in its factories. 
South Carolina required them in its cotton mills. Four states required 
them in their mines. 
In six states, white and black prisoners could not be chained 
together. 
In seven states, tuberculosis patients were separated by race. 
In eight states, parks, playgrounds, bathing and fishing and boating 
facilities, amusement parks, racetracks, pool halls, circuses, theaters, and 
public halls were all segregated. 
Ten states required separate waiting rooms for bus and train 
travelers. 
Eleven states required Negro passengers to ride in the backs of buses 
and streetcars. Eleven states operated separate schools for the blind. 
Fourteen states segregated railroad passengers on trips within their 
borders. Fourteen states segregated mental patients. 
And in May of 1951 seventeen states required the segregation of pub-
lic schools, four other states permitted the practice if local communities 
wished it, and in the District of Columbia the custom had prevailed for 
118. ARGUMENT, supra note 114, at 244. Indeed, two years after Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), less than half the populace approved of black children attending the same 
schools as whites. See J. CASPER, THE PoLmcs OF ClvIL LIBERTIES 169 (1972). 
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nearly ninety years.119 
Statistical evidence disclosed that, by the end of the decade follow-
ing the Justices' decree in Brown v. Board of Education, 120 more than 
half the black pupils enrolled in the border jurisdictions - Delaware, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia - attended integrated schools. 121 Although 
wide-scale implementation of Brown's ban on legally imposed school 
segregation was accomplished only after the political branches af-
forded coercive support in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was the 
Court's mandate that provided the indispensable impetus. Of course, 
the story of school desegregation still remains unfinished, particularly 
in respect to the extremely controversial issue of busing, the effective-
ness of which has been judged by various observers as ranging from 
significant success to dismal failure. 122 Moreover, even if in the long 
run, socio-economic facts and politico-psychological attitudes render 
"the nationalizing, egalitarian, assimilationist conception of the public 
schools' mission~' 123 to be either unattainable or unwanted, as of the 
early 1980's the facts remain that "white opposition to integrated 
schools has dropped considerably; . . . black drop-out rates . . . have 
fallen; and the proportion of black youngsters attending college has 
risen tremendously."124 In sum, there is no demeaning the signifi-
cance for individual liberty - both pragmatically and symbolically -
of the elimination of enforced racial separation in schools and all other 
public facilities. 
More important, however, it must be acknowledged that the over-
all consequences of the Court's historic ruling and its major contribu-
tion to the advancement of racial justice in the United States radiated 
far beyond the cold statistics in southern schoolhouses. Although a 
congeries of complex factors contributed to the civil rights upheaval in 
the 1960's,125 in the words of Anthony Lewis, Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation was the "catalyst" for "the revolution in American race rela-
tions," creating 
a climate that encouraged the Negro to protest against segregation on 
buses, to demand coffee at a lunch counter, to stand in long, patient lines 
119. R. Kl.UGER, supra note 85, at 327. 
120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
121. See U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC EDUCATION 292 (1964). 
122. See Daniels, In Defense of Busing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. 
123. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 137 (1970). 
124. Rustin, Integration and Education: 25 Year.s After Brown, 23 How. L.J. 89, 91-92 
(1980). 
125. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411, 468-69 
(1973). 
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waiting to take a biased test for the right to vote. . . . It took the drama 
of school desegregation, and then of the protest movements, to make the 
possibility of freedom come alive . . . . 126 
Robert Carter similarly found that in Brown, 
the psychological dimensions of America's race relations problem were 
completely recast. ... As a result, the Negro was propelled into a 
stance of insistent militancy. Now he was demanding - fighting to se-
cure and possess what was rightfully his. The appeal to morality and to 
conscience still was valid, of course, but in a nation that was wont to 
describe itself as a society ruled by law, blacks had now perhaps the 
country's most formidable claim to fulfillment of their age-old dream of 
equal status - fulfillment of their desire to become full and equal par-
ticipants in the mainstream of American life.127 
Furthermore, the "social upheaval" fathered by this judicial doc-
trine128 provided the political branches of national government with 
both the moral courage and intellectual bases for combating discrimi-
nation in voting and opening employment opportunities for 
minorities.129 
Black leaders from all walks of life have attested that Brown 
sparked an eruption of emotion and energy in the "hearts and minds" 
of black Americans, young and old, "in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done." 130 Louis Lomax explained that "[i]t would be impossible for a 
white person to understand what happened within black breasts on 
that Monday .... That was the day we won; the day we took the 
white man's laws and won our case before an all-white Supreme Court 
with a Negro lawyer .... And we were proud."131 Richard K.luger 
observed that 
[e]very colored American knew that Brown did not mean he would be 
invited to lunch with the Rotary the following week. It meant some-
thing more basic and more important. It meant that black rights had 
suddenly been redefined; black bodies had suddenly been reborn under a 
new law. Blacks' value as human beings had been changed overnight by 
126. A. LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE 5, 8-9 (1964). Indeed, Kenneth Karst has observed 
that the Justices' desegregation rulings not only "forever alter[ed] the substance and the tone of 
race relations in this country; they made us question the validity of all sorts of systems of domi-
nance and dependency," thus "set[ting] in motion forces (moral and political) that fostered other 
'liberation' movements." Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
91 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 21 (1977); see also Glickstein, The Impact a/Brown v. Board of Education 
and its Progeny, 23 How. L.J. 51, 53 (1980) ("The movement to secure the rights of black Amer-
icans has fostered concern for the rights of women, Indians, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, various 
other ethnic groups, the mentally and physically handicapped, prisoners, children, the aged and 
those with special sexual preferences."). 
127. Carter, The Wa"en Court and Desegregation, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 237, 247 (1968). 
128. Id. at 246. 
129. See Glickstein, supra note 126, at 51-52. 
130. The phrases come from Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
131. L. LoMAX, THE NEGRO REVOLT 73-74 (1962). 
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the declaration of the nation's highest court. At a stroke, the Justices 
had severed the remaining cords of de facto slavery. The Negro could no 
longer be fastened with the status of official pariah. No longer could the 
white man look right through him as if he were, in the title words of 
Ralph Ellison's stunning 1952 Novel, Invisible Man. No more would he 
be a grinning supplicant for the benefactions and discards of the master 
class; no more would he be a party to his own degradation. He was both 
thrilled that the signal for the demise of his caste status had come from 
on high and angry that it had taken so long and first exacted so steep a 
price in suffering.132 
2. Miscegenation 
One of the later of the Warren Court's major interventions in favor 
of individual rights uprooted one of the most passionately held barri-
ers to full racial freedom. Fifteen years prior to the Justices' 1967 
ruling in Loving v. Virginia, 133 which held that laws forbidding interra-
cial marriage violated equal protection, twenty-nine states had such 
statutory provisions.134 Between 1953 and 1967, thirteen of these 
states repealed their antimiscegenation laws, 135 galvanized in part by a 
constitutional decision of the California Supreme Court136 and in part 
by the success of the revolutionary movement toward racial equality 
engendered by the School Segregation Cases. 131 Still, as late as 1967, 
the statutes of sixteen states continued to prohibit miscegenous 
marriages.13s 
132. R. Kl.UGER, supra note 85, at 749. In the opening paragraphs of "Soul on Ice," El-
dridge Cleaver wrote from Folsom Prison: 
Nineteen fifty-four, when I was eighteen years old, is held to be a crucial turning point in the 
history of the Afro-American - for the U.S.A. as a whole - the year segregation was 
outlawed by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was also a crucial year for me because on June 18, 
1954, I began serving a sentence in state prison for possession of marijuana. 
The Supreme Court decision was only one month old when I entered prison, and I do 
not believe that I had even the vaguest idea of its importance or historical significance. But 
later, the acrimonious controversy ignited by the end of the separate-but-equal doctrine was 
to have a profound effect on me. This controversy awakened me to my position in America 
and I began to form a concept of what it meant to be black in white America. 
E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 3 (1968). 
133. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
134. See Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. 
L.J. 49, 50 (1964). 
135. The repealing states were Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming. 388 U.S. at 6 n.5; 
Applebaum, supra note 134, at 50 n.12; Note, Miscegenation: An Example of Judicial Recidi-
vism, 8 J. FAM. L. 69, 70 (1968). 
136. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). 
137. See Applebaum, supra note 134, at 50. See generally Zabel, Interracial Marriage and 
the Law, TuE An. MONTHLY, Oct. 1965, at 75 (discussing the origins and extent of antimis-
cegenation statutes and the prospects of the then up-and-coming Loving case). 
138. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Vir-
ginia. 388 U.S. at 6 n.5. 
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The consequences of these laws were not inconsiderable. Ordina-
rily, the laws applied not only to marriages consummated within the 
prohibiting state but also to persons of different races who married 
outside such states and subsequently came to live in the state with an 
antimiscegenation law.139 In some states where such unions were ille-
gal, violation subjected the parties to prosecution for a felony. 140 Pen-
alties ranged from thirty days (where the offense was only a 
misdemeanor) up to five-to-ten years.141 In the 1940's, prison terms 
were not infrequently imposed.142 
The antimiscegenation laws also produced serious noncriminal 
ramifications. Because the statutes made interracial marriages void, 
all offspring were considered illegitimate. Children and surviving 
spouses were denied the right to intestate inheritance, to take property 
under a will, to be granted letters of administration, and to receive 
worker's compensation benefits.143 In the late l 950's, black servicemen 
who had married white women while on European tours of duty, on 
return to the United States, were transferred from their military units 
when their divisions were stationed in jurisdictions that barred racially 
mixed unions.144 
These varied disabilities of antimiscegenation laws - all with "the 
ultimate aim of preventing interracial couples from having any legal 
peace of mind"145 - were removed by the Loving decision. The exact 
number of persons that Loving directly affected is incalculable. How-
ever a 1956 survey, which indicated that in states where mixed mar-
riages were lawful perhaps five percent of blacks had spouses of a 
139. 388 U.S. at 2-3; see Applebaum, supra note 134, at 55-56. 
140. Applebaum, supra note 134, at 53 n.41. Many of the statutes also made it a crime for 
any person to perform a marriage ceremony for an interracial couple or to issue a marriage 
license to them. Id. at 54. The effect of this prohibition was confirmed by a widely publicized 
incident in 1958 when county clerks in Nevada rebuffed longshoreman leader Harry Bridges 
three times after he applied for permission to marry a Japanese-American woman. See Mixed 
Marriages - And an Exception, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 1958, at 20. 
141. Applebaum, supra note 134, at 53. 
142. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 224 N.C. 183, 29 S.E.2d 744 (1944) (length of sentence not 
stated); Till Law Us Do Part, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1948, at 25 (six-month sentence in Virginia). 
In 1959, the principals in the Laving case "were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial 
judge suspended the sentence for a period of25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the 
State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years." 388 U.S. at 3. 
143. See cases and authorities cited in Applebaum, supra note 134, at 54-55; Note, supra note 
135, at 71-72. Indeed, as recently as 1965, even after the Court had invalidated laws that im-
posed special penalties for interracial cohabitation, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), 
the United States Comptroller General's office refused military death benefits to the black widow 
of a deceased white soldier because they had wed in a state forbidding rniscegenous marriages. 
See Seidelson, Miscegenation Statutes and the Supreme Court, 15 CATH. U. L. REv. 156, 156-57 
(1966). 
144. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 11, 1957, at 110. 
145. Note, supra note 135, at 72. 
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different race, 146 suggests the breadth of Loving's impact on individual 
constitutional rights. 
B. Rights of the Accused 
1. Exclusionary Rule 
It was up to the Court to strike forcefully against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio 147 because the legisla-
tive process had not. Twelve years had passed since the Court in-
formed the states that they were bound by the fourth amendment, 148 
yet still more than half continued to admit into evidence the fruits of 
illegal searches and seizures.149 
The extent to which the exclusionary rule has deterred official mis-
conduct and thus secured the fourth amendment's promise of freedom 
is a matter of substantial debate. Some empirical surveys150 - the 
methodology of which has been sharply criticized151 - have simply 
concluded that Mapp's stricture is ineffective, thus supporting the view 
that the Court's efforts on behalf of individual liberty have been 
largely inconsequential. The most celebrated review, by Dallin Oaks, 
returns an inconclusive verdict: "The data contains little support for 
the proposition that the exclusionary rule discourages illegal searches 
and seizures, but it falls short of establishing that it does not."152 Per-
haps the only position that may be taken with confidence is that 
Mapp's "deterrent efficacy defies precise measurement."153 
146. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 7, 1963, at 63. 
147. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
148. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). 
149. 367 U.S. at 652 n.7. This should not be particularly surprising. Students of police 
behavior have observed that the law enforcement profession is extremely sensitive and commonly 
resistant to regulation from without, see J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 231-32 
(1968); Reiss & Bordua, Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police, in THE 
POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL EssAYS 25, 38-39 (D. Bordua ed. 1967), thus making legislative 
control, according to Anthony Amsterdam, a "politically suicidal undertaking." Amsterdam, 
Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 379 (1974). 
150. See, e.g., Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and 
Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). 
151. See Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 
62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 740 (1974). 
152. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 
667 (1970). Again, however, the underlying evidence has been challenged as being "insufficient 
and largely inappropriate." Canon, Is the Exlusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data 
and a Plea against Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 698 (1974). The nature of the re-
search enterprise generally - which seeks to measure that which cannot be directly observed -
has been said to be skewed against demonstrating the rule's achievements. Morris, The Exclu-
sionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 51 WASH. L. REV. 647, 653 
(1982). 
153. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule - Part L· Cur-
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To concede that the exclusionary rule falls short of curing the dis-
ease and that it produces the undesired side effect of preventing other-
wise justified criminal convictions,154 however, does not refute its 
prophylactic value - at least until a more effective antidote is discov-
ered.155 For, although the rule "does not produce police conformity 
with the requirements of law in all cases," it "does have a significant 
impact upon police practice in some situations."156 While "[t]he evi-
dence consists only of bits and pieces, . . . the fragments indicate it is 
a mistake to think that police behavior is never conditioned by the 
sanction of excluding evidence that might lead to conviction."157 
Many lawyers, judges, and law enforcement officials have expressed 
the opinion that Mapp has induced police departments into avoiding 
illegal searches.158 In an intensive study of the administration of crim-
rent Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 395 (1965). See generally D. 
HOROWITZ, THE CoURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 220-54 (1977). 
154. The extent to which the number of such lost convictions may be exaggerated is dis-
cussed in Kamisar, How We Got the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule and Why We Need It, 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1982, at 4, 11; Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's 
Defense, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1982, at 28, 29. But see U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REsEARCH REPORT, THE EFFECI'S OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A 
STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 18 (1982) ("[T)he exclusionary rule does appear to be an important fac-
tor in the processing of state felony cases."). 
155. See, e.g., Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978); Schroeder, Deterring 
The Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361 
(1981). 
156. W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 428 
(1965); see also Canon, supra note 151, at 403 ("Existing data at the present time make it impos-
sible to establish empirically a universal 'yes, it works' or a 'no, it doesn't work' conclu-
sion .•.• "). But see Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It Is a 
Dete"ent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979) ("[T)he available evidence doesn't even come 
close" to showing that the exclusionary rule is an effective deterrent.). 
157. D. HOROWITZ, supra note 153, at 230. For example, although the District of Columbia 
police had been conducting "random stops" of cars for license or registration checks in the ab-
sence of articulable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot, when the Court rejected 
the practice in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), 
"[t)he Chief of Police issued an immediate telex message to bis officers, advising them to 
desist from the practice" and then "incorporat[ed) the change in procedures in the Depart-
ment's General Orders, a set of regulations issued to each officer and with which each officer 
must be familiar." Moreover, even before the ultimate Supreme Court decision in Prouse, 
the Delaware State Police Legal Officer, in response to the trial court's invalidation of "ran-
dom stops," "had disseminated a memorandum to all troops and units within the State 
Police describing the decision, explaining the conduct it prohibited . . . advising that it did 
not affect the stops based on articulable suspicion," and "provid[ing] several examples of 
facts that could provide sufficient articulable suspicion for a stop." 
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than 
an "Empirical Proposition"?,. 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 660-61 (1983) (quoting Mertens & 
Wasserstrom, Foreword: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the 
Police and Derailing the Law, 10 GEO. L.J. 365, 400 (1981)). 
158. A substantial majority of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges surveyed in North 
Carolina agreed that "[e]xclusion of evidence is an effective way of reducing the number of illegal 
searches." Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North 
Carolina, 45 N.C. L. REv. 119, 134 (1966). Similar views were expressed by police officials, 
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inal justice in Oakland, Jerome Skolnick concluded that "the exclu-
sionary principle puts pressure on the police to work within the rules 
in those cases where prosecution is contemplated."159 
Further, at least in some areas, "[i]t is clear that the exclusionary 
rule has served as a stimulus to police training on the legal require-
ments of search and arrest."160 Thus, the New York City police com-
missioner could 
think of no decision in recent times in the field of law enforcement which 
had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as [Mapp] . ... Retraining 
sessions had to be held from the very top administrators down to each of 
the thousands of foot patrolmen and detectives engaged in the daily basic 
enforcement function. Hundreds of thousands of man-hours had to be 
devoted to retraining 27,000 men.161 
Early reports from several cities found that police use of search war-
rants increased enormously after the Mapp decision. 162 A recent ex-
tensive survey of police attitudes concerning the exclusionary rule 
found that it "probably had a significant effect on police behavior be-
public defenders, and judicial officers in small towns and rural areas of southern Illinois and 
western Massachusetts; "[i]n general, the judges saw the police departments as making fewer 
illegal searches, as operating more carefully in their work, and as educating the men of the de-
partments so that a situation won't arise where evidence will be suppressed.'' S. W ASBY, supra 
note 27, at 113-14; see also Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State 
and Federal Levels, 5 AM. PoLmcs Q. 57 (1977). 
159. J. SKOLNICK, JUSI1CE WITHOUT TRIAL 224 (1966). As the Attorney General of Mary-
land recently observed, many prosecutors - both state and federal - routinely review the quan-
tum of probable cause with police officers before a seizure is made because they "want the search 
to stand up in court.'' Sachs, supra note 154, at 30. Evidence gleaned from such cities as Balli· 
more, Boston, Buffalo, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington indi· 
cates "that to a considerable extent the rule is producing the impact that was intended.'' Canon, 
supra note 152, at 698; see also Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and 
"Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 171, 179-82 {1962). 
160. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule - Part IL· De· 
fining the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REv. 566, 594 (1965); see also S. WASBY, 
supra note 27, at 107-08. 
161. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem of Com-
pliance by Police Departments, 44 TEX. L. REV. 939, 941 (1966). Similarly, in the FBI training 
program, 
agents spend . . . thirty hours learning how to apply constitutional law principles to prac· 
tice arrest, searches, interrogations, and applications for search warrants. Each FBI field 
office has a legal advisor to keep field agents abreast of current changes in the law. 
All other new federal enforcement agents ••. [devote] a minimum of twenty-one hours 
to search and seizure law •••. 
Customs Department agents continue training for approximately five more weeks, 
spending ten to twelve hours on additional search and seizure problems with particular 
emphasis on those problems relating to customs agents, for example, border searches. The 
Drug Enforcement Administration emphasizes search and seizure law in an additional 
twenty-four hours and focuses on its particular need, airport searches. . . . 
In [Maryland], Mapp has been responsible for a virtual explosion in the amount and 
quantity of police training in the last twenty years. 
Sachs, supra note 154, at 31. 
162. See Murphy, supra note 161, at 941-42; Specter, Mapp v. Ohio, Pandora's Problems/or 
the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 4 (1962). 
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cause it seemed to 'mean business' as a matter of law as much as be-
cause of any deterrent sanction which it may have imposed."163 
At the very least, Mapp "provides a counterweight within the 
criminal justice system that prevents the system from functioning as 
an unmitigated inducement to policemen to violate the fourth amend-
ment on every occasion when there is criminal evidence to be gained 
by doing so."164 Regardless of whether or not the rule deters the po-
lice from violating the search and seizilre guarantee, its repeal "would 
positively encourage such unconstitutional activity."16S 
2. Equality for the Poor 
a. At trial. When Gideon v. Wainwright166 was decided in 1963, 
the number of states that provided counsel for all or virtually all indi-
gent felony defendants who so requested had increased from thirty-
five, at the time of Betts v. Brady, 161 to forty-five. 168 Thus, Gideon's 
greatest impact was felt by the destitute accused in only five states.169 
Indeed, even in those states, some cities and counties regularly as-
signed lawyers for the trial of poor persons who were charged with 
serious crimes.17° But this is not to suggest that Gideon was of only 
minor significance for individual rights. In Florida alone, in the first 
few months after the Justices' ruling, "1,000 prisoners were released 
because prosecutors could not or would not attempt to reprosecute. 
Of those 300 plus who were retried, most had their sentences re-
duced."171 Further, "to facilitate compliance with Gideon (and other 
subsequent implementing cases), legislatures and courts in twenty-six 
states took specific actions within twenty-four months to expand or 
improve their assigned counsel or public defender systems in varying 
degrees"172 - efforts that, as we shall see,113 provided lawyers for 
163. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. 
REV. 24, 30 (1980). 
164. Amsterdam, supra note 149, at 431. 
165. Johnson, New Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 4 (1978) (working pa-
per) (on file in the University of Michigan Law Library), quoted in Kamisar, supra note 157, at 
659 n.529 (emphasis in original). 
166. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
167. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
168. Brief for Petitioner at 29-30, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
169. Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. See Kamisar, The 
Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of 
an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1962). 
170. Id. at 20. 
171. S. WASBY, supra note 18, at 8. 
172. G. MITAU, DECADE OF DECISION 161 (1967). 
173. See text at notes 814-17 infra. 
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many accused indigent misdemeanants as well as persons charged with 
more grievous offenses. 
There is no denying the substantial difficulties that have arisen "be-
cause of inadequate financing of defense services and a lack of suffi-
cient qualified attorneys to handle the indigent caseload,"174 and that, 
at least in certain large cities in which assigned counsel systems func-
tion, some degree of assembly-line justice undoubtedly results, thus 
producing less than the Supreme Court's sixth amendment rulings ap-
pear to promise.175 Nonetheless, given the fact that, as of 1980, state 
and local governments were estimated to spend $30 million annually 
for defense services,176 from the perspective of the security of personal 
liberty, surely even this form oflegal representation is better than none 
at all. 
It well may be - as subsequent discussion will explore in detail177 
- that the most profound impact of the Gideon decision' came · 
through its catalytic force in changing the perception of both the bar 
and the laity as to the need for a lawyer's assistance at other stages and 
levels of the criminal justice process. More directly, however, its 
greatest immediate significance can be measured only when viewed in 
combination with the Court's rule established in Carnley v. Cochran 118 
- that "where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, 
the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request. . . . 
[Rather,] [t]he record must show . . . that an accused was offered 
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer."179 
As of the early 1960's, it appeared that in a majority of the forty-five 
states that mandated counsel for all indigent felony defendants, this 
right was afforded only "on request" of the accused. 180 It is uncertain 
whether this meant, as it did in at least some states,181 that the accused 
was always first advised of his rights; or whether the accused obtained 
174. Lefstein & Portman, Implementing the Right to Counsel in State Criminal Cases, 66 
A.B.A. J. 1084, 1086 (1980). 
175. See Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a 
Profession, 1 LAW & SocY. REv. June 1967, at 15. But see Skolnick, Social Control in the Adver-
sary System, 11 J. CoNFLICT REsoLVTION 52, 59-68 (1967). 
176. Lefstein & Portman, supra note 174, at 1087. 
177. See text at note 367 infra. 
178. 369 U.S. 506 (1962). 
179. 369 U.S. at 513, 516. Carnley enunciated this rule most emphatically, though it had 
earlier origins. See McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 
437 (1948); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
180. See AssN. OF N.Y.C. BAR & NATL. LEGAL AID AssN., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AC-
CUSED app., at 98-111 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL JUSTICE]; 365 U.S. app., at 119-22; 
Kamisar, supra note 169, at 14-21 (22 of 37 states); id. app. I, at 67-74 (3 of 8 states). 
181. See EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 180, at 49 (New Jersey). 
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counsel only if he solicited assistance on his own initiative. If the latter 
were true, as was found to be so in at least eight states, 182 then, irre-
spective of how broad the sixth amendment right might be, it is rea-
sonable to infer that a sizable percentage of those for whom the 
protection was intended would not receive it.183 The Court's stringent 
waiver rule in Carnley corrected this in respect to the right to counsel 
at trial. 
b. On appeal Prior to the Court's decisions in Griffin v. Illi-
nois184 and Douglas v. California, 185 the practice in each of the then 
forty-eight states respecting the rights of indigents to receive free tran-
scripts or appointed counsel on appeal of their criminal convictions 
was uncertain.186 But it was well-established that a large percentage of 
persons convicted of crime were indigent (estimates often exceeded 
fifty percent)187 and that a significant number of criminal convictions 
were reversed when appealed (statistics sometimes surpassed forty 
percent).188 
In 1955, counsel for petitioner in Griffin reported that nineteen 
states refused to provide free trial transcripts to indigents who sought 
to appeal their convictions of noncapital offenses.189 Shortly thereaf-
ter, a more detailed and comprehensive survey indicated that twenty-
one states did not afford free transcripts for noncapital felony ap-
peals.19o The more important finding of the latter study, however, was 
that within three years of the Griffin ruling more than two-thirds of 
these states appeared to have formally altered their procedures to re-
182. See Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the ''Successful" Criminal 
Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 n.5 (1965). 
183. This inference is confirmed by an empirical study of the operation of the Miranda rule 
which showed that, while almost two-thirds of arrestees who were informed of their right to 
counsel requested assistance, more than three-fourths of those who were not so advised failed to 
exercise the right. See Medalie, supra note 27, at 1371-72. 
184. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
185. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
186. In a number of states no statute addressed the subject. Even if there had been a consis-
tent pattern in each state and some persons had known of it, no empirical study systematically 
documented the law in action in every jurisdiction in the country. 
187. See, e.g., E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (1951); L. SILVER-
STEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE CoURTS 7-8 (1965); 
REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITIEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 134 (1963); Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate 
Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783 n.l (1961); Kadish & Kimball, Legal Representation of the 
Indigent in Criminal Cases in Utah, 4 UTAH L. REv. 198, 214 (1954). 
188. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 21-25, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
189. 351 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
190. D. Wilkes, Post-Conviction Constitutional Rights of Indigent Criminal Defendants: 
State Interpretation of Griffin v. Illinois, apps. I & II, at 1-20, 21-23, 26-28 (Inst. of Jud. Ad.) 
(July 1959). 
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move this severe obstacle to effective appellate review of many convic-
tions. Five years later no evidence existed of any deviation from 
Griffin.191 
As for counsel on appeal, in 1959 no more than fourteen states 
required the appointment of a lawyer for indigents on "the first appeal, 
granted as a matter of right ... from a criminal conviction."192 
Among the remainder, some states appointed appellate counsel for in-
digents only in capital cases; others left the matter to the discretion of 
the reviewing court, the trial judge, or the trial lawyer (if there was 
one); in yet others the practice varied from county to county. Even in 
the fourteen states that did regularly assign counsel, some limited the 
practice to felony cases and at least five193 formulated their rules only 
in response to their prescient reading of the Griffin rationale.194 How-
ever, an extensive nationwide audit conducted just a few months after 
Douglas found that "nearly all the sample counties had some system 
for providing counsel for appeals,"195 thus affording what few lawyers 
or laymen would dispute to be a normally indispensable ingredient for 
successful appellate review. 
3. Line-ups 
Before 1966, there was no comprehensive data regarding the extent 
to which the police afforded persons accused of crime the right to 
counsel or other procedural safeguards at pretrial identification pro-
ceedings. But "law enforcement officials of the Federal Government 
and of all 50 states . . . [had] proceeded on the premise that the Con-
stitution did not require the presence of counsel at pretrial confronta-
tions for identification" and "no court [had] announced such a 
requirement"196 prior to a Fifth Circuit ruling in that year,197 which 
the Supreme Court approved in United States v. Wade 198 and reaf-
firmed in Gilbert v. California. 199 Although "the Court quite obvi-
191. L. SILVERSrEIN, supra note 187, at 139. States that changed their position within three 
years included Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachu· 
setts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. 
192. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 356 (emphasis omitted). In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S 
600 (1974), the Court declined to extend the Douglas principle to discretionary state appeals or to 
applications for review in the United States Supreme Court. 
193. D. Wilkes, supra note 190, app. I, at 7 (Md.), 8 (Mass.), 15 (Or.), 16 (S.D.), 18 (Va.). 
194. Id. 
195. L. SILVERSrEIN, supra note 187, at 139. 
196. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967). 
197. Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966), vacated on other grounds, 388 U.S. 
218 (1967). 
198. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
199. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
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ously [did] not have before it any reliable, comprehensive survey of 
current police practices on which to base its new rule,"200 the array of 
unfairly suggestive police identification procedures sifted by the Court 
from reported state cases is striking201 and tends to confirm the view 
that "the influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses 
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other sin-
gle factor."202 
The response to the Wade-Gilbert dictate was impressive. A sur-
vey of forty-seven police departments across the country, carried out 
three years after the decisions, showed that all had promulgated regu-
lations governing the conduct of pretrial identification practices. 203 
Every police department in the study "indicated that if a suspect 
desires the presence of counsel at a lineup . . . but does rtot have his 
own attorney, there is an established procedure for providing the sus-
pect with counsel."204 Although the great majority of police regula-
tions limited the lawyer's role to that of an observer,205 some went 
beyond this minimum requirement of the Court's holding by allowing 
counsel to proffer suggestions concerning the conduct of the lineup 
and even to question witnesses. 206 · 
Wade and Gilbert, of course, do not complete the story of police 
identification practices. A survey of several metropolitan police de-
partments suggested that one result of the Wade and Gilbert decisions 
was the greater use of photographic displays instead of lineups,207 and 
in United States v. Ash, 208 the Court held that photographic displays, 
200. 388 U.S. at 252 (White, J., dissenting). 
201. 388 U.S. at 232-34. 
202. P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965); see also E. 
BORCHARD, CoNVICTING THE INNOCENT xiii, 1-6 (1932). 
203. Note, Protection of the Accused at Police Lineups, 6 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 345, 
347 n.7 (1970). In cities such as Buffalo, New Orleans, New York and Pittsburgh, police rules 
required that "[t]he subject shall be advised that he is going to be viewed by others for the 
purpose of establishing his identity . . . and . . . that he is entitled to have an attorney present 
during such proceeding ••.. " Id. at 360 (quoting N.Y. Police Dept. Reg., Police Line-up for 
Identification (July 26, 1967)); see also Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Pro-
ceedings, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 65, 79-83 (1967) (discussing police practices in Pittsburgh). 
204. Note, supra note 203, at 361. Indeed, a few departments - such as Denver and Toledo 
- even forbade waiver by the accused, at least in "felony cases of major importance." See id. at 
362 (quoting Denver Police Dept. Regs., Lineups (undated) (disallowing use of lineups "unless 
an attorney, other than a District Attorney, be present")); id. at 363 (quoting Toledo Police 
Dept. Gen. Order No. 231, Right to Presence of Counsel When Confronted by Witness (June 28, 
1967) (forbidding waiver of the right to counsel at lineups by the accused, at least in "felony 
cases of major importance")). 
205. Note, supra note 203, at 363. 
206. Id. at 366. 
207. Steele, Kirby v. Illinois: Counsel at Lineups, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 49, 53 (1973). 
208. 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
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in contrast to lineups, were not subject to the sixth amendment right 
to counsel.209 Further, in Kirby v. lllinois, 210 the Court restricted the 
Wade-Gilbert protection to those lineups conducted after formal 
charges were filed against the accused. As a consequence, although a 
majority of the courts that had addressed the question between Wade 
and Kirby had found the distinction announced in Kirby unpersua-
sive, 211 most post-Kirby decisions adopted its limitation.212 Some state 
courts, however, disregarded Kirby's circumscription of individual 
rights and applied the Wade-Gilbert safeguard to virtually all post-
arrest lineups.213 
Yet stronger evidence of the libertarian impact of the Court's deci-
sions may be found in the fact that, despite Kirby, the practice of many 
police departments of affording counsel at all lineups, irrespective of 
whether or not formal charges have been filed, remained un-
changed.214 Moreover, even if counsel is not present at the lineup, 
several empirical surveys disclose that the Wade ruling "stimulated 
new efforts" to devise lineup norms to eliminate "the most obvious 
forms of abusive practice. For example, they typically advise that 
lineup participants be of generally the same age, sex, height, weight 
and race, and some stipulate that they must wear similar clothing."2ts 
Finally, for identification procedures without counsel, "the most sig-
nificant factor will be the retention of a record that permits counsel at 
209. But cf. In re W.C., 85 N.J. 218, 426 A.2d 50 (1981) (defendant may have right to 
pretrial lineup); Commonwealth v. Sexton, 485 Pa. 17, 400 A.2d 1289 (1979) (same). 
210. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
211. See Note, Right to Counsel at Lineups -A Pro Forma Right?, 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
587, 599 (1973). 
212. See Note, The State Responses to Kirby v. United States, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 423, 437· 
38; see also Lomax v. Alabama, 629 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981); 
People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474, 487, 435 N.E.2d 376, 382-83, 450 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982); State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 10, 203 S.E.2d 10, 17 (1974), 
vacated on other grounds, 428 U.S. 902 (1976); Wyatt v. State, 566 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1978). 
213. Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 
P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974); 
Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974); cf. State v. Thomas, 406 So. 2d 
1325, 1328 (La. 19!sl) (state statutory right to counsel broader than federal constitutional right). 
Michigan went beyond these courts by requiring counsel for an accused in custody at post-arrest 
photographic displays as well. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 171, 186-87, 205 N.W. 2d 
461, 467, 476 (1973). 
214. In a study of nine metropolitan police departments on the effect of Kirby, six advised 
that they would continue to conduct their lineups according to the procedures devised after 
the Wade case. The other three departments advised that they would continue to follow 
their Wade procedures in most cases; e.g., "We may use Kirby in emergency cases or late at 
night, but we will continue to use our present procedure in routine cases." 
Steele, supra note 208, at 57 n.38. 
215. Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to 
Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (1973). 
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trial to reconstruct the lineup and call the jurors' attention to elements 
of suggestiveness, and that record commonly is available under the 
new regulations."216 
4. Jury Trial 
In a series of decisions in 1968 and 1970, the Court extended the 
constitutional right of criminal defendants to trial by jury, holding 
that the sixth amendment guarantee for all crimes authorizing impris-
onment for more than six months must be afforded in state criminal 
cases as well as in federal prosecutions. Prior to Duncan v. Louisi-
ana 211 and Baldwin v. New York, 218 Louisiana grantedjury trials only 
in cases in which death or imprisonment at hard labor could be im-
posed, thus denying this fundamental safeguard for a great many of-
fenses, including batteries which carried penalties of up to two 
years.219 New Jersey withheld jury trials for disorderly conduct 
charges which might result in one-year sentences; and New York City 
provided jury trials only for offenses bearing maximum sentences of 
more than one year.220 As a consequence of the Justices' holdings, 
these jurisdictions either lowered the penalties for a number of offenses 
to six months (or less) or provided defendants with a jury trial. 221 
Although the jurisdictions concerned were few in number, statistics 
from New York City alone for a thirty-month period in the mid-1960's 
showed that more than 300,000 cases would have been affected.222 
It is more difficult to estimate G1e number of criminal contemnors 
whose rights were secured223 by the Court's ruling in Bloom v. llli-
nois224 that the right to jury trial applies to any contempt prosecution 
when a penalty of more than six-months imprisonment is imposed. 
But a study not long before the decision found that in more than one-
third of the states "either no limitation is placed on contempt 
216. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Wa"en Court, 15 
MICH. L. REv. 1319, 1370 n.229 (1977). Compare Bruce v. State, 268 Ind. 180, 263-64, 375 
N.E.2d 1042, 1086 (no right to counsel at lineup recorded on videotape before formal charges), 
cert denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978), with State v. Gaitor, 388 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (counsel required at lineup after formal charges despite videotape). 
217. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
218. 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
219. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146. 
220. 391 U.S. at 161 n.33. 
221. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 71. 
222. 399 U.S. at 135 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
223. Cf. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 207 n.8 (1968) (state contempt penalties often diffi-
cult to determine). 
224. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
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sentences or the limitation is in excess of six months."225 In the fed-
eral courts, data for the fiscal year ending in mid-1962 revealed that of 
twenty-one contemnors committed to prison, "[s]entences of eight of 
these prisoners exceeded six months; three prisoners had sentences ex-
ceeding one year, and of these two prisoners had sentences of two 
years or more."226 Moreover, other evidence suggested a substantial 
increase in more recent years in the use of summary punishment and 
severe penalties for criminal contempt.221 
The significance for personal liberty of the constitutional right to 
jury trial may be gleaned from several sources. In the years 1973-
1977, between fifty-four and sixty-one percent of all criminal defen-
dants who went to trial in the federal court system chose to entrust a 
judgment to a jury.228 These figures must take into account the fact 
that because of various considerations - e.g., the type of offense, the 
accused's prior record, fear of community prejudice, and the nature of 
the major defense - there is often an informed expectation of a lesser 
sentence after a bench trial.229 When these special circumstances are 
not present, however, careful empirical research discloses that juries 
are substantially more sympathetic to defendants than judges in re-
spect to such vital matters as conviction or acquittal and harshness of 
penalty.230 
It is true that not all of the Court's decisions in this area have 
favored the right to jury trial. Indeed, there is impressive evidence 
that the rulings in Apodaca v. Oregon, 231 which upheld nonunanimous 
225. Note, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court Constructs a Limited Right to Trial by 
Jury for Federal Criminal Contemnors, 1961 DUKE L.J. 632, 655 n.84. In New Jersey, for exam· 
pie, sentences would run for as long as three years. Id. 
226. Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 385 n.3 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
227. See Hilts, The Increasing Use of the Power of Contempt, 32 MONT. L. REV. 183, 185 
(1971); Note, Contempt of Court, 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 517, 519 (1973). Although there ap· 
peared to be no recorded case before 1914 involving a sentence of greater than one year, see 
United States v. Green, 241 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1957), ajfd., 356 U.S. 165 (1958), a 1971 
Pennsylvania decision presented a -sentence of up to 22 years for criminal contempt, see May· 
berry Appeal (Commonwealth v. Langnes), 434 Pa. 478, 48()..81, 255 A.2d 131, 132-33 (1969), 
vacated sub nom. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
228. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. CoURTS, 1977 JUROR UTILIZATION JN U.S. DJS· 
TRICT CoURTS (1978) (foldout rttached to back cover). 
229. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 26-30 (1966). 
230. See id. at 58-62. To cite one illustration, in response to questionnaires submitted by 
Kalven and Zeisel "to 550 judges across the country with reference to 3,576 jury trials over 
which they had presided .••• [t]hejudges agreed with the juries 75 per cent of the time. In the 
other 25 per cent, the juries were primarily more· lenient than the judges would have been." M. 
BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM 134 (rev. ed. 1972) (summarizing the Kalven and 
Zeise! study). 
231. 406 U.S. 404 (1972); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (less-than· 
unanimous jury verdict does not violate due process or equal protection). 
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jury verdicts, and, especially, Williams v. Florida, 232 which permitted 
juries containing as few as six persons, have markedly diminished the 
protections afforded the accused by peer judgment. Empirical data 
suggest that smaller juries are not as representative of the community; 
are less likely to recall important evidence, make accurate fact-find-
ings, or engage in effective group deliberation; are less inclined to 
deadlock and therefore more likely to reach "extreme compromises" 
and render "incorrect" decisions; and, ultimately, more likely to con-
vict defendants - indeed, more likely to convict innocent 
defendants. 233 
These adverse effects have been somewhat ameliorated, however, 
by the Justices' most recent pronouncements in Ballew v. Georgia, 234 
rejecting the use of only five jurors, and in Burch v. Louisiana, 235 inval-
idating a rule permitting nonunanimous verdicts by a six-person jury. 
Overall, it must be fairly concluded that the Court's product on jury 
trials has advanced the individual rights of those accused of crime. 
5. Self-Incrimination 
In Griffin v. California, 236 the Court disapproved the rule of six 
states237 that permitted the trial judge, and in some instances the pros-
ecutor, in a criminal case to make adverse comments to the jury on the 
accused's failure to testify in his own defense. The extent to which this 
practice impaired the constitutional right against self-incrimination is 
incapable of precise verification. But common sense persuasively sug-
gests that the possibility of damaging comments on the defendant's 
silence confronted him with a troublesome dilemma: it would either 
exacerbate the inference of guilt that most jurors draw from the de-
fendant's not taking the stand,238 or it would force him to testify de-
spite the attendant dangers that the self-incrimination privilege meant 
to avoid. As the Court long ago recognized, 
It is not ever:y one who can safely venture on the witness stand though 
entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervous-
ness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a sus-
232. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
233. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230-43 (1978), and authorities cited therein; see 
also Zeise!, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A. J. 367 (1972) (questioning the Supreme 
Court's decision to allow six-person juries). 
234. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
235. 441 U.S. 130 (1979). 
236. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
237. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 611-12 n.3 (California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico 
and Ohio). 
238. Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with 
a Criminal Record, 4 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 215, 221 n.47 (1968). 
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picious character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse 
and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase, rather than remove 
prejudices against him. 239 
The pressures on criminal defendants to forgo their constitutional 
right of silence were recently mitigated even further in Carter v. Ken-
tucky, 24-0 in which the Court rejected the practice of at least five 
states241 of refusing to have the trial judge instruct the jury against 
making biased assumptions about the accused's decision not to take 
the stand. 
6. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
At the time of the Court's decision in Robinson v. California, 242 
which held that it was cruel and unusual punishment to make narcotic 
addiction a criminal offense, approximately one-third of the states did 
so, with the penalty ranging up to five years imprisonment.243 
Although many states had also authorized civil commitment of nar-
cotic addicts,244 most "failed to provide even the minimum facilities 
required"245 for treatment. 
_Obviously, Robinson has solved neither society's drug problems 
nor the plight of its victims. Indeed, Robinson notwithstanding, "pos-
session" of narcotics may still be made criminally punishable,246 so 
most addicts continue to run a serious risk of penal incarceration.247 
Further, to the extent that compulsory civil commitment, which was 
approved in Robinson, either fails to afford addicts a reasonable 
chance of cure or results in prolonged confinement not dissimilar to 
imprisonment under criminal conviction,248 it may be said that Robin-
239. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893). Among the "costs of testifying," for 
the innocent as well as the guilty, are "the defendant's unconvincing demeanor, confusion, or 
faulty memory as to details of his story, and especially, the fear that he will be impeached with 
prior convictions." Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Years, 79 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1290, 1294 (1981): 
240. 450 U.S. 288 (1981). 
241. 450 U.S. at 290 n.2 (Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma and Wyoming). 
242. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
243. See Laws Controlling Illicit Narcotics Traffic, S. Doc. No. 120, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 
(1956) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 120]. 
244. See F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 87-88 
(1961). 
245. S. Doc. No. 120, supra note 243, at 45; see also Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Nar-
cotic Addicts, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 405, 406 (1967); Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 
76 YALE L.J. 1160, 1164 (1967). 
246. See Note, Punishment of Narcotics Addicts for Possession: A Cruel But Usual Punish· 
ment, 56 IOWA L. R.Ev. 578, 586 (1971). 
247. See King, Narcotic Drug Laws and Enforcement Policy, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 
113, 130-31 (1957). 
248. Early data contradicted neither premise. See generally Kramer, The State Versus the 
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son has accomplished little for civil liberty. 
But the record is not so one-sided. Spurred at least in part by the 
Court's ruling in Robinson, 249 both California and New York (where 
estimates placed nearly ·two-thirds of the country's narcotics ad-
dicts),250 followed by Congress, enacted new civil commitment pro-
grams that for the first time attempted large scale treatment with the 
"hope to succeed where previous efforts have notoriously failed."251 
The rehabilitation success rate of these plans has apparently been 
modest at best,252 with California statistics between 1967 and 1973 
showing a somewhat steadily decreasing percentage of persons placed 
on outpatient status who are returned within five years with a new 
civil narcotic commitment.253 Moreover, although questions have 
been raised about their methodology,254 several studies have shown a 
dramatic reduction in overall arrest rates during methadone mainte-
nance treatment.255 Further, it has been held that the state's failure to 
provide minimal treatment to persons who have been institutionalized 
involuntarily is grounds for release.256 
Addict: Uncivil Commitment, 50 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1970); Aronowitz, supra note 245; Note, supra 
note 245, at 1162-63. But see text at note 257 infra. 
249. See Aronowitz, supra note 245, at 410-11; Note, supra note 245, at 1160. 
250. Departments of Treasury and Post Office and Executive Office of the President Appropria-
tions for 1968: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 417 (1967). 
251. Note, supra note 245, at 1162. 
252. See generally Kramer, supra note 248; Aronowitz, supra note 245. 
253. See CAL. REHABILITATION CENTER PROGRAM, SUMMARY STATISTICS: CIVIL COM-
MITMENT PROGRAM FOR NARCOTIC ADDICTS 63-66 (1972); see also Wood, 18,000 Addicts 
Later: A Look at California's Civil Addict Program, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1973, at 26, 31 
(nearly half of all persons released from California Rehabilitation Center pursuant to special 
program "have remained in the community for over 1 year" and "less than 5 percent are re-
turned with new felony commitments"). Most impressive - although perhaps attributable at 
least in part to changes in the California criminal sentencing law - is the percentage of male 
narcotic addicts in California who are returned each year to rehabilitation centers with new civil 
narcotics commitments as compared to the total number of outpatients. From a high of 5.6% in 
1967, the figure has consistently diminished to an average of 1.5% in the years 1978-1980. Com-
puter Printout from California Department of Corrections, to author, as of Dec. 29, 1981 (1967 
- 5.6%, 1968 - 4.5%, 1969 - 4.9%, 1970 - 3.4%, 1971 - 3.7%, 1972 - 3.5%, 1973 -
3%, 1974- 2.9%, 1975 - 2.8%, 1976 - 2.7%, 1977 - 1.7%, 1978 - 1.6%, 1979 - 1.3%, 
1980 - 1.7%). 
254. Greenberg & Alder, Crime and Addiction: An Empirical Analysis of the Literature, 
1920-73, 3 CoNTEMP. DRUG PROB. 221, 248-60 (1974). 
255. Cushman, Relationship Between Narcotic Addiction and Crime, Fed. Probation, Sept. 
1974, at 38, 43; see also Joseph, A Probation Department Treats Heroin Addicts, Fed. Probation, 
Mar. 1973, at 35, 38-39. 
256. Cf., e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (petitioner committed to 
mental hospital upon acquittal by reason of insanity has right to adequate treatment, which if not 
rendered may entitle petitioner to be released); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 
1974) (civil commitment for mental retardation must be accompanied by minimally adequate 
treatment); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (civilly committed mental 
patients have a right to treatment), affd. in part & revd. in part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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Finally, at the very least, some meaningful indication of Robinson's 
impact on personal rights may be gleaned from the attitudes of those 
subject to it: in a survey of persons who had been involuntarily con-
fined in California, most of those "who had been convicted of a felony 
narcotics violation prior to their civil commitment (about 75% of the 
population) feel that they are better off serving time in the civil com-
mitment program than in a prison."257 
7. Commitment of Mentally Ill 
The Court's 1966 decision in Baxstrom v. Herold258 apparently af. 
fected persons confined in mental facilities only in the state of New 
York and has gone "virtually unnoticed by legal scholars. "259 In 
Baxstrom, the Court held that New York's statutory procedures for 
civilly committing persons at the expiration of their prison sentence 
violated equal protection because only this class was denied "the right 
to de novo review by jury trial of the question of their sanity,"260 and 
only this class coul9 be committed to the two institutions maintained 
by the Department of Correction (rather than the twenty-one operated 
by the Department of Mental Hygiene)261 without a judicial determi-
nation that they were "dangerously mentally ill."262 
Within little more than six months of the Justices' edict, 992 pa-
tients were transferred - pursuant to an administrative process 
dubbed "Operation Baxstrom" - from the Department of Correction 
facilities at Dannemora and Matteawan to Department of Mental Hy-
giene institutions.263 The consequences for those transferred were sub-
stantial: the Court in Baxstrom observed the "striking . . . 
dissimilarities" between the types of institutions264 and the respon-
dents referred to the "environment of loose security and relaxed obser-
257. Kramer, supra riote 248, at 12-13. This may be due largely to the fact that, at the time, 
the potential period of incarceration was shorter. Id. at 13. 
258. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
259. Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of 
Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Co"ection of the State of New 
York, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 651, 665 (1968); see Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110-11, 114. 
260. 383 U.S. at 111. 
261. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
262. 383 U.S. at 110. 
263. Morris, supra note 259, at 655, 671. This included 136 of the 210 inmates who had been 
held in Matteawan on the basis of an administrative determination that they were "too danger-
ously mentally ill to be in civil hospitals." Id. at 671, 674. "Unless overnight 136 dangerous 
mental patients were miraculously cured of their dangerousness, it may be safely assumed that 62 
per cent of the patients confined in Matteawan pursuant to [this criterion] were not, in fact, 
dangerous." Id. at 674. 
264. 383 U.S. at 113. 
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vation" in the facilities for the civilly insane.265 More specifically, the 
median period of confinement at Matteawan had been between six and 
seven years (with nearly twenty percent of the residents being incar-
cerated twenty years or more) as compared to a four-month average 
length of hospitalization at the Department of Mental Hygiene 
units.266 
The dispositions of the 992 people moved to civil mental hospitals 
is even more telling. Within a little more than six months, seventy-
nine were discharged, twenty-two were conditionally released on con-
valescent care, twenty-four became "informal" patients (free to go at 
any time), 273 were retained on "voluntary" status (able to leave 
within ten days after written request), and an additional forty-two had 
departed on other statuses. Only six were re-transferred to Matteawan 
as dangerously mentally ill.261 
Finally, the Court's decision in Baxstrom had an indirect, albeit 
extremely significant effect relating to psychiatric predictions of dan-
gerousness. As a result of the Justices' edict, the State of New York 
appropriated funds for long-term studies of the patients released or 
transferred.268 These inquiries found a startlingly low rate of post-
release dangerous offenses, and triggered a rash of further studies and 
articles critically assessing the ability of psychiatrists to predict "dan-
gerousness."269 If this succeeds in lessening courts' traditional reli-
ance on these predictions (e.g., in respect to civil commitments, release 
of the insane, etc.) the impact on the individual rights of those subject 
to such predictions promises to be enormous. 21° 
265. Brief for Respondent at 7, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
266. Morris, supra note 259, at 656. In 1965, 
there were 255 patients at Matteawan whose sentences had expired. The median period of 
confinement of this group was 9 years. To that 9 years must be added the time spent in 
Matteawan prior to the expiration of their sentences. 
Fifty-four other ex-criminal patients had been transferred to Matteawan from civil state 
hospitals. The median period of confinement of this group was JO years. 
Id. at 657 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
267. Id. at 672-73. The tale of Johnnie K. Baxstrom is illustrative. Sentenced to two-and-
one-half to three years for second degree assault, he was certified as insane by a prison doctor and 
sent to Dannemora where he was retained for over four years after his penal sentence expired. 
Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 108-09. Pursuant to "Operation Baxstrom," he was transferred to a civil 
hospital and, after requesting review of his retention, was discharged three months after the 
Court's decision when a jury found him not mentally ill. Morris, supra note 259, at 670 n.131. 
268. See, e.g., Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the 
Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972). • 
269. See, e.g., Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
439, 445-47 (1974). 
270. For a possible harbinger of such change, see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981) 
(noting criticism of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness). 
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8. Juveniles 
In the mid-1960's, it was reported that persons under eighteen 
years old accounted for more than twenty percent of arrests for serious 
crimes and for more than fifty percent of arrests for serious property 
offenses.211 In 1967, the year of the Supreme Court's landmark deci-
sion in In re Gault, 272 811,000 cases concerning allegedly delinquent 
youths were disposed of in juvenile courts273 and some 84,000 children 
were committed to juvenile institutions (public training schools and 
forestry camps).274 By 1976, the juvenile courts were handling about 
1.4 million delinquency cases annually, a substantial increase from 
1961.215 The number of minors potentially affected by the fairness of 
juvenile court procedures is immense. 
It is true that, in the two decades prior to Gault, marked progress 
had been made to afford "a greater measure of procedural regularity in 
the juvenile courts."276 Of most far-reaching significance, in the early 
1960's, three major states, California, New York and Illinois, promul-
gated new juvenile court acts277 which went a considerable distance in 
anticipating the Supreme Court's ruling.278 But, as will become clear, 
these developments cannot "overshadow the revolutionary dimensions 
of the Gault decision,"279 which established and delineated the scope 
of four constitutional rights for a child at juvenile court proceedings in 
which he might be adjudged "a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged mis-
conduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed 
to a state institution."280 
First, the child (and his parents or guardian) must have written 
271. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 n.26 (1967). 
272. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
273. Approximately 382,000 of these cases were resolved judicially and approximately 
429,000 were disposed of nonjudicially. J. CORBE'IT & T. VEREB, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 
1974, 15, 17. 
274. Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of 
Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 375, 400 n.141 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ferster]. The average 
length of stay was about ten months in training schools and about six months in forestry camps. 
Id. at 400 n.142. 
275. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 1980, at 199 (table 340) (101st ed. 1980). 
276. TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND AnMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH 
CRIME 29 (1967). 
277. Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code§§ 500-87 (1961) (repealed 1976); N.Y. Family Court 
Act (1962); Ill. Rev. S~t. ch. 37, §§ 701 et seq. (1966). 
278. See Platt & Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1163 (1968). 
279. Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Imple-
mentation, 3 LAW & SocY. REV. 491, 559 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lefstein]. 
280. 387 U.S. at 13. 
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notice "of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at 
the hearing . . . ." This notice "must be given sufficiently in advance 
of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to pre-
pare will be afforded, and it must 'set forth the alleged misconduct 
with particularity.' " 281 Prior to Gault, most states considered juvenile 
proceedings to be "civil" rather than "criminal" and thus "not subject 
to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a 
person of his liberty."282 As a consequence, courts had held either 
that alleged delinquents had no constitutional right to adequate no-
tice283 or, more frequently, that the information afforded need be less 
than for adults accused of crime.284 Thus, in 1949, the eminent soci-
ologist Paul Tappan found that "[a]n almost universal handicap of the 
child is his ignorance of the meaning of the charge and of his rights in 
court; rarely is he appraised fully and intelligibly so as to remove his 
childish misunderstanding and fears."285 
Although, as we shall see, compliance with all of Gault's mandates 
has been far less than perfect, available evidence strongly implies 
nearly full conformity with the requirement of adequate notice. A sur-
vey conducted in the early 1970's by about 3,000 members of the Na-
tional Council of Jewish Women in thirty-five jurisdictions reported 
that "[i]n almost all courts, children and their families are given notice 
of charges. "286 
Second, Gault held that "the child and his parents must be notified 
of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if 
they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to 
represent the child."287 At the time of the Court's opinion, about one-
third of the states made some provision - by legislation, court rule or 
281. 387 U.S. at 33. 
282. 387 U.S. at 17. 
283. See, e.g., Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923) (state may act without any 
process restrictions to take custody of child). 
284. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965); Rose v. State, 137 
Tex. Crim. 316, 129 S.W.2d 639 (1939); see also Clark, Juvenile Delinquency in Colorado: The 
Law's Response to Society's Need, 31 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1958). 
285. P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 184 (1949). 
286. E. WAKIN, CHILDREN WITHOUT JUSTICE: A REPORT BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL 
OF JEWISH WOMEN 68 (1975). As a more specific example, in Ohio "the officers of the Juvenile 
Court Judges Association, immediately after Gault, gave warning to all Ohio judges that a statute 
'which set forth that a complaint is sufficiently definite which merely alleges the child to be 
delinquent is no longer valid.' " Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527, 
540 (1968). Subsequent interviews with officials of eight juvenile courts in the state disclosed that 
there had been "a 'tightening up' of procedural safeguards in delinquent cases" - charges were 
now being made with greater particularity; notices were now being forwarded to parents with the 
summons; parents were now being given adequate time to prepare. Reckless & Reckless, The 
Initial Impact of the Gault Decision in Ohio, 18 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 121-22 (1968). 
287. 387 U.S. at 41. 
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practice-for counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings.288 Nation-
wide, statutes and judicial decisions were sharply divided.289 More-
over, two widely cited empirical studies revealed that counsel 
appeared in only a small fraction of juvenile delinquency adjudica-
tions. 290 "Taken together these two surveys suggested that not only 
was the frequency of defense counsel involvement dismally low in 
most big-city courts in the years immediately prior to the Gault deci-
sion, but that this condition was uniform throughout our major cities 
and was not improving."291 
The meager incidence of representation for alleged delinquents also 
contributed to the uneven provision of the third and fourth constitu-
tional liberties recognized in Gault: the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, 292 and the right to be advised of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.293 As a matter of law, some courts, relying 
on the rationale that juvenile proceedings were "non-criminal," held 
that there was no guarantee of confrontation and permitted findings of 
288. 387 U.S. at 37-38. 
289. Some laws accorded only a right to retained counsel; a few guaranteed appointed coun-
sel for indigents, at least on request; others left appointment of a lawyer to the court's discretion. 
In states with no statutory provisions, courts split on whether or not there was a right to retain 
an attorney, but few guaranteed assignment of counsel for the poor. See the citations collected in 
Lefstein, supra note 279, at 492 n.2; Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 COR· 
NELL L. Q. 387, 404-07 (1961). 
290. In 1963, in a survey of juvenile court judges sitting in the nation's 75 largest cities 
(representing 37 states), 59% reported that youthful offenders were represented by a lawyer in 
less than 5% of all delinquency proceedings, and in 81% of the courts, minors had attorneys in 
less than 10% of the cases; only 4% of the judges responded that counsel appeared in more than 
half the hearings. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAM. L. 77, 
81 (1964). When lawyers were present, they "were almost always retained counsel rather than 
assigned or defender system counsel." Id. at 84. In 1966, in a survey of 207 juvenile courts 
serving populations of more than 100,000, 48% of those responding (184 courts replied) dis-
closed that minors had retained counsel, and 77% reported that minors had assigned counsel, in 
less than 5% of the cases; 65% responded that children had retained counsel, and 74% revealed 
that children had assigned counsel, in less than 10% of the cases; fewer than 4% of the respond-
ing judges reported that retained or appointed counsel appeared in more than 40% of the hear-
ings. TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 276, at 82 (table 16). Likewise, 
fewer than 4% reported that appointed counsel appeared in more than 40% of the hearings. Id. 
291. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE CoURTS: GUIDELINES FOR 
THE FUTURE 15 (1973). 
292. 387 U.S. at 56-57. 
293. 387 U.S. at 51-55. As observed by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice in a report issued just before the Gault decision: 
The presence of an independent legal representative of the child, or of his parent, is the 
keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a minimum system of procedural justice 
requires. The rights to confront one's accusers, to cross-examine witnesses, to present evi-
dence and testimony of one's own, to be unaffected by prejudicial and unreliable evidence, to 
participate meaningfully in the dispositional decision, to take an appeal have substantial 
meaning for the overwhelming majority of persons brought before the juvenile court only if 
they are provided with competent lawyers who can invoke those rights effectively. 
PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86 (1967). 
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delinquency to be based on unswom testimony and hearsay.294 Simi-
larly, most courts held the right against self-incrimination inapplicable 
in juvenile hearings,295 and those that ruled otherwise "felt it unneces-
sary or even inadvisable to inform the minor of this right."296 A com-
mon practice was described as follows: · 
The judge after reading the allegations of the petition to the juvenile will 
often ask, "did you do it?" or "is this true?" If the youth admits his 
guilt, the adjudication is complete. If he denies his delinquency, in some 
jurisdictions the judge will continue to interrogate the child in an effort 
to determine the veracity of the complaint . . . . 291 
The state legislative response to the Court's dictates in Gault was 
impressive. Many states enacted statutes governing some or all of the 
procedural safeguards announced in Gault. 298 Of probably greater sig-
nificance, although the percentage of youths who were in fact repre-
sented by counsel at delinquency hearings remained fairly low in a 
number of juvenile courts, the general increase was dramatic. In 1972, 
the Boston University Center for Criminal Justice conducted a survey 
of juvenile court judges in the nation's 100 largest cities.299 While 
"[b]efore Gault only 4% of ... [those] cities indicated that more than 
50% of juveniles were represented in delinquency cases,"300 the survey 
found that in 1972, 
in 61.8% of the responding cities, more than 75% of juveniles in delin-
294. See Antieau, supra note 289, at 401; Lefstein, supra note 279, at 493 n.2; Note, Juvenile 
Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized Justice, 19 HARV. L. REV. 775, 794-95 
(1966). 
295. See NATL. CoUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN 
THE JUVENILE COURT 26-27 & n.6 (1962); Lefstein, supra note 279, at 493 n.2. 
296. Lefstein, supra note 279, at 517. 
297. Note, supra note 294, at 795. . 
298. For example, within montbs of the decision, Colorado enacted a new Children's Code 
explicitly affording the right to retained or assigned counsel and applying the traditional rules of 
evidence to delinquency hearings. Vermont added provisions governing notice of charges, right 
to counsel, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Lefstein, supra note 279, at 559 n.184. 
California, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and New Jersey all established the right to an 
appointed lawyer for indigent minors either in all proceedings or in proceedings that may result 
in the commitment of the child. Rubin & Glen, Developments in Co"ectional Law, 14 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 155, 157 (1968). In the years following Gault, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Virginia and West Virginia followed suit. Glen, Developments in Juvenile and Family Court 
Law, 5 CRIME & DELINQ. 295, 299 (1969). And in 1969, "[t]otally new juvenile court acts, or 
substantial revisions of existing acts" were passed in Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, North Car-
olina, North Dakota and Ohio; all dealt "at least minimally with assignment of counsel, specific-
ity of pleadings, and the various evidentiary rights announced in Gault." Glen, Developments in 
Juvenile and Family Court Law, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 198, 198 (1970). In addition, Texas 
authorized lawyers for poor children. Id. at 201. Shortly after Gault, it was reported that in 
many areas of the country public or voluntary defender services had been extended to juvenile 
courts. These sites include Chicago; Cleveland; Denver; Indianapolis; Minneapolis; Montgomery 
County, Maryland; and Ogden, Utah. Paulsen, supra note 286, at 529-30. 
299. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 291, at 16. 
300. Id. 
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quency cases based upon a felony or serious crime are represented by 
counsel and that in 47.1% of these cities, over 75% of juveniles are rep-
resented by counsel in delinquency cases based upon non-felonies or less 
serious crimes. 301 
The extensive National Council of Jewish Women study in the early 
1970's found that almost seventy percent of children were automati-
cally assigned counsel and that about fifteen percent were provided a 
lawyer on request. 302 Results of surveys conducted in individual states 
confirm these figures. 303 
Despite the increase in the number of juveniles represented by at-
torneys, the reports on Gault's implementation in the hustings were 
not uniformly affirmative. Perhaps the most frequent criticism in-
volved the failure of juvenile court officials to give proper notice and 
advice concerning the right to counsel. Some jurisdictions promptly 
devised written forms to comply with both the letter and the spirit of 
Gault's requirements. 304 However, observations in several metropoli-
tan juvenile courts of cases in which the alleged offender went unrepre-
sented revealed differential acceptance of the Justices' ruling.305 
Shortly after Gault, a study was conducted of three major American 
cities, with populations ranging from just under one million to over 
301. Id. 
302. E. WAKIN, supra note 286, at 63. 
303. Writing five months after the Gault decision, an observer estimated that in Philadelphia 
"only about 5 per cent of the children appearing in juvenile court had been represented by coun-
sel in the period immediately preceding 1967. At present, close to 40 per cent of the children are 
represented." Coxe, Lawyers in Juvenile Court, 13 CRIME & DELINQ. 488, 488 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Coxe]. In Ohio, a review of the records of 3,225 juvenile cases in Columbus in the 
year before and the year after Gault showed that 
the overall use of counsel in the post-Gault period (29 per cent of the cases) was more than 
double the pre-Gault rate (13 per cent) ••.• [This] is especially notable because the right to 
counsel and to notification of this right had been established by an Ohio statute four years 
before Gault. 
Reasons, Gault: Procedural Change and Substantive Effect, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 163, 167 
(1970). This phenomenon was confirmed by a mail survey in 1967 in which 13 of 47 juvenile 
court judges or chief probation officers in Ohio replied that delinquent children were more often 
represented by counsel after Gault. Reckless & Reckless, supra note 286, at 123. A 1969 study of 
67 rural county judges in Kentucky concluded that two-thirds of the courts that had more than 
half the juveniles represented by lawyers did so "in positive response to Gault." Canon & Kot-
son, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study, 10 J. FAM. L. 300, 318 (1971). A 
statistical analysis in a Tennessee county court, comparing the 14 months prior to Gault with the 
35 months immediately thereafter, showed the use oflawyers had more than doubled (from 7% 
to 16%). Langley, The Juvenile Court: The Making of a Delinquent, 7 LAW & SocY. REV. 273, 
286 (tables V, Va) (1972). In Providence, Rhode Island, representatation tripled (from a pre-
Gault 5% to a post-Gault 15%) and increased tenfold in Portland, Maine (from 2% to 20%). D. 
HOROWITZ, supra note 153, at 185-86. By the mid-1970's, the staff of the Brooklyn, N.Y. Legal 
Aid Society's Juvenile Rights Division had grown from two or three prior to Gault to 70 attor-
neys and more than 30 social workers. P. PRESCO'IT, THE CHILD SAVERS 75 (1981). 
304. See Paulsen, supra note 286, at 531-32. 
305. w. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 36 (1972) [hereinafter 
cited as w. STAPLETON]. 
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five million persons. 306 The cities were given fictitious names: Zenith, 
Metro, and Gotham, listed in descending order according to popula-
tion. 307 The study found that full compliance with Gault was achieved 
in fifty-six percent of the cases in Zenith. 3os In Metro and Gotham, 
however, the written notice that all parents received was incom-
plete. 309 Furthermore, in one-third of the cases in Metro and eighty-
five percent of those in Gotham, the right to counsel was not men-
tioned by the judges to those youths appearing without counsel.310 In 
the authors' view, "[i]n virtually all of the other instances, the advice 
given was insufficient in content to comply with constitutional require-
ments."311 In a similar study, undertaken several years after Gault, 
written notice was afforded to all parents, but only thirty percent of 
the youths who appeared without lawyers received full oral advice 
from the judge.312 Moreover, evidence from these surveys and other 
sources indicated that some judges and probation officers not infre-
quently either directly advised against having a lawyer or indirectly 
prejudiced the offender's interest in retaining one.313 
Even granting all these imperfections, Gault's effect in markedly 
increasing the number of youths represented by counsel stands uncon-
tradicted. Despite the special difficulties and conflicts confronting 
lawyers in the juvenile court system,314 and the criticism that some 
juvenile court lawyers - especially public defenders315 - spent too 
306. Lefstein, supra note 279, at 494. 
307. Id. 
308. Lefstein, supra note 279, at 510. 
309. Id. at 506. 
310. Id. at 510; see also W. STAPLE'{ON, supra note 305, at 36 (summary of the findings of 
the Lefstein study). 
311. w. STAPLETON, supra note 305, at 36; see also M. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE 
CoURT 139 (1982) (study of a large metropolitan juvenile court disclosed that the "clarity" with 
which juveniles were informed of their right to counsel "varies"). 
312. Ferster, supra note 274, at 377-80. Furthermore, the authors question the sufficiency of 
the written notice. Id. at 377. 
313. See Lefstein, supra note 279, at 511-16; Ferster, supra note 274, at 378-79; Project, The 
Lawyer-Child Relationship: A Statistical Analysis, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 627, 637 (1971). Indeed, it 
has been more recently argued that the "collage of social service agencies which serve the youth 
of a community but which are not a regular part of the formal juvenile justice system" have 
diverted many alleged delinquents from the juvenile courts altogether and have thereby caused 
them to relinquish "voluntarily" all of Gault's procedural guarantees. Streib, The Infonnal Juve-
nile Justice System: A Need for Procedural Fairness and Reduced Discretion, 10 JOHN MAR. J. 
PRAC. & PROC. 41, 52 (1976). At the same time, of course, they also "relinquish" the onus of 
being committed to an institution for delinquents. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 153, at 204-12. 
314. See M. BORTNER, supra note 311, at 136-39. 
315. But cf. M. BORTNER, supra note 311, at 137 (arguing that public defenders regularly 
assigned to juvenile cases are potentially superior juvenile advocates because they are better inte-
grated into the system). 
52 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
little time with their clients,316 the consequences of greater presence of 
counsel in the juvenile justice system have been notable. Although a 
study made just after the Gault decision showed very poor compliance 
by juvenile judges with the self-incrimination rule in cases in which the 
offender was unrepresented,317 another survey done several years later, 
which found most youths represented by a lawyer, reported that sev-
enty-five percent of the children had the fifth amendment privilege.318 
Furthermore, although a pre-Gault study of the impact of lawyers 
in juvenile court concluded that their "major contribution . . . lay in 
their ability to mitigate the severity of dispositions rather than dis-
proving allegations of the petitions,"319 post-Gault data revealed that 
entry of counsel has significantly increased the number of contested 
cases32o and dismissals. 321 A parallel study concluded that "there 
were fewer commitments to institutions and more findings of 'not in-
volved' when the child was represented by counsel."322 Finally, in 
Philadelphia, it was reported that increased provision of lawyers dra-
matically reduced pre-hearing and post-hearing detention of youthful 
offenders. 323 
316. See E. WAKIN, supra note 286, at 65; Project, supra note 313, at 639; M. BOR1NBR, 
supra note 311, at 141; Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public 
Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619, 634 (1968). 
317. Lefstein, supra note 279, at 520-24. 
318. E. WAKIN, supra note 286, at 68. Indeed, even when no lawyer participated in the 
proceedings, Gault's confrontation requirement was found to be wholly or partially fulfilled in 
the large majority of instances. Lefstein, supra note 279, at 524-27. 
319. Lemert, The Juvenile Court- Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE ON JuVBNlLB DB· 
LINQUENCY, supra note 276, at 91, 103. Cf M. BOR1NER, supra note 311, at 139 (juveniles 
represented by attorney receive more severe dispositions, although they are more likely to be 
placed on probation). 
320. Paulsen, supra note 286, at 531. 
321. In Columbus, Ohio, it was discovered "that the proportion of cases dismissed (regard-
less of representation by counsel) doubled, from 8 per cent (142 out of 1,752 dispositions) to 16 
percent (233 out of 1,473), undoubtedly a result of the court's greater emphasis upon legal fact-
finding." Reasons, supra note 303, at 169; see also W. STAPLETON, supra note 305, at 66-67 (in· 
depth empirical study of two metropolitan juvenile courts which found that in one, "attorneys 
had a profound impact on the outcomes of cases with which they were associated"). 
322. Ferster, supra note 274, at 402. Similar results were observed in Philadelphia: 
Stated bluntly, the presence of lawyers willing to fight for their clients is preventing judges 
from dumping children into institutions because they don't know what else to do and are too 
harried or callous to find another solution. It cannot be argued that the reduction is being 
effected by the the release of children who should really be confined, for re-arrest of those 
represented by the .... [legal services] office has been at the unusually low rate of 2.6 
percent. (Admittedly the figure for one year's operation is not conclusive.) ••• [I]n the pre-
Gault days an average of fewer than two judges per court day disposed of 12,000 cases a 
year, and it was not uncommon for one judge to "hear'' 100 cases in a day. 
Coxe, supra note 303, at 493; see also Polow, The Impact of Gault on the Juvenile Process, 20 
Juv. Cr. JUDGES J. 159 (1969) ("in New Jersey .•• commitments have dropped to less than 
half the pre-Gault rate."). 
323. Coxe reports that 
In the past, it was found "necessary" to confine large numbers of children for long periods 
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Gault's holding was expressly limited to the four constitutional 
rights discussed above. But its legacy for individual liberty has 
stretched much more broadly. Because of the Court's ruling "that the 
Due Process Clause has a role to play"324 in juvenile proceedings, 
lower courts have held that children are also entitled to the sixth 
amendment right to a speedy trial325 and to the fourth amendment 
right to suppression of illegally seized evidence. 326 Although Gault 
left open the applicability of the Miranda rule to questioning of 
juveniles by police and probation officers,327 state statutes328 and judi-
cial decisions329 have extended this fifth amendment protection to 
youthful offenders, one jurisdiction going so far as to exclude automat-
ically any confession by a juvenile who did not have the advice of a 
lawyer.330 Despite the Court's conclusion that the sixth amendment 
right to jury trial is not obligatory in delinquency proceedings,331 at 
least ten states have nonetheless chosen to require it. 332 Gault found it 
unnecessary to decide whether due process demands that states give 
of time before their hearing, and, despite much official hand-wringing, the situation became 
worse and worse. Chronic overcrowding of the Youth Study Center became the rule, with 
an average of fifty-three children sleeping on the gym floor each night. Now, as the result of 
test cases brought by [legal services] lawyers, the practice of holding children in detention 
before a court hearing merely upon the authority of a probation officer has been discontin-
ued. Consequently the Youth Study Center is now operating consistently at less than capac-
ity. Also contributing to the depopulation of this facility has been legal action to compel a 
drastic reduction in post-hearing detention of children - sometimes up to three years -
pending an opening in an institution providing appropriate treatment. The reduction has 
been accomplished by legal action to compel the release of children or their admission into 
other facilities. It is surprising how institutions will do what they "can't" when they have 
to. 
Coxe, supra note 303, at 492-93. 
324. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. 
325. See, e.g., Piland v. Clark County Juvenile Court Servs., 85 Nev. 489, 457 P.2d 523 
(1969). 
326. See, e.g., Ciulla v. State, 434 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). 
327. 387 U.S. at 43 n.74; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (holding that a 
juvenile's request to see his probation officer is not a per se invocation of his fifth amendment 
rights under Miranda). 
328. For citation of nine such state provisions, see Harris, Children's Waiver of Miranda 
Rights and the Supreme Court's Decisions in Parham, Bellotti, and Fare, 10 N.M. L. REv. 379, 
396 n.97 (1980). 
329. See, e.g., In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1968); Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 
167 S.E.2d 163 (1969), modified, Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976) (per se 
exclusionary rule replaced by one that looks at totality of circumstances); Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 
431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972);In re AaronD., 30 A.D.2d 183, 290N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974); Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1968); State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 463 P.2d 640 (1970) (en bane). See generally 
Schultz & Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisprudence, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE 
CHILD 20, 25-26 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976). 
330. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 12-15-67 (1975). 
331. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
332. See Comment, The Right to a Jury Under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 14 GoNZ. L. 
REV. 401, 421 (1979). 
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indigents transcripts of juvenile hearings for purposes of appeal, 333 but 
both state legislatures334 and judges335 have done so. 
Finally, although Gault's guarantee of counsel covered only the 
delinquency adjudication process, 336 many states routinely expanded 
this liberty to the disposition stage. 337 Moreover, about one-quarter of 
the state legislatures, following the pattern of the Uniform Juvenile 
Court Act, 338 have guar:;inteed the right to counsel at "all stages" or 
"every stage" of juvenile proceedings, 339 and several states have ap-
plied this to such stages as pretrial lineups, 340 appeals from delin-
quency adjudications,341 and probation revocation hearings.342 
(Indeed, a majority of the states have gone even further to assure the 
right of both parents and children to a lawyer at proceedings for termi-
nation of parental rights343 and a number of courts have extended this 
to child dependency or neglect hearings. 344) 
Akin to Brown v. Board of Education, Gault has been hailed as the 
"keystone" of the rise of a nationwide "children's liberation" move-
ment. 345 Although the complete impact of the Court's decision has 
yet to be felt and is ultimately immeasurable, its substantial signifi-
333. 387 U.S. at 58. 
334. Glen, Developments in Juvenile and Family Court Law, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 198, 201-
02 (1970). 
335. See, e.g., In re Boykin, 39 Ill. 2d 617, 237 N.W.2d 460 (1968); Chambers v. District 
Court, 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967); In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968); In 
re Karren, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968); In re D.L.F., 85 S.D. 44, 176 N.W.2d 486 
(1970); see also Paulsen, supra note 286, at 541-42. 
336. 387 U.S. at 27, 
337. See Ferster, supra note 274, at 391. 
338. UNIFORM JUVENILE CoURT Acr § 26(a) (1968). 
339. Clark, Procedural Rights in the Juvenile Court: Incorporation or Due Process?, 7 PEP· 
PERDlNE L. R.Ev. 865, 876-77 n.44 (1980). 
340. See, e.g., In re Carl T., 1 Cal. App. 3d 344, 81 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1969); In re Holley, 107 
R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970). 
341. See, e.g., Reed v. Duter, 416 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1969); In re L.G.T., 216 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Chambers v: District Court, 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967). 
342. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-l 17(3)(b) (1978); see also People ex rel Guggenheim 
v. Mucci, 352 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1974) (application of Gault principles to preliminary detention 
hearings). 
343. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30, 34 (1981) (citing cases from 
Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma and Washington) (34 jurisdic-
tions statutorily allow for appointment of counsel in termination disputes). Compare Davis v. 
Page, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that parents have a constitutional right to counsel in 
all dependency proceedings), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 735 (1984), with Ex rel. D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 
(Fla. 1980) (holding that counsel is constitutionally required only when the parent is threatened 
with permanent loss of custody). 
344. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30 n.6. 
345. See Nationwide Drive for Children's Rights, in THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
206 (B. Gross & R. Gross eds. 1977). 
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cance for the advancement of personal liberty has already been plainly 
confirmed. 
9. Military Justice 
The number of persons actually affected by the series of Supreme 
Court decisions between 1955 and 1969 denying court-martial author-
ity over various criminal offenses is probably unknowable. But the 
potential number of defendants thereby removed from the military's 
jurisdiction was great. During the five years before the ruling in United 
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles346 - holding that former members ·of the 
armed forces could not be court-martialed for crimes allegedly com-
mitted while they were in the military - over 3,000,000 persons had 
been discharged;347 seven years later this figure had increased to over 
22,000,000.348 At the time of the Court's decisions in 1957 and 
1960349 - withdrawing military jurisdiction over offenses committed 
abroad by civilian dependents of military personnel and by civilian 
employees of the armed forces - there were 450,000 such dependents 
and 25,000 such employees overseas. 350 In the seven years preceding 
Reid v. Covert, 351 a case involving dependents, the army alone had 
tried 181 civilian dependents by general court-martial and 2,273 by 
special or summary court-martial for such misdeeds as murder, man-
slaughter, assault, narcotics and sex offenses, robbery, larceny, for-
gery, bribery and fraud.352 After the Court held in 1969, in 
O'Callahan v. Parker, 353 that existing members of the armed services 
could not be tried in military courts for crimes that were not "servl.ce-
connected," the Army Judge Advocate General estimated that in the 
prior eighteen years his branch alone had prosecuted 450,000 such 
cases.354 
More difficult than approximating the number of people possibly 
affected by these decisions is determining their real consequences for 
individual rights. This inquiry turns on where offenders who had been 
346. 350 u.s 11 (1955). 
347. 350 U.S. at 19. 
348. See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 195 (1962). 
349. McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 
361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
350. See Warren, supra note 348, at 195. 
351. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
352. Supplemental Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing at 30-31, Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
353. 395 u.s 258 (1969). 
354. See Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Of-
fenses: An Analysis ofO'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1969). 
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held to be immune to a court-martial will be tried, and the extent to 
which their personal liberties will be better protected by the 
alternative. 
There are three possibilities. First, if the conduct of an active or 
former serviceman, or a civilian employee or dependent of the mili-
tary, is contrary to federal law, then he may be tried in an article III 
court355 - either in the state in which the alleged crime took place or, 
if committed outside the United States, then "at such place . . . as the 
Congress may by Law have directed."356 Congress, however, has 
never established such federal court jurisdiction and, as a result, some 
alleged offenders (such as Toth and the members of Lieutenant Cal-
ley's platoon, who had been discharged before their role in the My Lai 
massacre was discovered) are not tried at all. 357 Second, if the pur-
ported misdeed takes place within the United States and violates state 
law, then the defendant may be charged in a state court. This would 
appear to be the effect of O'Callahan-type instances, although there is 
some evidence that state law enforcers will tend to overlook some acts 
(e.g., involving drinking or sexual dalliance) that would otherwise be 
prosecuted harshly by military authorities.358 Third, ifthe misconduct 
occurs in another country and is a breach of that nation's laws, then 
the individual may be tried in a foreign court. 359 This would seem to 
be the lot of many civilian employees or dependents and of active 
members of the military who commit nonservice-connected offenses 
abroad.360 
On the one hand, it has been forcefully contended that, given the 
vastly improved quality of military justice, substituting a state trial for 
a court-martial offers the defendant little advantage,361 and that the 
alternative of being prosecuted criminally in a foreign regime may well 
put him in an even worse position. 362 On the other hand, neither the 
commendation of military procedures nor the disparagement of for-
355. See Toth, 350 U.S. at 21; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 48-49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
356. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2. 
357. See W. GENEROUS, SWORDS AND SCALES 176, 224 n.30 (1973). 
358. See Bishop, Court Martial Jurisdiction over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, 
Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 338-43 (1964). 
359. See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). 
360. See Mills, O'Callahan Overseas: A Reconsideration of Military Jurisdiction Over Service-
men's Non-Service Related Crimes Committed Abroad, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 325, 325 (1972). 
361. See, e.g., Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages Over a Civilian 
Defendant, 22 ME. L. REv. 105 (1970); Nelson & Westbrook, supra note 354, at 58-61. 
362. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 76 n.12 (Harlan, J., concurring); Everett, 
O'Callahan v. Parker - Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice?. 1969 DUKE L.J. 853, 866; 
Moorhead, Reid v. Covert and Its Progeny: The Practical Problem of Punishment, 12 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 18, 25 (1960). 
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eign justice is unanimous. 363 In any event, without resolving this dis-
pute, it must be noted that however protective of the rights of the 
accused the present system of military justice may be, this was not the 
situation when the Court began confronting the problem in the 
1950's364 - although the current reforms were nearly all effectively in 
place by the time of the O'Callahan ruling in 1969.365 Most impor-
tant, there is reason to believe that the progress that has been made 
was stimulated, at least in part, by the Court's pronouncements. 366 
10. In General 
Finally, apart from the direct effects of the Warren Court's per-
formance to secure constitutional justice for the accused, its equally 
significant legacy may be - as Professor Jerold Israel has suggested 
- "the long-range consequences that fl.owed from its direction of pub-
lic attention" to the general problem, leading to "various reforms in 
the criminal justice process that have benefitted the accused." Thus, 
the populace "came to recognize that police training involves more 
than teaching people to shoot straight, that we must devote substantial 
resources to police training, and that we must recruit our police from 
all groups in the community." The bar came to perceive "criminal 
law as an area of intellectual and social challenge, and this, in turn, 
induced more able lawyers to enter that field, particularly in the offices 
of public defenders and prosecuting attorneys." And the lawmakers, 
led by "[v]arious distinguished professional groups, such as the Ameri-
can Bar Association, American Law Institute, and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws," came to 
reexamine the role of legislation in the criminal procedure field. The 
proposed reforms "did not always indicate whole-hearted support of 
particular Warren Court decisions, but they certainly reflected a gen-
eral concern for the rights of the accused and urged expansion of those 
rights in many areas, such as pretrial discovery."367 
363. See, e.g., O'Cal/ahan, 395 U.S. at 265-66; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 37-39 (plurality 
opinion); Everett, supra note 362, at 866 n.55; Sherman, The Civi/ianization of Military Law, 22 
ME. L. REV. 3 (1970); Note, Military Trial of Civilian Offenses: Drumhead Justice in the Land of 
the Free, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 356, 363-64 (1970). 
364. See W. GENEROUS, supra note 357, at 179. 
365. See id. at 184-85. 
366. See id. at 179. 
367. Israel, supra note 216, at 1424 n.438. 
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C. Free Expression and Association 
1. Censorship 
[Vol. 83:1 
The first half of this century was a period "marked by unbridled 
censorship"368 of motion pictures in the United States. As Chief Jus-
tice Warren remarked in his 1961 dissent in Times Film Corp. v. Chi-
cago,369 "[a] revelation of the extent to which censorship has recently 
been used in this country is indeed astonishing."370 
Objections grounded in political, racial, moral and religious 
prejµdices usually motivated the deletions required in films or the out-
right bans on their being shown. 371 Police officers assigned to the Chi-
368. R. RANDALL, CENSORSHIP OF THE MOVIES 24 (1968). 
369. 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
370. 365 U.S. at 69 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
371. Specific illustrations provide a fuller flavor. With respect to political themes, The Spirit 
of 76, a movie depicting atrocities by British soldiers during the Revolutionary War, was banned 
in Chicago. E. DE GRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS 20 (1982). As pointed out by Chief 
Justice Warren, "Before World War II, the Chicago censor denied licenses to a number of films 
portraying and criticizing Ufe in Nazi Germany including the March of Time's Inside Nazi Ger-
many." 365 U.S. at 69. "Maryland censors restricted a Polish documentary film on the basis 
that it failed to present a true picture of modern Poland," and excised the sentence "We, the 
workers of the world, will take care of that" from Idiot's Delight. 365 U.S. at 70-71. In New 
York, the board eliminated from Potemkin a picture of Lenin's tomb because it bore the inscrip-
tion "Religion is the opiate of the people." 365 U.S. at 71. "Professor Mamlock was produced in 
Russia and portrayed the persecution of the Jews by Nazis. The Ohio censors condemned it as 
'harmful' and calculated to 'stir up hatred and ill will and gain nothing.' It was released only 
after substantial deletions were made. The police refused to permit its showing in Providence, 
Rhode Island, on the ground that it was communistic propaganda. Millions of Us, a strong union 
propaganda film, encountered trouble in a number of jurisdictions." 365 U.S. at 71. In Penn-
sylvania, "several rather mild anti-Fascist statements" were cut from Spanish Earth, a pro-Loyal-
ist film based on the Spanish Civil War. R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 24. "Charlie Chaplin's 
satire on Hitler, The Great Dictator, was banned in Chicago, apparently out of deference to its 
large German population." 365 U.S. at 72. The Detroit and Pennsylvania censors rejected The 
Youth of Maxim - described by the New York Herald Tribune as "a stirring, vivid and beauti-
fully integrated document of the Russian Social-Democratic movement" - on the ground that it 
was "pure Soviet propaganda." E. DE GRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, supra, at 212-13. Other Chaplin 
films were barred in Memphis because of his Communist associations. Memphis Commercial 
Appeal, Oct. 16, 1972, at 15, col. 6. [hereinafter cited as Memphis Commercial Appeal]. Both 
"Ohio and Kansas banned newsreels considered pro labor. Kansas ordered a speech by Senator 
Wheeler opposing the bill for enlarging the Supreme Court to be cut from the March of Time as 
'partisan and biased.' " 365 U.S. at 72. Finally, Chicago banned newsreels showing city police 
shooting at labor pickets, 365 U.S at 69, and during a 12-month period in 1937-1938, Massachu-
setts "required 13 deletions from newsreels and the March of Time series." E. DE GRAZIA & R. 
NEWMAN, supra, at 202. 
As for the subject of civil rights, "[b]eginning in 1915 with Birth of a Nation, which portrayed 
supposed excesses of Reconstruction, courts sustained the right of communities to censor films 
touching upon race questions." R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 24. Thus, 
[t]he Memphis censors banned The Southerner which dealt with poverty among tenant 
farmers because it "reflects on the south." Brewster's Millions, an innocuous comedy of 
[forty] years ago, was ... forbidden in Memphis because the radio and film character 
Rochester, a Negro, was deemed "too familiar." ... No Way Out, the story of a Negro 
doctor's struggle against race prejudice, was banned by the Chicago censor on the ground 
that "there's a possibility it could cause trouble." The principal objection to the film was 
that the conclusion showed no reconciliation between blacks and whites. The ban was lifted 
after a storm of protest and later deletion of a scene showing Negroes and whites arming for 
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cago censor unit described the dominant attitude: "Coarse language 
or anything that would be derogatory to the government - propa-
ganda" is ruled out of foreign films. "Nothing pink or red is al-
lowed."372 "Children should be allowed to see any movie that plays in 
Chicago . . . . If a picture is objectionable for a child, it is objectiona-
ble period."373 During World War I, "[m]ovies praising pacifism or 
denouncing war were widely banned by local censors."374 But idio-
syncratic whims also operated, as exemplified by the Memphis board's 
prohibition on all train robbery films because its chairman had once 
been so victimized when he had worked as a railroad mail clerk. 315 
a gang fight. Memphis banned Curley because it contained scenes of white and Negro chil-
dren in school together. Atlanta barred Lost Boundaries, the story of a Negro physician and 
his family who "passed" for white, on the ground that the exhibition of said picture "will 
adversely affect the peace, morals and good order'' in the city. 
365 U.S at 70 (citations omitted). A movie of the Willard-Johnson heavyweight championship 
fight in Cuba was refused entry into the United States. E. DE GRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, supra, at 
185. 
Not surprisingly, moral and religious fervor produced many prohibitions. Because she had 
borne an illegitimate child, Ingrid Bergman's films were excluded in Memphis. Memphis Com-
mercial Appeal, supra. Chicago's censors "ordered the deletion of a scene depicting the birth of a 
buffalo in Walt Disney's Vanishing Prairie" and refused a license for Anatomy of a Murder be-
cause they "found the use of the words 'rape' and 'contraceptive' to be objectionable. 365 U.S at 
69. "Witchcraft, a study of superstition through the ages, was suppressed for years because it 
depicted the devil as a genial rake with amorous leanings, and because it was feared that certain 
historical scenes, portraying the excesses of religious fanatics, might offend religion." "New 
York censors banned Damaged Lives, a film dealing with venereal disease, although it treated a 
difficult theme with dignity and had the sponsorship of the American Social Hygiene Society." 
365 U.S at 71. "An early version of Carmen was condemned on several different grounds. The 
Ohio censor objected because cigarette-girls smoked cigarettes in public. The Pennsylvania cen-
sor disapproved the duration of a kiss." More generally, "[t]he New York censors forbade the 
discussion in films of pregnancy, venereal disease, eugenics, birth control, abortion, illegitimacy, 
prostitution, miscegenation and divorce. A member of the Chicago censor board explained that 
she rejected a film because 'it was immoral, corrupt, indecent, against my . . . religious princi-
ples.'" 365 U.S at 72 (citation omitted). 
Finally, periodic objections were made to films depicting illegal conduct. For example, 
''Scarface, thought by some as the best of the gangster films, was held up for months; then it was 
so badly mutilated that retakes costing a hundred thousand dollars were required to preserve 
continuity." 365 U.S at 71. In Memphis, Dead End, "which is now something of a classic, 
starred Humphrey Bogart, and was banned because 'it would encourage crime • . . and there is 
no need of showing a picture that might influence boys how to be gangsters.' " Note, Film is a 
Four Letter Word, 5 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 41, 46 n.47 (1974). 
The Chicago censor bureau excised a scene in Street With No Name in which a girl was 
slapped because this was thought to be a "too violent" episode. It Happened in Europe was 
severely cut by the Ohio censors who deleted scenes of war orphans resorting to violence. 
The moral theme of the picture was that such children could even then be saved by love, 
affection and satisfaction of their basic needs for food. 
365 U.S. at 69-70 (citation omitted). And the Maryland licensors ordered that a scene from The 
Man with the Golden Arm, depicting a narcotics addict injecting himself with heroin, be excised. 
See United Artists Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 210 Md. 586, 124 A.2d 292 (1956) 
(holding that scene was likely to deter narcotics use and should not have been eliminated). 
372. Chicago Daily News, Apr. 7, 1959, at 3, cols. 7-8. 
373. Chicago Tribune, May 24, 1959, at 8, col. 3. 
374. E. DE GRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, supra note 371, at 19. 
375. Memphis Co=ercial Appeal, supra note 371. 
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Complete statistics as to the total number of films either banned or 
edited are not available. But scattered data suggest a very large 
amount of censorship. Thus, in 1921, New York's censors "banned or 
demanded deletions in 235 movies for being 'indecent,' 'inhuman,' 'im-
moral,' or 'tending to incite to crime.' Three years later, the number 
jumped to 3684."376 "When it lacked sufficient personnel to do the 
job, the commission enlisted state troopers. It was not an easy 
task."377 In 1938, "the New York board censored, in one way or an-
other, over five percent of the moving pictures it reviewed."378 Be-
tween 1943 and 1947, the Empire State censored over 100 movies per 
year.379 In the early 1960's - even after, as shall become evident 
later, censorship was in sharp decline - the state boards in Maryland, 
New York and Virginia each imposed their views on at least an aver-
age of thirty films per year.38° Finally, although (as shall also be 
shown later) judicial review would often correct the over-zealous cen-
sor, indications were that many exhibitors were inclined simply to ca-
pitulate38I rather than "assume the burden of instituting judicial 
proceedings and of persuading the courts that the film is protected 
expression. "382 
Although the Court did not impose exacting procedural strictures 
on movie censorship systems until 1965,383 .it turned the comer thir-
teen years earlier, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 384 when it held 
that motion pictures were a form of expression protected by the first 
and fourteenth amendments. The ruling's effect was twofold. First, 
"[t]he new freedom it provided helped to stimulate a maturity in the 
medium that eventually saw greater sophistication of subject and 
treatment .... "385 Second, after Burstyn, a "considerable an-
tilicensing swell"386 mounted. In the next few years, the Justices, in a 
series of per curiam decisions, rejected "all but one of the principal 
statutory censorship criteria that censors had applied for decades to 
376. E. DE GRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, supra note 371, at 28. 
377. Id. 
378. 365 U.S. at 71-72. 
379. R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 108 (table 5). 
380. Id. at 40 (table 1). 
381. See M. ERNsr & A. LINDLY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON 80 (1940); Lockhart & Mc-
Clure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 314-16 
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Literature]. 
382. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1965). 
383. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
384. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
385. R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 32. 
386. Id. at 41. 
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prevent the showing of films."387 The supreme courts of a number of 
states struck down movie censorship schemes, either as forbidden by 
the federal Constitution388 or the free speech provisions of their state 
constitutions.389 Even the Court's 1961 refusal in Times Film to con-
demn all prior submission systems for films did not diminish the forces 
let loose by Burstyn. Significantly influenced by Chief Justice War-
ren's powerful dissent in Times Film, no reported appellate decisions 
(mostly by state courts) during the four years following Times Film 
sustained the censors on the merits; one state court went "so far as to 
quote only from ... [the Warren dissent] while not mentioning the 
Times Film majority opinion."390 Between 1952 and 1960, not once 
did the Illinois courts uphold the Chicago unit when the exhibitor 
elected to appeal.391 Only twice between 1952 and 1965 did the New 
York judiciary uphold that state's censorship board. 392 Moreover, the 
number of censorship boards active throughout the country also "de-
creased appreciably."393 
In 1965, Freedman v. Maryland394 critically (although not fatally) 
wounded motion picture censorship by ruling that although the first 
amendment does not flatly forbid laws requiring advance submission 
of films to a censor, there must be a series of "procedural safeguards 
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system" :395 if the cen-
sor believes that the film is constitutionally unprotected, the censor 
must take the initiative by promptly seeking an injunction; the censor 
bears the burden of proof; and there must be an expeditious final judi-
cial decision. 396 
387. E. DE GRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, supra note 371, at 83-84. 
388. See R.K.O. Radio Pictures v. Department of Educ., 162 Ohio St. 263, 122 N.E.2d 769 
(1954); Brattle Films v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 Mass. 58, 127 N.E.2d 891 (1955). 
389. In four of these cases, licensing itself was invalidated under free speech provisions of 
state constitutions. In two others, procedural deficiencies were found in licensing laws, and 
in two more, licensing standards were held misapplied to particular films. Finally, in three 
cases in which the censors prevailed, two turned on the fact that the film proprietor had 
proceeded improperly, and the third on the appellate court's refusal to consider the obscen-
ity issue or to view the film, thereby letting stand an adverse decision in the trial court. 
R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 39-40 (footnotes omitted). 
390. S. W ASBY, supra note 18, at 139. 
391. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 72-73 (1961). 
392. I. CARMEN, MOVIES, CENSORSHIP AND THE LAW 148 (1966). 
393. R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 17; see I. CARMEN, supra note 392, at 184 (perhaps as 
many as 90 censorship boards in the early 1950's); R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 40 (5 states 
and 48 municipalities in 1959; down to 4 states and 27 municipalities with active boards in 1963); 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 n.5 (1965) (down to 4 states and 15 municipalities in 
1965). 
394. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
395. 380 U.S. at 58. 
396. 380 U.S. at 58-59. 
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As a result of Freedman's carefully circumscribed requirements, 
"[l]egal censorship of movies was virtually dead."397 After state courts 
in Kansas,398 Virginia,399 and New York400 found their respective 
schemes wanting under Freedman, state legislatures simply abandoned 
the enterprise.401 Maryland, the only state that actively persisted in 
the field, redrafted its statute to conform to Freedman, 402 but its high-
est court continued to elevate the censor board's burden403 so that 
"[v]ery few films have been banned in Maryland under its new 
law."404 
Similarly, state and federal courts invalidated licensing schemes in 
several municipalities.405 Dallas subsequently cured its procedural in-
firmities, 406 first imposing "what were probably the most elaborate 
procedural obligations ever required of a prior censorship agency,"407 
and then totally eliminating administrative discretion to bar exhibition 
of any film whose distributor agrees that it be classified as "Not Suita-
ble for Young Persons."408 A Providence ordinance (enacted pursu-
ant to an amended Rhode Island enabling statute) strictly 
"safeguard[s] the right of a motion picture exhibitor against unwar-
ranted prior restraint."409 
397. R. LISTON, THE RIGHT TO KNow: CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 51 (1973). 
398. State v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 197 Kan. 448, 417 P.2d 255 (1966). 
399. Victoria Films v. Division of Motion Picture Censorship (Richmond Cir. Ct. 1965) (un· 
reported), noted in R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 241 n.43. 
400. Cambist Films, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 46 Misc. 2d 513, 260 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 
1965). 
401. S. W ASBY, supra note 18, at 139. 
402. See Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d 
235 (1965). 
403. See Hewitt v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 241 Md. 283, 216 A.2d 557 (1966), 243 
Md. 574, 221 A.2d 894 (1966); Dunn v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 249, 213 A.2d 
751 (1965). See generally R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 46-47. 
404. M. MAYER, THE FILM INDUSTRIES 139 (rev. ed. 1978). 
405. See, e.g., Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (Chicago); National Assn. of 
Theatre Owners v. Motion Pictures Commn., 328 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (Milwaukee); 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 247 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Tex. 1965) (Dallas); Embassy Pictures 
Corp. v. Hudson, 242 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Tenn. 1965) (Memphis); Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. 
Seattle, 74 Wash. 2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968) (Seattle); see also Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadel· 
phia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d 
45 (1968) (successful challenges to a Pennsylvania procedure authorizing injunctions against 
films already being shown). Chicago revised its licensing scheme to meet the Freedman stan· 
dards. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Memphis 
has since established a system of dubious validity. See Note, supra note 371, at 51-58. 
406. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968). 
407. R. RANDALL, supra note 368, at 47. See generally Note, A Model Movie Censorship 
Ordinance, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (1968). 
408. DALLAS, TEX. CITY CODE § 46-15(b) (1979). 
409. Shipyard Drive-In-Theatre, Inc. v. Scuncio, 107 R.I. 554, 567, 268 A.2d 820, 828 
(1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 1005 (1971). 
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In all, movie censorship has "existed in principle after Freedman 
but in highly circumscribed· form and had life in only a few loca-
tions."4I0 The Justices' rulings, by emasculating the legal mechanisms 
that prevented satisfaction of market pressures,411 have immeasurably 
expanded the viewing fare of the American public. 
2. Defamation 
Because there are no comprehensive empirical data available, it is 
impossible to demonstrate the exact extent to which fear of damage 
judgments for libel, before 1964, deterred the news media from pub-
lishing matters of public interest. Nevertheless, the number and size of 
such awards suggests that there was a substantial chilling effect. For 
example, at the time of the Court's landmark decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 4I2 which overturned a jury verdict of $500,000 
against the newspaper and four other defendants for publishing a de-
famatory advertisement by civil rights protesters, "libel suits for nearly 
$300 million were pending against news organizations active in the 
South."4I3 Overall, there can be little doubt that the potential of such 
crushing liability significantly influenced newspapers and broadcasters 
to engage in self-censorship, thus limiting the dissemination of a wide 
range of information, at least some of which was of genuine concern to 
the public.4I4 
New York Times, and its progeny that have amplified protection of 
journalistic discretion,4I5 has not fully eliminated the chilling effect of 
410. S. WASBY, supra note 18, at 139. 
411. For a description of the decline of the motion picture industry's self-censorship system 
for similar reasons, see R. LITTON, THE RIGHT TO KNow: CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 44-46 
(1973); see also E. DE GRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, supra note 371, at 85-86 ("The Supreme Court's 
rulings indirectly undermined the intellectual and legal authority of the industry's Production 
Code."). 
412. 376 u.s 254 (1964). 
413. Kupferberg, Libel Fever, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 1981, at 36, 37. 
414. This phenomenon has not been unique to the United States. For example, in England 
where, in addition to vague and potentially harsh contempt laws, see generally C. WINTOUR, 
PRESSURES ON THE PRESS 129-40 (1972), "staggering jury verdicts" have been rendered pursu-
ant to the English libel rules, it has been reported that in the early 1960's, newspapers withheld 
reporting damaging details of the Profumo "sex and security" scandal for half a year. Dickinson, 
Libel Suits and Press Freedom, 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPS. 883, 891 (1963).The editor of the 
New Statesman explained that "[t]he press has a duty - but we cannot always afford to perform 
it." Id. (quoting Roth, Britain's Libel Laws Keep Profumo Case Under Cover, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, June 15, 1963, at 11). Indeed, British publishers even delayed printing Lord Denning's 
official report on the affair until Parliament afforded the media a "qualified privilege" on publica-
tion. Dickinson, supra, at 891. 
415. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Monitor Patriot Co. v. 
Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971), remanded in part, 112 N.H. 80, 290 A.2d 207 (1972); Greenbelt Coop. 
Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
64 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 83:1 
possible defamation actions.416 But these decisions have significantly 
relieved the problem, a conclusion evidenced by both informed opin-
ion and hard facts. An illustration of the former is the Los Angeles 
Times lawyer's comment on investigative reporting concerning public 
officials and public figures: "If the article is properly structured any 
rational lawyer will recognize that a libel action . . . would be futile 
and would be dismissed under one of the various privileges."417 Other 
news media attorneys feel "that material is now being published that 
would not have been before Times."418 Indeed, the journal of the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association recently reported that 
416. For example, "[m]ore libel decisions were reported in the United States in 1973 thnn in 
1963, the last full year before the upheaval began." Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 
53 TEX. L. REv. 422, 430 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Anderson, Libel and Press]. And Supreme 
Court decisions subsequent to New York Times have upheld substantial judgments for plaintiffs. 
See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 138 (1967) ($460,000); Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40 (1971) ($275,000). More recently, there have been jury awards of 
$39.6 million (reduced to $4 million) against Hustler magazine, $26.5 million (reduced to $14 
million) against Penthouse magazine, $9.2 million against the Alton (Ill) Telegraph, $4.6 million 
against the San Francisco Examiner, $1.6 million (reduced to $800,000) against the National 
Enquirer, and $1 million against the Daily Oklahoman. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A 
Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REsEARCH J. 797, 797 n.1; Kupferberg, supra note 413, at 
36. Furthermore, the anecdotal evidence also demonstrates that publishers are still deterred 
from publishing some materials for fear of libel actions. In Cleveland, investigative reporters 
"considerably diluted" the impact of a 1975 television program on deceptive selling practices by 
hearing aid dealers, even after a federal court had denied an injunction sought by one of the 
interviewees. The "news department made a journalistic decision to proceed with the story, and 
a business decision to make that story weaker, but legally defensible." Neff, Cleveland: Watering 
Down the News, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May 1975, at 39. In 1974, after the subject of an 
article on theft by a public official threatened a libel suit, a San Jose newspaper published a 
clarification and ordered its staff off the story, despite its lawyer's judgment that a retraction was 
unnecessary and that the paper was on firm legal ground. The subject's "implied threat suc-
ceeded [not only] in rectifying a questionable interpretation of his letter by reporters - but also 
in ending the paper's investigation into his affairs." Anderson, San Jose: Threatening a Libel 
Suit, 14 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May 1975, at 40 (hereinafter cited as Anderson, San Jose]. 
Also, in 1974, a journalism review 
deleted certain passages from an article for fear that publication of them would result in 
legal action. The review had consulted its lawyers, who advised that it would probably win 
a libel suit, "but that the cost of defending it might easily bankrupt the magazine. After a 
good deal of agonizing, • • . we decided that the risk was not worth it." The article in 
question charged that the New York Times had refused to publish a mnnuscript by one of its 
investigative reporters, even though that newspaper's lawyers also had reviewed the charges 
and concluded that a libel suit would probably be filed, but could be defended successfully. 
The passages censored . • . were excerpts from that manuscript; thus neither publication 
printed the material, even though the lawyers for both independently had concluded that it 
probably was not libelous. 
Anderson, Libel and Press, supra, at 431 (footnotes omitted). Additional evidence may be found 
in the recent admonition to journalists by the general counsel of the Los Angeles Times - advice 
duplicated at numerous similar seminars throughout the country - "to keep your sources of 
possible libel suits to a minimum." Seminar, Urban Policy Research Institute 12 (Jan. 10, 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Seminar]. 
417. Seminar, supra note 416, at 14-15. 
418. Anderson, Libel and Press, supra note 416, at 430 (citing Le Maistre, Who Needs Egg on 
His Face?, 4 Jurus DR. 33-34 (May 1974)). 
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"no newspaper admits to even considering"419 " 'backing off' on news 
coverage to avoid legal entanglements."420 Although this last stated 
view is unquestionably exaggerated, the fact is that "suits against me-
dia defendants are not likely to be rewarding."421 
Even those cases modifying the thrust of New York Times, such as 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 422 Time, Inc. v. Firestone,,423 Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire424 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn. 425 - which media 
advocates have criticized as creating uncertainties and consequent in-
hibitions for publishers and broadcasters,426 and as particularly threat-
ening "the smaller, newer, and less conventional media voices"427 -
have not been without value in furthering freedom of the press. A 
careful study of Hutchinson's and Wolston's impact during their first 
year and a half of influence disclosed no significant effects for media 
419. Rambo, Old Nemesis Haunts Press: Suits Multiply, Rulings Sting (Special Report on 
Libel), PRESSTIME, Nov. 1980, at 4. 
420. Id. However, "several media attorneys express the fear that it will happen if libel costs 
continue to increase." Id. 
421. Franklin, supra note 416, at 829. An extensive study of defamation litigation against 
the media between 1976 and 1980 disclosed that "plaintiffs win a low percentage of appeals (5 
percent) compared to the success rate of 66 percent for defendants." Id. at 829, 803 & n.17; see 
also Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. REsEARCH J. 455, 489 (noting similar disparity in 1976-1979 study) [hereinafter cited as 
Winners and Losers]. Moreover, whereas plaintiffs who lose at trial often abandon their cases, it 
is "most unusual for media defendants to make any payment whatever without an appellate 
decision." Winners and Losers, supra, at 461, 462-63. In the cases that were appealed, "trial 
court rulings [often on motions to dismiss or on summary judgment had] favored defendants 75 
percent of the time." Franklin, supra note 416, at 802. Although there has been no systematic 
study of settlements by media defendants, fragmentary information suggests that they are fairly 
few in number and quite small in amount. Franklin, supra note 416, at 800 n.12. But see 
Rambo, supra note 420, at 5 ($600,000 settlement by San Francisco Examiner). Moreover, it 
appears that few really large awards have ever been paid. Rambo, supra note 419, at 5. In 
addition, it is now estimated that "at least half of the 1,765 daily newspapers and 8,000 weeklies 
in the United States carry libel insurance; they are, in other words, prepared for suits and con-
sider the cost of insurance as part of the price of doing business." Pickerell, Public Rights vs. 
Private Rights, Long Beach Press-Telegram, Nov. 19, 1981, at B9, col. 6; Kupferberg, supra note 
413, at 39. As for legal fees for pre-publication counseling and libel defense, see Franklin, supra 
note 416, at 800 n.13. Finally, to the extent that publishers and broadcasters are ultimately held 
liable, in the judgment of the American Newspaper Publishers Associations' general counsel, it is 
largely because journalists have failed to "clean up their act . • . . The editors really aren't on 
the job ••. [and reporters] are reporting their ego trips." Hanson, Editor and Publisher, Oct. 
24, 1981, p. 46. 
422. 418 U.S 323 (1974), cert. denied on appeal after remand, 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982). 
423. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
424. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
425. 443 U.S. 157 (1979). 
426. See generally Anderson, Libel and Press, supra note 416 (assessing the effectiveness of 
the Times-Gertz privilege in preventing self-censorship); Stonecipher & Trager, The Impact of 
Gertz on the Law of Libel, 53 JOURNALISM Q. 609 (1976) (discussing lower court interpretations 
of the Gertz fault standard and the Gertz public figure criteria). 
427. Anderson, The Selective Impact of Libel Law, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May 1975, 
at 38, 38. 
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defendants.428 Furthermore, it has been predicted that Gertz's limita-
tions on the spectre of catastrophic damages "should make libel more 
readily insurable by making awards more predictable;" "insurance 
companies should be able to evaluate risks more accurately, and there-
fore be more willing to underwrite risks previously avoided."429 This 
consequence is "the most promising approach"430 for fulfilling the first 
amendment's "profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."431 
3. Loyalty-Security 
There appears to be neither comprehensive data, nor adequate reli-
able sources for assembling it, on the number of Americans adversely 
affected by the sweeping post-World War II assaults on communica-
tive and associational rights posed by government loyalty-security pro-
grams. These regulations applied to a great many vocations, benefits 
and activities432 and were imposed by a majority of states433 as well as 
the federal government.434 In all, it was estimated that "more than 
one-sixth of the total civilian labor force was subject to some type of 
loyalty qualification,"435 the most common forms being traditional 
loyalty oaths, 436 substantive restrictions for the job, 437 and required 
428. Franklin, supra note 416, at 821-26. 
429. Anderson, supra note 427, at 42; see Libel Insurance Available from Six Different Carri· 
ers (Special Report on Libel), PRESSTIME, Nov. 1980, at 10. 
430. Anderson, supra note 427, at 42. 
431. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. 
432. See, e.g .• Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974) (ballot access); Baggett v. 
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (public employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (tax 
exemptions); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (practice of law). 
433. As of 1958, 24 jurisdictions subjected all public employees to the regime of these 
schemes and seven more states covered teachers. R. BROWN, JR., LoYALTY AND SECURITY 92 
& n.2 (1958). Various states also applied them to welfare benefits, see, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 110 
N.E.2d 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951) (unemployment benefits), public housing tenancy, see, e.g., Law-
son v. Housing Auth., 70 N.W.2d 605 (Wis.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1953), and even to 
social workers, veterinarians, boxers and wrestlers. See generally R. BROWN, supra, at 21-119, 
164-83; W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL REsTRAJNTS 129-30 
(1956) (discussing seemingly irrelevant loyalty oaths and investigations in licensing matters); 
Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 487, 496-97 (1963) 
(detailing epidemic of loyalty-security programs). 
434. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968) (licensed seamen); United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (labor leaders); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 
1972), ajfd., 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (passports). 
435. Developments in the Law- The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 1130, 1160 & n.144 (1972) (citing T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRES· 
SION 206 (1970)). 
436. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). 
437. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). 
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disclosures as a condition of employment.438 
Although the harmful repercussions of these programs are difficult 
to measure specifically, apart from those persons who actually exper-
ienced the physical and mental agonies associated with the lasting 
stain of false charges of disloyalty,439 there would appear to be two 
major groups of people who suffered their burdens. First, there were 
those who were deterred from seeking various jobs or benefits because 
of prior conduct that had been lawful when engaged in. For example, 
it has been estimated that as many as one million former Communists 
were present in the population.440 Second, there were those whose be-
havior, both at work and avocationally, was restrained because of the 
threat of being fired or subjected to more severe penalties. Thus, a 
1952 survey of government employees of professional rank recounted 
widespread fear of open political discussion even with close friends 
and fellow employees, alteration of reading habits and ownership of 
books, and reluctance to join organizations.441 
On the other side of the scale, although there appears to be no hard 
information on the number of "real subversives" who were actually 
deterred from seeking "sensitive" positions in either the public or pri-
vate sectors, existing data tend to show that a distressingly small gov-
ernment interest was served despite the programs' encompassing 
reach.442 This may be seen especially in the litigated cases, many of 
which involved members of pacifist religious groups.443 
In a long series of rulings (grounded in such constitutional doc-
438. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). 
439. See, e.g., Jahoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An Exploratory 
Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61 YALE L.J. 295, 316-17 (1952). 
440. See Sager, The Impact of Supreme Court Loyalty Oath Decisions, 22 AM. U. L. REV. 39, 
64 (1972). 
441. See Jahoda & Cook, supra note 439, at 308-15. An authoritative study in 1958 - con-
firmed more recently in 1972 - disclosed that 76% of teachers believed that loyalty systems 
would negatively affect their ability to teach properly. Sager, supra note 440, at 67-68. 
442. For example, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), although a meet-
ing of between 300 and 400 faculty members at the State University of New York at Buffalo 
originally opposed the contemplated loyalty system, by the time the action was commenced, only 
four (against whom no evidence of disloyalty was adduced) still refused to sign the oath. Brief 
for Appellants at 9, Keyishian. Similarly, a 1953 study of the newly enacted Pennsylvania pro-
gram found that the "only tangible results" were the resignation in protest of one official after he 
had taken the oath and the discharge of eight admittedly unimpeachable employees. Byse, A 
Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 480, 482 (1953). In the west, 26 
members of the University of California faculty were dismissed for refusing to sign the Regents' 
oath and 37 others resigned in protest; there was no evidence that any was a communist. R. 
BROWN, supra note 433, at 95. 
443. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 
(1966); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); see also Byse, supra note 442, at 482-83 (describing 
Quaker objections to loyalty oaths). 
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trines as vagueness,444 overbreadth,445 and procedural fairness446), the 
judiciary effectively eliminated the chilling consequences of the na-
tion's loyalty-security restrictions - although the Court's record in 
this area during the 1950's and 1960's was by no means uniform and 
has been said to have been significantly influenced by the national 
political climate.447 The Justices' impact is perhaps most sharply illus-
trated by the fact that between 1965 and 1972 virtually all of the 
thirty-three state and federal provisions for teachers that were on the 
books in 1964 were formally laid to rest - six by the Supreme Court 
and, following its lead, nineteen by lower federal courts, two by state 
courts, and four by state attorneys general. 448 
4. Obscenity 
In its 1957 ruling in Roth v. United States, 449 the Supreme Court 
held for the first time that "portrayal of sex . . . in art, literature and 
scientific works"450 - unless it constitutes "obscenity" - falls within 
the protection of the first amendment. While a majority of American 
jurisdictions had already adopted the Roth view451 (although not as a 
constitutional requirement), many had not. Contrary to the Supreme 
Court's rule that, in order to be "obscene," "the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole" must appeal "to prurient interest,"452 
statutes in at least fourteen states - and occasional judicial decisions 
- had found writings to be obscene on the basis of merely "isolated 
passages."453 Furthermore, although Roth stipulated that, to be "ob-
scene," material must appeal to the prurient interest of "the average 
444. E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 
U.S. 278 (1961). 
445. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
446. E.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 
(1958); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Board of Educ. v. Mass, 47 Cal. 2d 
494, 304 P.2d 1015 (1956); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 
(1954); Lawson v. Housing Auth., 70 N.W.2d 605 (Wis.), cert denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955); 
Nathanson v. Adams, 207 Misc. 572, 138 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1955), appeal dismissed, 148 N.Y.S.2d 
742 (App. Div. 1956). 
447. J. CASPER, supra note 118, at 48-52. See generally J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 123-25. 
448. Sager, supra note 440, at 74. 
449. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
450. 354 U.S. at 487 (footnote omitted). 
451. See Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amend· 
ment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 539-40 (1975); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The 
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 70, 88-89 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 
Censorship of Obscenity]; Literature, supra note 381, at 345. 
452. 354 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). 
453. See Censorship of Obscenity, supra note 451, at 89; Literature, supra note 381, at 343-44 
& n.321. 
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person,"454 statutes in at least eleven states and some courts455 had 
continued to follow the 1868 English rule456 (repudiated by the Jus-
tices several months before Roth )457 that judged material on the basis 
of its impact on youth or other more susceptible members of society. 
Finally, whereas Roth and its Warren Court progeny (especially A 
Book Named ''John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. 
Attorney General of Massachusetts)458 defined "obscenity" as that 
which is "utterly without redeeming social importance,"459 a number 
of state courts and legislatures had proscribed various forms of expres-
sion simply because they contravened the community's current moral 
standards. For example, the New York courts condemned D.H. Law-
rence's The First Lady Chatterly on the ground that its theme is that it 
"is dangerous to the physical and mental health of a young woman to 
remain continent and that the most important thing in [Chatterly's] 
life, more important than any rule of law or morals, is the gratification 
of her sexual desire."460 In 1953, Georgia enacted a statute prohibit-
ing distribution of "any literature offensive to chastity or modesty, ex-
pressing or presenting to the mind or view something that purity and 
decency forbids to be exposed."461 The practice of censoring commu-
nication because of the objectionable nature of the ideas advocated was 
specifically invalidated by the Court in 1959.462 
Under the restrictive pre-Roth regime, a vast amount of literature, 
with indisputable if not classic "social importance," fell victim to sup-
pression.463 Yet more devastating were the less formal, but even more 
454. 354 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). 
455. See Literature, supra note 381, at 338-40. 
456. Queen v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868). 
457. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
458. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See gen~rally Lockhart, supra note 451, at 541-44. 
459. 354 U.S. at 484; see 383 U.S. at 418. 
460. People v. Dial Press, Inc., 182 Misc. 416, 418, 48 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 (Mag. Ct. 1944) 
(quoting People v. Berg, 241 A.D. 543, 544-45, 272 N.Y.S. 586, 587-88 (1934)), ajfd., 269 N.Y. 
514, 199 N.E. 513 (1935)). Other books were rejected in New York because they tended to 
"lower the standards of right and wrong specifically as to the sexual relation." People v. Van-
guard Press, Inc., 192 Misc. 127, 130, 84 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (Mag. Ct. 1947); People v. Berg, 241 
A.D. 543, 544-45, 272 N.Y.S. 586, 587-88 (1934), ajfd., 269 N.Y. 514, 199 N.E. 513 (1935). In 
Massachusetts, Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy was prosecuted because "[i]n the story, 
Clyde had killed his lovemate Roberta when her pregnancy threatened his social plans and an 
advantageous marriage. 'A story like this is indecent,' declainied the district attorney. 'It's an 
invitation to young people to learn birth control.'" A. HAYES, CITY LAWYER 238-39 (1942). 
461. GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-630la (1953). 
462. Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
463. Apart from titles already mentioned, the following books were among those determined 
to be "obscene" by courts or federal postal officials: Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer, Lewis, The 
Most Recent Troubles of "Tropic'~· A Chapter in Censorship, N.Y. Times Sunday Book Rev., Jan. 
21, 1962, at 4; Boccaccio's Decameron, Apuleius' Golden Ass, Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit, Er-
skine Caldwell's God's Little Acre, Literature, supra note 381, at 303 n.60; Alberto Moravia's 
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effective, tactics of police and district attorneys and the National Or-
ganization for Decent Literature (formed under the auspices of the 
Roman Catholic Hierarchy and extending to virtually every diocese in 
the country) who compiled "blacklists" and, through direct threats of 
boycott and implied threats of prosecution, succeeded in having be-
tween 300 and 750 titles of paperbacks withdrawn from sale in most 
American communities. 464 
Beyond this, the general inhibiting effects that the permissive pre-
Roth rules had on authors, editors, publishers and booksellers were 
substantial. As Judge Jerome Frank observed in the lower court in 
Roth: 
Fear of punishment serves as a powerful restraint on publication, and 
fear of punishment often means, practically, fear of prosecution. . . . If 
the definition of obscenity had a limited and fairly well known scope, 
that fear might deter restricted sorts of publications only. But on ac-
count of the extremely vague judicial definition of the obscene, a person 
threatened with prosecution ... [in respect to] almost any book which 
deals in an unconventional, unorthodox, manner with sex, may well ap-
prehend that, should the threat be carried out, he will be punished. As a 
result, each prosecutor becomes a literary censor (i.e., dictator) with im-
mense unbridled power, a virtually uncontrolled discretion. . . . Having 
no special qualifications for that task, nevertheless, he can, in large mea-
sure, determine at his will what those within his district may not read on 
sexual subjects. In that way, the statute brings about an actual prior 
restraint of free speech and free press which strikingly flouts the First 
Amendment. 465 
H.L. Mencken's complaint in 1917 is powerful and not atypical: 
[A]s a practical editor, I find that the Comstocks, near and far, are of-
tener in my mind's eye than my actual patrons. The thing I always have 
to decide about a manuscript offered for publication, before ever I give 
any thought to its artistic merit and suitability, is the question whether 
The Woman of Rome and Ernest Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls, Censorship of Obscen-
ity, supra note 451, at 35 n.170. 
464. See Literature, supra note 381, at 304-05, 310-11, 317. Among the books stilled were a 
collection of stories by Guy de Maupassant, Flaubert's Madame Bovary, William Faulkner's 
Pylon and Sanctuary, James M. Cain's Mildred Pierce and The Postman Always Rings Twice, 
Erskine Caldwell's Tobacco Road and A Place Called Estherville, John Dos Passos' The Forty. 
Second Parallel, James T. Farrell's Young Lonigan and A World I Never Made, Thomas Heg-
gen's Mister Roberts, Pierre Louys' Aphrodite, W. Somerset Maugham's Fools and Their Folly 
and The Painted Veil, John O'Hara's Appointment in Sama"a and Butterfield 8, Emile Zola's 
Nana and Theresa, Nelson Algren's The Man With The Golden Ann, Niven Busch's Duel in the 
Sun, C.S. Forester's The African Queen, Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms, James A. 
Michener's Tales of the South Pacific, Christopher Morley's Kitty Foy le, Irwin Shaw's The Young 
Lions, Natalit. Anderson Scott's The Story of Mrs. Murphy, Ben Ames Williams' The Strange 
Woman, and James Warner Bellah's Ward 20. Also included were such nonfiction works as The 
Sexual Side of Marriage by M.J. Exner, M.D., How Shall I Tell My Child by Belle S. Mooney, 
M.D., and The Story of My Psychoanalysis by John Knight. Id. at 316-19. 
465. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 820-22 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring) 
(footnotes omitted), affd., 354 U.S. 476 (1956). 
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its publication will be permitted - not even whether it is intrinsically 
good or evil, moral or immoral, but whether some roving Methodist 
preacher, self-commissioned to keep watch on letters, will read inde-
cency into it. Not a week passes that I do not decline some sound and 
honest piece of work for no other reason. I have a long list of such 
things by American authors, well-devised, well-imagined, well-executed, 
respectable as human documents and works of art - but never to be 
printed in mine or any other American magazine. It includes four or five 
short stories of the very first rank, and the best one-act play yet done, to 
my knowledge, by an American. All of these pieces would go into type 
at once on the Continent; no sane man would think of objecting to them; 
they are no more obscene, to a normal adult, than his own bare legs. ·nut 
they simply cannot be printed in the United States, with the law what it 
is and the courts what they are.466 
As for those who seek to challenge the system, "[a] publisher en-
meshed in litigation in a number of jurisdictions - either directly or 
through the indemnities to booksellers that prevail in the book trade 
- soon finds himself facing legal expenses that make publication of 
the book unprofitable, and may even jeopardize his economic exist-
ence. "467 And authors are even more vulnerable because 
the author is ordinarily less able to bear the financial risk involved in a 
book that might be suppressed as obscene, and his contract with the pub-
lisher may even contain a clause that "Thf? author hereby guarantees 
. . . that the work . . . contains nothing of a scandalous, an immoral or 
a libelous nature." The inevitable tendency is to make the serious author 
timid, to cramp his mind so that the books he is not afraid to write will 
fall far below the level of his abilities. And society, as a consequence of 
the anxiety to suppress smut at all costs, may lose the values of impor-
tant literary, scientific, and educational contributions. In their place it 
may have a distorted literature, unfaithful to life, and perhaps even a 
blacking out of rational public discussion of social problems of immense 
public importance.468 
The extent to which the availability of socially meaningful and val-
uable sex-related literature has become generally enhanced since the 
Court's 1957 pronouncement in Roth really needs no documentation 
for any observer. Writing in 1960, William Lockhart and Robert Mc-
Clure reported that beginning in mid-1957, the National Organization 
for Decent Literature had begun "to decline as a potent force in the 
suppression of books and magazines."469 Although they could not 
trace a direct causal relationship between .. : [the Court's] decisions 
and opinions and the changes in the censorship pattern . . . it is equally 
466. H. MENCKEN, Puritanism as a Literary Force, in A BOOK OF PREFACES 197, 277 
(1917). 
467. Jurisdictional Statement at 13, Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
468. Literature, supra note 381, at 373 (footnotes omitted). 
469. Literature, supra note 381, at 373. 
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difficult to avoid drawing the inference that the new constitutional stan-
dards must have contributed to the relative freedom from censorship 
that now exists for both paper-bound and hard-cover books.470 
Ten years later, Charles Rembar observed that 
[l]iterary censorship has its most important impact . . . on the author. 
If he must keep an eye on the law, we are deprived of his best efforts. 
That perversion of the creative process ha[s] been stopped .... Since 
the time of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, there has been no high-court deci-
sion holding any book to be obscene. If there have been any contrary 
low-court decisions that remain unreversed, it is only because they have 
not been appealed. 471 
Although several empirical studies found that the Justices' rulings 
had only minimal effect on the merchandising practices of booksellers 
and newsdealers,472 and that wholesalers and retailers - especially in 
smaller communities - often responded to the threats of censorship 
groups by withdrawing publications and succumbing to restrictions 
"that were not consistent with their usual practices or with Supreme 
Court decisions,"473 broader inquiry disclosed that "the Supreme 
Court's impact ha[d] been considerable."474 When "wholesalers or re-
tailers perceived that they could defend themselves and took a stand 
against the censors, they frequently succeeded."475 Often, prosecutors 
simply "refused to back the movement and told the censors that the 
materials they sought to suppress were not legally obscene," and "the 
censorship drive ceased when its members became convinced that con-
victions could not be obtained under the law or when court suits were 
dismissed or decided in favor of newsdealers."476 Moreover, because 
"the Supreme Court's decisions were economically beneficial to pub-
lishers,"477 they applied counterpressures on their distributors to mar-
ket "the more popular girlie, romance, and adventure magazines,''478 
which were now plainly protected constitutionally.479 
470. Censorship of Obscenity, supra note 451, at 7, 13 (footnotes omitted). 
471. Rembar, Introduction to OBSCENITY: THE CoMPLETE ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE 
THE SUPREME 0..URT IN THE MAJOR OBSCENITY CASES at xii (L. Friedman ed. 1970). 
472. Levine, Constitutional Law and Obscene Literature: An Investigation of Bookseller Cen-
sorship Practices, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME CoURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDJES 129, 
138-41 (f. Becker ed. 1969) (noting, however, that the survey is inconclusive about the impact of 
legal norms of obscenity on bookseller behavior); Rodgers, Censorship Campaigns in Eighteen 
Cities: An Impact Analysis, 2 AM. PoL. Q. 371, 376 (1974). 
473. Rodgers, supra note 472, at 378; see also id. at 379. 
474. Id. at 385. 
475. Id. at 380. 
476. Id. at 381. 
477. Id. at 382. 
478. Id. at 383. 
479. Indeed, an ancillary benefit to free expression noted was that "since erotic publications 
usually sold well and yielded a good profit" and "since many of the retailers and some of the 
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Finally, there is no indication that the Burger Court's 1973 deci-
sion in Miller v. California480 - which promulgated a "substantially 
modified constitutional standard for separating obscenity from consti-
tutionally protected material dealing with sex"481 - has resulted in 
any significant revival of the suppression of socially important com-
munication. Because of the uncertainties created by Miller's some-
what relaxed first amendment strictures on the regulation of sex-
related expression, 482 there were widespread predictions - in the 
phrase of one prosecutor - of "a totally different ball game."483 
Within the year, however, the Justices' unanimous ruling in Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 484 that the film Carnal Knowledge "could not be found under 
the Miller standards to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
way,"485 made clear that Miller had not eviscerated the Warren 
Court's protection of first amendment values in this area. Just as prior 
experience under the post-Roth system had indicated that successful 
censorship campaigns were very short-lived,486 "contrary to the expec-
tations of civil libertarians," the Miller edict has had "relatively little 
effect."487 An analysis of "censorship incidents" in American libraries 
showed that virtually the same number occurred in each of the years 
immediately preceding and following Miller. 488 And a comprehensive 
empirical study of Miller's impact concluded that 
both the number of jurisdictions conducting obscenity prosecutions and 
the total number of obscenity prosecutions have declined since the Court 
wholesalers ran marginally profitable businesses," their continued ability to carry the less socially 
valuable publications averted their going out of business altogether. Id. at 382. 
480. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
481. Lockhart, supra note 451, at 544. 
482. See Lockhart, supra note 451, at 544-57. 
483. Project, An Empirical Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of 
Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 810, 858 (1977) (quoting Washington Post, June 23, 1973, § B, at 
9, col. 2). These expectations were given credence by stories immediately following the decision 
that Playboy and similar publications had been ordered off the newsstands in cities such as Ash-
land, Ohio, Charlottesville, Virginia, and Gulfport, Mississippi, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 
30, 1973, at 25, and that copies of Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five had been burned in 
Drake, North Dakota, TIME, July 8, 1974, at 56. Moreover, a majority of states adopted the new 
Miller definition either by statute or judicial construction. Project, supra. at 936. However, the 
obscenity laws of some jurisdictions were invalidated by state or federal courts under the Miller 
standard. See, e.g., Stroud v. Indiana, 263 Ind. 3, 300 N.E.2d 100 (1973); Hamar Theatres, Inc. 
v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated, 419 U.S. 1085 (1974). In addition, some 
states (including Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, South Dakota and West Virginia), even after 
Miller, elected to regulate only the distribution of obscene materials to minors and unconsenting 
adults. Project, supra, at 864-65, 937. · 
484. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 
485. 418 U.S. at 161. 
486. Rodgers, supra note 472, at 374-75. 
487. TIME, July 8, 1974, at 56. 
488. Shuman, A Geography of Censorship: A Regional Analysis of Recent Cases, 26 NEws-
LETIER. ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 3 (1977). 
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promulgated its new standard. This reduction occurred despite a finding 
that the quantity and the explicitness of hard core pornography have 
almost universally increased. In addition, the survey shows that neither 
nonprosecutory nor extra-legal methods have supplanted criminal prose-
cution as a regulatory tool. Rather, the study indicates, prosecutors in 
the years since Miller have accorded a lowered priority to obscenity 
prosecutions, and communities throughout the nation have evidenced a 
growing tolerance of sexually explicit materials. The empirical research 
shows, moreover, that both the nationwide conviction rate and the per-
ceptions of prosecutors about the likelihood of conviction in obscenity 
trials in their own jurisdictions have remained constant since the Roth-
Memoirs era.489 
It is, of course, impossible to determine the precise influence that 
the Justices' rulings on sexual expression have had on shaping public 
attitudes and mores. It is equally difficult to ascertain the impact dur-
ing the last three decades of such obviously important factors as demo-
graphic changes and the revolution that has occurred within the 
communications media generally. But there is no question that there 
has been a "drastic restructuring of the boundaries of permissible sex-
ual speech."49° As a result, "even those dealers who voluntarily cen-
sor their stock increasingly accept literature which treats sex boldly" 
and the tolerance level of the censorship groups themselves has been 
markedly raised.491 This had led to "jury acquittals on materials that 
jurors until recently would have declared obscene," which, in tum has 
"influenced prosecutors to handle only cases involving particularly 
hard core materials."492 In all, the quantum of communication reach-
ing the American public has increased enormously and the Court has 
undoubtedly played a major role. 
5. Group Legal Services 
Although a handful of group legal service plans had existed openly 
for over a half century, until the 1960's these enterprises (and other 
less visible ones, such as assistance by labor unions with respect to 
grievances against employers) had been stringently opposed by the 
professional ethics canons of the organized bar and regularly enjoined 
by state courts.493 This condition was drastically altered by a series of 
Supreme Court decisions articulating the constitutional right of indi-
viduals to band together to secure "meaningful access to the 
489. Project, supra note 483, at 858-59. 
490. Rodgers, supra note 472, at 386. 
491. Id. 
492. Project, supra note 483, at 898. 
493. See Schwartz, Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 UCLA L. REv. 279 (1965) (fore-
word to The Availability of Counsel and Group Legal Services: A Symposium). 
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courts."494 In addition to facilitating immeasurably the work of civil 
rights organizations such as the NAACP and ACLU,495 the Justices' 
newly formulated constitutional principle enormously spurred the 
growth of group legal service programs throughout the country. 
Most importantly, 
[a]s a result of the Court's decisions, the ABA abandoned its antagonism 
towards these plans and actively endorsed prepaid legal services. In 
1970, it established a committee to study the area and, together with 
other organizations, it developed the first large scale plan which is still in 
existence today. Moreover, in 1975, the ABA removed almost all the 
ethical restrictions discouraging attorneys from participating in these 
plans by amending its Code of Professional Responsibility.496 
Congress contributed its support by changing the Taft-Hartley Act to 
require employers to bargain in good faith over the creation of prepaid 
legal service plans497 and by affording favorable federal tax treatment 
to such employer-funded programs.498 
Although the escalation of health plan costs and the generally ad-
verse state of the national economy have deterred labor unions from 
pressing more aggressively in collective bargaining negotiations for in-
clusion of legal service programs as fringe benefits, 499 the increase in 
the number of such plans has nonetheless been extremely encourag-
ing. 500 Nationally, it has been estimated that there are between 3,000 
and 5,000 plans in operation, 501 "partly serving the legal needs of nine 
494. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971); see also 
United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (first and 
fourteenth amendments give union the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its mem-
bers in the assertion of their legal rights); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel 
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (union has a constitutional right to recommend particular 
attorneys to its members to handle their injury claims); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) 
(NAACP has a constitutional right to provide legal counsel for its members in individual racial 
discrimination suits). 
495. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Jn re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
496. Comment, Prepaid Legal Services: Obstacles Hampering Its Growth and Development, 
47 FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 841-42 (1979). 
497. 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(a)-(c) (1982). 
498. See I.R.C. §§ 120, 501(c)(20) (1982). 
499. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES - Soc10-EcoNOMIC IM-
PACTS 31-33 (1976) (adverse state of economy); Labor Letter, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1981, at l, col. 
5 (escalation of health plan costs). 
500. For example, during 1982 the United Auto Workers included prepaid legal benefits in 
contracts with General Motors, Chrysler, and American Motors, and the Sheet Metal Workers 
obtained coverage for 6,000 members and their families. White, More Workers Gaining Prepaid 
Legal Insurance, 68 A.B.A. J. 1558, 1558-59 (1982). Moreover, whereas California had practi-
cally no such programs prior to 1969, statistics for the five-year period beginning in July of that 
year showed nearly 700 group legal service arrangements by 1974 covering about 1.5 million 
people. Letter from Judith C. Cheney, Senior Legal Services Program Developer, State Bar of 
California, to the author (May 16, 1979). 
501. See Saks, Insurance Trends and Topics, 9 Esr. PLAN. 248, 249 (1982); St. Antoine, 
Growth Patterns in Legal Services, AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, Feb. 1976, at 19, 19. 
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to ten million persons."502 In addition, the nation's major insurance 
companies continue to increase their marketing efforts for the 
programs. 503 
Further, early data substantiate the view that group plans will re-
spond to the problem of serious underutilization of lawyers' services in 
the United States. 504 A careful empirical survey of the first major pro-
gram of the 1970's (the Laborers Local No. 229 Legal Service Plan)5os 
disclosed that during its first year the number of members consulting 
attorneys was sixty percent greater than in the immediately preceding 
year and that a significant segment of these people "would not have 
seen a lawyer were it not for their membership in the plan."506 Fur-
ther, the participating attorneys reported "that even when a member 
might have brought a problem to a lawyer anyway, the legal insurance 
plan enabled the member to get more extensive service."507 The evi-
dence also indicated that the program encouraged preventive legal 
assistance ("use of lawyers for advice only")508 but showed "no signs 
of a flood of trivial matters being taken to lawyers."509 When the 
plan's experimental phase was about to expire after three years, the 
union's rank and file - which had originally been only passively inter-
ested in it - "made it clear that they wished the program to continue 
and would contribute the funds necessary to support it."510 
Whether or not the promise of group legal services plans - whose 
childhood and adolescence is directly attributable to the Justices' par-
entage - will fully mature remains for the future. But there is reason 
to believe that the very optimistic predictions of the mid-1970's- that 
within a decade legal plans would serve as many as twenty million 
subscribers, comprising about seventy percent of all people who con-
502. Murphy, The Impact of Prepaid Legal Services Upon the Minority Bar, 5 BLACK L.J. 4, 
11 (1976) (emphasis added to make clear that the typical plan does not provide comprehensive 
coverage but rather applies only to designated areas such as auto accidents, employment griev-
ances, etc.); see also 68 A.B.A. J. 1559, supra note 500 (estimated 5.5 million persons and family 
members covered in 1983). 
503. Saks, supra note 501, at 249. 
504. See B. CURRAN & F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 91 (1974) (more 
than 50% of respondents indicated interest in joining relatively low-cost prepayment or insur-
ance type legal service plan); see also text at notes 1226-28 infra. 
505. Generally known as the "Shreveport Plan," the program was a pilot project developed 
and partially funded by the ABA, Ford Foundation and Louisiana and Shreveport Bar Associa-
tions. Note, supra note 496, at 842 n.9. 
506. F. MARKs, R. HAI.LAUER & R. CLIFTON, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT 
IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES 61-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited as F. MARKS]. 
507. Id. at 62. 
508. Id. 
509. Id. at 65. 
510. Politz, Prepaid Legal Services: The Public Interest, 21 BAYLOR L. R.Ev. 405, 407 (1975). 
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sult lawyers511 - may yet be realized at some time within the foresee-
able future. 
D. Religious Freedom: Public Schools 
1. Prayers 
Several surveys, undertaken shortly before the Court's decisions in 
the early 1960's forbidding prayer and Bible reading ceremonies in the 
public schools,512 revealed that these activities were either permitted 
or required in seventy-five to eighty-five percent of the states,513 and 
actually in operation in about half of the school districts in the 
country.514 
There are at least two major difficulties - one qualitative and the 
other quantitative - in assessing the full impact on individual rights 
of the Justices' pronouncements. First, given their present state of 
learning, psychologists and sociologists cannot measure with any real 
accuracy the actual nature of the threat to religious liberty posed by 
sectarian practices in public schools, especially when dissenters are ex-
cused from participation.515 But despite this empirical uncertainty, 
the existence of the potential danger has been almost universally rec-
ognized. It has been widely observed that young people of minority 
religious groups, or with no religious affiliation at all, are extremely 
sensitive about conspicuously absenting themselves from religious ex-
ercises conducted by the majority and that there is a powerful, albeit 
subtle, pressure to conform.516 The emotional strain is very fre-
511. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 499, at 103; SPECIAL CoMMITIEE ON 
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, A PRIMER OF PREPAID LEGAL 
SERVICES 18 (P. Murphy ed. 1974); see also Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for 
Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122, 146-55 (1980); Politz, supra note 510. 
512. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421 (1962). . 
513. R. DIERENFELD, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOIS 21 (1962); K. DOLBEARE 
& P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS 29 (1971). 
514. Katz, Patterns of Compliance With the Schempp Decision, 14J. PUB. L. 396, 405 (1965). 
515. See Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark -A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme 
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 177 (1963) (no danger if participation in 
ceremony is voluntary). 
516. Social psychologists and sociologists have pointed out that children place great impor-
tance on how they are esteemed by their peers. J. BOSSARD & E. BOLL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT 411 (4th ed. 1966). The need to fit in with classmates is peculiarly strong. 
Id. at 428-29; see also Cushm;m, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 
495 (1955). The "fear of being accused by the others of wanting to be 'different'" and the "very 
strong need to remain a member of one's group" are carried so far as to cause these children to 
do and say things in accordance with the majority that they are convinced are wrong, even with 
reference to simple perceptual materials. R. BERENDA, THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP ON 
THE JUDGMENTS OF CHILDREN 30, 14-33 (1950). This is particularly prevalent "where the situa-
tion is ambiguous and not very clear cut." Id. at 32. 
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quently so great that it results in unwilling participation in ceremonies 
that are contrary to deeply held religious or conscientious precepts in 
preference to some amount of social ostracism.517 The option either to 
participate in the majority's religious worship or "to suffer the pain of 
psychic loneliness" has been described as forcing these immature stu-
dents "to choose between equally intolerable alternatives."518 Even 
religious educators have warned "that so-called voluntary exemption 
[from religious observances] does not overcome the compulsion ex-
erted by majority behavior."519 
Second, because of the unwillingness of dissenters to come forward 
and identify themselves,520 the actual number of children whose reli-
gious liberty was infringed by these devotional exercises is highly un-
certain. But given the broad heterogeneity of the nation's school 
population, the insuperable problems encountered by those who have 
attempted to fashion a religiously unobjectionable prayer,521 and the 
fact that no version of the Bible has been found acceptable even by all 
the major religious faiths, 522 there is little doubt that the number was 
substantial. 
Few decisions of the Supreme Court have generated greater polit-
ical hostility and popular noncompliance than those proscribing 
prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, 523 conditions that con-
tinue, albeit considerably abated, to the present.524 Nonetheless, a se-
ries of studies within the first few years of the rulings disclosed that, 
517. See generally Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Stan-
dard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 343-46 (1963) (discussing indirect coercion as a violation of the 
establishment clause). 
518. Address by Professor Robert Bierstedt, The Use of Public Schools for Religious Pur-
poses, ACLU Biennial Conference, June 22, 1962, at 10 (available in American Civil Liberties 
Union Archives, Princeton University Library). 
519. Committee on Religion and Public Education of the National Council of Churches of 
Christ, Relation of Religion to Public Education - A Study Document, INTL. J. RELIGIOUS 
Enuc., April 1960, at 21, 29. 
520. See Choper, Comments, 23 J. LEGAL Enuc. 143, 145-46 (1970). 
521. Choper, supra note 517, at 368-69. 
522. Id. at 372-75. 
523. More than fifty proposed constitutional amendments were introduced in Congress 
within three days of the Engel decision, and following Schempp, by the close of the Eighty-
eighth Congress, more than one hundred fifty amendments had been introduced. Proposed 
constitutional amendments seeking to overturn these decisions have been introduced in Con-
gress in every year since 1962. The Senate has voted twice on such proposals, the House 
once. In each instance the measure was defeated. 
Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (1983); see 
also J. CHoPER, supra note I, at 131, I<i7, 152, 158 & citations therein; Beaney & Beiser, Prayer 
and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, 13 J. Pue. L. 475, 477-
83 (Engel), 486-503 (Schempp and proposed constitutional amendment) (1964). 
524. See, e.g., Prayers in Schools Still at Issue 17 Years After Ruling, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 
1980, at A20, col. I. In 1982, the Reagan administration proposed a constitutional amendment 
to "remove the bar to school prayer established by the Supreme Court." President's Message to 
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despite the unusually high degree of resentment and recalcitrance, 
these religious exercises had been either completely or almost com-
pletely eliminated in about two-thirds of all school districts in the na-
tion. 525 Indeed, "with the exception of the South, the practices had 
largely disappeared in public elementary schools by the academic year 
1964-65."526 By 1973, the date of the most recent known survey, the 
national compliance level had reached ninety percent. 527 Thus, de-
spite persisting efforts to overturn the Court's edicts528 and sporadic 
episodes of outright defiance, 529 in the main, voluntary acceptance by 
the vast percentage of the populace and vigorous policing of the excep-
tions by the state and federal judiciary530 have effectively extinguished 
these violations of freedom of individual conscience. 
2. Evolution 
In 1968, when the Court held in Epperson v. Arkansas531 that a 
statute forbidding public school teachers to teach Darwin's theory of 
evolution violated the first amendment's religion clauses, only two 
states - Arkansas and Mississippi - had "such 'anti-evolution' or 
the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, 18 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 664, 665 (May 
17, 1982); see also ACLU, Civil Liberties Alert, No. 6, at 1 (July 1983). 
525. See Reich, The Impact of Judicial Decision Making: The School Prayer Cases, in THE 
SUPREME COURT AS POLICY-MAKER 44, 47 (D. Everson 2d ed. 1972) ("In 1960 forty-one per-
cent (41%) of the responding school districts reported devotional Bible reading; in 1966 thirteen 
percent (13%) reported it"); Way, Survey Research on Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible 
Reading Cases, 21 W. PoL. Q. 189, 191 (1968) ("By the academic year 1964-65 the situation had 
changed from the pre-1962 figure of 60 per cent of the classrooms saying prayers at sometime to 
only 28 percent."); Dolbeare & Hammond, Inertia in Midway: Supreme Court Decisions and 
Local Responses, 23 J. LEGAL Eouc. 106, 110 (1970) ("about one-third of all districts were still 
not complying"); Katz, supra note 514, at 403 (19 of 25 states report that Bible reading has 
"completely" or "almost completely stopped"). It must be noted that this data is the product of 
self-reporting by school districts of their official policies (rather than observation of actual prac-
tices in individual classrooms) and thus may be less than wholly trustworthy. 
526. Way, supra note 525, at 189. 
5').7. Prayer: An Issue Without an Amen, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1980 (Education) at 3, col. 1. 
528. See notes 523-24 supra. 
529. See Harris, A School Prayer Rebellion, S.F. Examiner, Mar. 21, 1982 (This World), at 
22; High Court's Rulings Against School Prayer Are Often Violated, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 1, 
col. 1. 
530. See, e.g., Jalfree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1707 
(1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 
1980); DeSpain v. Dekalb County School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 
U.S. 906 (1968); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); 
Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 
(1977), cert. denied, 434 u.s: 877 (1977); Opinion of the Justices, 387 Mass. 201, 440 N.E.2d 
1161 (Mass. 1982); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978). Compare 
Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983), and Beck v. McElrath, 548 
F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), vacated, 718 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1983), with Gaines v. Ander-
son, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976) (minute of silence at beginning of school day). 
531. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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'monkey' laws on their books."532 Moreover, there was good reason to 
believe that even in these jurisdictions the laws' impact was 
nonexistent. 533 
Despite the absence of formal enforcement of the two state laws, 
however, other evidence strongly indicates that the efforts of anti-
evolution partisans - who caused twenty state legislatures to seri-
ously consider banning Darwinism in the 1920's534 - had by no 
means failed. The fact is that during this time administrative regula-
tions and public opinion were more effective than state legislation in 
restricting student knowledge about human biological history. For ex-
ample, when the state legislatures in Louisiana, North Carolina and, 
originally, Mississippi declined to enact anti-evolution laws, the state 
school superintendents or boards of education, responding to clerical 
influence, accomplished the same result by administrative edict, as did 
local school boards in Portland, Oregon and Charlotte, North 
Carolina. 535 
Further, studies from many parts of the country - including At-
lanta, Chattanooga, Nashville and New York City - reported that 
teachers succumbed to informal pressures, with or without official 
threats of dismissal.536 A 1926 general survey of high school curricula 
found that 
physics and chemistry received a disproportionate emphasis and that bi-
ological sciences were neglected. Even when biology was studied, the 
subjects, evolution and genetics, ... were "practically ignored." ... 
Even in 1933, a large number of questionnaires from the South and Bor-
der States reported that evolution cannot be taught. In some places it 
may be described as a theory refuted. Many teachers dare not even men-
532. 393 U.S. at 101. 
533. In Arkansas, the Little Rock school administration "had inadvertently violated its own 
law ... by revising public-school biology textbooks to include a chapter on evolution," NEWS· 
WEEK, Nov. 25, 1968, at 37, and such textbooks had been "commonly used in Arkansas 
schools," TIME, Nov. 22, 1968, at 41. Furthermore, there had never been a single recorded 
attempt to enforce the statute since its passage in 1928. In 1970, when the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, relying on Epperson, invalidated its 1926 statutes, the trial court had dismissed the cha!· 
lenger's complaint "because it did not charge that the defendants were making any effort to, or 
threatening, to enforce these laws." Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 694 (Miss. 1970). Indeed, in 
1967, when a science teacher was discharged for violating Tennessee's similar 1925 enactment, 
made famous by the celebrated Scopes case, Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), 
the Tennessee legislature itself acted to repeal the prohibition. See Academic Freedom: Opposi· 
tion to Ban on Teaching Evolution, 96 SCH. & Soc. 329, 330 (1968). 
534. 393 U.S. at 101 n.8. 
535. H. BEALE, ARE AMERICAN TEACHERS FREE? 228-29 (1936). In Paducah, Kentucky, 
after proposed legislation was defeated in two consecutive years, two high school teachers were 
denied reappointment "because parents accused them of propounding evolution.'' Allen, The 
Anti-Evolution Campaign in America, 24 CuRRENT H1sr. 893, 894, 897 (1926). Similarly, in 
Portland, Oregon, "a manual training teacher was ousted . • . partly because he believed in 
evolution.'' H. BEALE, supra, at 231. 
536. H. BEALE, supra note 535, at 234-37. 
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tion the word "evolution." Some of them report that they use textbooks 
in which evolution is discussed, but that they have to skip over that 
section. 537 
81 
A 1930 report concluded that the teaching of evolutionary principles 
has been quietly abolished throughout the greater part of the United 
States. . . . Nothing can be taught in 70 percent of the secular schools 
of this Republic today not sanctioned by the hosts of 
Fundamentalism. . . . 
... During 1928-29 only three [anti-evolution] bills were presented. 
It is but natural that the general public should assume that "the fight is 
over, and science has won." 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The Fundamentalists have 
merely changed their tactics. As one of their leaders has worded it, ~'We 
were too precipitate; we must go directly to the people themselves and 
not depend on the legislators."538 
There appears to be no comprehensive data as to whether these 
conditions persisted in succeeding decades. But such facts from the 
1960's as the firing of an instructor in Tennessee,539 allegations that 
"numerous teachers" refused to teach evolution in Mississippi, 540 and 
the continuing controversy since the 1970's over the role of creation-
ism theory in public school science courses541 plainly show that the 
issue is still very much alive. 
It is clear that the Court's ruling in Epperson has not resulted in all 
public school pupils learning about Darwinism. For one thing, one of 
the fundamentalists' most successful avenues of attack - beginning in 
the 1920's and continuing into the 1970's -has been to influence biol-
ogy textbook authors and publishers to omit or minimize discussion of 
evolution, 542 a practice beyond the reach of the Justices' mandate. 
Moreover, although Epperson plainly forbids the use of any religiously 
motivated criteria in the appointment process and bars sanctions 
against instructors for teaching evolution in their classes, the difficulty 
in actually proving such matters probably limits the full effectiveness 
537. H. BEALE, supra note 535, at 238. 
538. Shipley, Growth of the Anti-Evolution Movement, 32 CURRENT HISr. 330 (1930). 
' 539. See note 533 supra. 
540. Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 694 (Miss. 1970). 
541. See Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 
515, 515-18 (1978). Indeed, it is yet unknown whether the recent federal district court judgment, 
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D.Ark. 1982), which relied on Epperson 
to invalidate Arkansas' "Creation-science" law, will finally still the efforts in over 20 other state 
legislatures in which nearly identical bills have either been enacted or introduced. Religious 
Zeal, Religious Tyranny, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at A24, col. 1; Cookson, Professors Fight 
Creation Bill, N.Y. Times Higher Educ. Supp., June 5, 1981, at 6; O'Neil, Creationism, Curricu-
lum, and the Constitution, 68 ACADEME, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 21. 
542. See Grabiner & Miller, Effects of the Scopes Trial, 185 SCIENCE 832, 832-35 (1974); 
Evolution and Education (letters to the editor), 187 SCIENCE 389, 389-90 (1975). 
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of this security. In addition, the fact that "teachers generally realize 
that nonconformity injures them and that conventional ideas and im-
plicit obedience are the means to professional advancement,"543 un-
doubtedly results in many teachers continuing to follow the path of 
least resistance. But it is equally clear that the Court's decision has 
protected the jobs of those teachers unwilling to submit to subtle coer-
cion and has bolstered the courage of others similarly inclined. Fi-
nally, the fact that contemporary creationists are now resigned to 
seeking equal time rather than outright abolition of evolutionary the-
ory544 must also plausibly be attributed at least in part to the opera-
tional success of the Court's strictures. 
E. Sexual Conduct: Contraception 
Still under the influence of the nineteenth century congressional 
Comstock Act, as of the early 1960's, more than thirty states contin-
ued to impose various forms of restrictions or prohibitions in respect 
to contraception. 545 The laws in some jurisdictions (such as Arizona, 
Mississippi and New Jersey) were effectively rendered meaningless by 
administrative practice or judicial interpretation. 546 Despite repeated 
legislative efforts for liberalization, however, at least two states -
Connecticut and Massachusetts - flatly forbade all sale, distribution 
or advertisement of any device to prevent conception (Connecticut 
even making it a crime to use such articles for this purpose).547 Wis-
consin made it unlawful to transfer contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons. 548 Approximately one-third of the states permitted only 
physicians or licensed pharmacists to dispense contraceptives549 and 
more than half the states prohibited advertising, display or dissemina-
tion of information about them. 550 These oppressive restraints on sex-
ual freedom and family planning were all nullified by the Court 
543. H. BEALE, supra note 535, at 589. 
544. Wade, Creationists and Evolutionists: Confrontation in California, 178 SCIENCE 724, 
724 (1972). 
545. See c. DIENES, LAW, PoLmcs, AND BIRTH CONTROL, app. B. (1972); NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES, FAMILY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION AND VOL· 
UNTARY STERILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 
EACH STATE AND JURISDICTION 58 (U.S. Dept. Health, Educ., & Welfare, Pub. No. (HSA) 74-
16001, 1972) [hereinafter cited as FAMILY PLANNING - 1972]. 
546. See Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battles Over Birth Control, 49 COR· 
NELL L. Q. 275, 278 (1964); FAMILY PLANNING - 1972, supra note 545, at 60. 
547. See Comment, supra note 546, at 278-79; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 21 (West 
1980). 
548. See Wis. Stat. § 450.11(4) (1969). 
549. See C. DIENES supra note 545, app. B, at 317-19. 
550. See id. 
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beginning with its decision in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut, ssi fol-
lowed in 1972 by Eisenstadt v. Baird,ss2 and completed in 1977 by 
Carey v. Population Services International. ss3 
Of course, the revolution in the law's attitude toward contracep-
tion that has taken place since the mid-1960'sss4 cannot be attributed 
exclusively to the Court's intervention. The process of change in pub-
lic policy - stimulated particularly by political leaders and voluntary 
organizations (especially Planned Parenthood) as well as by many 
physicians and health professionals - had its origins several decades 
earlier.sss Despite the measured progress that preceded the Court's in-
itial pronouncement, however, the Griswold ruling provided the cata-
lyst for the gigantic reforms that occurred in its wake. ss6 Overall, in 
the six years following the Griswold benchmark, at least thirteen states 
repealed or substantially liberalized their anti-birth control laws. ss7 
Probably the most profound effect of the Court's mandate was for 
the underprivileged. Even in Connecticut and Massachusetts, in-
formed persons who could afford to consult private physicians within 
or without the state had no difficulty obtaining advice about contra-
ception;sss the law was enforced effectively only against birth control 
clinics which, in the main, aided those "without either adequate 
knowledge or resources to obtain private counseling."5s9 The situa-
tion was similar in those states which permitted only doctors or drug-
gists to dispense birth control devices and information.s60 For 1966, it 
was estimated "that women in the poverty sector experienced some 
551. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
552. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
553. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
554. See FAMILY PLANNING - 1972, supra note 545, at SS. 
555. See Jaffe, Public Policy on Fertility Control, 229 SCIENTIFIC AM. 17, 17 (1973). -
556. The day after the decision, the Chicago City Council's attorney ruled that Griswold 
"provided ample legal basis for approving the City's contract to purchase contraceptive supplies 
for the Board of Health." N. ST. JOHN·STEVAS, THE AGONIZING CHOICE: BIRTH CoNTROL, 
RELIGION AND THE LAW 54-55 (1971). Nine days later, the New York legislature rescinded its 
84-year-old ban on dissemination of birth control devices and information. See Ball, The Court 
and Birth Control COMMONWEAL, July 9, 1965 at 490, 493. Within less than a year of the 
Connecticut statute's invalidation, Massachusetts modified its absolute prohibition regarding 
contraception. See MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, Oct. 21, 1966, at 106. 
557. See FAMILY PLANNING - 1972, supra note 545, at 58. 
558. See Back in Business, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1965, at 60. 
559. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 503 (White, J., concurring). 
560. A report issued in 1965 by the Committee on Population of the National Academy of 
Sciences found that "The highest proportion of couples who never employ contraception or who 
have children beyond the number they intend is found among non-whites who live in the rural 
South or who have a rural southern background." The study suggested that most people who 
used contraception learned about it informally from friends or relatives or from family doctors, 
while "the disadvantaged groups . . . often do not have even these informal sources of informa· 
tion, and seldom consult private physicians." Birth Control: Academy Report Stresses Burdens of 
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450,000 unwanted births."561 Thus, prior to Griswold, according to a 
leading manufacturer of oral contraceptives, "the birth control market 
was severely limited by economics."562 
Although the federal government had not been wholly uncon-
cerned with this problem, its pre-Griswold activity had been only mini-
mal. In the words of one National Institutes of Health official: 
The honest fact is that until the Supreme Court finally moved, the fed-
. eral government regarded birth control as a political hot potato. We had 
a few research studies going. But generally, the spending of the govern-
ment for birth control research has been peanuts. As of Jan. 1, 1965, the 
total was $7-million, spread out over 280 research projects. For that 
kind of money, you don't get in-depth research; you just get isolated 
statistical studies. 563 
In the year following Griswold, HEW issued its first policy statement 
on family planning. President Johnson, in a special message to Con-
gress, cited family planning as one of four health problems requiring 
particular attention. In 1967, Congress designated family planning for 
special emphasis in the poverty program and provided that at least six 
percent of appropriations for maternal and child health be devoted to 
family planning projects; it also amended the Social Security Act to 
require that the states offer family planning services to all public assis-
tance recipients. In 1970, Congress passed the Family Planning Ser-
vices and Population Research Act, authorizing $382 million for 
programs of birth control services and research. By the mid-1970's, 
the national government had established an Office of Population Af-
fairs, a National Center for Family Planning Services and a Center for 
Population Research,564 and in 1977 there were at least nine different 
federal programs dealing with family planning of some kind. 565 
The family planning efforts of local government and privately fi-
nanced agencies increased in comparable fashion. In 1960, no more 
than 150 public and voluntary health agencies operated birth control 
programs,566 and in 1965 it was estimated that only about 470,000 
women in the United States received family planning assistance from 
High Birth Rates Among Impoverished Here, 148 SCIENCE 1205, 1206 (1965). See also C. 
DIENES, supra note 545, at 258 n.14. · 
561. C. DIENES, supra note 545, at 257. 
562. Popu[ation Control Takes a Forward Step, BUSINESS WEEK, June 19, 1965, at 108. 
563. Id. at 108 
564. Jaffe, supra note 555, at 17, 20. 
565. See OFFICE FOR FAMILY PLANNING, FAMILY PLANNING, CoNTRACEPTION, VOLUN· 
TARY STERILIZATION AND ABORTION: AN ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES, EACH STATE AND JURISDICTION 4 (U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Pub. No. 
(HSA) 79-5623, 1978) [hereinafter cited as FAMILY PLANNING - 1978]. 
566. See Jaffe, supra note 555, at 21. 
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these sources.567 But by 1972, "nearly 3,000 hospitals, health depart-
ments and voluntary agencies were providing services to an estimated 
2.6 million women"568 (up to 460,000 being never-married teenag-
ers), 569 and by 1975 this number had risen to more than 3.8 million.570 
In the decade between 1968 and 1978, the number of women coun-
seled in contraception and family planning by federally funded clinics 
increased more than fivefold to approximately 4.5 million,571 and in 
the five years between 1971 and 1976, the percentage of "sexually ex-
perienced never-married women aged 15-19" who always used some 
form of contraception nearly doubled. 572 
The impact of the Court's action in behalf of personal liberty may 
be seen most vividly in statistics revealing that "the incidence of un-
wanted pregnancy declined 36 percent between the first and second 
half of the 1960s"573 and that this reduction was greatest among 
blacks and women with little education. 574 Indeed, the decline in fer-
tility generally was "most pronounced among disadvantaged minori-
ties and low income groups, and among the poorest women as 
classified by the poverty index."575 Government expenditures for fam-
,ily planning services through Medicaid alone reached nearly $100 mil-
lion in 197 6. 576 
F. Right To Vote 
1. Denials: In General 
In a series of decisions between 1965 and 1970, the Court firmly 
established the principle that most laws "distributing the franchise"577 
- i.e., granting "the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requi-
site age and citizenship"578 but denying it to others - are presump-
567. G. PERKIN & D. RADEL, CuRRENT STATUS OF FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 14, 16 (Population Program, Ford Foundation 1966). 
568. Jaffe, supra note 555, at 21. 
569. Morris, Estimating the Need for Family Planning Services Among Unwed Teenagers, 6 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 91, 96 (1974). 
570. Cutright & Jaffe, Family Planning Program Effects on the Fertility of Low-Income U.S. 
Women, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 100, 100 (1976). 
571. HEW, FIVE·YEAR PLAN FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES AND POPULATION RE-
SEARCH 18 (Sept. 1979). 
572. Zelnik & Kantner, Sexual and Contraceptive Experience of Young Unmarried Women in 
the United States, 1976 and 1971, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 55, 62 (table 9) (1977). 
573. Jaffe, supra note 555, at 21. 
574. Cutright & Jaffe, supra note 570, at 101. 
575. Id. 
576. FAMILY PLANNING - 1978, supra note 565, at 125 (table 20). 
577. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). 
578. 395 U.S. at 627. 
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tively invalid. As a consequence, the barriers erected by a multitude of 
state provisions, disenfranchising massive numbers of voters, have 
been eliminated. 
The first important pronouncement was Carrington v. Rash, s79 in-
validating a Texas constitutional provision that denied the vote in state 
elections to all persons who came to Texas as members of the military 
so long as they remained in the armed service. Although only about a 
half dozen states had similar absolute bans, sso approximately half the 
states applied the prohibition to any such person living on a military 
base,ssi thus" '[f]encing out' from the franchise"S82 a notable segment 
of the population. 
Beyond military personnel, Carrington's most important conse-
quences have been for students residing at the colleges and universities 
that they attend. As of the early 1970's, "only six states ... permit-
ted students to register in their college town."ss3 The political impli-
cations of the contrary rule, ordained by Carrington, ss4 are apparent, 
given the many college communities throughout the nation in which 
student voting sentiment is potentially dispositive and the fact that 
college students vote at a substantially higher rate than their nonstu• 
dent counterparts. sss 
Probably the Court's most significant decision on the subject was 
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, ss6 holding that rules limiting the ballot 
to property taxpayers in elections concerning various forms of state 
and local indebtedness violated equal protection. Although the re-
quirement of property ownership as a qualification for voting gener-
579. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
580. Brief for Respondent at 36-38, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
581. A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, THE ELECTION PROCESS: VOTING LAWS AND PROCE· 
DURES 13 (1972). 
582. 380 U.S. at 94. 
583. A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, supra note 581, at 16 (Alaska, Colorado, Nebraska, 
Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
584. See, e.g., Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 
(1974); Auerbach v. Kinley, 499 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); cf Hershkoff v. Board of 
Registrars, 366 Mass. 570, 321 N.E.2d 656 (1974). 
585. R. WOLFINGER & s. ROSEN5f0NE, WHO VOTES? 56-57 (1980). "In Champaign, Illi-
nois, for example, 16,000 votes are cast at a usual election - the same as the number of students 
who live at the Llniversity of Illinois." A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, supra note 581, at 15 n.•. 
Indeed, in 1978, "student enrollment exceed[ed] the incumbent's margin of victory in 91 U.S. 
Congressional districts in 33 states." A. LEVINE, WHEN DREAMS AND HEROES DIED: A POR· 
TRAIT OF TODAY'S CoLLEGE STUDENTS 34 (1980); For discussion of continuing official barriers 
to students voting in campus communities, see Palmer, Student Groups Join in Proclaiming a 
'Right-to-Vote Emergency,' CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 1984, at 15. 
586. 399 U.S. 204 (1970); see also Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (restrict· 
ing franchise to property tax payers in elections on revenue bonds violates the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
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ally, which was dominant at the time the Constitution was ratified, 
had disappeared almost entirely during the Jacksonian era,587 as of 
1970 nearly one-third of the states continued to impose such a condi-
tion in order to vote on som~ bond issues. 588 The potential impact of 
the enfranchisement of all those citizens who were subject to the bene-
fits and burdens of such decisions589 may be strikingly illustrated by a 
1967 election in Houma, Louisiana, in which an issuance of utility 
revenue bonds was approved by a vote of 1828 to 896 property owners 
while "6,926 duly qualified and registered non-property tax paying 
voters"590 were forbidden to participate. 
The Court's rulings on whether "residents of requisite age and citi-
zenship"591 may be excluded from voting in the more than 20,000 
"special purpose districts" in the United States592 have drawn a some-
what ambiguous line. 593 But since school districts and junior college 
districts have been specifically held to be within the protective bounda-
ries, 594 and since these comprise about eighty percent of the "special 
purpose districts,"595 the broad effect of the Court's mandate has been 
manifest here as well. Finally, other decisions of the Justices - and of 
lower courts following their lead - have extended the right to vote to 
such previously disenfranchised groups as those living on federal en-
claves within the states596 and arrested persons being detained for 
trial.597 
587. See generally K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 77-111 
(1918). 
588. 399 U.S. at 213 n.11; see also Recent Developments, Voting - Property Qualifications 
for Voting in Special Purpose Districts: Beyo:;d the Scope of "One Man-One Vote," 59 CoRNELL 
L. REv. 687, 691 n.21 (1974). 
589. See 399 U.S. at 209-12. 
590. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 5, Cipriano v. City of Houma. 
591. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). 
592. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERN-
MENTS, FINANCES OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS, Vol. 4, No. 2, at 1 (1967). 
593. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (water district election law apportioning voting 
power according to number ofacres owned does not violate equal protection clause); Salyer Land 
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S 719 (1973) ("water storage district" 
election not subject to judicial scrutiny when benefits and burdens of election fall disproportion-
ately on landlords and assessments on land sole means by which expenses paid). But see John-
ston v. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 99 Ida. 501, 584 ·P.2d 646 (1978). 
594. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. 
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
595. J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES x (1957). 
596. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). Compare the long line of contrary state rul-
ings in Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1193-202 (1954). 
597. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); Arlee v. Lucas, 55 Mich. App. 340, 222 
N.W.2d 233 (1974). 
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2. Poll Taxes 
Historically, substitution of poll taxes for property-ownership re-
quirements for voting was intended to expand the franchise. 598 But 
when the eleven states of the old Confederacy enacted these levies dur-
ing the post-Reconstruction era,599 their purpose was rather to deny 
the ballot either to racial and ethnic minorities, or poor whites.600 Be-
cause of the plethora of other antivoting devices, both blatant and sub-
tle, directed particularly against racial minorities, it is difficult to 
determine precisely just how successful this effort was. Thus, although 
statistics in 1960 showed that a higher percentage of blacks were regis-
tered to vote in those southern states with poll taxes than in those 
without them, 601 it has been observed that if the numerous extralegal 
"restraints on Negro voting disappeared overnight, the economic bur-
den of the tax would be a real obstacle to voting by poorer Ne-
groes."602 Further, data from various periods strongly imply that the 
poll tax did pose a significant deterrent to exercise of the franchise. 603 
By 1966, when the Court, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections, 604 invalidated poll taxes, only four states - Alabama, Mis-
sissippi, Texas and Virginia - continued to exact them.605 The evi-
dence of their inhibiting effect on voting, although again less than 
conclusive (especially because of the contemporaneous influence of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and sustained black voter registration 
drives) is nonetheless impressive. The data that perhaps best isolates 
the deterrent impact of these poll taxes from other disincentives to 
voting may be found by comparing the percentage of eligible citizens 
casting ballots in the 1964 presidential election to that in 1960. The 
598. See Nimmo & McCleskey, Impact of the Poll Tax on Voter Participation: The Houston 
Metropolitan Area in 1966, 31 J. POL. 682, 682 (1969). 
599. Id. 
600. See H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-22 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1821, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962); J. PERRY, DEMOCRACY BEGINS AT HOME 205 (1944); cf. F. OGDllN, 
THE POLL TAX IN Th'!. SOUTH 144-68 (1958) (study of comparison of poll tax rates of payment 
showed fewer voters in counties with a dense population, a high degree of urbanism and a high 
percentage of nonwhites). 
601. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 28, 1960, at 40, 41. 
602. V. KEY, supra note 87, at 618 (1949). 
603. For example, in 1897, prior to Louisiana's imposition of the tax, 130,300 blacks were 
registered to vote; this number decreased to 5,300 in 1900 and to 1,340 in 1904. After Louisiana 
repealed its poll tax in 1934, with the support of Huey Long's neo-Populist surge, the average 
rate of eligible voter participation in senatorial primaries rose from 31 % to 47% and in guberna-
torial primaries from 40% to 61 %. In the presidential election following Florida's elimination of 
its levy in 1937, the vote increased by 46%. And when Georgia rescinded its poll tax in 1945, the 
eligible voter turnout nearly doubled. See Douglas, Should State Poll Tax Laws As Applied to 
Federal Elections Be Uniformly Abolished - Pro, CoNG. DIG., May 1962, at 144-46. 
604. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
605. 383 U.S. at 666 n.4. 
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1964 election, which obviously preceded the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, was the first in which the twenty-fourth amendment's bar on 
poll taxes in federal elections was operative. In thirty-two states the 
percentage voting declined between 1960 and 1964; it increased in only 
twelve states, three of which were relatively insignificant; of the nine 
remaining states with an increase, five (the four still left in Harper plus 
Arkansas) made payment of a poll tax a prerequisite to voting in 
1960.606 
The most detailed information on Harper's consequences comes 
from Texas. After a three-judge federal court declared the state's poll 
tax unconstitutional a month before the Supreme Court's Harper rul-
ing, 607 a special session of the Texas legislature "whipped through an 
inhospitable new registration law which, because it contained many 
restrictive features, was called the 'Mississippi plan.' "608 Although 
the law afforded only fifteen days for nonregistrants to enroll, and 
although the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had already been in effect for 
over half a year, more than 600,000 Texans registered, thereby enlarg-
ing the electorate by twenty-five percent. 609 In local elections held the 
following month, blacks won office in five towns; in four of them, it 
was the first time a black had been elected since a poll tax requirement 
for voting had been adopted 65 years earlier.610 In the Democratic 
primary held one month later, three blacks (including Barbara Jordan) 
were nominated to the legislature, which had not had a single black 
legislator in the twentieth century.611 Notable results also occurred in 
the other states whose poll taxes were disapproved in Harper. 612 Of 
course, as noted earlier, the abolition of the poll tax was but one of the 
606. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, app. B, at 38, 47-49, Harper v. Virginia Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
607. United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex.), ajfd., 384 U.S. 155 (1966). 
608. NATION, Apr. 4, 1966, at 381. 
609. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1966, at 60, col. 6. 
610. Id. 
611. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1966, at 20, col. 3. A careful study in Houston (the South's largest 
city), which experienced the same 25% increase in registration despite the absence of any partic-
ularly salient election contest, Nimmo & McClesky, supra note 598, at 684-85, 687, specifically 
addressed the ethnic minority issue. It found that "[t]he most striking feature" of the poll tax 
system "was the exclusion of the Mexican-Americans • • . for they constituted 5.6 percent of the 
potential voters but only 1.6 percent of the poll-tax payers." Id. at 688. During the 15-day 
enrollment period, there was a "spectacular increase in Mexican-American registration from 1.6 
percent of total paid registrants to 7.2 percent of the free registrants." Id. at 692. 
612. In Virginia, four months after the court's mandate, Rep. Howard W. Smith, then one of 
the "top-ranking fiscal and racial conservatives in Congress and in Virginia's once-unbeatable 
Democratic oligarchy," suffered a narrow defeat. This was attributable to "a combination of 
factors - his age, the reapportionment of his district" and his opponent's "vigorous and un-
abashed appeal to new Negro voters . . . recently freed of Virginia's rigorously enforced poll 
tax." N.Y. Times, July 13, 1966, at 1, col. 4; 26, col. 3. In Alabama, it was observed that 
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many factors - and, indeed, not the major one - that produced 
many of these results. But, as suggested by the more causally related 
evidence described above, its contribution cannot be slighted. 
Finally, it may be-as concluded in the Houston study- "that the 
end of the poll-tax system [had itself] failed to revolutionize voter 
tumout"613 or election results, for substantial numbers of persons who 
registered after the levy's demise actually failed to vote in the immedi-
ately succeeding election.614 Nonetheless, in Houston, there was a fif-
teen percent increase in those who went to the polls, and "we know 
from past experience that a newly enfranchised electorate responds but 
slowly to its opportunities; it takes time to throw off the habits and 
attitudes associated with nonparticipation (low levels of interest in 
politics, ignorance of polling procedures, lack of ties to political organ-
izations, etc.)."615 In all, while it is surely possible that the poll tax 
would have eventually fallen into disuse by its own weight, it is quite 
plain that the Court's action against it has had a marked effect in ad-
vancing the constitutional right to vote of the economically 
disadvantaged. 
3. Dilution: Apportionment 
Although critics of legislative malapportionment predicted revolu-
tionary political and social changes as a result of the Supreme Court's 
one person-one vote mandate616 - indeed, Chief Justice Warren iden-
tified the reapportionment decisions as the most significant of his ten-
ure617 - in the first half decade after Reynolds v. Sims, 61 8 despite 
complying alterations in virtually every state legislative and congres-
"thousands of Negroes registered under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ha[d] not paid the poll tax 
in anticipation of the court's ruling" in Harper. TIME, Apr. 1, 1966, at 25B. 
Six years after Harper, it was reported that in Mississippi 
black voter registration has increased from 28,500 in 1964 to over 300,000 today. Ten years 
ago there were no black elected officials in Mississippi. Today, Mississippi, with a total of 
128, leads the southern states with the largest number of black officeholders. In the Missis· 
sippi general elections of 1971, a record number of 309 black candidates sought public office 
at all levels ... [and] the victories of 72 black candidates at the beat and county levels 
represented a net increase of 34 new black officials. Elected to public office in 1971 were 7 
members of county boards of education, 16 members of election commissions, 1 state repre· 
sentative, 5 county-wide officials (including a tax assessor and a circuit clerk), and 46 county 
beat-level offices. 
Lewis & Allen, Black Voter Registration Efforts in the South, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 105, 115 
(1972). 
613. Nimmo & McClesky, supra note 598, at 698. 
614. Id. at 696-97. 
615. Id. at 699. 
616. See generally THE PoLmcs OF REAPPORTIONMENT (M. Jewell ed. 1962). 
617. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1969, at 1, col. 5. 
618. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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sional district in the nation, 619 the studies undertaken came to conflict-
ing conclusions as to the effect of reapportionment on state policy and 
the extent to which reapportioned legislatures were more likely than 
malapportioned ones to expend funds, respond to urban needs and 
have a competitive political system. 620 Subsequent empirical efforts, 
however, have vindicated the criticism621 that those who had earlier 
discounted the political and policy consequences of reapportionment 
had failed to prove their case. Several phenomena have been suggested 
as contributing to the initial skepticism and delayed effectiveness of 
reapportionment - among them being "that survival instincts among 
state legislators are very strong, and that in the process of reapportion-
ment key incumbents would be protected and would likely retain posi-
tions of power,"622 and that, in any event, changes in state legislative 
decisionmaking tend to be incremental rather than dramatic. 623 But 
whatever the dynamics, a large number of careful studies since 1970 
consistently demonstrate the consequential differences that reappor-
tionment has produced. 
The clearest change was the one most expected: from Alaska to 
Wyoming there were immediately observable marked increases in ur-
ban and suburban representation with resulting diminished influence 
of rural interests. 624 Although, as indicated above, pervasive substan-
tive reversals did not occur, 625 various inquiries disclosed that many 
issues were affected by implementation of the Court's edict.626 In a 
"longitudinal 50-state study of the impact of reapportionment on fiscal 
619. See McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 61 MICH. L. REv. 
223, 229 (1968). 
620. For a collection and appraisal of these studies, see Bicker, The Effects of Ma/apportion-
ment in the States - A Mistrial, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's, at 151 (N. Polsby ed. 
1971). 
621. Id. 
622. Cho & Frederickson, The Effects of Reapportionment: Subtle, Selective, Limited, 63 
NATL. Crv. REV. 357, 359 (1974); see also T. O'ROURKE, THE IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT 
150 (1980). 
623. Cho & Frederickson, supra note 622, at 360. 
624. See T. O'ROURKE, supra note 622, at 149; IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT ON THE 
THIRTEEN WESTERN STATES 45, 66, 87, 173, 179, 202, 236, 304, 309 (E. Bushnell ed. 1970) 
[hereinafter cited as IMPACT]; Erickson, The Partisan Impact of State Legislative Reapportion-
ment, 15 MIDWEST J. POL. Ser. 57 (1971); Robeck, Urban-Rural and Regional Voting Patterns 
in the California Senate Before and After Reapportionment, 23 W. POL. Q. 785, 794 (1970). 
625. See note 623 supra and accompanying text. See also T. O'ROURKE, supra note 622, at 
151; Robeck, supra note 624, at 794. 
626. Thus, one early nationwide analysis found that "[w]hile the results of reapportionment 
are not • . . either uniform in every state or very dramatic in any state, they do suggest that 
legislative apportionment is one important component in explaining changes in state policies 
during the late 1960's." Hanson & Crew, The Effects of Reapportionment on State Public Policy 
Out-Puts, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME CoURT DECISIONS 155, 160 (f. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 
1973). 
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and non-fiscal policy . . . it was concluded, by using an elaborate se-
ries of multiple linear regression equations, that reapportionment is 
having a generally democratizing impact on state policy."627 In a sur-
vey in 1979 of all incumbent state senators who had been in office in 
1967, nearly four out of five respondents perceived a more liberal di-
rection in lawmaking over that period of time. 628 And, "the large 
number of single state studies conclude[d] that reapportioned states 
became more responsive to urban needs and their spending patterns 
became more liberal."629 More specifically, "[l]egislative responsive-
ness was significantly influenced by reapportionment in politically and 
socially critical policy issues such as firearms control and civil rights 
... [although] not in morally controversial issues such as divorce and 
abortion legislation. "63o 
As for state fiscal policies, marked adjustments were observed in 
both the level and direction of expenditures. "Using a before-and-after 
test,'' the two comprehensive nationwide surveys "found that the rate 
of increase was significantly greater in reapportioned than in non-reap-
portioned states."631 Although the earlier of the studies discerned that, 
because of population movement from the inner cities, 632 spending 
"increases due to reapportionment were more likely to have benefitted 
suburban interests than the central cities,''633 there was no disputing 
the general reversal of emphasis on rural concerns. Thus, with the ex-
ception of aid to schools, the later fifty-state analysis reported that 
metropolitan-nonmetropolitan disparity was significantly reduced by re-
apportionment in total state aid and welfare spending. . . . 634 Those 
states whose legislatures were reapportioned earlier spent more for gen-
eral welfare and urban-related functions such as public welfare, public 
health and hospitals, and less for highways, [and] state aid to local gov-
ernments in general. 635 
A more recent six-state study confirmed the broad conclusion, but spe-
cifically noted reapportionment's greater impact in those states whose 
central cities (rather than suburbs) had been more severely under-
627. Cho & Frederickson, supra note 622, at 357-58. 
628. Saffell, Reapportionment and Public Policy: State Legislator's Perspectives, 9 POLY. 
STUD. J. 916, 922, 928 (1980-81). 
629. Id. at 921. 
630. Cho & Frederickson, supra note 622, at 360. 
631. Hanson & Crew, supra note 626, at 172; see also Cho & Frederickson, supra note 622, at 
358. 
632. Hanson & Crew, supra note 626, at 170. 
633. Id. at 172. 
634. Cho & Frederickson, supra note 622, at 361. 
635. Id. at 359. 
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represented in the old system.636 Indeed, the overwhelming majority 
of state senators surveyed in 1979 responded that the elimination of 
malapportionment produced more state aid to urban areas. 637 
Less prominent but nonetheless measurable effects, in regard to the 
election of racial and ethnic minority legislators and more balanced 
political party representation, have also been recorded despite the ac-
knowledged increase in various forms of gerrymandering allegedly 
aimed in the opposite direction. 638 Although it is impossible to demon-
strate a direct causal relationship, in the first decade after Baker v. 
Carr, 639 ten additional congressional districts came to be represented 
by blacks and the number of black state legislators increased from 94 
to 238. 640 As for political parties, reapportionment was found to be 
the cause of "the emergence of viable two-party competition for legis-
lative control . . . [in] Tennessee and, to a lesser extent, Kansas,"641 
and to have resulted in greatly improved proportional equity between 
Democrats and Republicans in the New York legislature.642 
Overall, "[a]lthough reformers in the early 1960s may have over-
stated the anticipated benefits of reapportionment, much of what they 
have predicted has occurred. Empirical studies in the 1970s consist-
ently have concluded that state legislatures have become more 
respons[ive] to majority will,"643 and "the impact of reapportionment 
636. T. O'ROURKE, supra note 622, at 151, 156. 
637. Saffell, supra note 628, at 929. 
638. See, e.g., Cho & Frederickson, supra note 622, at 362; Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pan-
dora, and Procrustes Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 474 (1970); Smith, The Failure of Reapportionment; The Effect of Reapportionment on the 
Election of Blacks to Legislative Bodies, 18 How. L.J. 639 (1975). 
639. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
640. Smith, supra note 638, at 661, 674. More pointedly, in California 
[a] Negro was elected to the senate for the first time in 1966, and he, four Negro assembly-
men, and one Negro assemblywoman served in the 1969 legislature. A Mexican-American 
was elected to the assembly in 1968. Although several persons of Mexican descent have 
been elected to the California Legislature since 1850, he was the lone representative of the 
state's largest ethnic minority in either house in 1969. Two persons of Asian descent, an 
assemblywoman and a senator, were elected in 1966 and reelected in 1968. It is worthwhile 
to note that all these minority-group legislators were elected from urban districts, most of 
which were attributable to the 1965 reapportionment. 
Gallagher & Weschler, California, in IMPACT, supra note 624, at 71, 87. In Nevada, the election 
of the first black legislator in the state's history "was caused by the increase in seats in Las Vegas, 
which has a substantial Negro enclave, and the consequent enlarged opportunity for a minority 
candiate." Bushnell, Nevada, in IMPACT, supra note 624, at 185, 200. In Kansas, New Jersey 
and Tennessee, "an increase in the number of black legislators as a result of greater central city 
representation and subdistricting of central city counties" was reported. T. O'ROURKE, supra 
note 622, at 149. 
641. T. O'RoURKE, supra note 622, at 149. 
642. Scarrow, The Impact of Reapportionment on Party Representation in the State of New 
York, 9 POLY. STUD. J. 937, 944 (1980-81). 
643. Saffell, supra note 628, at 922. 
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apparently has been more extensive in those states more severely 
malapportioned prior to Baker and Reynolds than in states less se-
verely malapportioned."644 Moreover, given the operative dynamics 
of gradualism described above, there is good reason to believe that 
continued change is the path of the future. 
Because the Supreme Court's rulings in Baker, Reynolds, and subsequent 
cases mandate periodic redistricting to bring legislative districts in line 
with population changes, legislative apportionment in the coming years 
can provide little protection to those political interests which suffer a 
declining population base. This situation is in sharp contrast to the half 
century before Baker when malapportionment entrenched conservative 
and rural elements in the face of adverse population trends. 645 
Finally, and probably most importantly, the Justices' rejection of 
the previous system cogently repaired a crucial void in American dem-
ocratic society. For, as Joseph Bishop succinctly put it, "legislative 
malapportionment had become a scandal and an affront to democ-
racy. "646 By actively furthering- although by no means insuring or 
seeking fully to insure - the democratic ideal of majority rule (as well 
as that of equality), the Court successfully exercised its power on be-
half of the majority of citizens and voters in the nation, mostly urban 
dwellers, whose political influence had been seriously diluted by en-
trenched minority interests. At least when dealing with the federal 
and state legislatures, only the Court seemed to be capable of improv-
ing the majoritarian quality of the political process. 647 
Granting that the full complement of apportionment decisions 
shored the theoretical foundation of the political process at many 
levels of American government, it has by no means provided for the 
elimination of every influential anti-majoritarian device. But the for-
mal representative institutions with which the Court dealt were per-
versely incompatible with the democratic ideal because they afforded 
no meaningful protection to individual constitutional rights - at least 
as commonly perceived - and were indeed able affirmatively to pro-
mulgate laws opposed by the majority of the constituency as a whole. 
644. T. O'ROURKE, supra note 622, at 156. 
645. Id. at 159-60. 
646. Bishop, The Warren Court Is Not Likely to Be Overruled, in THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDER EARL w ARREN, supra note 29, at 93, 98. 
647. It is true that, in the past, legislators who had been the beneficiaries of existing arrange-
ments for voting had moved on their own initiative to enfranchise additional groups of citizens 
(such as women). But the electoral effect of extending voting rights to such persons who were 
scattered throughout the population was much less certain than that of equalizing legislative 
districts. Because of the paralytic nature of malapportionment - whose cure would guarantee 
some lawmakers the loss of their seats and would imperil those of many others - there was no 
reason to believe that a nonjudicial remedy would ever be forthcoming. 
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4. Ballot Restrictions 
Whether the Supreme Court's 1968 ruling in Williams v. Rhodes64s 
- finding that Ohio's requirements for new political parties to obtain 
a place on the state's election ballot were unduly burdensome - will, 
as then predicted, be "a landmark decision in terms of the future of 
American political institutions"649 has yet to be confirmed. The diver-
sity of state rules that independent candidates or those of nonestab-
lished parties had to meet in order to gain a ballot position was 
overwhelming,650 and Ohio's restrictions - enacted in 1948 specifi-
cally to thwart the presidential aspirations of those like Henry Wal-
lace651 - "stood at the extreme even among those statutes thoroughly 
designed to discourage qualification."652 Further, as of the end of 
1984, only three times since Williams has a full opinion of the 
Supreme Court rejected a nonfinancial state restriction on ballot ac-
cess - and in Moore v. Ogilvie653 and Illinois Board of Elections v. 
Socialist Workers Party654 the decisions concerned relatively narrow 
impediments. 655 Moreover, in several subsequent cases, the Court has 
held that a number of state regulations demanding that minor parties 
and independent candidates demonstrate specified support before be-
ing listed on the ballot were not unconstitutionally burdensome. 656 
And a substantial number of lower courts have followed this lead by 
sustaining a variety of similar state provisions. 657 Consequently, Wil-
liams' impact has been less than revolutionary. 
Nonetheless, the Court's holdings and dicta concerning the consti-
tutional limits of state qualification rules have wrought important 
change. Federal courts in several states have struck down laws similar 
" 
648. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
649. Ireland & Ireland, The Political Arena: Revolution in the Barriers to Entry, 1970 J. L. & 
Soc. ORD. 213, 214. 
650. See Ireland & Ireland, supra note 649, at 215-18; Note, The Uncertain Impact o/Wil-
liams v. Rhodes on Qualifying Parties for the Ballot, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 236, 242-44 (1969). 
651. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 47 n.9 (1968) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
652. Note, supra note 650, at 241. 
653. 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (Illinois required independent candidates to submit 200 signatures 
from each of 50 counties). 
654. 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (Illinois required new political parties and independent candidates 
to submit more signatures to qualify for local elections than for statewide elections). 
655. See also McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317 (1976) (opinion of Powell, J., as Circuit 
Justice) (Texas required that a presidential candidate be a member of a political party to secure a 
place on the ballot). For the third, and the most recent decision, see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780 (1983) (invalidating an early filing deadline for presidential candidates), discussed at 
note 664 infra. 
656. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 
(1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). 
657. See cases collected in 43 UMKC L. REv. 127, 137 n.68 (1974). 
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to the one invalidated in Moore v. Ogilvie. 658 In at least four other 
states, lower federal courts, relying principally on Williams v. 
Rhodes, 659 struck down other overly demanding restrictions for minor 
parties. 66° Most significantly, within two years of the Court's pro-
nouncement in Storer v. Brown that independent candidates must have 
an opportunity to be placed on the ballot, 661 the laws of fifteen juris-
dictions - flatly prohibiting independents from running for the presi-
dency (and affecting perhaps as many as 45,000 other elective offices at 
the federal, state and local level) - were forced to give way either 
voluntarily or by court order.662 Indeed, mainly through the efforts of 
supporters of Eugene McCarthy, "[i]n ten months in 1976 parts of the 
election laws of twenty-four states were altered or struck down."663 
Moreover, during the presidential election of 1980, the independent 
candidacy of John Anderson resulted in successful federal court chal-
lenges to seven additional state requirements. 664 
One may surely question the appraisal that these developments 
"may effect the most important change in the American body politic 
ever accomplished by court decisions."665 But certain events - such 
as George Wallace's winning a place on the ballot in every state in 
1968, James Buckley's election to the Senate as an independent in 
1970, and James Longley's election as Governor of Maine as an in-
dependent in 1974 - point to their marked contribution to the revival 
of nonestablished candidacies and the enhancement of individual polit-
ical rights. Their future potential for cracking the existing political 
structure is even more promising, especially in light of the increasing 
tendency of American voters (recently estimated as exceeding one-
658. See e.g., Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1970), affd. sub 
nom. Sweetenham v. Gilligan, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 
F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 400 U.S. 806 (1970); Socialist Workers Party v. Hare, 304 F. 
Supp. 534 (E.D. Mich. 1969). 
659. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
660. See American Party v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Salera v. Tucker, 
399 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd., 424 U.S. 959 (1976); Toporek v. South Carolina Elec-
tion Commn., 362 F. Supp. 613 (D.S.C. 1973); Barnhart v. Mandel, 311 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 
1970). 
661. 415 U.S. 724, 745-46 (1974). 
662. See Armor & Marcus, The Bloodless Revolution of 1976, 63 A.B.A. J. 1108·09 (1977). 
663. Armor & Marcus, supra note 662, at 1108. 
664. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d 55 
(1980), vacated (on attorney fee issue), 658 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Quinn, 634 
F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. 
Poythress, 656 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.M. 1980); 
Anderson v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Ky. 1980), revd. in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 
600 (6th Cir. 1981) (state law grounds); see also Greaves v. State Bd. of Elections, 508 F. Supp. 
78 (E.D.N.C. 1980). 
665. Armor & Marcus, supra note 662, at 1108. 
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third)666 to abjure major political party affiliation and identify them-
selves with individual candidates.667 Thus, in 1980, Congressman 
John Anderson obtained a ballot position in every jurisdiction in the 
nation, 668 seriously threatened to determine the contest between Ron-
ald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, 669 probably cost the incumbent a sub-
stantial number of electoral votes, 670 and actually received almost 
seven percent of the ballots cast. 671 
Moreover, scholars have shown that, throughout our history, "by 
voicing grievances and by proposing panaceas, third parties have ex-
erted significant influence upon the policies and programs of major 
parties."672 Indeed, minor political groups initially proposed and 
worked for the adoption of a large number of fundamental precepts 
that eventually became part of the fabric of American institutions -
including national political party nominating conventions and plat-
forms, women's suffrage, old age pensions, 673 primaries for party 
nominations and the elections of delegates to national conventions, 674 
the direct election of U.S. senators, 675 the secret ballot, the graduated 
income tax, 676 and taxation of rent income and mechanics lien laws. 677 
Third parties have been instrumental in fueling the political move-
ments that have led to the abolition of slavery678 and the establishment 
of free public education. 679 The American Independent Party has 
been credited with focusing the nation's attention on the issue of bus-
ing in 1968, thus prodding the major parties to address the problem 
666. See McClellan & Anderson, The Bipartisan Ballot Monopoly, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 
1975, at 18; Armor & Marcus, supra note 662, at 1108. 
667. See Note, Changes in Party Affiliation and the Right to Vote in the Primary. 51 N.C. L. 
REV. 543, 553 (1973). 
668. See Reagan Buries Carter in a Landslide, 38 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3296, 3299 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Landslide]. Ed Clark of the Libertarian Party also obtained a ballot position 
in every jurisdiction. F. SMALLWOOD, THE OTHER CANDIDATES 173 (1983). 
669. Landslide, supra note 668, at 3296; 38 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3231 (1980). Political 
contests have been determined by independent candidates in the past. W. HESSELTINE, THIRD 
PAR1Y MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (1962) (Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose Pro-
gressive Party in the national election of 1912); id. at 19 (anti-Masonic party in many state 
elections in the 1830's). 
670. Landslide, supra note 668, at 3298. 
671. Id. at 3299. 
672. W. HESSELTINE, supra note 669, at 3. 
673. F. SMALLWOOD, supra note 668, at 26. 
674. W. HESSELTINE, supra note 669, at 72. 
675. D. MAzMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 58 (1974). 
676. W. HESSELTINE, supra note 669, at 61. 
677. Id. at 23. 
678. F. SMALLWOOD, supra note 668, at 25. 
679. W. HASSELTINE, supra note 669, at 21. 
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seriously. 680 In addition, third parties have been said to fulfill the crit-
ical function in our two-party scheme of "[providing] access to the 
political arena" for frustrated minorities, and thus "enabling them to 
work legitimately within the confines of the American political sys-
tem,"681 and stimulating major parties to be "more responsive to genu-
ine public concerns. "682 
Through the Justices' efforts since 1968, there is even greater rea-
son to believe that splinter groups and independent candidates will 
continue to exert such strong influence on American political life, even 
if unsuccessful at the polls. Indeed, given that "a major portion of the 
responsibility" for the difficulties confronting third parties has been 
attributed by a host of political scientists to "the exclusionary effect of 
the legal techniques"683 under discussion, the periodic success of mi-
nor party nominees for various state and federal offices in the past 
despite these obstacles, 684 and the enormous number of positions 
(mentioned above) now opened to political outsiders by the federal 
judiciary, the prognoses for the Court's impact in this area may well 
turn out to be somewhat less extravagant than they seem to be. 
G. Discrimination Against New Residents 
In a series of decisions commencing in 1969, the Court rejected 
rules in every state by invalidating durational residency requirements 
for welfare benefits, voting, and medical care for indigents. Prior to 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 685 which eliminated one-year waiting periods for 
welfare assistance, over eighty percent of the states imposed at least 
this long a requirement for Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Aid 
to Dependent Children, or Aid to the Permanently and Totally 
Disabled. 686 
680. D. MAzMANIAN, supra note 675, at 85-87. 
681. F. SMALLWOOD, supra note 668, at 25. 
682. Id. at 27. 
683. Note, Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success, 57 YALE L.J. 1276 (1948). 
684. See Bell, Constraints on the Electoral Success of Minor Political Parties in the United 
States, 25 POL. STUDIES 103, 108 (1977). 
685. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
686. See Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes - /, 51 IOWA L. 
REv. 1080, 1Q91-95 (1966). Indeed, about three-fourths of the jurisdictions demanded that ap-
plicants "have resided within the state five of the preceding nine years, including the immediate 
past year to be eligible to receive old age, deaf and blind benefits." Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. 
Supp. 331, 339 n.2 (D. Conn. 1967) (Clarie, J., dissenting). 
Derived from the Elizabethan Poor Law, durational residence provisions "had been part of 
the states' poor relieflaws from the beginning," Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thompson: "The Beggars 
Are Coming to Town," 1969 SUP. Cr. REv. 303, 304, despite abolition recommendations in the 
decade before Shapiro by the Governor's Conference, the HEW Advisory Council on Public 
Assistance, the White House Conference on Children and Youth, the White House Conference 
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The extent to which waiting-period barriers have actually deterred 
poor people from exercising their constitutional right of interstate mi-
gration is uncertain, 687 though by no means disproven. 688 But it is 
clear that their elimination has markedly improved the lot of a great 
many indigents. Although the experience in some jurisdictions that 
removed durational requirements indicated that only a negligible 
number of additional persons received aid, 689 statistics from others re-
vealed more significant increases,690 thus confirming HEW's estimate 
in 1968 "that the elimination of residency requirements would nation-
ally increase by 100,000 to 200,000"691 the number of impoverished 
citizens able "to obtain the very means to subsist."692 
As for durational residency requirements for voting, at the time of 
the Court's decisions in Dunn v. Blumstein 693 and its direct progeny694 
- invalidating any waiting period much beyond fifty days for register-
ing to vote in state or local elections - all jurisdictions mandated a 
longer span for state elections (two-thirds stipulating a year or more) 
and more than half the states set a period of three to six months for 
county elections. 695 It has been estimated 
on Aging, the 1960 Democratic Party Platform and others. Brieffor Appellant at 15-16, Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
687. See 394 U.S. at 650 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Artigues, A Study of Residence Require-
ments and Reciprocal Agreement in the Public Assistance Program in Pennsylvania (1959) (un-
published dissertation), cited in Brieffor Appellants, app., at 26 n.6, Reynolds v. Smith, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969). 
688. For example, the conclusion of a study by the D.C. Dept. of Public Welfare, that 
"figures relating to place of birth and migration of mothers and children support the belief that 
few if any families either white or Negro, move into the District for the purpose of obtaining 
public assistance," Problems of Hungry Children in the District of Columbia: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Public Health, Education, Welfare. and Safety of the Senate Comm. on the District 
of Columbia, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 523.(1957), ignores the fact that the D.C. waiting period 
provision may itself have seriously influenced these findings. 
689. These states include Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See 
Brief for The Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law as Amicus Curiae at 28-29, Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: A New Approach Under the Equal 
Protection Clause?, 6 CAL. W. L. REv. 179, 195 (1969). 
690. See, e.g., Note, supra note 689, at 194-95 (California- 10%, Illinois - 7.4%); Rosen-
heim, supra note 686, at 328 n.106 (Washington, D.C. - 3-6% for various categories); Kasius, 
What Happens in a State Without Residence Requirements, in RE.srnENCE LA ws: ROAD BLOCK 
TO HUMAN WELFARE 18, 19-20 (National Travelers Aid Association 1956) (New York-2%); 
Brief for Appellees at 12 n.12, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Connecticut - 2% ). 
691. Note, supra note 689, at 195. 
692. Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. at 627. In terms of actual dollars provided, Connecti-
cut's 2% growth for ADC recipients alone was estimated to come to $2,000,000 annually. 
Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 337 n.4 (D. Conn. 1967). California's outlay during the 
first two months of unrestricted benefits amounted to $385,000. Note, supra note 689, at 194. 
693. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
694. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973). 
695. Note, Durational Residency Requirements in State Elections: Blumstein v. Ellington, 46 
IND. L.J. 222, 223-24 n.10 (1971). 
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that residency requirements disenfranchised five million citizens in 1954, 
between five and eight million in 1960, almost fifteen million in 1964, 
and another five to eight million in 1968. . . . Moreover the class of 
people who move are, "as a single gross category . . . men who tend to 
be somewhat better educated and who have considerably better jobs and 
higher incomes than the natives of the region they leave"; the class of 
people who are most likely to vote if given the opportunity. 696 
Specific election contests even more dramatically underline the poten-
tial consequences. As just one example, in 1970, when nearly 14,000 
Indiana citizens "lost the right to vote from intrastate movement 
alone,"697 the U.S. Senate race "was decided by only 4,383 votes, 
while other state offices were won or lost by margins as low as 7,416 
and 476."698 By 1972, a comprehensive study reported that "relatively 
few people were still affected by residency requirements. Our esti-
mates indicate that the probability of voting in the 1972 general elec-
tion was not affected by existing residency requirements anywhere."699 
The Court's decision in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County700 
- holding violative of equal protection a requirement of one year's 
residence in the county for indigents to receive free nonemergency 
hospitalization or medical care - affected substantially fewer people. 
After 1960, the Social Security Act forbade states participating in the 
federal Medicaid program for the aged from imposing waiting periods 
as a condition for eligibility.701 But because many state medical care 
plans were independent of Medicaid, durational residency provisions 
persisted in nearly one-third of the states. 702 Lower court rulings rely-
ing on Shapiro produced their demise in ten states and Memorial Hos-
pital ended them in the remaining five. 703 Figures from Maricopa 
County, Arizona alone estimate an annual increase of 20,000 in-pa-
tient hospitalization days and 17,500 out-patient clinic visits for indi-
gent new residents. 704 These statistics suggest the importance of the 
Justices' edict for people's health and lives, a matter powerfully con-
firmed by pre-Memorial Hospital denials of nonemergency treatment 
of Arizona indigents for such conditions as childbirth, epilepsy, diabe-
696. Id. at 224-25 (footnote omitted). 
697. Id. at 225. 
698. Id. at 225. 
699. Rosenstone & Wolfinger, The Effect of Registration Laws on Voter Turnout, 72 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 22, 33-34 (1978). 
700. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
701. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b)(2)-(3) (1982). 
702. Brief for Appellant, supra note 686, at 51-54. 
703. Id. 
704. Id. at 34. 
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tes and severe injuries in a fire. 105 
Although the Justices have made clear that not all waiting periods 
for the benefit of public privileges are forbidden,7°6 the effect of their 
invalidations has been extended significantly by the lower courts. 
State and federal judges have overwhelmingly rejected durational resi-
dence requirements for government employment and private employ-
ment on public projects.707 Federal courts of appeals that have 
addressed the issue have brought waiting periods for public housing 
within the principle's protective coverage.708 As for waiting periods 
for bar admission, which existed in a substantial number of the 
states, 709 although the Supreme Court has summarily affirmed the 
constitutionality of a fairly short requirement, 710 a host of lower fed-
eral courts have disapproved longer ones, 711 thus seriously jeopardiz-
ing the myriad durational provisions for licensing of such other 
professions as medicine, dentistry, architecture and accounting.712 Fi-
nally, despite several Supreme Court decisions summarily affirming 
waiting periods in order to be a candidate for state, county or munici-
pal offi.ce713 - required almost universally and ranging up to ten 
years714 - nearly two dozen state and federal courts have reached 
contrary results on the particular facts before them.7 15 
705. Brief for Maricopa County Legal Aid Society as Amicus Curiae at 24, Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). ' 
706. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
707. See cases cited in Note, Durational Residence Requirements for Public Employment, 67 
CALIF. L. REv. 386, 388-89 n.15-18 (1979); Note, Durational Residence Requirements From 
Shapiro Through Sosna: The Right to Travel Takes a New Tum, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 622, 636-37 
n.97 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, New Tum]. 
708. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S 
863 (1971); Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). 
709. See NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 
15 (1968). 
710. Suftling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M.), affd. mem. sub nom. Rose v. 
Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) (six-months residency requirement upheld). 
711. See cases cited in Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Ad-
mission to the Bar, 71 MrcH. L. RE.v. 838, 839 n.7 (1973); Note, New Tum, supra note 707, at 
645 n.144. 
712. See, e.g., Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1966) (striking down portion of 
Florida statute requiring two-year residency by accountants). 
713. Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958 (1975), affg. mem. 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974) 
(three-judge court); Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891, affg .. mem. Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. 
Nov. 3, 1974) (three-judge court); Chimento v. Stark, 414 U.S. 802, ajfg. mem. 353 F. Supp. 1211 
(D.N.H. 1973) (three-judge court); Hadnott v. Amos, 401 U.S. 968 (1971), ajfg. mem. 320 F. 
Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge court). 
714. See Le Clercq, Durational Residency Requirements for Public Office, 27 S.C. L. REv. 
847 n.1 (1976). 
715. See cases cited in Le Clercq, supra note 714, at 848-49; see a/so, e.g., Henderson v. Fort 
Worth Indep. School Dist., 526 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976) (striking three-year "qualified voter" 
requirement for school board position); Billington v. Hayduk, 439 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 
565 F.2d 824 (1977) (striking five-year residency requirement for position of county executive). 
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H. Debtors' Rights: Wage Garnishment 
Prior to the Court's 1969 decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp., 716 nearly twenty states717 permitted a creditor, even in the ab-
sence of extraordinary circumstances, to obtain a prejudgment gar-
nishment of a person's wages without any prior notice to the alleged 
debtor or opportunity for a hearing at which the debtor might defend 
against the plaintiff's claim. Although there are no nationwide statis-
tics on the actual number of persons who were subject to this proce-
dure, the fact that there were 78,000 wage garnishments in Chicago 
alone in 1969718 and over 20,000 prejudgment wage garnishments in 
Wisconsin's five most populous counties in 1968719 suggests the mag-
nitude of the problem. 
Loss of employment by the debtor has been the most direct adverse 
consequence of wage garnishment. 720 Because of the substantial ad-
ministrative expense imposed on the employer721 and the belief that 
garnishment is evidence of poor character,722 it was estimated in 1967 
that between 100,000 and 300,000 American workers were being fired 
annually because of garnishment. 723 As would be expected, unskilled 
laborers, low income persons and members of racial minorities were 
heavily overrepresented in this group.724 A 1964 survey showed that 
716. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
717. See REPORT OF THE NATL. ADVISORY CoMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS 140 (1968); Pe-
titioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
718. D. CAPLOVITZ, CoNSUMERS IN TROUBLE 2 (1974), 
719. Brief of Petitioner at 10, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
720. Some of the data referred to below concerned postjudgment garnishment as a form of 
execution and thus may not be automatically transposable to the prejudgment garnishment at 
issue in Sniadach. 
721. Several studies estimated the cost at $15 to $35 per garnishment. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra 
note 718, at 237 n.10; WESTERN CENTER ON LAW & POVERTY, WAGE GARNISHMENT - IM· 
PACT AND EXTENT IN Los ANGELES CoUNTY 5 (1968); Consumer Credit Protection Act: Hear· 
ings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking 
and Cu"ency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 766 (1967) (statement of James Gannon, Staff Reporter of 
the Wall Street Journal) [hereinafter cited as Consumers Credit Hearings]. Boeing Corporation 
in Seattle alone reported an annual cost of over $20,000. Project, Wage Garnishment in Wash· 
ington - An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743, 755-56 (1968). 
722. See WESTERN CENTER ON LAW & POVERTY, supra note 721, at 48; Comment, supra 
note 721, at 756 n.78. 
723. Consumers Credit Hearings, supra note 721, at 739. 
724. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 233-43; WESTERN CENTER ON LAW AND POV-
ERTY, supra note 721, at 5, 9; Ryan & Maynes, The Excessively Indebted: Who and Why, 3 J, 
CoNSUMERS AFF. 107, 112 (1969). More recent legislation, however, exempting certain amounts 
of wages from being garnished, has significantly reduced the impact of wage garnishment on low 
income debtors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982) (exempting 75% or 30 times the minimum wage, 
whichever is lower); WIS. STAT.§ 425.106 (1977) (exempting 75% or 40 times minimum wage). 
For evidence of other potential impacts see generally, Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer 
Credit Collecting System, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 1047, 1135 (suggesting limiting debtor remedies will 
lead to drop in availibility of credit). 
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thirteen percent of American manufacturing firms fired workers as 
soon as their wages were garnished.725 Statistics from various areas 
throughout the country confirm this phenomenon. 726 Although the 
Consumer Protection Act of 1968 forbids employee discharge for a 
single garnishment727 its ameliorating effect appears to have been min- . 
imal at best. 728 Consequently, debtors whose salaries were garnished 
or so threatened, much more often than nongamished debtors, settled 
on terms they believed to be unfair in order to avoid the loss of em-
ployment that would occur before they had any opportunity to test the 
defense.729 "The result in many cases [was] vicious, allowing 'loan 
sharks and collection agencies practically to blackmail a debtor by ty-
ing up his wages in advance of proving the validity of their claim, and 
without prior notice of intent to attach.' " 730 . 
The modest ruling in Sniadach, which left the state's power intact 
to authorize prejudgment wage garnishments and requires only prior 
725. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, PERSONNEL POLICY STUDY No. 194, 
PERSONNEL PRACTICES IN FACTORY AND OFFICE: MANuFACTURING 38 (table 40) (1964). 
726. In a detailed inverview·study of debtors in Chicago, Detroit and New York, it was 
found that "[n]ot only did 19 percent of the garnisheed lose their jobs by the time of the inter-
view, but fully 43 percent of the garnisheed had either lost their jobs or were threatened with job 
loss by their employer." D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 275-76. In Seattle, 19% of employers 
surveyed reported that they "always" discharged an employee for wage garnishment and 54% 
said that they "sometimes" did so. Project, supra note 721, at 757 n.79. A similar survey in San 
Diego disclosed that 17% of the employers fired their workers after the second garnishment and 
49% after the third. Consumers Credit Hearings, supra note 721, at 1020-21. A Wisconsin study 
revealed that 11% of garnished workers were fired immediately and 41% received a warning. 
Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 WIS. L. REv. 759, 766 n.29. Further evi-
dence indicates that some workers simply quit their jobs because of fear of garnishment. D. 
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 62. As a result, data from numerous informed sources shows a 
strong relationship between strict state wage garnishment laws and the number of personal bank-
ruptcies. See authorities cited in Comment, Wage Garnishment: Still Driving the Wage-Earning 
Family to the Wall, 11 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 631, 653 (1977); Project, supra note 721, at 766-
67. But see D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 274-75; Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: 
A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1236 n.122 (1965). 
It has been reported that the threatened use by consumer debtors of Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1979, 11 U.S.C. § 362, - which greatly eases the way for them to dis-
charge their obligations - has acted as a significant disincentive to creditors to institute wage 
garnishments and made them much more amenable to less drastic accommodations. See, e.g., 
Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full Employment for Lawyers Bill (part IV) 
1982 UTAH L. REv. 237 (discussing the effect of the more generous chapter 13 provisions on 
creditor-debtor relations). 
727. 15 u.s.c. § 1674 (1982). 
728. "Dismissal occurs because in many states the same debt may involve multiple garnish-
ments, to say nothing of multiple garnishments for different debts, and because it is very difficult 
to prove that the dismissal stemmed from the garnishment order rather than some other cause." 
D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 238. Indeed, it has been observed that wage garnishment "is 
detested as an unmitigated nuisance by employers to such an extent that even union contracts 
tacitly or specifically recognize the right of an employer to discharge an employee whose debts 
result in more than a prescribed number of garnishments within a specified period." Note, Gar-
nishment in Kentucky - Some Defects. 45 KY. L.J. 322, 330 (1956-57). 
729. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 244-45. 
730. Note, supra note 728, at 327-28. 
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notice to the debtor and an opportunity to be heard, obviously has not 
eliminated all of these hardships. But it does address some important 
elements of the problem. Although the evidence is fragmentary and 
often based more on self-serving opinion than hard fact, it suggests 
that in a significant number of garnishment cases the underlying debt 
may be subject to a valid defense - such as that payment has been 
made or "complaints about defective merchandise, wrong merchan-
dise, price and insurance deception, . . . [and] being tricked into sign-
ing contracts."731 Sniadach assures the debtor the chance of 
effectively presenting his defense and thereby preventing the garnish-
ment altogether. Even if the debtor declines to avail himself of the 
opportunity of a hearing - as studies indicate is true of the large ma-
jority of those who have been sued for the debt732 - and reaches an 
accord with the creditor that the debtor feels is unjust, at least his 
adversity will not be compounded by his having lost his job as well. 
I. Expatriation 
Prior to the series of Warren Court decisions culminating in its 
1967 ruling in Afroyim v. Rusk, 733 an immense number of American 
citizens were expatriated because they engaged in conduct for which 
acts of Congress withdrew their citizenship. The first case in the 
Court's progression that culminated in Afroyim was Trop v. Dulles, 734 
which invalidated a federal law authorizing expatriation of members 
of the armed services who deserted in wartime. Although the statute 
originated in the Civil War, statistics on the number of military per-
sonnel disabled under it during the Spanish-American War and World 
War I do not appear to be available. The Court noted, however, that 
[d]uring World War II, according to Army estimates, approximately 
21,000 soldiers and airmen were convicted of desertion and given dis-
honorable discharges by the sentencing courts-martial and that about 
7,000 of these were actually separated from the service and thus ren-
dered stateless when the reviewing authorities refused to remit their dis-
honorable discharges. 735 
This figure must be augmented by those in the Navy and Marines who 
were treated correspondingly. During the Korean War, although 
nearly 3,400 members of the army alone were convicted for deser-
731. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 91. See also id. at 37-41, 91-130; 118 CONG. REC. 
1831-32 (1968). 
732. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 718, at 215-22. 
733. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
734. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
735. 356 U.S. at 91. 
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tion, 736 apparently no more than eleven actually lost their national-
ity. 737 The Vietnam era, of course, came after Trop. The fact that 
almost 1,000 soldiers were convicted of desertion between 1964 and 
1971,738 and that more than 10,000 additional military personnel were 
fugitive AWOL offenders as of 1974,739 suggests the wide scope of pro-
tection that Trop has afforded to personal liberties. 
The Court's edict in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,74-0 that Con-
gress could not revoke the citizenship of persons who flee the country 
to avoid military service, similarly preserved the individual rights of 
countless numbers of Americans. Again, the sanction was originally 
enacted during the Civil War and again, comprehensive statistics ap-
pear to be unavailable. But the fact that as of 1944 
the Department of Justice discovered that in the western district of 
Texas, in the vicinity of El Paso alone, there were over 800 draft delin-
quents . . . who had crossed the border into Mexico for the purpose of 
evading the draft, but with the expectation of returning to the United 
States to resume residency after the war74l 
strongly implies that many tens of thousands of persons fell within the 
statute's potential proscription. More precise figures disclose that ap-
proximately 2,000 draft evaders were administratively deemed to be 
expatriated pursuant to this law between the end of World War II and 
the statute's demise in 1963.742 Were it not for Mendoza-Martinez, 
many more who left the United States to avoid military duty during 
the war in Vietnam might also be added to the list - a recent estimate 
revealed that about 5,000 such young men took exile in Canada for 
this period. 743 
Further, the Court's holding in Schneider v. Rusk144 in 1964, con-
demning a statute that denationalized any naturalized American who 
lived continuously for three years in the country to which he formerly 
owed allegiance, spared the citizenship of a suprisingly large number 
of people. The law had been in effect since 1940. Immigration Service 
statistics showed that nearly 14,000 naturalized citizens had been ex-
736. See L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, RECONClLIATION AFTER VIETNAM 128 (1977). 
737. See Note, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1165 n.9 (1955). 
738. See L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, supra note 736, at 128. 
739. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT xiii (1975). 
740. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
741. H. R. REP. No. 1229, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944). 
742. See Note, supra note 737, at 1165 n.9 (1,281 persons between 1945 and 1953); Brief for 
Appellant at 51 n.29, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (883 persons between 
1948 and 1956); INS ANN. REP. 109 n.1 (table 51) (1964) (359 persons from 1955 to 1963) 
[hereinafter cited as 1964 INS REP.]. 
743. See L. BASKIR & w. STRAUSS, supra note 736, at 137. 
744. 377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
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patriated under this statute in the last ten years of its operation, 745 
data . for the first fourteen years of its tenure not being readily 
available. 
The particular congressional act held invalid in Afroyim v. Rusk 
provided for loss of citizenship by any person who voted in a foreign 
political election. This statute too had resulted in statelessness for 
about 14,000 Americans between 1955 and 1968 alone,746 figures for 
the earlier fourteen years of its effectiveness not being published. But 
the impact of Afroyim's rationale was much broader. It reasoned that 
American citizenship attained by either a person's being born or natu-
ralized in the United States cannot be lost except "by the voluntary 
renunciation or abandonment by the citizen himself. " 747 Although a 
few people continue to be administratively stripped of their citizenship 
in seeming conflict with Afroyim's doctrine, 748 the fact is that the 
Court's mandate has almost wholly circumscribed Congess' power of 
expatriation, thus securing this fundamental right from potentially in-
numerable future abridgments. 
V. THE BURGER COURT 
It is often heard that judicial protection of personal liberties, which 
concededly blossomed under Earl Warren, withered rapidly in 1969 
with the seating of his successor and died completely by 1972 when all 
four of President Nixon's appointees had been finally confirmed. 
However, although there is no denying that, overall, the Burger Court 
has been less sympathetic to claims of infringement of individual 
rights than was its predecessor - after all, no Supreme Court in our 
history has been as protective of personal freedom as the Warren 
Court - examination of the record discloses that the Court's decisions 
since 1969 have had a very significant impact on the lives and liberties 
of individuals. 749 
745. 1964 INS REP., supra note 742, at 109 (table 51). 
746. 1964 INS REP., supra note 742, at 109 (11,945 persons from 1955 to 1964); INS ANN. 
REP. 121 (1967) (869 persons in 1965); INS ANN. REP. 135 (1975) (1,159 persons from 1966 to 
1968) (hereinafter cited as 1975 INS REP.]. 
747. 387 U.S. at 266. Cf. Rogers v. Bellei, 4-01 U.S. 815 (1971) (doctrine inapplicable to 
citizenship attained other than by being born or natl!~·alized in the United States). 
748. See, e.g., 1975 INS REP., supra note 746, at 135 (99 persons expatriated between 1970 
and 1975 for serving in the armed forces of a foreign state). 
749. See generally Choper, supra note 27, at 785-87; Burger-Led Court Surprises Experts, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1980, at 25, col. I. 
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A. Rights of the Accused 
1. Search and Seizure 
107 
a. Persons present during lawful search. In 1979, in Ybarra v. Illi-
nois, 750 the Court held that when the police have a warrant to search 
designated premises or persons, they cannot (a) conduct a search of 
persons present (but unnamed in the warrant) for evidence without 
probable cause, nor (b) make a patdown search of such persons for 
weapons unless there is a reasonable belief or suspicion that they are 
armed and presently dangerous. At the time of the Court's decision, 
the Public Defender of California contended that "[a] clear majority of 
jurisdictions which have considered the question"751 agreed with the 
Court's conclusion, whereas another commentator found the Court's 
approach to be "the minority position"752 - "[t]he great majority of 
cases preceding Ybarra upheld the use of evidence . . . [taken pursu-
ant to a warrantless search of] persons present at a lawful search of the 
premises. "753 
A number of factors have tended to account for the difficulty of 
determining just how many state rules were modified - and in exactly 
what ways - by the Justices' pronouncement. Although research dis-
closes that the courts of approximately thirty jurisdictions had ad-
dressed various aspects of the problem754 - and about fifteen states 
(in some of which there were also court decisions) had statutes author-
izing the search of persons present during execution of a search war-
rant for the purposes of protecting the police or preventing destruction 
of items described in the warrant755 - decisions in both statutory and 
nonstatutory jurisdictions that permitted evidentiary searches on less 
than probable cause often drew distinctio_ns based on the nature of the 
premises for which the warrant was issued. About a half dozen 
states756 in addition to Illinois appeared to allow a "blanket search" of 
750. 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
751. Brief for State Public Defender of California as Amicus Curiae at 25, Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
752. Supreme Court Review, Fourth Amendment - Search of an Individual Pursuant to a 
Warrant to Search the Premises, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 558, 561 (1980). 
753. Id. at 562. 
754. See notes 756-59 infra. For some speculative reasons as to why there were no reported 
decisions in many states despite the potentially widespread occurrence of the situation, see Note, 
58 CORNELL L. REV. 614, 614 n.4 (1973). 
755. See Comment, Fourth Amendment Rights of Persons Present when a Search Warrant is 
Executed: Ybarra v. Illinois, 66 IOWA L. REv. 453, 455 n.22 (1981}; Note, Criminal Law -
Search of a Person Present on Premises Subject to a Search Warrant - Ybarra v. Illinois, 28 
KAN. L. REv. 512, 513 n.10 (1980). 
756. See Colding v. State, 259 Ark. 634, 536 S.W.2d 106 (1976}; Samuel v. State, 222 So. 2d 
3 (Fla. 1969); State v. Loudermilk, 208 Kan. 893, 494 P.2d 1174 (1972}; Commonwealth v. 
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all persons on the premises unless the circumstances indicated that 
they were "innocent stranger(s) having no connection with the prem-
ises" such as a crowd of patrons at a "large retail or commercial estab-
lishment. "757 Four other states seemed only to authorize a full search 
for evidence of persons present but unmentioned in the warrant if the 
place to be searched was a residence or automobile rather than a "pub-
lic" area. 758 On the other hand, it appears that nearly two-thirds of 
the states with an articulated view on the question had already 
adopted (or had come very close to) the probable cause standard man-
dated by the Court. 759 Thus, overall, it is fair to say that Ybarra prob-
ably expanded the privacy rights of those at the scene of a search 
warrant's implementation760 in more than one-third of the country. 
The qualitative value of the Court's decree is quite obvious. 
Although it is undoubtedly true that a contrary rule - permitting all 
persons present to be subjected to a complete search - would mark-
edly enhance the detection of crimes and the seizure of evidence and 
contraband, 761 a study of sixty cases taken from the files of the Chi-
cago Police Department to document this fact also plainly reveals the 
degree to which it compromises the personal liberties of innocent 
people.762 
Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (Mass.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976); Brown v. State, 498 S.W.2d 
343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); United States v. Graves, 315 A.2d 559 (D.C. 1974). 
757. People v. Ybarra, 58 Ill. App. 3d 57, 61-62, 373 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (1978), revd., 444 
U.S. 85 (1979) (emphasis added). 
758. See State v. Cochran, 135 Ga. App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181 (1975); Willis v. State, 122 Ga. 
App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487 (1970); State v. Sims, 75 N.J. 337, 382 A.2d 638 (1978); People v. 
Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 396, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50, 330 N.E.2d 26 (1975); People v. Nicoletti, 60 Misc. 2d 
108, 302 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1969); Van Hom v. State, 496 P.2d 121 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). 
759. See Smith v. State, 292 Ala. 120, 289 So. 2d 816 (1974); State v. Mendez, 115 Ariz. 367, 
565 P.2d 873 (1977); People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 67 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968); People v. 
Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 1238 (1971); State v. Procce, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 637, 260 A.2d 413 
(1969); State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); State v. Nabarro, 55 Hawaii 585, 525 
P.2d 573 (1974); Purkey v. Maby, 33 Idaho 281, 193 P. 79 (1920); McAllister v. State, 159 Ind. 
App. 340, 30q N.E.2d 395 (1974); State v. Bums, 306 A.2d 8 (Me. 1973); Sibiski v. State, 19 Md. 
App. 149, 310 A.2d 200 (1973); State v. Fox, 283 Minn. 176, 168 N.W.2d 260 (1969); State v. 
Bradbury, 109 N.H. 105, 243 A.2d 302 (1968); Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 
29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); State v. Carufel, 106 R.I. 739, 263 A.2d 686 (1970); 
Tacoma v. Mundell, 6 Wash. App. 673, 495 P.2d 682 (1972); State v. Massie, 95 W. Va. 233, 120 
S.E. 514 (1923); State v. Wuest, 190 Wis. 251, 308 N.W. 899 (1926). 
760. For discussion of the clarity of Ybarra's application to warrant authorized searches of 
"private premises," see 2 w. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
.AMENDMENT § 4.9 (Supp. 1984). 
761. See Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae at 2-
14, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
762. In an example that typifies many of those offered, during the execution of a warrant to 
search an apartment for narcotics, an evidentiary search was made of all nine persons present 
although there was no reason to believe that any was guilty of an offense; while this resulted in 
the arrest of four individuals for possession of drugs or weapons, nothing incriminating was 
found on the other five. Id. at 12 (X708253); see also id. at 12-13 (P726675, A703426, Y701990). 
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Several unanswered questions will ultimately determine just how 
important a protection of individual rights Ybarra actually affords. If 
the police need only satisfy a very lenient standard before making a 
patdown of all persons at the scene of a search warrant's implementa-
tion, and if the officers may then seize (and introduce against the de-
fendant at trial) all evidence discovered pursuant to their exploration 
during the patdown, then the Justices' holding may well have at best a 
quite modest impact.763 But, as to the former issue, the Court's contin-
ued emphasis in the Ybarra opinion on the "narrow scope"764 of the 
patdown exception to the probable cause requirement strongly sug-
gests that it will be vigilant in demanding "reasonable belief or suspi-
cion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person 
happens to be on premises where an authorized . . . search is taking 
place."'65 And, although the Court has yet to rule specifically on the 
latter issue, its position that the purpose of the patdown is (a) "to find 
weapons,"766 and (b) should not "be understood to allow ... any 
search whatever for anything but weapons"767 at least implies that the 
seizure of most non weapons evidence in this context will likely be held 
inadmissible. 768 
b. Arrest at suspect's home. The potentially far-reaching signifi-
cance of the Court's 1980 decision in Payton v. New York769 -holding 
that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the fourth and four-
teenth amendments require the police to obtain a warrant before mak-
ing a nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make an 
arrest770 - is evident from the fact that, at the time the decision was 
handed down, twenty-four states had expressly permitted such war-
rantless entries and only fifteen states unequivocally prohibited 
them. 711 But Payton's ultimate value in securing personal liberty turns 
This pattern is replicated by sundry data involving, for example, law enforcement officials empty-
ing the purse of an attorney on the premises when her firm's files were being searched for client 
records, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 13, 1979, § 2, at 1, col. 4, and making a full search of a person 
who was simply standing at the curb in front of a house for which the police had a warrant. State 
v. McClelland, 215 Kan. 81, 523 P.2d 357 (1974). 
763. See Comment, supra note 755, at 464. 
764. 444 U.S. at 93. 
765. 444 U.S. at 94. 
766. 444 U.S. at 93. 
767. 444 U.S. at 93-94. 
768. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 149, at 437-38; LaFave, ''Street Encounters" and 
the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39, 91-93 (1968). 
769. 445 u.s 573 (1980). 
770. In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the Court extended the principle to 
require a search warrant before police enter the home of a third party in order to seize a person 
for whom they have an arrest warrant. 
771. 445 U.S. at 598-99. 
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on the extent to which the Justices' ruling - which interposes the 
determination of a "neutral and detached magistrate"772 on the issue 
of probable cause "between the zealous officer and the citizen"773 -
will actually prevent unjustified invasions of privacy. 
It is generally agreed that persons who are arrested or searched 
without probable cause presently have no reliable remedy for the un-
lawful intrusion. 774 If incriminating evidence is acquired incident to 
the illegal arrest or search, the exclusionary rule may preclude its use 
against the defendant. Although this would afford the victim of the 
invalid arrest or search an enormous benefit, it would not directly re-
pair the injury to his constitutional rights. If no evidence is seized 
pursuant to the unlawful arrest or search, the exclusionary rule is of 
no aid whatever. If there is adequate reason to believe that the ar-
rested defendant is guilty he must stand trial regardless of the illegality 
of this seizure. 775 And the exclusionary rule surely provides no solace 
for the wholly innocent victim of the police misconduct. Thus, the 
most effective way to deal with the harsh consequences of illegal ar-
rests or searches is to stop them from occurring in the first place. 
Although the Justices have often expounded the virtues of a war-
rant procedure in protecting against unconstitutional arrests and 
searches, it is unquestionably true that a wide gulf exists between the 
judicially stated ideal and actual practice. Various empirical studies 
have demonstrated that, notwithstanding the Court's talk about in-
formed and deliberate determinations by impartial judicial officers, 776 
"the ex parte warrant procedure . . . is conducted in most jurisdic-
tions by the lowest official in the judicial hierarchy"777 - usually mag-
istrates (and occasionally court clerks778) who have often been 
nonlawyers779 - and that, in any event, "there is virtually no judicial 
772. 445 U.S. at 586 n.24 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
773. 445 U.S. at 602. 
774. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Amsterdam, supra note 149, at 360-61; Newman, supra 
note 155. 
775. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S 463 (1980). 
776. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 
110 (1964). 
777. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the Possi-
bility of Police Peljury, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 405, 415. 
778. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972). See generally Note, A Survey of the 
Qualifications of Magistrates Authorized to Issue Warrants, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 443, 451-52 
(1975). 
779. Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study in Current 
Practices, 1964 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 12. But see Note, supra note 778, at 446-47 (federal magis-
trates must now be lawyers unless no lawyer is available), 453-55 (some states limit issuance of 
warrants to judges or lawyer-magistrates). 
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inquiry into the existence of probable cause for the issuance of arrest 
warrants."780 Indeed, despite the Court's holding that a prosecutor's 
judgment that a warrant should issue does not satisfy the "impartial 
judicial officer" standard,781 a series of observational studies of actual 
practices have disclosed that, in fact, "the prosecutor plays a dominant 
role"782 and often "alone makes the effective warrant decision."783 
But even apart from the warrant procedure's symbolic value or the 
possibility that the Court may in the future monitor the system more 
rigorously, there are several factors that indicate that Payton's require-
ment of a warrant will help secure individual rights. At a minimum, it 
should deter geographic dragnet searches for a fugitive or entries into 
the homes of all his acquaintances.784 Further, the warrant require-
ment demands that arresting officers prepare a written record prior to 
entry or seizure785 - a corrective for indolence leading to improper 
invasions of privacy and a protection against hindsight evaluations of 
probable cause. Moreover, "[a]lthough often influenced by the atti-
tude of the police officer requesting the warrant, the prosecutor usu-
ally does give careful attention to the facts of the individual case and 
does in fact decide whether an arrest or prosecution is permissible and 
desirable."786 Finally, despite the widespread belief that the protective 
features of the warrant requirement are seriously undermined by po-
lice perjury787 (as well as by the rule that the identity of unnamed 
police informants need not be divulged788), the Court's decision in 
Franks v. Delaware189 -facilitating defendants' challenges to warrant 
780. Miller & Tiffany, supra note 779, at 6. 
781. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
782. W. LAFAVE, supra note 156, at 34. See generally LaFave & Remington, Controlling the 
Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. 
REV. 987, 991-95 (1965). 
783. Miller & Tiffany, supra note 779, at 4. 
784. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). 
785. U.S. CoNsr., amend. IV. 
786. W. LAFAVE, supra note 156, at 34. But see Grano, supra note 777, at 414. While 
"detailed consideration of the available evidence ... is not customary," it does occur occasion-
ally. See Miller & Tiffany, supra note 779, at 13. Witnesses, the suspect, or the victim are some-
times interviewed and, in some instances, "reports of medical examiners, results of polygraph 
tests and physical evidence either of the crime or the condition of the victim are examined. And 
occasionally, defense attorneys are permitted to present arguments about the sufficiency of the 
evidence and even to call the attention of the prosecutor to additional evidence." Id. at 13-14. In 
Detroit, "[a] quite highly regularized system of intra-office review was established" to "insure 
uniformity in charging, both in its evidence sufficiency and policy aspects." Id. at 14. While 
these considerations and procedures provide added protection against misconduct as to arrest 
warrants, their effect on search warrants is likely to be substantially less. 
787. See Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839, 863-
73 (1974) and authorities cited therein. 
788. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
789. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
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affidavits - promises to ameliorate this condition by deterring such 
misconduct. 
2. Equality for the Poor 
a. Right to counsel. i. Preliminary hearings. Prior to the Court's 
1970 decision in Coleman v. Alabama, 790 although computations va-
ried somewhat, it appeared that no more than one-third of the states 
appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants at a preliminary 
hearing to test the sufficiency of the state's evidence to warrant hold-
ing the accused for prosecution. 791 The absence of a lawyer was a 
significant reason for the very high percentage of waivers of prelimi-
nary hearings in several of those jurisdictions where counsel was not 
provided as compared to those states where it was.792 
The potential assistance to the accused, as a result of Coleman, of 
competent representation at a preliminary hearing is substantial. The 
greatest benefit is the possibility that a "lawyer's skilled examination 
and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the 
State's case"793 and thereby lead to dismissal. Various studies attest to 
the significance of this opportunity. Although "fruitful evaluation of 
their conclusions is made especially difficult . . . by substantial varia-
tions in the structure of the preliminary hearing as it is conducted 
throughout the country,"794 statistics indicate that the dismissal rate 
exceeds thirty percent in some major urban counties. 195 
It is true that, as a formal matter, a dismissal or reduction of 
charges at the preliminary hearing ordinarily "does not preclude the 
prosecutor from either taking the . . . case to the grand jury or, where 
prosecution is by information and a preliminary exam bindover is stat-
utorily required, refiling the charges and seeking assignment of the 
790. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
791. See 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN 
STATE COURTS 75 (1965); Note, Constitutional Right to Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, 15 
DICK. L. REV. 143, 145 (1970); see also 45 TuL. L. REV. 1056, 1057-58 (1971). In federal 
prosecutions, the right was already provided by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1982), and by 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44. 
792. See Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings 
and Legal-Policy Observations, 18 UCLA L. REV. 635, 646-47, n.35 (1971). 
793. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9. 
794. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES· 
CoMMENTS-QUESTIONS 963 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as KAMISAR - 5th ed.]. 
795. Id., at 964; see also authorities cited id. at 963 n. a. In addition, "a significant percentage 
of cases may be reduced to misdemeanors at the preliminary hearing stage, so that the percentage 
of cases 'boundover' for felony trials may be less than 30% of all the cases in which felony 
charges were originally filed." Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: CASES-CoMMENTS-QUESTIONS 958 n. b (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 
KAMISAR - 4th ed.]. 
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preliminary hearing to another magistrate."796 But, as a practical 
matter, the prosecution will take such action "only in 'special' cases -
usually where additional evidence is obtained or the magistrate's rul-
ing is considered clearly erroneous."797 Moreover, although "the 
grand jury is in no way limited by the bindover, and may refuse to 
indict despite the bindover, or may indict for a lesser or higher offense, 
depending upon the evidence presented to it," in most "information 
jurisdictions," the prosecutor i's limited either "to the charges desig-
nated in the bindover decision" or to an offense disclosed by the evi-
dence presented at the preliminary hearing.798 Thus, the aid of 
counsel at a preliminary hearing can have far-reaching consequences 
for the accused. 
Apart from the chance of reduction of charges or outright dismis-
sal, even if the defendant is bound over, "the skilled interrogation of 
witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment 
tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or 
preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not 
appear at the trial." Moreover, "trained counsel can more effectively 
discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the 
preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial"799 - an 
especially valuable device where "state law and practice provide very 
little pretrial discovery."800 Further, "even though state law provides 
extensive discovery, if that discovery is not available until after the 
critical time for plea settlements has passed, the preliminary hearing 
may still serve as the primary discovery vehicle for the substantial per-
centage of cases resolved by guilty pleas."801 Moreover, "discovery" 
of the demeanor and other strengths and weaknesses of witnesses is 
something that is not obtainable from the prosecution's file no matter 
how liberal the state's discovery rules may be. Finally, "counsel can 
also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective argu-
ments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early 
psychiatric examination or bail."802 
Although the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Ar-
raignment Procedure provides that the right to a preliminary hearing 
796. KAMISAR - 5th ed., supra note 794, at 965; see also id. at 996-97. 
797. Id. at 965; see also Graham & Letwin, supra note 792, at 730. 
798. KAMISAR - 4th ed., supra note 795, at 960. 
799. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9. 
800. KAMISAR - 5th ed., supra note 794, at 967. 
801. Id. 
802. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9. 
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may not be terminated by the filing of an indictment, 803 in practice, 
most state and federal prosecutors may avoid a preliminary hearing 
altogether by this technique. 804 But "state prosecutors generally do 
not follow the common federal practice of 'mooting' almost all sched-
uled preliminary hearings by obtaining a prior indictment."805 Nor 
have the states responded to Coleman by the seemingly permissible 
move of abolishing preliminary hearings altogether. Thus, it is fair to 
conclude that the Court's ruling in Coleman has significantly extended 
the protection of personal rights of state criminal defendants. 
ii. Misdemeanor trials. In 1972, when the Court decided 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 806 at least four or five states807 completely re-
fused to appoint counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants. Be-
yond this, determining the exact practice throughout the nation is 
complicated by several factors. Statewide laws were applied differently 
in different areas of some states; there were conflicting rules within 
certain states; and in other states that wholly forbade assignment of 
counsel, federal courts had ruled that lawyers must be provided for at 
least some indigent accused misdemeanants. 808 Despite these ambigu-
ities, it is plain that only a minority of the fifty states afforded indi-
gents counsel in all (or virtually all) nonfelony prosecutions where 
imprisonment might result. 909 
The number of indigent misdemeanor defendants who subse-
quently obtained the assistance of a lawyer because of the Argersinger 
edict cannot, of course, be computed precisely. But it was unquestion-
ably substantial. For example, in the city of Cleveland alone it was 
803. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 330.1 (American Law Institute 1975). 
804. KAMISAR - 5th ed., supra note 794, at 979-80. 
805. KAMISAR - 4th ed., supra note 795, at 975. 
806. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel extended to trials 
for misdemeanors which might result in imprisonment). 
807. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, 23, 25, 26-27, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner]; S. KRANrz, C. SMITH, D. ROSSMAN, P. FROYD & J. 
HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO CoUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 694-701 (1976) [hereinafter cited as s. 
KRANrz]. 
808. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 807, at 18, 21, 26 (e.g., Louisiana, Nebraska, 
Virginia). 
809. See generally Goldberg & Hartman, Help for the Indigent Accused: The Effect of 
Argersinger, 30 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 203, 205 (1972). In Maine, Montana, and Rhode Island 
the appointment of counsel was within the court's discretion. In Alabama counsel was assigned 
only for "serious" offenses or where "special circumstances" were found to exist. Other jurisdic-
tions appointed counsel only when incarceration exceeded six months (Colorado, Florida, Idal10, 
Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Utah and Wisconsin), or 90 days (Michigan), 
or 60 days (Hawaii). Even in such states as Georgia, Indiana and Oklalioma, where statutes or 
judicial decisions required counsel in all cases, the rule was administered unevenly. See also Brief 
for Petitioner, supra note 807, at 11-28 (giving a slightly different breakdown of the state rules 
from that of Goldberg & Hartman); S. KRANrz, supra note 807, at 694-701. 
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shown that 4,000 misdemeanor cases annually would be affected. 810 
Several broader estimates at the time, using different bases of calcula-
tion, found that between 1,000,000 and 1,250,000 persons annually 
charged with misdemeanors were without funds, 811 and one of the 
studies concluded that prior to Argersinger perhaps as many as sev-
enty-five percent of all those charged with misdemeanors went 
unrepresented. 812 
It is true that many of these people would not qualify under the 
potential limitation to Argersinger, established by Scott v. Illinois, 813 
that counsel must be appointed only when imprisonment is imposed. 
But it is equally beyond cavil that many of those indigents who did 
have lawyers provided at state expense at the time of Argersinger 
would not have had this benefit were it not for the Court's earlier right 
to counsel rulings. Thus, Alabama, which before Gideon v. Wain-
wright814 had appointed counsel only in capital cases, implemented 
Gideon by assigning lawyers not only for felonies but for serious mis-
demeanor offenses as well.815 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 
mandating the Argersinger approach as early as 1967, pointed to 
Gideon as the basis for its holding.816 Indeed, whereas at the time of 
the Gideon decision only five states required appointment of counsel 
for any misdemeanor, by 1970 twelve states did so for at least some 
and nineteen more did so for most misdemeanors.817 By 1979, nearly 
forty states had either clearly or arguably adopted a standard which 
appointed lawyers in connection with any offenses for which imprison-
ment is authorized, whether or not it is actually imposed.818 Given the 
finding of one survey that "misdemeanants represented by attorneys 
are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges 
dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without coun-
sel, "819 it may fairly be said that theArgersinger rule, building as it did 
810. See Portman, Gideon's Trumpet Blows for Misdemeanants - Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
The Decision and Its Impact, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 14 (1973). 
811. See id. at 18; Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel. 55 IOWA L. 
REV. 1249, 1260 (1970). 
812. Portman, supra note 810, at 13. 
813. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
814. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
815. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 807, at 11. 
816. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). 
817. See Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty 
States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 133 (1970). Within 18 months of the Argersinger ruling, 
some states (Arizona, North Carolina and South Dakota) moved to expand the announced right 
to encompass some misdemeanors when only a fine could result. See S. K.RANTz, supra note 807, 
at 694-701. 
818. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 385-88 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
819. ACLU, LEGAL CoUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1970). 
116 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
on the progress already generated by Gideon, significantly affected the 
personal liberties of many Americans. Indeed, the fortunes of even 
those indigent misdemeanor defendants who are not assigned counsel 
as a result of the Argersinger-Scott mandate have been meaningfully 
improved by the Justices' decisions, for the state's refusal to appoint a 
lawyer for them means that, even if convicted, they cannot be incar-
cerated nor can those convictions be used to enhance prison sentences 
for any subsequent offenses. 820 
iii. Enhanced punishment. The criminal codes of most states and 
of the federal government provide that persons found guilty of some 
offenses may receive enhanced punishment if previously convicted of 
certain misdemeanors. 821 In probably the most widespread example, 
one survey revealed that more than half the states' laws stipulate, 
"either generally or for specific offenses, that repeated serious traffic 
violations are punishable by an increased term of imprisonment."822 
In addition, minor crimes such as illegal entry of aliens, 823 larceny of 
merchandise, 824 possessing weapons825 or ammunition, 826 petty 
theft, 827 passing bad checks, 828 misusing credit cards, 829 distributing 
obscene materials,830 indecent exposure,831 and prostitution,832 are 
often treated as felonies if the defendant has previously been convicted 
of the same offense. 
It is difficult to assess the full impact of the Court's ruling in 
Baldasar v. Illinois, 833 that, if an indigent defendant is denied ap-
pointed counsel for a misdemeanor conviction, that judgment cannot 
be used to increase his prison sentence for a subsequent offense. 834 
820. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), discussed at notes 821-40 infra. 
821. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
822. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5 n.7, Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 
(1980). 
823. 8 u.s.c. § 1325 (1982). 
824. 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1731(2), (3) (West 1983). 
825. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 12025 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 265.01, 265.02 (Mc-
Kinney 1980). 
826. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 12304 (West 1982). 
827. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (Baldwin 1983). 
828. OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2913.11 (Baldwin 1983). 
829. OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 2913.21 (Baldwin 1983). 
830. CAL . .PENAL CoDE §§ 311.2, 311.9 (West 1970). 
831. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 314 (West 1970). 
832. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West 1970). 
833. 446 U.S. 222 (1980). 
834. There may be some uncertainty respecting this statement as the holding in Ba/dasar. 
Only four members of the Court, including the now retired Justice Stewart, specifically sub-
scribed to this formulation of the rule. Justice Blackmun, who joined the Court's per curinm 
opinion in Ba/dasar, did so on the ground that counsel should have been appointed for defen-
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First, many persons accused of petty crimes will in fact have had a 
lawyer at their earlier trial, under the rule of Argersinger v. Hamlin 835 
and Scott v. Illinois. 836 Moreover, a substantial number of states "pro-
vide counsel in all cases where imprisonment is authorized, even 
though counsel is not constitutionally required."837 Second, although 
apparently fewer than a dozen states had resolved the precise issue 
prior to the Baldasar decision, a majority of these correctly anticipated 
the Justices' conclusion. 838 Nonetheless, in addition to Illinois, the 
rule in both New Jersey and Texas permitted prior uncounseled mis-
demeanor convictions to be used collaterally in recidivist proceed-
ings, 839 and all the state tribunals mentioned above that had held to 
the contrary did so pursuant to their understanding of the commands 
of the Court's earlier sixth amendment decisions. Thus, given the 
large number of habitual offenders potentially affected - an estimated 
500 each year under the federal law regarding illegal entry of aliens 
alone840 - the Baldasar edict must be counted as significantly secur-
ing the personal rights of those accused of crime. 
b. Sentence. As of the end of the 1960's, the statutes of the federal 
government and all states except Delaware authorized imprisonment 
of persons who were unable to pay a fine. 841 Although there were no 
comprehensive statistics, evidence obtained from varied sources indi-
cated that the number of such persons incarcerated was amazingly 
large - one widely cited estimate placing the figure at between 40% 
and 60% of all inmates in county jails. 842 This led to the "conserva-
dant's original misdemeanor conviction because, even though no imprisonment resulted, it was 
"for an offense punishable by more than six months' imprisonment." 446 U.S. at 230 (Black-
mun, J., concurring). 
835. 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see notes 806-20 supra and accompanying text. 
836. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
837. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 229 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
838. State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968); Alexander v. State, 258 Ark. 633, 
527 S.W.2d 928 (1975); Monroe v. Fincher, 305 So. 2d 108 (La. 1974); Commonwealth v. Bar-
rett, 322 N.E.2d 89 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); State v. Kirby, 33 Ohio Misc, 48, 289 N.E.2d 406 (Ct. 
Common Pleas 1972); Maghe v. State, 507 P.2d 950 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); cf. Morgan v. 
State, 235 Ga. 632, 221 S.E.2d 47 (1975) (Argersinger applied retroactively). 
839. State v. McGrew, 127 N.J. Super. 327, 317 A.2d 390 (1974); Aldrighetti v. State, 507 
S.W.2d 770 (fex. Crim. App. 1974). Cf. Nelson v. Tullos, 323 So. 2d 539 (Miss. 1975) (may 
imprison a convicted indigent for failure to pay a fine imposed without counsel after reasonable 
measures designed to aid payment prove unavailing). · 
840. Brief for the United States at 2, Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980). Statistics 
from California disclose that, in 1980, about 150 misdemeanants were subject to enhanced pun-
ishment because of prior misdemeanor convictions. Letter from Section Manager of Bureau of 
Criminal Statistics and Special Services to the author (Feb. 18, 1982). 
841. See Note, Installment Payments: A Solution to the Problem of Fining Indigents, 24 U. 
FLA. L. REv. 166, 173 (1971). 
842. s. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CoRRECTION 286 (2d ed. 1973). A study of a Phila-
delphia prison in 1949-1950 found that 60% of the 4140 defendants sentenced were committed 
118 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
tive estimate" that on any day nearly 28,000 persons would be in jail 
in the United States because they had failed to pay a fine. 843 
Two Supreme Court decisions in the early 1970's greatly affected 
this situation. In Williams v. Illinois, 844 the Court held that equal pro-
tection forbade an indigent's imprisonment "beyond the maximum 
term specified by statute because of his failure to satisfy the monetary 
provisions of the sentence."845 The Justices emphasized that they were 
only addressing this "narrow issue."846 But although two state stat-
utes and a few court rulings had already conformed to the Williams 
principle,847 "[m]ost states permit[ted] imprisonment beyond the max-
imum term allowed by law, and in some there [was] no limit on the 
length of time one may serve for nonpayment."848 It was possible for 
states or cities to avoid the thrust of the Williams mandate either by 
increasing the maximum sentences for various offenses (and thus pro-
viding sentencing judges with more leeway), or by authorizing courts 
that heretofore could not impose jail terms (as many could not)849 to 
do so. 
In Tate v. Short, 850 however, the Court expanded the Williams ra-
tionale by adopting the position that equal protection prohibits indi-
gents from being jailed for involuntarily "failing to make immediate 
for nonpayment of fines. Note, Fines and Fining -An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013, 
1022 (1953). In New Jersey, approximately 6,000 of the 18,000 persons jailed for misdemeanors 
and traffic offenses in 1961-1962 were sentenced in lieu of payments of fines. L. SILVERSTEIN, 
supra note 791, at 123. Between 1960 and 1964, New York City courts imprisoned an average of 
a&out 25,000 persons annually because of their inability to pay fines. See Comment, Fines, lm-
pfisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Do//ars or Thirty Days," 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778, 787-88 n.86 
(1_969). In 1965, a 10-month survey of Baltimore prisons revealed that 80% of the 20,000 in-
mates were there for failure to pay fines. U.S. TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICE, PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CoURTS 124 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE 
REPORT: THE CoURTS]. In addition, a 1969 study of the states of Arkansas and New Jersey and 
the city of Miami discovered that about 45% of all persons serving post-conviction jail terms 
were sentenced for nonpayment. Note, supra note 841, at 169. These statistics confirm earlier 
figures from national censuses and research in other cities. See Comment, supra, at 787. 
843. Note, supra note 841, at 169. 
844. 399 u.s 235 (1970). 
845. 399 U.S. at 236. 
846. 399 U.S. at 236. 
847. See Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); People v. 
Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966); Note, Imprisonment/or Non-
payment of Fines-A Perplexing Problem Confronting State Legislatures, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 
328, 331 (1971) (Arizona and California). 
848. Wi//iams, 399 U.S. at 239. 
849. See Tigar, The Supreme Court-1969 Term, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: 
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 52 n.37 (1970). Memphis was one city that pursued 
this course. Rossum, Problems in Municipal Court Administration and The Stress of Supreme 
Court Decisions: A Memphis Cose Study, 3 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53, 79-80 (1974). 
850. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
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payment of any fine."851 Tate required instead that states first exhaust 
other collection aternatives such as installment payments. Although 
perhaps as many as ten states had previously authorized judges to ac-
cept payment of fines on the installment plan, 852 none of these jurisdic-
tions had required that indigents be given this opportunity.853 While 
research has not produced any nationwide data on our experience with 
the installment technique, both earlier and recent indications strongly 
suggest that Williams and Tate have greatly reduced the number of 
jailings for nonpayment854 and thus have markedly expanded the free-
dom of poor persons convicted of minor crimes throughout the nation. 
In addition, these rulings promise such ancillary benefits as alleviating 
overcrowded prison conditions, reducing the economic burden on the 
states of incarceration (perhaps approaching $100 million annu-
ally), 855 improving the collection rate for fines imposed, 856 and amelio-
rating the "pervasive" belief, among ghetto residents particularly, that 
by imposing fines the judicial system discriminates against the poor. 857 
3. Self-Representation 
Although, as of 1975, the right of a criminal defendant to represent 
himself at trial was provided by statute for federal prosecutions, guar-
anteed by the constitutions of thirty-six states and suggested by judi-
cial decisions in several additional states, 858 it was not universally 
secure. In California alone, where the right to dispense with the assist-
ance of counsel was not recognized, research disclosed thirty-two pub-
lished appellate cases between 1950 and 1970 (suggesting a much 
851. 401 U.S. at 398 (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970) (White, J., 
concurring)). 
852. See Tate, 401 U.S. at 400 n.5; Williams, 399 U.S. at 244-45 n.21; see also Note, supra 
note 842, at 1023 n.71. 
853. See Note, supra note 841, at 174. 
854. See Note, supra note 842, at 1023 (After implementation of an installment procedure, 
"in Sweden, commitments for nonpayment fell from 13,358 in 1932 to 286 in 1946; in Britain, 
from an average of 83,187 for 1909-1913 to 2,667 in 1946 .•.. In West Virginia, even in the 
midst of the depression, only 5% of those allowed to pay by installment had to be commit-
ted • • . ."); Note, Criminal Procedure - The Use of the Fine as a Criminal Sanction in New 
Jersey: Some Suggested Improvements, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 1185, 1190, 1197 (1975) (only about 
1 % of defendants permitted to pay by installments were jailed for nonpayment); Comment, 
"Fines and/or Imprisonment": Pauper's Dilemmma or Delight?, 33 ARK. L. REV. 378, 388-89 
(1979) (unlikely that any person in Arkansas who cannot pay will be imprisoned); Note, supra 
note 841, at 174-76 (experience in Delaware). 
855. Note, supra note 841, at 169; see also Comment, The ''$30 or 30 days" Fine as Applied to 
Indigents, 33 LA. L. REV. 671, 680 (1973). 
856. See Note, supra note 841, at 175-76 (35% improvement in Delaware). 
857. See U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON ClvIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON ClvIL DISORDERS 337 (1968). 
858. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1975). 
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larger figure overall) in which the trial judge denied the accused's re-
quest to defend pro se. 859 The usual justification for the defendant's 
motion was "dissatisfaction with his counsel (typically the public de-
fender or appointed counsel) and even an express disagreement over 
trial strategy."860 
The contention that to deny the asserted constitutional right of 
self-representation - established in Faretta v. California861 - is "to 
impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them 
as empty verbalisms" and "to imprison a man in his privileges"862 is 
surely debatable. Objectively, it appears "undeniable that in most 
criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's 
guidance"863 and that "in all but an extraordinarily small number of 
cases an accused will lose whatever defense he may have if he under-
takes to conduct the trial himself."864 Indeed, despite the fact that 
criminal trials usually result in convictions in any event, for most per-
sons it may well be that the individual right afforded by Faretta is 
nothing other than "an instrument of self-destruction"865 - probably 
even more so in the plea bargaining process than the formal proceed-
ing itself. But none of this negates the right's operational value to some 
defendants, few as they may be. 
Moreover, the importance of a constitutional safeguard must also 
be measured by the perceptions of its beneficiaries. Traditionally, de-
fense lawyers have been empowered to make critical strategic deci-
sions for their clients even when directly opposed by clients themselves 
- including waiver of such fundamental rights as speedy trial, cross-
examination of adverse witnesses, subpoena of witnesses desired by the 
accused, withdrawal of an insanity plea, and objection to the introduc-
tion of illegally seized evidence. 866 This being true, it is difficult to 
dispute the view of some defendants - exemplified by the plea of one 
that " '[i]f I'm going to be railroaded to the gas chamber at least let me 
be the engineer' " 867 - that by forcing him to be represented by coun-
sel "the law contrives against him."868 This deeply ingrained objec-
859. Brief for Petitioner, app. A, at 6a-8a, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
860. Id., app. A, at 2a. 
861. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
862. Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942). 
863. Farella, 422 U.S. at 834. 
864. 422 U.S. at 838 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
865. 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
866. See authorities cited in Brief of Petitioner, supra note 859, at 18-21; see also Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Farella, 422 U.S. at 820. 
867. Brief of Amicus' Curiae at 2, Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
868. Farella, 422 U.S. at 834. 
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tion is overcome by the Court's ruling in Faretta, and those defendants 
who desire vindication of their right to proceed pro se have it pro-
tected by the Court and their liberty thus enhanced. 
4. Double Jeopardy 
a. Collateral estoppel. As of 1970, the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel - "the principle that bars relitigation between the same parties 
of issues actually determined at a previous trial"869 - was a "safe-
guard firmly imb~dded"870 for federal criminal trials. But the 
Supreme Court's decision of that year in Ashe v. Swenson, 871 holding 
that collateral estoppel was part of the double jeopardy prohibition 
which applied to the states, contravened the rule then existing in more 
than half the jurisdictions in the nation. 872 
It is true that Ashe's impact may be significantly circumscribed by 
the fact that "[c]ollateral estoppel is unavailable to many defendants 
because of the difficulty in determining, from a general verdict, what 
issues were actually litigated and necessarily decided in the defen-
dant's favor in the first trial."873 The Court, however, was careful to 
emphasize that its edict was "not to be applied with the hypertechnical 
and archaic approach of a nineteenth century pleading book, but with 
realism and rationality."874 And a series of subsequent decisions ap-
plying the Ashe doctrine demonstrates its vitality. 875 Moreover, had 
Ashe then been the law, subsequent prosecutions after acquittals in a 
number of earlier decisions - dealing, for example, with the alleged 
robbery of several persons at the same time876 - would most surely 
have been prevented. The collateral estoppel doctrine also forbids 
such frightening - but by no means purely hypothetical - possibili-
ties as forcing an accused to run the gauntlet of successive prosecu-
tions (until a conviction is obtained) for each of seventy-five hands of 
869. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442 (1970). 
870. 397 U.S. at 446 n.10. 
871. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
872. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203, 228-30 (1966); See generally Case Comment, Collateral 
Estoppel: A Constitutional Guarantee, 50 B.U. L. REV. 604 (1970); Comment, Ashe v. Swenson: 
Collateral Estoppel, Double Jeopardy and Inconsistent Verdicts, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 321 (1971). 
873. Note, Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising from the Same Transaction, 15 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 259, 282 (1978); see also Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double 
Jeopardy: Waller and Ashe, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 394 (1970). 
874. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444. 
875. See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972) (per curiam); Johnson v. Estelle, 506 
F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1024 (1975); McDonald v. Wainwright, 493 F.2d 204 
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971). 
876. See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958); Johns v. State, 130 Miss. 803, 95 So. 
84 (1923); Novak v. State, 139 Md. 538, 115 A. 853 (1921). 
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poker played in a continuous game, 877 or for each throw of the dice in 
an all night crap game. 878 Finally, although the Ashe majority refused 
to take the further step - urged by Justices Brennan, Douglas and 
Marshall - of requiring the government "to join at one trial all the 
charges against a defendant that grow out of ... [the] 'same transac-
tion,' " 879 a number of state courts have since done so, 880 thus afford-
ing some further evidence of the Court's influence in support of 
personal liberties. 
In sum, Ashe's impact has certainly not been revolutionary. But 
there is sound reason to believe - especially in light of the recent 
"extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related statutory of-
fenses" and consequent ability of prosecutors "to spin out a startlingly 
numerous series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transac-
tion"881 - that the Court's ruling has been beneficial in reducing "the 
potential for unfair and abusive reprosecutions."882 
b. Insufficient evidence. As of the mid-1960's, the federal judici-
ary883 and the courts of at least ten states884 had adopted the position 
that the Constitution did not bar retrial of a criminal defendant after 
his conviction had been reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence to 
sustain the verdict of guilty at trial. Only the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico had held to the contrary885 and statutory and judicial lan-
guage in other jurisdictions indicated that they would follow the pre-
vailing rule.886 By the mid-1970's, several additional states had 
accepted the view that retrial under these circumstances was constitu-
877. Cf. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) (each of75 hands of 
poker in a single session treated as seperately punishable offenses). 
878. Cf Parks v. State, 57 Tex. Crim. 569, 123 S.W. 1109 (1909) (defendant previously con-
victed for the first throw in an all-night crap game can be separately tried for each subsequent 
throw). 
879. 397 U.S. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
880. See, e.g., People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 
Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972). 
881. 397 U.S. at 445 n.10. 
882. 397 U.S. at 445 n.10. 
883. See Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). 
884. See People v. Hardisson, 61 Cal. 378 (1882); People v. Benson, 24 Ill. 2d 159, 180 
N.E.2d 483 (1962); State v. Bowman, 94 Iowa 228, 62 N.W. 729 (1895); State v. Phillips, 175 
Kan. SO, 259 P.2d 185 (1953); Harris v. State, 158 Miss. 439, 130 So. 697 (1930); State v. Patton, 
308 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1958); State v. Lamoreaux, 20 N.J. Super. 65, 89 A.2d 469 (1952); State v. 
Robinson, 100 Ohio App. 466, 137 N.E.2d 141 (1956); Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 77 
S.E.2d 447 (1953); Montgomery v. State, 136 Wis. 119, 116 N.W. 876 (1908); see also Thompson, 
Reversals/or Insufficient Evidence: The Emerging Doctrine of Appellate Aquittal, 8 IND. L. REV. 
497, 502 (1975). 
885. State v. Moreno, 69 N.M. 113, 364 P.2d 594 (1961). 
886. Comment, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evi-
dence, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 365, 372 n.31 (1964). 
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tionally forbidden. 887 But other state courts reaffirmed the traditional 
doctrine, 888 and the federal courts continued to adhere to the estab-
lished principle - although some limited it to instances in which the 
defendant had moved for a new trial (rather than straightforwardly 
seeking a judgment of acquittal)889 or where special equitable reasons 
existed890 for giving the prosecution "an opportunity for the prover-
bial 'second bite at the apple.' "891 
The Court's 1978 ruling in Burks v. United States 892 - that the 
fifth amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy, made fully ap-
plicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, 893 forbids retrial 
after reversal of a conviction "solely for lack of sufficient evidence to 
sustain the jury's verdict,"894 whether or not "a defendant has sought 
a new trial as one of his remedies"895 - therefore had substantial na-
tionwide impact. Although there appears to be no compilation of the 
exact number of criminal convictions throughout the country that are 
overturned each year on the ground of insufficient evidence, perusal of 
the appellate reports from any state suggests the scope of the problem. 
While it is undoubtedly true that the number of retrials that actually 
take place after such judgments is but a fraction of the total, nonethe-
less it is fair to infer that, as a result of the Justices' decision in Burks, 
a great many persons will avoid the trauma and ordeal of actual and 
threatened reprosecution and possible conviction despite the govern-
ment's having tried and failed to prove its case against them. 
c. Successive state-municipal prosecutions. At the time of the 
Court's 1970 decision in Waller v. Florida, 896 that successive state and 
municipal prosecutions for the identical criminal act conflicted with 
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, about half the 
states897 permitted such prosecutions on the theory that the state and 
887. See Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 495 P.2d 204 (1972); People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App. 
2d 281, 241 N.E.2d 653 (1968); cf. State v. Torres, 109 Ariz. 421, 510 P.2d 737 (1973). 
888. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 254 Md. 385, 255 A.2d 5 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 
(1970). 
889. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 558 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Robin-
son, 545 F.2d 301, 305 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976). 
890. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 517 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
891. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. l, 17 (1978). 
892. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
893. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978). 
894. Burks, 437 U.S. at 2. The Court left open the question of whether retrial would be 
permissible if "the trial court committed error by excluding prosecution evidence, which, if re-
ceived, would have rebutted any claim of evidentiary insufficiency." 437 U.S. at 5 n.4. 
895. 437 U.S. at 17; see also Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981) (same rule applicable 
when trial judge grants new trial on ground of insufficient evidence). 
896. 397 U.S. 287 (1970). 
897. 397 U.S. at 391 n.3. 
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its municipalities were "separate sovereign entities, each capable of im-
posing punishment for the same alleged crime."898 But despite this 
large number of states technically affected by the Waller ruling, it ap-
pears that the actual occurrence of such prosecutions was relatively 
rare. 899 Moreover, research subsequent to Waller indicates that its ap-
plication has been significantly limited by its requirement that the 
prosecutions be for the "same offense" coupled with the ability of 
states and their municipalities to manipulate the definitions of statu-
tory violations.900 Indeed, the defendant in the Waller case himself -
who, having removed a mural from the St. Petersburg City Hall, was 
first convicted for violating muncipal ordinances against destruction of 
city property and disorderly conduct and then found guilty of grand 
larceny by the state - was ultimately held responsible for all charges 
when, on remand, after the Supreme Court reversed the grand larceny 
conviction, the state courts held as a matter of Florida law that the 
municipal charges were not lesser included offenses of grand larceny 
and thus there was no double jeopardy after alJ.901 
This is not to say, however, that the Justices' mandate in Waller is 
of no consequence. Within several months of the Waller ruling, at 
least two appellate courts, relying on its rationale, reversed state con-
victions that followed municipal prosecutions for similar miscon-
duct. 902 And adherence to Waller would surely have prevented such 
earlier results as permitting a state conviction for "theft of a jacket the 
value of [$45]" after a municipal conviction for "theft of merchandise 
valued at $45 from a New Orleans department store."903 Especially in 
light of the plausible inference that the dual prosecution technique had 
in the past often been used for such improper purposes as harassing 
unpopular defendants,904 it is fair to conclude that the Court's decision 
meaningfully assisted the cause of individl,\al rights. 
5. Capital Punishment 
In 1976, the Court announced that the death penalty did not, in all 
898. 397 U.S. at 391. 
899. See Brief for Petitioner at 25, Waller v. Florida 397 U.S. 387 (1970). 
900. See Co=ent, Double Jeopardy- Municipal Prosecutions as a Bar to Subsequent State 
Prosecutions/or Offenses Arising from the Same Criminal Actions, 76 DICK. L. REV. 282, 285-93 
(1972). 
901. Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
902. See People v. Allison, 46 Ill. 2d 147, 263 N.E. 2d 80 (1970); Barrett v. State, 478 P.2d 
1016 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970). 
903. Louisiana ex rel Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295, 295 (E.D. La. 1967). 
904. See Brief for Petitioner at 25-26, Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). 
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circumstances, violate the Constitution.905 But other decisions in the 
early 1970's, in which the Court held that various forms of capital 
punishment contravene the eighth amendment, were of literally life-
saving importance to many people. The ruling in Furman v. Geor-
gia, 906 invalidating the capital punishment laws of thirty-nine states 
and several federal statutory provisions, prohibited the execution of 
633 prisoners on death row.907 "All were entitled to new sentences of 
life imprisonment, to a term of years, or, in a few cases, to new trials. 
The precise disposition was up to the state courts."908 None were put 
to death.9°9 As a result of Woodson v. North Carolina, 910 in which the 
Court rejected mandatory capital punishment for specified offenses, 
278 convicts had their death sentences rescinded.911 
The consequences of the Justices' holding in Lockett v. Ohio;912 
which required that the sentencer consider all mitigating factors prof-
fered by the defendant, are less precisely calculable. Since only nine of 
the thirty-four states that then had capital statutes conformed to this 
new standard,913 serious doubt was cast over the laws of the other 
states,914 whose death rows contained approximately 135 prisoners.915 
What is clear, however, is that Lockett - and state court decisions 
from Pennsylvania and New York which anticipated its reasoning916 
- preserved the lives of ninety-nine inmates in Ohio (precise numbers 
from New York and Pennsylvania are unavailable),917 apart from 
those others still to be tried before an acceptable death penalty statute 
is enacted. 
Of probably greatest significance - at least for the future - is the 
905. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
906. 408 u.s 238 (1972). 
907. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 292-98 (1973). 
908. Id. at 293. 
909. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 309 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The experi-
ence of the 21 Massachusetts inmates affected by Furman is instructive: 18 had their sentences 
reduced, two were retried and acquitted, and one committed suicide. Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 
339 N.E.2d 676, 694 n.2 (Mass. 1975). 
910. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
911. The Death Penalty Revived, TIME, July 12, 1976, 35, 35. 
912. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
913. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
914. See, e.g., Jordan v. Arizona, 114 Ariz. 452, 561 P.2d 1224 (1976), vacated and re-
manded, 438 U.S. 911 (1978) (death sentence vacated based on Lockett). 
915. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. (June 20, 1978). 
916. People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735, 371 N.E.2d 735, 371 N.E.2d 456 
(1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978); Pennsylvania v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382 A.2d 442, 
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978). 
917. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, supra note 915, at 7. 
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Court's holding in Coker v. Georgia 918 that the death sentence may not 
be imposed for the crime of rape of an adult woman. Coker's immedi-
ate effect was to save thirty-four persons then under such sentences 
from capital punishment.919 The number whose lives will be spared in 
years that follow may, of course, only be conjectured. But the fact 
that 455 people were executed for rape between 1930 and 1968920 fore-
tells the substantial number of individuals potentially involved. 
It may be that even those rulings that upheld capital punishment 
have "opened up new possibilities that with imaginative and resource-
ful litigation may avoid or nullify many death sentences."921 But there 
is no question that the Court's decisions upsetting death penalty laws 
have influenced in the most significant manner the personal liberties of 
thousands of people. 
6. Prisoners 
a. Disciplinary proceedings. Although there appear to be no na-
tional statistics on the number of charges of serious misconduct that 
are lodged against those incarcerated in America's prisons,922 data 
from two states suggest the importance of the matter. In 1973, when 
California's prison population was about 22,000, over 20,000 discipli-
nary hearings were held;923 and figures from Georgia indicate a similar 
near equivalence between total inmates and annual disciplinary pro-
ceedings. 924 Further, several surveys disclosed that a high proportion 
of such cases resulted in either forfeiture of "good conduct-time 
credit" (which is authorized in virtually all jurisdictions)925 or imposi-
tion of solitary confinement, or both.926 Probably an even more im-
918. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
919. See H. BEDAU, THE CoURTS, THE CoNSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 112 
(1977). 
920. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
BULL. No. 45, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-1968, at 1 (1969). 
921. Bedau, New Life far the Death Penalty, 233 THE NATION Aug. 28, 1976 at 146. See, 
e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
922. See Brief for Petitioner at 42, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
923. Brief for Attorney General of California as Amicus Curiae at 8, Wolff v. McDonnell 
418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
924. Special Project, Behind Closed Doors: An Empirical Inquiry into the Nature of Prison 
Discipline in Georgia, 8 GA. L. REv. 919, 958 (1974) (there were about two or three hearings per 
week in prisons with an average of 167 prisoners each. Id. at 950 n.223, 958). 
925. See Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures: Is Due Process Provided'/, 47 
N.D. L. REv. 12 n.24 (1970). 
926. Note, The Problems of Modem Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IOWA L. 
REV. 671, 690 n.138, 692 n.154 (1967) (approximately 60% of dispositions in Iowa in 1966 
resulted in loss of good time and 50% in solitary confinement, usually for 3 days); Special Pro· 
ject, supra note 924, at 968 (23% of hearings surveyed resulted in loss of good time and 57% in 
solitary confinement, usually for 14 days). 
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portant sanction for a disciplinary action, albeit one that is often less 
formal, is the fact that the incident is usually "taken into account" in 
setting the date on which the prisoner's parole may be considered. 
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 921 the Court held that even though prison 
disciplinary proceedings do not implicate the full panoply of the rights 
of a defendant in a criminal prosecution, 928 procedural due process 
does require designated protections when substantial penalties - such 
as loss of good time credits or solitary confinement - are imposed for 
misconduct.929 Although a 1974 American Bar Association survey, 
published on the eve of the Wolff ruling, found that nearly all prison 
systems in the United States claimed that they already adhered930 to 
the Justices' mandate that the accused prisoner receive written notice 
of the charges before the hearing,93 I other due process minima an-
nounced by the Court required significant changes in many jurisdic-
tions. Thus, at least fourteen states932 did not explicitly require "a 
written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and 
the reasons for the disciplinary action taken."933 Only twenty-nine re-
porting states934 purported to provide that the inmate "be allowed to 
call witnesses . . . in his defense when permitting him to do so will not 
927. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
928. For example, neither the right to retained or appointed counsel nor the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses apply. 418 U.S. at 567-70. 
929. 418 U.S. at 571 n.19. 
930. REsOURCE CENTER ON CoRRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES, ABA CoMMIS-
SION ON CoRRECTIONAL FACILmES AND SERVICES, SURVEY OF PRISON DISCIPLINARY PRAC-
TICES AND PROCEDURES WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF Wolff v. McDonnell 11 (rev. 
Dec. 1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA CoMMISSION]. Although 48 of the 49 reporting jurisdic-
tions declared that they provided this notice, there is substantial reason for skepticism as to the 
accuracy of these self-appraisals. The 48 respondents included Georgia and Nebraska, two of the 
very few states for which there was published empirical data. The contemporaneous Georgia 
study revealed that more than one-fifth of the inmates interviewed reported that they were first 
given notice of the charges against them at the time of the hearing itself. Special Project, supra 
note 924, at 958. In Wolff. the district judge found that Nebraska's practice often afforded the 
prisoner only oral notice shortly before the hearing. 418 U.S. at 558, 563-64. 
Similarly, every prison system in the country reported that the accused prisoner is permitted 
to make a statement at the hearing, ABA CoMMISSION, supra, at 11, thus at least partially con-
forming to the Wolff requirement that the inmate be allowed to "present documentary evidence 
in his defense." 418 U.S. at 566. The Georgia study disclosed, however, that despite a state 
regulation guaranteeing an opportunity to explain or deny the charges, over one-fifth of the pris-
oners (and more than half of those from one of the three prisons examined) claimed that they 
were denied this right. Special Project, supra note 924, at 960. 
931. 418 U.S. at 564. 
932. See ABA CoMMISSION, supra note 930, at 56. 
933. 418 U.S. at 563. 
934. See ABA COMMISSION, supra note 930, at 11. Again, empirical evidence from Rhode 
Island, which was one of the 29 states, contradicts its response to the survey. See Harvard 
Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE SCI. 200, 213 (1972). 
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be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals,"935 
and a majority of the federal circuits which had ruled on the issue held 
at that time that prisoners had no such constitutional right.936 
In order to assess adequately the impact of the Wolff decision, sev-
eral large issues remain to be examined. First, experience from all re-
gions of the country strongly indicates that prison officials have been 
especially recalcitrant in complying with judicial decrees expanding 
the constitutional rights of inmates.937 Moreover, the fact that within 
weeks of the Justices' ruling states such as Connecticut and Louisiana 
promulgated new disciplinary rules that provided even greater proce-
dural protections than those mandated by the Court,938 affords no as-
surance that the reality has been significantly altered. For it has been 
observed that, as a matter of both theory and practice, "[c]orrectional 
administrators, if they so choose, could comply with court orders 
through changes which meet the letter of the court order, but not its 
spirit, and thereby frustrate the intent of the court."939 Nonetheless, 
the results of a survey of forty-two jurisdictions in 1980 disclosed that 
the response to Wolff by corrections agencies (and lower courts) has 
resulted in the articulation of substantial reforms beyond those set 
forth in the Court's opinion.940 
However, even assuming that, despite the official antagonism de-
935. 418 U.S. at 566. 
936. 418 U.S. at 572 n.20. 
937. See, e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, SOS F.2d 194, 216 (8th Cir. 1974) (the 
prison superintendent allegedly stated "that appeals court ruling is nothing but a bunch of shit 
and don't mean nothing"); M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OP 
JUDICIAL DECREES IN CoRRECTIONAL SETTINGS 169-70 (Louisiana), 370-71 (Maryland) 
(1977); Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 934, at 222 (Rhode Island). 
938. ABA CoMMISSION, supra note 930 (preface to rev. ed.). 
939. Note, Judicial Intervention in Co"ections: The CalijOmia Experience - An Empirical 
Study, 20 UCLA L. REv. 4S2, S30 (1973). 
940. Babcock, Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 22 B.C. L. REV. 1009, 1014 
(1981). At least three-quarters of the new prison disciplinary regulations "require that the in-
mates be informed of the rules of conduct," id. at 1017, with some specificity. Id. at 1018-21. 
Nearly one-fifth designate a maximum period that may pass between commission of the alleged 
offense and the time when the accused prisoner must receive notice of the charges, and most 
states require that the notice "must contain a complete description of the facts surrounding the 
incident." Id. at 1037. Although Wolff decreed no guarantee of either retained or appointed 
counsel, "[t)he response of the prison systems has been to offer a more liberal right to representa· 
tion." Id. at 1039. Further, although there are perceived problems respecting the impartiality of 
adjudicators, a majority of jurisdictions stipulate that a member of the hearing panel "must be 
excused if he has participated in the investigation of the incident or been a witness thereto," id. 
at 1060, and some have given real content to a right of confrontation and cross examination. Id. 
at 1074. Although the Justices did not mandate any internal appeal of disciplinary proceedings, 
all surveyed prison systems but one "have adopted some form of administrative review." Id. at 
1083. Finally, nearly halfthe surveyed jurisdictions were found to have extended Wolff's proce-
dural standards to the "imposition oflesser penalties," 418 U.S. at S71 n.19, such as transfers to 
other prisons, with California including administrative segregation. Babcock, supra, at 1094-9S; 
cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 4S9 U.S. 460 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 21S (1976). 
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scribed above, all of the Justices' requisites have been fully imple-
mented, there is powerful evidence that this is of no tangible 
consequence to prisoners accused of serious misconduct. The fact ap-
pears to be that, especially when resolution of the matter turns on the 
conflicting testimony of the inmate and a prison officer, the former is 
rarely believed.941 As an Attorney General of California stated: "Be-
cause of their code of conduct, the credibility of virtually every inmate 
is questionable. What reason is there for allowing participation in due 
process hearings when the participant cannot be believed?"942 Mainte-
nance of prison staff morale is, understandably, another factor for 
favoring their word over that of the convict. Indeed, a Georgia survey 
over a three-month period found that 1085 of 1087 disciplinary hear-
ings produced a punitive action.943 
However, practical results such as exoneration, meaningful as they 
are, may not be the sole measure of the value of the implementation of 
the right to due process. That fair procedures have significant intrinsic 
value beyond their important symbolic force is confirmed by the study 
of a Rhode Island corrections facility shortly after pre-Wolff judicially 
ordered improvements. Apart from a plainly "positive inmate re-
sponse,"944 there 
clearly were some objective manifestations of institutional change. Cases 
were dismissed where there were technical violations of the regulations, 
inmate witnesses were allowed in some cases, delays between charge and 
final hearing were minimized, and the extreme forms of punishment 
which instigated the imposition of the order were largely eliminated.945 
Moreover, although appraisal of the causal relationship was compli-
cated because a new warden took office at the same time,946 while 
"[b]efore the decree 30% of the dispositions involved segregation, [sol-
itary confinement,] and 15% loss of good time," such sanctions "com-
prised only 19% and 7% respectively of the dispositions after the 
decree."947 Thus, while it is possible to conclude that the due process 
protections mandated by the Court in Wolff will have had some salu-
tary effects on the rights of inmates, their precise extent and value is in 
need of further empirical investigation. 
941. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 934, at 213. 
942. Brief for Attorney General of California as Amicus Curiae at 7 n.6, Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 428 U.S. 539 (1974). 
943. Special Project, supra note 924, at 957 & n.236. 
944. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 934, at 222. 
945. Id. at 222. 
946. Id. at 214-16, 222 n.133. 
947. Id. at 214. 
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b. Good conduct credit. In Weaver v. Graham, 948 the Court held 
that Florida's 1978 amendment to its "gain time for good conduct" 
statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Prior to this time, 
convicts in the Florida prison system could earn good conduct credit 
of five days a month off the first and second years of their sentence, ten 
days a month off the third and fourth years, and fifteen days a months 
off all succeeding years. The 1978 amendment changed this 5-10-15 
formula to 3-6-9. Since the state chose to apply this new schedule to 
previously convicted prisoners for all time they would serve after Jan-
uary 1, 1979, both the number of prisoners affected and the potential 
consequences for each were dramatic. 
Statistics for the immediately preceding three years alone - 1976, 
1977, and 1978 - revealed that more than 18,000 persons had been 
initially confined during that period whose sentences extended beyond 
the begining of 1979.949 To this must be added those convicts whose 
terms began earlier - and who therefore would lose the largest credits 
(only nine days a month instead of fifteen days). Petitioner's situation 
illustrates the additional incarceration time at stake. Under the origi-
nal good conduct statute, Weaver, who had been sentenced to a term 
of fifteen years in 1976, had an anticipated release date of December 
31, 1984. Under the amended law, he was scheduled to remain in 
prison until February 2, 1987 - more than twenty-five months 
longer.950 
Even on the assumption that the Justices' ruling had no impact 
beyond the State of Florida,951 it undeniably avoided a substantial re-
duction of many convicts' chances to shorten their sentences simply by 
adhering to prison rules and adequately performing their assigned 
prison tasks. 
7. Parole and Probation Revocation 
The number of persons subject to revocation of probation or parole 
in the United States is huge. Although all figures must be seen as 
informed estimates at best, as of the mid-1960's, on any given day 
nearly 700,000 adults and juveniles who had been convicted of crimi-
nal offenses were on probation and over 100,000 felons who had been 
released from prison were on parole.952 By the late 1970's, both of 
948. 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 
949. Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.6, Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 
950. 450 U.S. at 27 n.6. 
951. This assumption is by no means of certain validity. See Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. 
Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967), affd., 390 U.S. 713 (1968). 
952. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
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these numbers had roughly doubled.953 Indeed, as of the end of 1981, 
the number of adult probationers had about tripled.954 Furthermore, 
a substantial portion - estimates run from about thirty-five percent to 
as high as forty-five percent - of all persons who are conditionally 
released or placed under community supervision have their probation 
or parole rescinded. 955 
The precise extent to which the states had afforded procedural due 
process rights to persons whose probation or parole they were seeking 
to revoke is difficult to ascertain. As for probation, a widely cited 
1964 survey reported that the statutes of four jurisdictions (confirmed 
by judicial decisions in two) expressly authorized revocation without a 
hearing, and that in at least four additional states the courts had up-
held revocation with no hearing whatever.956 No detailed review of 
probation revocation procedures appears to have been subsequently 
undertaken, but the matter of parole has been somehwat more thor-
oughly examined. In 1970, an update of earlier studies concluded that 
nine states provided neither notice nor a hearing prior to a parolee's 
recommitment to prison.957 Two years later, a Supreme Court review 
of statutes and judicial decisions observed that "very few states pro-
vide no hearing at all in parole revocations."958 At the same time, a 
comprehensive national survey found "that by January, 1972 all juris-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CoRRECTIONS 27 n.1, 186-87 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESI-
DENT'S CoMMISSION]. 
953. U.S DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1976, at 
668, 703 (1977) (federal probationers and parolees) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS - 1976]; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LoCAL PROBATION AND PAROLE SYS-
TEMS 1 (Feb. 1978) (state and local probationers and parolees); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME 
& DELINQUENCY, PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1979 (Aug. 1980) (adult parolees). 
954. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE 1981, at 2 (1,222,024 adult probationers as of Dec. 31, 1981), with PRESIDENT'S CoM-
MISSION, supra note 952, at 27 n.1 (459,140 adult probationers as of Dec. 31, 1965). For 1982, 
see S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 19, 1983, at 10, col. 1 (1,335,359 adult probationers; 243,880 adult 
parolees). 
955. See D. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG Us 106 (1976) (23% of parolees); PRESIDENT'S 
CoMMISSION: CORRECTIONS, supra note 952, at 62 (35%-45% of parolees); TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: THE CoURTS, supra note 842, at 56 n.28 (108,000 of 431,000 adult probationers); CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1976, supra note 953, at 748, 750, 760 (25% of state male parolees; 
22% of state female parolees; 23-40% of federal parolees); ABA REsoURCE CENTER ON CoR-
RECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES, SURVEY OF PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES i 
(1973) (10,000 of 44,000 parolees) [hereinafter cited as ABA]. See generally R. McCLEARY, 
DANGEROUS MEN: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PAROLE (1978); P. SMITH, PERMISSION TO BE 
SLIGHTLY FREE: A STUDY OF THE GRANTING, REFUSING AND WITHDRAWING OF PAROLE IN 
CANADIAN PENITENTIARIES (1976). 
956. Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Ser. 175 (1964). 
957. Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. 
CoLO. L. REV. 197, 198 (1970). 
958. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 n.15 (1972). 
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dictions had chosen in fact to make use of some form of revocation 
hearing. Only four parole authorities (Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and 
Texas) did not grant parole-revocation hearings to all parolees facing 
return to incarceration . . . . "959 
Assuming that the states followed a similarly progressive path in 
respect to affording hearings for persons charged with probation viola-
tions, the Court's rulings in Morrissey v. Brewer960 and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli961 did not revolutionize the procedural rights of parolees and 
probationers. However, the decisions did significantly expand the in-
dividual liberties of these groups by bringing about "major restructur-
ing"962 of state practices. Almost all states had prejudiced an alleged 
parole violator's opportunity to rebut the charges by granting hearings 
only at a time well after the parolee's arrest and, indeed, only at the 
prison in which he had previously been incarcerated, a site that often 
was a considerable distance from the place in which the purported 
violation had occurred.963 In Morrissey and Gagnon, the Court sought 
to cure this defect by holding that due process requires that alleged 
probation and parole violators be granted a preliminary hearing after 
their detention at a place near the arrest and a final hearing before the 
ultimate decision on revocation. In addition, Morrissey and Gagnon 
imposed a series of procedural safeguards that many states theretofore 
had not provided. 964 
Within months of the Court's pronouncement, a study of parole 
boards in forty-five states concluded "that most of them are in formal 
compliance with most of the Morrissey requirements."965 In addition, 
959. O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making Characteristics: Report of a National Sur-
vey, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 651, 668 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
960. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
961. 411 U.S. 471 (1973). 
962. ABA, supra note 955, at 2. 
963. See O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 959, at 668-69, 679; Van Dyke, Parole Revocation 
Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1215, 1220-21 (1971). 
964. A survey of every parole board in the country - 54 in all - completed on the eve of the 
Morrissey decision revealed that, contrary to the Court's mandate, 19 did not grant the parolee 
notice of the specific charges, 22 did not permit the parolee to present witnesses, 26 denied the 
parolee the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and 50 declined to afford the 
parolee a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. O'Leary & 
Nuffield, supra note 959, at 671; see also O'Leary & Hanrahan, Law and Practice in Parole Pro· 
ceedings: A National Survey, 13 CRIM. L. BULL. 181, 197 (1977). The data collected earlier on 
probation revocation hearings, although much less detailed, were not dissimilar. See Sklar, supra 
note 956, at 192-93. 
965. ABA, supra note 955, at 1. Eighty percent of the 45 responding states were conducting 
on-site initial hearings and allowing "the parolee to present evidence and witnesses and to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses." All these states also provided an impartial hearing 
officer. Thirty-four of the 36 (the other states not responding to this question) indicated that they 
also provided a final written statement of the reasons for decision. Two-thirds of these states 
were holding the initial hearing within ten days of notice or arrest, although some parole boards 
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the federal government promptly revised its established parole and 
probation revocation procedures to comply with the conditions laid 
down in both Morrissey and Gagnon. 966 By 1976, a survey of parole 
boards of all fifty states, the national government, and the District of 
Columbia disclosed unanimous conformity with virtually all the 
Court's requirements (although six jurisdictions provided only verbal 
explanation of their revocation decision).967 
Furthermore, in 1972, over one-fifth of the parole boards refused 
to permit even retained counsel to be present at the revocation hearing 
and only twenty-six percent appointed lawyers for indigents.968 These 
statistics undoubtedly would have been less generous to the parolees969 
were it not for the decision several years before, in Mempa v. Rhay, 970 
that counsel is constitutionally required at sentencing even when sen-
tencing is deferred to a probation revocation proceeding. The earlier 
and less comprehensive data for probation revocations were stronger 
but still indicated that fewer than half the states provided a lawyer for 
an indigent charged with probation violation.971 The extremely im-
portant role of counsel for alleged parole and probation violators in 
effectuating such rights as presentation of evidence and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses was confirmed by professional observers972 of revoca-
tion hearings conducted between the time of the Morrissey decision 
(which did not reach the right to counsel issue) and the Court's ruling 
took up to thirty days. As for the revocation hearing, all reporting jurisdictions used impartial 
review panels. Forty-one of the 45 states responding assured the parolee an opportunity to be 
heard and to present witnesses and evidence - nine of the states had instituted this practice in 
direct response to Morrissey, either shortly before or just after the decision was handed down in 
June 1972. Thirty-eight of the 45 states responding permitted confrontations and cross-examina-
tion - an immediate increase of ten states. Whereas just prior to Morrissey only four parole 
boards drafted a written statement justifying revocation, thirty-eight states did so afterward. One 
of the strongest points of compliance with the Court's edict was that at least 43 of the 45 report-
ing states now provided parolees written notice of specific charges, a change in practice for at 
least eight boards. Id. at 3-7, 10. Overall, of the 45 states replying to the survey, seven "ex-
pressly pointed out that they were currently involved in efforts to determine what their responsi-
bilities under Morrissey consisted of and how they would implement changes required under that 
decision." Id. at 7. 
966. See Fisher, Parole and Probation Revocation Procedures After Morrissey and Gagnon, 
65 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 46, 57 (1974). 
967. See O'Leary & Hanrahan, supra note 964, at 197-202. 
968. O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 959, at 671, 673; see also O'Leary & Hanrahan, supra 
note 964, at 197; Van Dyke, supra note 963, at 1221; Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal 
System, 56 GEO. L.J. 705, 719 (1968); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 272-82 (1970). These figures had not 
substantially changed in the forty-five state survey undertaken shortly after Morrissey was 
handed down. See ABA, supra note 955, at 19. 
969. See O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 959, at 673. 
970. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
971. See L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN 
STATE CoURTS 143 (1965); Sklar, supra note 956, at 189, 192. 
972. See D. STANLEY, supra note 955, at 114-15. 
134 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
in Gagnon (which held that due process requires the assistance of 
counsel under certain circumstances). Although in Gagnon the Court 
declined to impose an automatic right to retained and appointed coun-
sel in all revocation hearings, its requirement of legal assistance when 
needed to assure a fair hearing will surely improve the lot of many 
probationers and parolees; in fact, Gagnon has led almost all jurisdic-
tions to permit retained counsel as a matter of course and has 
prompted a majority - including California, New York, and the fed-
eral government973 - to provide appointed counsel without any show-
ing of special need. 974 
The Court's rulings have not eliminated all the procedural injus-
tices, present or perceived, in the parole and probation revocation pro-
cess. 975 For example, it has been contended that, despite Morrissey's 
establishment of the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, the New York parole board "never produces any witnesses, 
other than parole officers . . . . The parole officer's testimony usually 
contains substantial amounts of hearsay, and violation charges are not 
infrequently sustained, solely or in large part, on the basis of hear-
say."976 Nonetheless, the fact that the parole officer himself may be 
confronted at the hearing represents a significant advance over the rev-
ocation authorities' common previous practice of relying exclusively 
on written reports.977 Moreover, at least some state courts have re-
cently imposed strictures on hearsay evidence in revocation proceed-
ings. 978 Further, at least in some instances, Morrissey and Gagnon 
have motivated reforms beyond the minimums stipulated - such as 
granting subpoena power to the parties in the revocation dispute,979 
excluding illegally seized evidence,980 permitting parolees some discov-
ery rights prior to their revocation hearing,981 providing them an op-
973. See Fisher, supra note 966, at 57 (federal government); Lee & Zuckerman, Representing 
Parole Violaters, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 327 (1975) (New York); Comment, The Impossible Dream? 
Due Process Guarantees far California Parolees & Probationers, 25 HASrJNGS L.J. 602, 630 (1974) 
(California). 
974. O'Leary & Hanrahan, supra note 964, at 199, 202. 
975. See, e.g., Lee & Zuckerman, supra note 973; see generally A. VON HIRSCH & K. HAN· 
RAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM, OR ABOLITION'/ (1979). 
976. Lee & Zuckerman, supra note 973, at 331. 
977. O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 959, at 674. 
978. See, e.g., People v. Winson, 29 Cal. 3d 711, 631 P.2d 55, 175 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1980); 
Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981). 
979. See Comment, Due Process for Parolees: Oregon's Response to Morrissey v. Brewer, 53 
OR. L. REv. 57, 78 (1973). 
980. Piccarillo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76, 397 N.E.2d 354, 421 
N.Y.S.2d 842 (1979). 
981. See O'Leary & Hanrahan, supra note 964, at 201. 
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portunity to appeal an adverse revocation decision,982 and applying 
certain due process rights to parole release hearings as well as to revo-
cation proceedings.983 And parole officials' post-Morrissey statements 
that "fewer revocations are now proposed on the basis of technical 
violations,"984 further evidences the favorable and substantial impact 
on personal liberty that the Court's efforts in Morrissey and Gagnon 
produced. 
8. Juveniles 
a. Burden of proof. Prior to 1967, when the Supreme Court de-
cided In re Gault, 985 a few state courts had held that proof "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" was required to convict at a juvenile hearing in 
which a minor was charged with conduct that would be a crime if 
committed by an adult.986 However, the overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions had adopted a "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard. 987 Gault did not address the question of what measure of proof 
was constitutionally required in these circumstances. However, in the 
three years between Gault's highlighting the issue of procedural safe-
guards in juvenile proceedings and the Court's ruling in In re Win-
ship 988 that the reasonable doubt test was demanded by due process, 
courts and legislatures in at least eight states chose to apply the more 
stringent standard on their own initiative.989 Under Gault's stimulus, 
acceptance of the reasonable doubt rule was urged by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the Chil-
dren's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's 
982. See id. at 203 
983. See Comment, The Prisoner's Right to a Statement of Reasons for Parole Denial: Silence 
is not Always Golden, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 567, 580 (1975); see also O'Leary & Hanrahan, supra 
note 964, at 204. 
984. D. STANLEY, supra note 955, at 113. 
985. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
986. See People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927); Jones v. Commonwealth, 
185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946). The New York Legislature subsequently withdrew this rule in 
favor ofa "preponderance of the evidence" test. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act§ 744(b) (McKinney 1963) 
(amended in 1976 to reflect In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
987. See Cohen, The Standard of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings: Gault Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt, 68 MICH. L. REV. 567, 600 n.128 (1970); Note, supra note 294, at 795. 
988. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
989. See Thomas v. State, 121 Ga. App. 91, 172 S.E.2d 860 (1970); In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 
535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-3-6 (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. ConE art. 26, 
§ 70-18(a) (Supp. 1969); N.J. Cr. RULES 5:9-9 (1969); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 27-20-29(2) (1969); 
WASH. Juv. Cr. RULES 4.4(b) (1969); Steinfeldt, Kerper & Friel, The Impact of the Gault Deci-
sion in Texas, 20 Juv. Cr. JUDGES J. 154, 156 (1969); see also United States v. Costanzo, 395 
F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968). 
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Social and Rehabilitation Service.990 Nonetheless, it remained for the 
Justices' mandate in Winship to impose the traditional criminal law 
standard on approximately four-fifths of the states. 
There is no conclusive evidence for the proposition that the 
Court's decision has significantly improved the condition of individual 
liberty for alleged juvenile offenders, but the available data strongly 
suggest it. In surveying reactions to the different quantum of proof 
requirements, sitting judges were asked "to translate into probability 
statements their sense of what it means to be convinced by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, and to be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt." When responding to questionnaires, at least, the judges 
thought there was an important difference: almost a third of the re-
sponding judges put "beyond a reasonable doubt" at 100%, another 
third put it at 90% or 95%, and most of the rest put it at 80% or 
85%. For the preponderance standard, by contrast, over half put it at 
55%, and most of the rest put it between 60% and 75%. Question-
naires sent to jurors and students produced slightly lower results for 
the reasonable doubt instruction, and rather higher results for the pre-
ponderance standard; still, for most people the distinction was clear.991 
Indeed, in the Winship case itself, in which the Court invalidated New 
York's preponderance of the evidence rule, the juvenile judge had ac-
knowledged that the proof of the alleged larceny "might not establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."992 Thus, it is fair to infer that the 
Winship ruling has had an important impact on the liberty of juveniles 
charged with delinquency. 
b. Reprosecution as adult. Prior to the Court's decision in 1975 in 
Breed v. Jones, 993 about five states explicitly protected a minor from 
being prosecuted in a criminal court for an offense on which evidence 
had already been heard against him in a juvenile court adjudicatory 
hearing.994 Nine additional jurisdictions achieved the same result by 
providing that if the youth were old enough to be tried in a regular 
criminal prosecution, then the juvenile court must make the decision 
990. See Uniform Juvenile Court Act§ 29(b) (1968); w. SHERIDAN, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 
FOR DRAFTING FAMILY AND JUVENILE CoURT Acrs § 32(c) (1969). 
991. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal 
Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 (1977) (footnotes omitted) (referring to Simon, Judges' Transla· 
tions of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, TRIAL LAW. GUIDE, Nov. 1969, at 29, 
and to Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proofi A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the 
Classroom, 5 LAW & SocY. REV. 319 (1971)). 
992. 397 U.S. at 360. 
993. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
994. See State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972); State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d 
765 (la. 1971); Juvenile Court Act § 2-7(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-7(3) (Supp. 1984); 
MINN. Juv. Cr. RULES 8·1(2) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-25 (1976). 
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to transfer its jurisdiction before the delinquency proceeding takes 
place.995 Further, the statutes of approximately twenty more states, 
by ruling that evidence introduced in a juvenile court adjudicatory 
hearing is inadmissible against the minor in a subsequent adult crimi-
nal prosecution,996 made it quite difficult - but not impossible997 -
to subject the youth to two trials for the same offense. In all other 
states, a youthful offender could be tried in criminal court after a juve-
nile proceeding against him for the same offense had begun and, in-
deed, even after he had been found to be a delinquent because of it.998 
Breed eliminated this possibility, holding that jeopardy attaches when 
the juvenile court begins to hear evidence to adjudicate whether a mi-
nor has committed acts that constitute a crime and that a subsequent 
criminal prosecution for this offense violates the constitutional prohi-
bition against double jeopardy. 
It may well be that, as a result of the Breed ruling, some juvenile 
judges will, on the basis of grossly incomplete evidence, transfer mi-
nors to adult criminal courts, thus subjecting them to potentially more 
serious consequences, whereas this would not have been done if a full 
adjudicatory hearing had first been held in juvenile court.999 How-
ever, this clearly need not be true because the Court's opinion in Breed 
plainly did not foreclose states "from requiring, as a prerequisite to the 
transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence that he committed the of-
fense charged, so long as the showing required is not made in an adju-
dicatory proceeding."1000 
More likely, Breed's principal thrust, so far as personal liberty is' 
concerned, should be twofold. First, it will ameliorate the unfair 
prosecutorial advantage of having the state hear the accused youth's 
full defense in the juvenile court proceeding prior to his being tried as 
an adult offender. Second, and more importantly, it will remedy the 
practice - occurring in a number of reported cases - of youths who 
have already been adjudicated delinquents being criminally prosecuted 
for the same offense because of misbehavior while confined in a juve-
nile correctional institution.1001 
995. See Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L. R.Ev. 266, 
299 n.134 (1972), and the statutes collected therein. 
996. See Rudstein, supra note 995, at 293 n.119, and statutes cited therein. Massachusetts 
subsequently changed its rule. See In re a Juvenile, 306 N.E.2d 822 (Mass. 1974). 
997. See Carter v. Murphy, 465 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). 
998. See Carr, The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on Juvenile Proceedings, 6 U. ToL. 
L. R.Ev. 1, 57-59 (1974); Milton, Post Gault: A New Prospectus for the Juvenile Court, 16 
N.Y.L.F. 57, 72 (1970); Rudstein, supra note 995, at 298-300. 
999. See Carr, supra note 998, at 48-54. 
1000. 421 U.S. at 538 n.18. 
1001. See, e.g., Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968); Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 
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The exact number of Breed's beneficiaries is unknown, but statis-
tics for just one year preceding the decision, showing that in California 
alone 764 youthful offenders were ultimately subjected to regular 
criminal prosecution, 1002 indicate that the Court's ruling affords mean-
ingful protection for the individual rights of substantial numbers of 
juveniles. 
B. Commitment of Mentally Ill 
1. Incompetency To Stand Trial 
As of the early 1970's, every state in the nation authorized the 
commitment to a mental institution of criminal defendants found to be 
incompetent to stand trial. 1003 About five jurisdictions conditioned 
such detention on a determination that the accused was "dangerous" 
and several others placed the commitment decision within the court's 
discretion, 1004 but in at least four-fifths of the states, accused persons 
who were found to be insufficiently intelligent or communicative to be 
able to assist in their own defense could be indefinitely institutional-
ized. Institutionalization was permissible even though they had never 
been convicted of any crime, were not "insane" or "dangerous" by any 
legal definition, and had never been afforded the procedures of a stan-
dard civil commitment. 1005 It was reported that the criteria for con-
finement in these incompetency proceedings "are often unclear or not 
adhered to. Expert testimony is relatively unchecked and does not ap-
pear to be subject to limitations such as those imposed in determina-
SS (W.D. Tex. 196S); Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d S7S, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831 
(1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973); People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 
6S6 (19S3); State v. R.E.F., 2Sl So. 2d 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), ajfd. per curiam, 26S So. 
2d 701 (Fla. 1972); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. S24, 140 A.2d 914 (19S8); In re Smith, 114 
N.Y.S.2d 673 (Dom. Rel. 19S2); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. lSO, 198 S.E.2d 629 (1973); 
Brooks v. Boles, lSl W. Va. S76, 1S3 S.E.2d S26 (1967); see also Note, Double Jeopardy and the 
Waiver of Jurisdiction in California's Juvenile Courts, 24 STAN. L. REv. 874, 882 (1972) (describ· 
ing an instance in which a minor was removed from a juvenile detention facility and held in 
county jail for more than a year pending his criminal trial). 
1002. See Edwards, The Case for Abolishing Fitness Hearings in Juvenile Court, 17 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. S9S, 611 & n.107 (1977). 
1003. Sees. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 444-S3 (Am. 
Bar Found. rev. ed. 1971). 
1004. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 71S, 733 (1972); S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, supra note 
1003, at 444-S3; Burt & Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 66, 66 n.4 (1972). 
lOOS. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 71S, 719 (1972); S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 
1003, at 41S; see generally Goldstein, The Mentally Disordered Offender and the Criminal Law, 
in THE MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDER 188 (A. de Reuck & R. Porter eds. 1968) (discussion 
of the use of competency hearings and civil commitment to accomplish preventive detention); 
Rosenberg, Competency for Trial - Who Knows Best?, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. S77 (1970) (compari-
son of medical and legal criteria for determining competency). 
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tion of criminal responsibility or need for civil commitment."1006 In a 
majority of c~es observed in one study, "the court and the defense 
counsel both did little more than to accept the hospital recommenda-
tion and to question the medical witness in a perfunctory manner."1001 
The number of such people involved was dramatic. In 1967, four-
teen percent of all persons sent to state mental institutions after being 
charged or convicted of crimes were committed as incompetents.1oos 
The 
patient population of Matteawan State Hospital for the criminally insane 
in New York was 2142 in November 1962. Of these, 1167 or 54.5%, had 
been admitted as incompetent to stand trial. By 1966 the Matteawan 
population had shrunk to 838 patients, but 565 (68%) of them were 
committed for incompetency. Ionia State Hospital in Michigan had 
1,484 patients in August, 1960; 755 or 57% of these were there because 
they were held incompetent. 1009 
Ordinarily, the defendant remained hospitalized until the director 
of the facility in which he had been confined certified that he had 
regained competency.1010 Such certification occurred only rarely in 
practice. It was reported that "[t]he hospitals that harbor incompe-
tent patients almost inevitably employ criteria of release which have to 
do with the patient's ability to go back to the community - an inap- . 
propriate standard since what is at issue is the accused's competency 
to stand trial."1011 Incompetents were generally housed in hospitals 
for the criminally insane, "usually the poorest available facilities."1012 
Since considerations of security and custody were paramount, the 
treatment afforded the incompetent was minimal - "usually less than 
if he had been civilly- committed to a mental institution."1013 Indeed, 
there was "evidence that he would more likely be given the proper 
treatment in prison, since some penal institutions [were] more willing 
to recognize the value of treatment methods of other disciplines such 
as psychology and sociology."1014 The modest treatment that was pro-
1006. s. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 1003, at 412. 
1007. Rosenberg, supra note 1005, at 586; see also A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 75 (1970). 
1008. See Burt & Morris, supra note 1004, at 66 n.1. 
1009. Comment, An End to Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 560, 574 
(1973) (footnotes omitted). 
1010. See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 1003, at 416; Bennett, Competency to Stand 
Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 569, 572 (1968); Note, 
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REv. 454, 471 (1967). 
1011. s. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 1003, at 417. 
1012. Bennett, supra note 1010, at 571 (footnote omitted). 
1013. Id.; see also S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 1003, at 412. 
1014. Bennett, supra note 1010, at 571 (footnote omitted). 
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vided was often misdirected. 1015 Finally, empirical studies indicated 
that the incompetent accused defendant was "less likely to gain release 
after making comparable progress toward recovery than if he were in a 
civil institution,"1016 and that the longer he was institutionalized the 
worse his condition became. 1017 As a result of all these factors, 
although a handful of states authorized conditional release of incom-
petent defendants on parole,1018 in most instances their hospitalization 
extended for exceedingly long periods - usually even more prolonged 
than for persons civilly committed.1019 
1015. Id. "One field study reports the case of a twenty-five-year-old male who was held as an 
incompetent patient for four years while hospital personnel worked toward his achieving 'insight 
into his behavior' and, even more inappropriately, 'confession of his crime.' " S. BRAKEL & R. 
ROCK, supra note 1003, at 417 (footnote omitted). See also Rosenberg, supra note 1005, at 588. 
1016. Bennett, supra note 1010, at 571-72 (footnote omitted). 
1017. See McGarry, The Fate of Psychotic Offenders Returned for Trial 127 AM. J. PSYCH!· 
ATRY 1181, 1183 (1971). 
1018. See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 1003, at 444-53. 
1019. See the data cited in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 734 n.16. A seven-year observa-
tional study in Massachusetts found "that the average confinement of those committed as incom-
petents was sixty-one months while the average hospital stay of those who were civilly committed 
was only fourteen months. One in six of the incompetent defendants had been returned to the 
community, but every member of the civilly committed group had been discharged to the com-
munity.'' Burt & Morris, supra note 1004, at 77 n.45 (citing McGarry & Bendt, Criminal vs. 
Civil Commitment of Psychotic Offenders: A Seven-Year Follow-up, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1387 (1969)). In New York's Matteawan Hospital for the criminally insane, a 1965 survey re-
vealed that "19 percent (208) of those confined as incompetent to stand trial had been there for 
twenty years or more, and 8 percent (89) had been there for thirty years or more.'' Id. at 78 n.49 
(citing MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT: A SECOND RE· 
PORT AND ADDmONAL RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SPECIAL COMMI'ITEE ON THE STUDY OP 
CoMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAW RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS OP THE AssOCIA· 
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 214-17 (tables 8 & 9) (1968)). Indeed, in New 
York 
there were several cases of persons committed as incompetent but not released even though 
the charges against them had been dismissed; either word of the dismissal simply never 
reached the hospital or the hospital did not act. In New York City when the courts were 
reorganized in 1963, all indictments outstanding twenty years or more were dismissed. De-
fendants committed to Matteawan occasionally wrote to the New York City courts about 
their status. The court clerk who answered these letters •.. [said] there were scores of 
cases like this but that there was no one to take the initiative to have these patients 
discharged. 
A. MATTHEWS, supra note 1007, at 138 n.3. In Massachusetts' Bridgewater facility, where an 
independent psychiatric study judged that one-third of those committed were actually capable to 
stand trial, it was found that this one-third of the population had been held for an average of over 
four years; the other two-thirds had spent an average of nearly 15 years in custody; more def en· 
dants committed as incompetent "left Bridgewater by dying than by all other avenues com-
bined." McGarry, supra note 1017, at 1181, 1183. In Washington, D.C.'s St. Elizabeth 
Hospital, 58% of the committed incompetents remained for more than a year, 23% more than 
three years, 11 % more than five years. See JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OP CO-
LUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT OF THE COMMI'ITEE ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL 
EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES, BEFORE TRIAL 161 (table 15) (1966). 
Even New York, one of the very few jurisdictions which had placed time limits on these deten· 
tions, see Burt & Morris, supra note 1004, at 67 n.4, permitted incompetent felony defendants to 
be hospitalized for two-thirds of the maximum sentence for the offense charged. N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW§ 730.50(3) (McKinney 1971). 
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The Court's ruling in Jackson v. Indiana 1020 ended these intolera-
ble restrictions on personal liberty. It held 
that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is commit-
ted solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held 
more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether 
there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the 
foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the 
State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding 
that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or re-
lease the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the de-
fendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued 
commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. 1021 
Even if Jackson influences trial judges to more readily find defen-
dants competent to be tried, this will likely be the lesser evil. 
If an incompetent defendant were to stand trial, his interests would be 
represented by his retained or appointed counsel rather than by a prose-
cutor, judge or court-appointed psychiatrist. Surely in view of the basic 
assumptions of our adversary system and the sorry consequences to an 
incompetent of a pre-Jackson non-adversary commitment, it will be to 
his advantage to stand trial, even if arguably incompetent.1022 
In addition, "[p ]ostponement of the trial often results in loss of evi-
dence, which may well be more damaging to the defendant than to the 
prosecution."1023 Finally, even if the accused is convicted, the data 
indicate that more likely than not the criminal sentence will be shorter 
and less severe than the indefinite incompetency incarceration.1024 
If, on the other hand, the State seeks to civilly commit the defen-
dant, this would also appear to be a marked improvement. In terms of 
procedure, as indicated above, the protection afforded will likely be 
greater. As a matter of substantive criteria, both state law and the 
Supreme Court's subsequent mandate in O'Connor v. Donaldson 1025 
(under which Jackson himself probably could not have been con-
fined)1026 will ordinarily impose a stricter commitment standard and a 
more lenient standard of release.1027 Finally, as has also been observed 
above, if the accused is in fact civilly committed, the strong likelihood 
is that the institution will be much less undesirable, his treatment 
much more appropriate, his privileges much greater and his period of 
1020. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
1021. 406 U.S. at 738. 
1022. Comment, supra n~te 1009, at 572. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 1005. 
1023. s. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 1003, at 412. 
1024. See Note, supra note 1010, at 456. 
1025. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See generally text at notes 1029-55 infra. 
1026. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 729. 
1027. 406 U.S. at 730. 
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confinement much shorter. 1028 Thus, the mandate of Jackson signifi-
cantly enhanced the protection of the rights of that sizeable class of 
individuals whose competency to stand trial is doubtful. 
2. Continued Involuntary Institutionalization 
As of the early 1970's, statutes in all states provided that persons 
might be civilly committed to public mental institutions against their 
will. 1029 Although there were some indications that the annual 
number of involuntary admissions was declining, 1030 and estimates of 
the exact number of such persons so confined at any time varied some-
what, there was no dispute that the figure was very large - ranging 
from about 500,000 to over 700,000.1031 Statutory criteria justifying 
involuntary commitment differed significantly, but as of 1974 less than 
one-third of the states limited involuntary commitment to persons 
who were either unable to care for their physical needs or were dan-
gerous to themselves or others.1032 The great majority of jurisdictions 
authorized compulsory confinement for much less compelling reasons, 
such as whether the individual was in need of care or treatment or was 
a fit subject for hospitalization.1033 Moreover, some states adopted 
even looser criteria for justifying a refusal to release involuntarily con-
fined persons than for justifying their initial commitment.1o34 
For several reasons, it is not possible to assess accurately the pre-
cise extent of the effect of the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 1035 which delineated a substantive "constitu-
tional right to liberty"1036 for those held involuntarily in mental insti-
tutions. First, regardless of the scope of this personal right, the 
magnitude of the ruling's impact on individual liberty is reduced 
1028. See Bennett, supra note 1010, at 571. 
1029. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1202-05 (1974). 
1030. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 43 (1976); Note, 
supra note 1029, at 1193 n.3. 
1031. See Steinzor, Kenneth Donaldson's Fight for Freedom, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1977, 
at 48, 50 (NIMH statistics indicate "that out of 1,600,000 live-in patients .•. at least 480,000 
were involuntarily committed"); Brief of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae at 2, O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (approximately 60% in New Jersey); Brief of Ohio as Amicus Curiae 
at 1, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (approximately 50% in Ohio); Note, lnvolun· 
tary Civil Commitments - How Heavy is the Burden?, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 187, 187 (1977) 
(almost 50% of admissions to Texas state mental hospitals in 1975-1976 were involuntary); Note, 
supra note 1029, at 1193 n.3 (of 404,000 patients admitted in 1972, 41.8% were involuntarily 
committed). 
1032. Note, supra note 1029, at 1203 n.11. 
1033. Id. at 1203-04. 
1034. Id. at 1385-86. 
1035. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
1036. 422 U.S. at 573. 
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somewhat by the relatively short time that the average person is likely 
to be confined. For example, in 1971, "86.9% of the total number of 
voluntary and involuntary patients who were admitted to state and 
county mental hospitals were discharged within 6 months of admis-
sion," and "the median length of stay in these hospitals was 41 
days." 1037 These naked statistics, however, should not mask 
O'Connor's potential importance for the substantial number of mental 
patients whose much longer deprivation of freedom is submerged in 
the calculations.1038 
However, the major obstacle in determining O'Connor's direct con-
sequences for individual rights is the extremely restricted scope of the 
Court's opinion. The record showed that Donaldson posed no danger 
to himself or others, had the capacity to earn his own living outside 
the institution in which he had been confined, had responsible people 
waiting to provide him any help he might need on release and "had 
received nothing but custodial care while at the hospital."1039 On 
these facts, the Court held that "a State cannot constitutionally con-
fine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviv-
ing safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and 
responsible family members or friends." 1040 The Court specifically de-
clined to decide "whether the State may compulsorily confine a 
nondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treat-
ment" 1041 - that is, "whether the provision of treatment, standing 
alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement."1042 
O'Connor was initially greeted by many observers as a near bound-
less declaration of freedom for mental patients - as a "renunciation of 
the past practice of warehousing human beings in conditions which 
1037. Note, supra note 1029, at 1198 n.17. 
1038. Donaldson himself was kept in custody against his will for nearly 15 years, 422 U.S. at 
564. Data for 1972-1973 from West Virginia revealed that the average stay for involuntary ad-
mitees was over 15 years and that more than half these inmates had been held for more than a 
decade. See State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 121 (W. Va. 1974). National Insti-
tute of Mental Health figures for five states showed that in 1966 and 1968 the median period of 
confinement ranged between 4.5 and 8.5 years; and in 1969 a majority of the patients in St. 
Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C., had been there over five years. Note, supra note 1029, 
at 1378 n.6. 
1039. 422 U.S. at 568-69. 
1040. 422 U.S. at 576; see also Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1222-23 (E.D. La. 
1976) (O'Connor's holding applies to mentally retarded or physically handicapped children). 
104l. 422 U.S. at 573. 
1042. 422 U.S. at 574 n.10. In a separate concurrence, however, Chief Justice Burger did 
advance the view that a state could not, consistently with due process, "confine an individual 
thought to need treatment and justify that deprivation of liberty solely by providing some treat· 
ment." 422 U.S. at 589. 
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were really comparable to Dante's Inferno,"1043 since it was believed 
that "the vast majority of mentally ill individuals will not engage in 
dangerous behavior if they are permitted to retain their freedom."1044 
These early predictions, however, were not rapidly fulfilled. Surveys 
in the months immediately following the Court's pronouncement 
found that very few patients attained their freedom as a direct result of 
the decision. 1045 Rather, mental institution officials explained the con-
tinued detention of almost all involuntary admittees by correctly 
pointing out that O'Connor "did not rule on the major form of treat-
ment normally given state patients - drugs."1046 
These facts notwithstanding, the impact of judicial review - if not 
of the narrow holding in the O'Connor case itself - on the personal 
liberties of involuntarily confined mental patients has been very signifi-
cant. Both shortly before and soon after the Supreme Court's decision 
in O'Connor, a number of lower federal courts ruled that due process 
forbids compulsory civil commitment of people unless they are either 
(1) likely to inflict physical harm on themselves or others, or (2) are 
not able to survive safely in freedom. 1047 Under the rationale of these 
decisions, given credence and support by the Court in O'Connor, the 
mere fact that a person is considered to be mentally ill and in need of 
treatment cannot constitutionally support involuntary hospitalization. 
In at least six of the states in which the federal courts had held the 
involuntary commitment procedures to be invalid, the state legisla-
tures responded by revising their statutes to conform to the judicially 
announced criteria.1048 Further, whereas a 1974 comprehensive sur-
vey of state civil commitment laws revealed that "[f]ifteen jurisdictions 
1043. Interview with Alan Stone, Chairman for Judicial Action of the American Psychiatry 
Assn., N.B.C. Today Show (July 8, 1975). 
1044. Note, supra note 1029, at 1230. On the day after the decison the New York Times 
speculated that the Court's edict "appeared likely to force the ultimate release from mental insti-
tutions of thousands of the estimated total of 250,000 patients regarded as untreated, harmless 
and not likely to become community charges." N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 5. A 
week later, Time magazine reported an American Psychiatric Association estimate that 90% of 
compulsorily detained mental patients were not sufficiently damaging to themselves or others to 
require hospitalization. TIME, July 7, 1975, at 44. 
1045. See Steinzor, supra note 1031, at 50; Kopolow, A Review of Major Implications of the 
O'Connor v. Donaldson Decision, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 379, 380 (1976). 
1046. Steinzor, supra note 1031, at 50. 
1047. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 450 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. 
Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. 
Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1974); 
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); 
Dixon v. Attorney General of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971). 
1048. See ALA. CooE § 22-52-10 (enacted 1975); IOWA CooE § 229.1 (amended 1975); 1 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (amended 1975); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 83-1009 (enacted 
1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301 (enacted 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.01(13)(b), 51.20 
(enacted 1975). 
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authorize commitment only if the individual is mentally ill and dan-
gerous to himself or others or is unable to care for his physical 
needs,"1049 within the next five years the lawmaking bodies of more 
than twenty additional states amended their more loosely drawn stat-
utes to adopt this tighter definition.1050 Indeed, a number of courts and 
legislatures went even further and adopted a "dangerous to self and 
others" standard as the exclusive test for involuntary commit-
ments.1051 The experience in Virginia - where the commissioner of 
mental health reported that the statute was reformed "in partial antici-
pation"1052 of O'Connor - is instructive: within a five-year period, 
the state's institutional population was reduced from 17,000 to 10,000 
of whom only 700 were involuntarily confi.ned.1053 
Thus, the Court's decision in O'Connor - along with its progeny 
and forebearers in other federal courts - has, even in the short run, 
directly and indirectly advanced the cause of personal freedom. By 
preserving or restoring the liberty of many mentally ill persons, judi-
cial review has greatly contributed to the prevention of the loss of vari-
ous legal rights and the suffering of economic, social, and 
psychological injuries1054 which were "often barely distinguishable 
from the analogous burdens imposed on criminals and may have been 
even more severe."lo5s 
1049. Note, supra note 1029, at 1203. 
1050. See, in addition to statutes listed in note 1048 supra, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1401, 
1428 (enacted 1979); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-179 (amended 1976); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 
§§ 5001, 5002 (amended 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 394.467 (amended 1979); IND. CODE§ 16-
14-9.1-10 (amended 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-2902 (amended 1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 202A.080(6) (enacted 1976, repealed 1982); Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 41-21-63, 75 (enacted 1975); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-12 (enacted 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.1-02, -07 (enacted 
1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A § 3 (amended 1977); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 27A-9-18, -
1-1 (amended 1976); UTAH CoDE ANN: § 64-7-36 (amended 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§§ 7101, 7617 (amended 1977); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 37.1-67.3 (amended 1976); w. VA. CoDE 
ANN. §§ 27-1-12, 27-5-4 (amended 1974). 
1051. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 
A.2d 289 (1975); In re Scopes, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.005, .300, .305 
(Vernon enacted 1980); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 33-6-104 (amended 1976). 
1052. Allerton, An Administrator Responds, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALmES: 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY 
DISABLED 17, 18 (V. Bradley & G. Clarke eds. 1976). 
1053. Id. at 18. 
1054. See Note, supra note 1029, at 1198-1200. 
1055. Note, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil 
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 562, 563 (1977). 
146 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
C. Procedural Due Process 
1. Denial of Welfare Benefits 
Prior to the Court's decision in 1970 in Goldberg v. Kelly, 1056 virtu-
ally no state public assistance agencies provided welfare recipients an 
evidentiary hearing before discontinuing benefits. Although some 
state and lower federal courts had held that there was a right to a prior 
hearing, 1051 "the universal practice [was] that the local agency termi-
nates aid by ex parte action and notifies the recipient of the immedi-
ately effective termination and of his right to a subsequent hearing if 
he wishes to contest the termination."105s 
Commentators who have studied the impact of the Goldberg ruling 
have pointed to several factors as undermining its effectiveness. First 
has been the matter of noncompliance. 
[T]he only systematic study that seems to have been made of the compli-
ance of agency practice with post-Goldberg fair hearing regulations 
found that the New York City public welfare agencies failed to provide a 
procedurally regular hearing in a significant number of cases . . . [and] 
there is also evidence of a fairly serious breakdown in the hearing process 
in other states. 1059 
This may at least in part be attributed to an ambivalent, if not unfavor-
able, attitude by caseworkers and other welfare staff members toward 
the importance of due process for their clients.1060 Further, despite 
the enormous rate of error that has been documented in overall wel-
fare administration 1061 and the great importance of the benefits to af-
fected persons, the number of welfare recipients who seek review 
hearings is surprisingly sman. 1062 This has been explained on the 
ground that while the eligibility requirements of the program are very 
complex, the claimant population has a low educational level and is 
psychologically reluctant "to fight city hall even when basic entitle-
1056. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
1057. See Comment, The Constitutional Minimum far the Termination of Welfare Benefits: 
The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing. 68 MICH. L. REv. 112-13 (1969). 
1058. Thorkelson & Sparer, Do the Present Regulations Governing the Time far Holding Fair 
Hearings in Public Assistance Violate Constitutional Due Process and the Social Security Act?, 6 
WELFARE L. BULL. 8 (1966). 
1059. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes 
on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare 
Claims, 59 CoRNELL L. REv. 772, 813-14 (1974). 
1060. See Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process - A Study of the Implementation of 
Fair Hearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1972). 
1061. See Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary System, 11 
HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 48, 68 (1976) (error rate of nearly 40% nationally). 
1062. Mashaw, supra note 1059, at 784 (review sought of approximately 2% of all appealable 
denials, terminations or awards challengeable as inadequate). 
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ment to benefits is at issue."1063 In addition to the fact that adminis-
trators may be deliberately lax in giving beneficiaries effective notice of 
their procedural rights, there is scant reason to believe that the claim- · 
ants either adequately comprehend or will skillfully pursue them. 
Thus, it has been concluded that "the welfare recipient is, realistically 
speaking, without a remedy that will enable him to protect his 
rights";1064 and "the difficulties of providing meaningful hearings may 
be much more significant than the Court was called upon to recognize 
in Goldberg. The question is not so much when recipients can best 
avail themselves of a hearing, as it is whether the adversary hearing is 
such a chimerical protection ... that due process requires more."106s 
But to concede that Goldberg falls far short of insuring against er-
roneous welfare terminations certainly does not mean it has no impor-
tance for the liberties of individuals. In the six-month period 
immediately before the decision's impact was felt, 1066 statistics indi-
cate that approximately 1,425 recipients of federally aided medical 
assistance and aid to families with dependent children who had their 
welfare payments discontinued requested a subsequent hearing to con-
test termination.1067 Although less than ten percent of these claimants 
1063. Id. at 812. 
1064. Rubenstein, supra note 1061, at 69. 
1065. Mashaw, supra note 1059, at 815. 
1066. Goldberg was decided on March 23, 1970. The six-month period described is January-
June 1970. 
1067. This figure (1,425) is obtained through extrapolation from statistics reported in U.S. 
NATL. CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FAIR 
HEARINGS IN PUBLIC AssISTANCE, JANUARY-JUNE 1970 (Nov. 10, 1971) (NCSS Report E-8) 
[hereinafter cited as FAIR HEARINGS, JANUARY-JUNE 1970], and in U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR 
SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEAI,TH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FAIR HEARINGS IN PUB· 
LIC AssISTANCE, JULY-DECEMBER 1970 (Apr. 5, 1972) (NCSS Report E-8) [hereinafter cited as 
FAIR HEARINGS, JULY-DECEMBER 1970 ]. 
During the period of January-June 1970, there were 19,400 requests for agency hearings. 
FAIR HEARINGS, JANUARY-JUNE 1970, at 1. Of the 19,400 requests, 16,700 were disposed of. 
According to the state agency reports, 2,100 of these 16,700 requests disposed of were made to 
contest the discontinuance of welfare benefits. Id. at 2. But three states - California, Ohio and 
South Dakota - did not report figures, id. at 1, and if they had, the number of hearing requests 
disposed of concerning discontinuance of benefits would have been about 2,540. FAIR HEAR· 
INGS, JULY-DECEMBER 1970, at 3 & n.2. (This figure is derived from statistics showing that the 
total number of hearing requests increased 51 % from 19,400 to 29,300 between January-June 
1970 and July-December 1970, and that 27.3% of this increase was attributable to the inclusion 
of these three states. In order to extrapolate from the July-December figures to the January-July 
figures, it is necessary to discount the increase (27.3%) attributable to the inclusion of the three 
states by the general, national rate of increase (23.7%). Thus, one may assume that, had these 
three states been included in the January-June figures, the total number of hearing requests 
would have increased by 20.8%. Assuming that these hearing requests followed the national 
pattern, the number of hearing requests disposed of concerning discontinuance of benefits in the 
January-June 1970 period would have been 2,540 (i.e., 2,100 x 120.8%)). 
Fifty-six percent of the 19,400 hearing requests were made under AFDC or medical assist-
ance programs. FAIR HEARINGS, JANUARY-JUNE 1970, at 2. Assuming that this percentage 
also applies to the number of hearing requests disposed of concerning the discontinuance of 
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were represented by counsel, 1068 over one-quarter succeeded in having 
their benefits reinstated, 1069 a ratio confirmed by several earlier stud· 
ies.1070 Had Goldberg's requirement of a prior hearing then been in 
effect, the great hardship suffered by these persons of having their sus· 
tenance cut off for a substantial period of time - a four-month delay 
between discontinuance and renewal of welfare after the post-termina· 
tion hearing being typical1071 - would have been avoided. 1072 
Of perhaps greater significance is that the Goldberg ruling did 
seemingly encourage more welfare beneficiaries to request hearings 
when informed that their AFDC or medical assistance aid was to be 
cancelled. In the six months immediately following the decision, the 
number of such persons almost doubled to roughly 2,8001013 -
although there appeared to be no marked increase in the number of 
recipients whose benefits were discontinued. 1074 Nor can this increase 
be attributed to unentitled recipients making frivolous claims in order 
to obtain continued payments while the hearing process ran its course. 
For, again, while under ten percent of the petitioners had lawyers, 101s 
one-quarter demonstrated that the welfare agency's judgment was in-
benefits, one may estimate that approximately 1,425 persons made hearing requests to contest the 
termination of AFDC or medical assistance benefits (Le., 56% of 2,540 = 1,425). 
1068. Of a total of 16,700 hearing requests disposed of concerning welfare claims, 1,500 
claimants had lawyers. See FAIR HEARINGS, JANUARY-JUNE 1970, supra note 1067, at table 12. 
1069. Of the 16,700 hearing requests disposed of, 4,600 (27.5%) were concluded in the 
claimant's favor. See id. at tables 6,7. 
1070. See Comment, supra note 1057, at 125 n.83 (1969); Note, Due Process and the Right to 
a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 604, 611 n.47 (1969). 
1071. See Comment, supra note 1057, at 125 n.83. 
1072. Although perhaps among the most dramatic examples, in Goldberg, 
an erroneous termination of welfare benefits, coupled with the four-month delay before the 
error was corrected, resulted in the crowding of thirteen children and two adults into a small 
apartment where the children lost weight and became ill from lack of food. In the same 
case, another of the plaintiffs, along with her family "had to go to the hospital for severe 
diarrhea, apparently brought on by the only meal they had had that day - spoiled chicken 
and rice donated by a neighbor." In [a companion case], after an erroneous tennination of 
welfare benefits, plaintiffs lacked food, medicine, and other necessities. 
Comment, supra note 1057, at 125 (footnote omitted). 
1073. In the July-December 1970 period, there were 5,000 reported requests for agency hear-
ings concerning discontinuance of assistance for all federally-aided welfare programs. AFDC 
constituted 44.2% and medical assistance 12.1 % of the 29,300 total requests for hearings. As-
suming that the AFDC and medical assistance percentages remain constant, 56.3% (or 2,800) of 
the 5,000 hearing requests concerning discontinuance of benefits involved recipients under 
AFDC or medical assistance programs. See FAIR HEARINGS, JULY-DECEMBER 1970, supra note 
1067, at 4. 
1074. See U.S. NATL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISfICS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., 
AND WELFARE, .APPLICATIONS, CASES APPROVED, AND CASES DISCONTINUED FOR PUBLIC 
AsslSTANCE Jan.-March 1970 (NCSS Report A-9), table 5 (143,000); id .. Apr.-June 1970, table 5 
(178,000); id., July-Sept. 1970, table 5 (130,000); id., Oct.-Dec. 1970, table 8 (147,000). 
1075. See FAIR HEARINGS, JULY-DECEMBER 1970, supra note 1067, at table 12. 
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correct.1076 Subsequent data portray a basically similar picture. In 
the next succeeding half year, the number of hearing requests disposed 
of, made by persons whose AFDC or medical assistance payments 
were sought to be discontinued, rose to about 3,400.1077 With just 
slightly more than ten percent represented by counsel, 1078 over a fifth 
were successful in resisting termination.1079 Five years later, in the 
first half of 1976, there were 22,530 hearing requests disposed of in-
volving termination of AFDC and medical assistance benefits.1080 
Although it is surely quite speculative to attribute this continued in-
creasing trend solely to Goldberg, again with barely over ten percent of 
the claimants having a lawyer, 1081 almost twenty-five percent of the 
claimants prevailea.1082 
1076. Id. at table 7. 
1077. In the January-June 1971 period, the Department disposed of 34,500 out of 46,500 
total hearing requests. Of these 34,500, 6,500 concerned the discontinuance of assistance for all 
federally-aided welfare programs. U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FAIR HEARINGS IN PUBLIC AssISTANCE, JANUARY-JUNE 
1971, at 3, 4 (May 22, 1972) (NCSS Report E-8). 
AFDC constituted 44.1 % and medical assistance 8.2% of the 46,500 total hearing requests. 
Id. at 4. Assuming these percentages pertaining to total hearing requests also apply to requests 
disposed of and further apply to requests disposed of concerning the discontinuance of benefits, 
we may conclude that 52.3% of the 6,500 hearing requests disposed of concerning discontinu-
ance of benefits specifically concerned AFDC or medical assistance benefits. (52.3% X 6,500 = 
3,400). 
1078. Of the 34,500 claimants whose hearing requests were disposed of during January-June 
1971, 4,300 (or 12%) were reported to be represented by counsel. Id. at table 12. (No reports 
were made in 7,300 cases. Id. If these cases are excluded, the percentage of claimants repre-
sented by counsel rises to 16%.) The text assumes that this percentage, pertaining to legal repre-
sentation of all claimants in the hearing request process, also applies more specifically to legal 
representation of those claimants contesting the discontinuance of AFDC or medical assistance 
benefits. 
1079. Of the 34,500 claimants whose hearing requests were disposed of during January-June 
1971, 7,000 (or 20.3%) obtained decisions in their favor. Id. at tables 6, 7. The text assumes that 
this percentage, pertaining to success of all claimants in the hearing request process, also applies 
more specifically to the success of those claimants contesting the discontinuance of AFDC or 
medical assistance benefits. 
1080. See U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH, EDUC., AND 
WELFARE, FAIR HEARINGS IN PUBLIC AssISTANCE, JANUARY-JUNE 1976, at 10 (table 5) (April 
1977). All hearing requests were filed under either AFDC (78%) or medical Assistance (22%) 
programs. Id. at 1. 
1081. Of the 75,860 claimants whose hearing requests were disposed of during the January-
June 1976 period, 7,967 (or 10.5%) were reported to be represented by counsel. Id. at 17 (table 
12). The type of representation was not specified in 14,236 cas~. Id. If these cases are excluded, 
the percentage represented rises to 13%. The text assumes that this percentage, pertaining to 
legal representation of all claimants in the hearing request process, also applies more specifically 
to legal representation of those claimants contesting the discontinuance of AFDC or medical 
assistance benefits. 
1082. Of the 75,860 claimants whose hearing requests were disposed of during January-June 
1976, 17,586 (or 23.2%) obtained decisions in their favor. Id. at 11 (table 6), 12 (table 7). The 
text assumes that this percentage, pertaining to the success of all claimants, also applies more 
specifically to the success of those claimants contesting the discontinuance of AFDC or medical 
assistance benefits. 
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It has been suggested that a major benefit of the Justices' edict is 
that a welfare agency's recognition of its clients' ability to have pay-
ments continued during the hearing process deters casually considered 
terminations. 1083 Whether or not this is so, the information presented 
above persuasively implies that the Goldberg decision - though surely 
augmenting administrative costs (a counterweight that, of course, 
must be reckoned in virtually all procedural due process cases)1084 and 
causing some extended nonrecoverable payments to ineligible claim-
ants - has appreciably furthered the personal rights of those welfare 
recipients whose benefits have been sought to be discontinued. 
2. Divorce Filing Fees 
Prior to the Court's decision in Boddie v. Connecticut1085 in 1971, 
holding that due process demands that indigents be permitted to ob-
tain a divorce without payment of court filing fees and costs for service 
of process, nearly half the states refused to allow impecunious spouses 
to proceed in forma pauperis in divorce actions. 1086 Required filing 
fees ranged from $5 to $60, the average such charge being about 
$30.1057 In addition, the expense for service of process could run as 
high as $150 when service by publication was used1088 - and "since 
divorce, especially among the indigent, is the type of action where per-
sonal or registered mail service is difficult due to the desertion factor, 
and since service by attorney involves considerable expense, service 
through publication ... [was] often the only practical alternative."1089 
It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of poor people who 
have been prevented from dissolving their marriages by these costs, 
but several widely acknowledged facts strongly suggest that indigents 
have faced serious difficulties in securing divorce. First, the relation-
ship between low income and marital instability has been confirmed by 
numerous studies.1090 Yet although the bottom economic groups pro-
duce the highest separat~on rates, they also show very low divorce 
1083. See Rubenstein, supra note 1061, at 60. 
1084. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 345, 347-49 (1976). 
1085. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
1086. See Brief of the National Legal Aid and Defender Assn. as Amicus Curiae at 7 & app. 
A, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NLADA Brief]. 
1087. Id. at app. A. 
1088. See Comment, An Indigent's Right to an In Forma Pauperis Proceeding in Penn-
sylvania Divorce Litigation -Analysis and a Proposal, 16 VJLL. L. REV. 282, 289-90 (1970). 
1089. Id. at 289. 
1090. See, e.g., Goode, &onomic Fqctors and Marital Stability, 16 AM. Soc. REV. 802 (1951) 
and studies discussed therein; N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1966, § 1, at 39, col. 3. 
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rates,1°91 thus giving inferential support to the intuitive conclusion 
that many poor people who desire a divorce simply cannot afford 
one.1092 
Perhaps even more revealing is that comprehensive surveys of legal 
aid programs disclose that divorce is very close to the top of the list of 
problems for which clients seek their services. Thus, for the decade 
between 1957 and 1966, the National Legal Aid and Defender Associ-
ation reported that forty-two percent of its nationwide caseload con-
cerned family law matters.1093 For the first six months of 1969, data 
from more than two-thirds of NLADA offices throughout the country 
showed that over twenty percent of their new actions were for divorce 
- in many cities this figure reaching higher than thirty-five per-
cent.1094 Nor do these statistics tell the full story. A broad-based sur-
vey of 275 legal aid organizations in the 1960's found that only one 
office in three "has an open policy toward divorce cases; the other 
offices impose restrictions ranging from a fairly liberal policy to out-
right exclusion."1095 Thus, in 1966, when an experimental legal aid 
system in Wisconsin permitted impoverished clients to have any law-
yer they wanted for any legal service they needed, sixty-three of the 
first eighty-six cases were divorce suits.1096 Finally, and of greatest 
importance, even those legal services offices that were receptive to di-
vorce actions usually could not afford payment of the court filing fees 
and charges for service of process incident to such actions.1097 As a 
consequence, even the data observed does not "reflect the number of 
indigents who were discouraged from seeking free divorce counsel be-
cause of the requirement that they pay these costs."1098 
Because the financial barriers invalidated by Boddie are by no 
means the only impediments to divorce that confront indigents, 1°99 the 
Court's ruling has not automatically enabled all poor people who wish 
to dissolve their marriages to do so. However, it plainly has substan-
tially improved the plight of those many persons whose only previous 
1091. See Weeks, Differential Divorce Rates by Occupations, 21 Soc. FORCES 334, 336 (1943). 
1092. See id.; Comment, supra note 1088, at 284-85 & n.6. 
1093. See P. STOLZ, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: A SURVEY ANALYSIS 11-13 (Re-
search Contributions of the American Bar Foundation, No. 4, 1968). 
1094. See NLADA Brief, supra note 1086, app. B. 
1095. Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URB. L. 549, 581 
(1967). 
1096. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1966, § 1, at 16, col. 3. 
1097. See Comment, supra note 1088, at 287; cf Brief of Center on Social Welfare Policy and 
Law et al as Amici Curiae at 47, Simmons v. West Haven Haus. Auth., 399 U.S. 510 (1970). 
1098. Comment, supra note 1088, at 287. 
1099. See generally Comment, supra note 1088. 
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alternatives were either continuing to live in an unhappy household or 
separating from their families. 
3. Denial of Child Custody 
In 1972, when the Supreme Court decided Stanley v. Illinois, 1100 
the statutes of at least eleven states1101 authorized the permanent re· 
moval of an illegitimate child from its father's custody without giving 
the father either notice or hearing as to his parental fitness. Although 
some state laws did afford putative fathers such rights, the majority 
simply failed to address the issue.1102 The value of the constitutional 
right set out in Stanley for those fathers who request hearings may be 
gleaned from the strong tendency of state courts to award parental 
prerogatives to fathers of illegitimate children who demonstrate their 
qualifications when the child's mother is dead or unfit. 1103 
Further, many states expressly refused to require provision of no· 
tice or a hearing to the father concerning his illegitimate child's pend· 
ing adoption 1104 - a failure also implictly held violative of due 
process by the Stanley ruling,1105 at least when the father has some 
significant relationship with the child.1106 Responding to this aspect of 
the Justices' reasoning, "[c]ourts and legislatures in a number of states 
. . . felt constrained to require notice of adoption even to unknown 
fathers by way of publication,"1107 and the Uniform Parentage Act 
(adopted in eight states as of 1980)1108 "not only requires the court to 
inquire of the mother concerning the identity of the natural father . 
1100. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
1101. Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, South Da· 
kota, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Brief for Petitioner at 69-70, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645 (1972); see also Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child - His Right to be Heard, SO 
MINN. L. REv. 1071, 1075-76 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to be Heard]; Note, Stan· 
ley v. Illinois: Constitutional Rights of a Putative Father. 41 UMKC L. REv. 334, 351-52 (1972); 
Note, Domestic Relations - Putative Father's Rights to Custody of His Child, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 
1262, 1265. 
1102. See Note, Right to be Heard, supra note 1101, at 1075-76. 
1103. See id. at 1073-74; Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative 
Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1582-83 (1972). 
1104. See Comment, supra note 1102, at 1584; Note, The ''Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: 
Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517 n.4 (1973). 
1105. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 253-54 (1978); Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 
(9th Cir. 1974); In re M., 132 Vt. 410, 413-14, 321 A.2d 19, 21-22 (1974). 
1106. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). 
1107. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals/or Legis· 
lative Change, 49 s. CAL. L. REv. 10, 63 (1975); see also HANDBOOK OF THE NATL. CONF. OF 
CoMMRS. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 355-56 (1973); Note, Protecting the Putative Father's 
Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115, 126-32 (1973· 
74). 
1108. HANDBOOK OF THE NATL. CoNF. OF CoMMRS. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 455-58 
(1980). 
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but permits the court to compel the mother's testimony on this 
point."1109 In this regard, some notion of Stanley's potential conse-
quences for individual liberty is revealed by the fact that the number of 
illegitimate births in the United States approached 600,000 annually 
by the end of the 1970's,1110 and that perhaps as many as one-third of 
such children are subsequently adopted. 1111 Moreover, whereas prior 
to Stanley a substantial majority of states denied a natural father visi-
tation rights over the mother's objection,1112 the Uniform Parentage 
Act has since provided mechanisms for his obtaining such 
privileges.1113 
Finally, although the Court has since declined to extend Stanley's 
rationale to require the putative father's consent before his illegitimate 
child may be adopted, m 4 a substantial number of states responded to 
Stanley by legislating such a rightlll5 - a voluntary expansion of the 
Court's protection of personal liberty likely to continue despite the 
Court's subsequent refusal to mandate it. 
4. Suspension from Public Schools 
In 1975, statutes in virtually all states specifically or impliedly au-
thorized suspension of public school pupils for as long as ten days 
without requiring that the pupil be given prior notice of the charged 
misconduct or an opportunity to explain his side of the story.lll6 Sta-
tistics from school districts in such cities as Akron, Charlotte, Cincin-
nati, Cleveland, Dallas, Houston, Little Rock, Memphis, Miami, New 
Orleans and New York varied somewhat, but it showed that the 
number of children affected each year was enormous.1117 One survey 
estimated that five percent of all secondary school pupils were sus-
1109. Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights: Implement-
ing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527, 537 (1975). 
1110. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL AllsTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83, at 66 (1982). 
1111. See Comment, supra note 1102, at 1584. 
1112. Tabler, Parental Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Be-
half of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L. 231 (1971). 
1113. See Note, The Rights of Fathers of Non-Marital Children to Custody, Visitation and to 
Consent to Adoption, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 412, 437 (1979). 
1114. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
1115. See Comment, The Unwed Father's Rights in Adoption Proceedings: A Cose Study and 
Legislative Critique, 40 ALB. L. REv. 543, 565 n.144 (1976). 
1116. See Zimring & Solomon, The Principle of the Thing: Goss v. Lopez, Students' Rights 
and Litigation in the Interest of Children, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW 
REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY part VI (R. Mnookin ed. forthcoming 1985); see, e.g., Mo. ANN. 
STAT.§ 167.171(Vernon1965) (amended 1973 to provide for notice of charges and an opportu-
nity to explain conduct); cf. E. BOLMEIER, LEGALITY OF STUDENT DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE 
97-98 (1976). 
1117. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 592 n.10 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Flygare, 
154 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
pended annually, 1118 a figure generally confirmed by national statistics 
for the 1976-1977 school year. 1119 Another study of junior and senior 
Jiigh school students in Arkansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio and 
South Carolina reported that about ten percent were suspended one or 
more times during the 1972-1973 school year. 1120 If this five-state sam-
ple figure were projected nationwide, it would amount to over two mil-
lion suspensions a year. 1121 The evidence further revealed that the 
suspensions fell disproportionately on members of racial minoritiest 122 
- civil rights organizations claiming that "[i]n most localities a Black 
is at least two or three times more likely than a White to be suspended 
from public school."1123 Persons in black communities viewed "the 
suspension of minority students as the rearguard attempt of school 
officials to perpetuate dual school systems."1124 
The harmful effects of suspensions on school children are necessar-
ily more difficult to document, but it is fair to assume that they may 
well prejudice future college and employment applications. Although 
other adverse consequences are yet more conjectural, professional ob-
servers of children and education believe that a pupil's suspension 
from school may damage his self-image and his status with teachers 
and peers, thus impairing his educational progress and his overall 
mental and emotional growth.1125 
The data concerning the degree to which the Court's 1975 decision 
Short-Term Student Suspensions and the Requirements of Due Process, 3 J. L. & EDUC. 529, 530. 
31 (1974), and authorities cited therein. 
1118. Flygare, supra note 1117, at 531. 
1119. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, DIREC· 
TORY OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRicrs, AND SCHOOLS IN SELECTED 
SCHOOL DISTIUcrs: SCHOOL YEAR 1976-1977, at IX, XIII (1979) (1,629,000 suspensions; 
43,714,000 total enrollment); see also Kaeser, Suspensions in School Discipline, 11 EDUC. & URD. 
SocY. 465, 469 (1979) (one study estimated that 4.2% of all students were suspended during 
1972-1973 school year). 
1120. Brief for Children's Defense Fund of the Washington Reasearch Project, Inc. et al as 
Amici Curiae at 22, 23, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Chi!· 
dren's Defense Fund]. 
1121. See Flygare, supra note 1117, at 531(a5% rate projected nationwide would affect one 
million students). 
1122. See Brief for Children's Defense Fund, supra note 1120, at 21-23; Brief for NAACP 
and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amici Curiae at 5, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for NAACP]; Demarest & Jordan, Hawkins v. Coleman: 
Discriminatory Suspensions and the Effect of Institutional Racism on School Discipline, 20 IN· 
EQUALITY IN EDUC. 25 (1975); Kaeser, supra note 1119, at 471. 
1123. Brief for NAACP, supra note 1122, at 3-4. 
1124. Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 SuP. 
CT. REV. 25, 31. 
1125. See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Out-
line. 119 u. PA. L. REV. 545, 576 (1971). See generally J. HOLT, How CHILDREN FAIL 1 (1964). 
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in Goss v. Lopez1126 - imposing minimal procedural due process re-
quirements for public school suspensions - has remedied these condi-
tions or otherwise advanced personal liberty is relatively thin.1127 
Although state statutes and administrative regulations have been 
amended to conform to the Court's ruling, 1128 related prior experience 
raises the possibility of a wide gap between formal rules and actual 
practice: 
A study of New York City's school officials' compliance with discipli-
nary hearing requirements, voluntarily adopted by the Board of Educa-
tion, did not find a single instance in which the Board's regulations had 
been fully observed . . . [and] an analysis of South Carolina school dis-
tricts' practice concluded that few had established hearing procedures, 
despite a state statute obliging them to do so.1129 
Thus, it is not unfair to speculate that "Goss may go ignored, or few 
students may demand hearings, or the hearing right may be so trun-
cated as to be rendered practically meaningless."1130 
The sparse information that has been gathered since the Court's 
edict, however, is somewhat more encouraging. Reports from Indiana 
and Mississippi disclose that even before Goss many school principals 
already afforded at least those rudimentary procedural safeguards 
mandated by the Court.1131 In the words of one principal, "Goss only 
affirms what principals with common sense should have been doing all 
along." i 132 This argument directly mitigates the fears of the Goss dis-
senters that "few rulings would interfere more extensively in the daily 
functioning of schools than subjecting routine discipline to the formal-
ities and judicial oversight of due process,"1133 and that "if hearings 
1126. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
1127. See Zimring & Solomon, supra note 1116; Timar, The Aftermath of Goss in the Federal 
Courts, 9 NOLPE SCH. L.J. 123, 126 (1981). 
1128. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CoDE §§ 48900-921 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 
122, § 10-22.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 3313.66 (Baldwin 1983); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 13-1318 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-305 (1977); 
see also Case Note, Notice and Hearing Required for Short Term Suspensions from High School: 
Goss v. Lopez, 10 LAND & WATER L. REv. 616 (1975) (regulation of Wyoming State Dept. of 
Education). See generally Zimring & Solomon, supra note 1116; Hazard, Court Intervention in 
Pupil Discipline, 23 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 169, 188-93 (1979). 
1129. Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. 
REv. 841, 853 (1976). 
1130. Id. at 860. 
1131. See Draba, Hertz, & Christoff, The Impact of the Goss Decision: A State Survey, 52 
VIEWPOINTS 1, 7-8 (No. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Draba]; Comment, Student Rights and 
Due Process: Procedural Requirements of Goss v. Lopez, 46 Miss. L.J. 1041, 1069 (1975). 
1132. Draba, supra note 1131, at 16; see also Letwin, Perspectives on the Post-Civil War 
Amendments: After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 
627, 653 n.101 (1977) ("due process has not heralded a blizzard of formal campus hearings" at 
UCLA). 
1133. 419 U.S. at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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were required for a substantial percentage of short-term suspensions, 
school authorities would have time to do little else."1134 More impor-
tantly, it provides a strong reason to feel that the decision will not go 
unheeded, a belief supported by a review of the adjudications since 
Goss revealing that the Justices' mandate has been quite scrupulously 
observed.1135 Moreover, the view that the Goss procedures will reduce 
mistaken suspensions and promote a more judicious use of this form of 
discipline is confirmed by the responses of school principals in the In-
diana survey. One group suggested that they would have to "tighten-
up" their procedures in terms of "better record keeping" and see that 
"more care [is] exercised in explaining suspensions."1136 It has been 
observed that Goss may also provide a school administrator who is 
sympathetic to the pupils' needs, yet "beleaguered by teachers and 
teacher unions, an excuse to be fair, to remind teachers that while he 
trusts and supports them, he is constitutionally obligated at least to 
listen to the student's side."1137 Other principals indicated that they 
would tend to substitute other forms of discipline for suspension. ms 
Thus, teachers may admonish a misbehaving pupil, scold him, isolate 
him by seating him at the back of the class, reduce his grades, or even 
administer corporal punishment (for which the Court seemingly has 
held the Goss requisites inapplicable).1139 All of these actions may 
arouse peer group pressure - "a tried and true method of obtaining 
conformity with rules"1140 - but, although it is by no means plainly 
demonstrable, none would appear to carry as great a stigma as suspen-
sion or as serious potential consequences for educational and personal 
development. 1141 "A teacher may also seek aid from counselors and 
parents, arranging a conference to discuss the student's problems. On 
occasion, these measures have lead to more formal procedures, but 
often the matter will end where it began - in the classroom."1142 
Much more empirical work remains to be done on the multifaceted 
1134. 419 U.S. at 592 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
1135. See Timar, supra note 1127. 
1136. Draba, supra note 1131, at 17. 
1137. Wilkinson, supra note 1124, at 67. 
1138. Draba, supra note 1131, at 17. But cf. Zimring & Solomon, supra note 1116. 
1139. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
1140. Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority and Organizational 
Theory: Implementing Due Process far Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wis. L. RBv. 891, 
911. 
1141. When public education is "viewed as a public family, then 'suspension, unlike disci-
pline within the school, is not the equivalent of a parental spanking or an order for junior to go to 
his room. The analogy is to throwing a child out of the house, albeit for a limited period of 
time.'" Zimring & Solomon, supra note 1116. 
1142. Yudof, supra note 1140. 
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potential impact of Goss, including its impetus for rules establishing 
fairer procedures for longer term separations of students from 
schools. 1143 However, there is at least some evidence and promise 
that, in addition to avoiding an unknown number of unjust suspen-
sions, the decision will enhance the appearance of evenhanded punish-
ment and may improve communication between school officials and 
suspected student troublemakers, thereby achieving the ancillary bene-
fits of increasing student respect for the disciplinary process and reliev-
ing certain racial tensions in the schools.1144 Finally, even if the 
Justices' ruling turns out to have been primarily symbolic, "the tangi-
ble but nonetheless important role of the competition between author-
ity and autonomy symbols and the way in which this conflict was 
resolved may be the enduring legacy of Goss v. Lopez. " 1145 
5. Termination of Utility Service 
As of the mid-1970's, more than 2200 electric utilities in the coun-
try, accounting for 13.5% of the total customers and 16.4% of the 
total kilowatt hours sold, were publicly owned. In addition, local gov-
ernments provided the source of most water used by Americans and 
some municipalities also operated gas supply systems which generated 
$624 million in annual revenues in 1977.1146 Although the policy of 
discontinuing service without notice for nonpayment was not univer-
sal, 1147 this "most troublesome and controversial billing practice"ll48 
was recognized as "municipal utility managers' most effective 
means"1149 of collection. In the City of Memphis alone, statistics from 
1973-1974 showed an average of nearly 2000 "so-called delinquent 
cutoffs" each month.1150 The seriousness of this course of action is 
most sharply illustrated by 1978 reports from New York that "[i]n the 
last four years there have been four deaths in the state blamed on 
1143. See Zimring & Solomon, supra .note 1116. 
1144. See Wilkinson, supra note 1124, at 32. 
1145. Zimring & Solomon, supra note 1116. 
1146. 4 GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES, FINANCES OF MUNICIPALITIES AND TOWNSHIP GOV-
ERNMENTS 5 (No. 4), in 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS (Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce 1979); A. FINDER, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 4 (Council of 
State Govts. 1977). 
1147. See A. FINDER, supra note 1146, at 64; Duffy, Service Denial for Nonpayment Through 
the Year.s, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 26, 1978, at 4, 4. 
1148. A. FINDER, supra note 1146, at 64. 
1149. 1978 Report of Committee on Municipal Water Problems, 42A NIMLO MUN. L. REv. 
235, 254 (1979). 
1150. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 23 n.l (1978) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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power cutoffs during the winter."1151 
The Court's decision in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. 
Craft1152 - holding that due process requires notice and at least 
"some kind of hearing" 1153 prior to termination of services by publicly 
owned utilities1154 - will not, of course, assure the continued provi-
sion of these "necessit[ies] of modem life"1155 irrespective of ability to 
pay. But given the substantial number of erroneous deprivations, es-
pecially "by an impersonal bureaucracy held together by com-
puters"1156 - one survey showing that "16% of the complaints 
investigated by [the] New York Public Service Commission resulted in 
adjustments in favor of the customer"1157 - the Justices' ruling 
promises to significantly alleviate real threats to convenience, health, 
safety and life itself. 
6. Adjudication of Paternity 
There are many reasons why "[a]n adjudication of paternity may 
profoundly affect a person's life."1158 The resulting support obliga-
tion, almost universally enforceable by the sanction of imprison-
ment, 1159 may not be avoided by mere lack of income and liquid 
assets. 1160 Even if a finding of liability results in no actual payment 
(and there is much evidence that it often does not), 1161 there is the real 
likelihood that a judicial conclusion of paternity "may disrupt an es-
1151. Duffy, supra note 1147, at 5. 
1152. 436 U.S. 1 (1978). 
1153. 436 U.S. at 16. 
1154. But cf Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (due process require· 
ments not applicable to privately owned utility). 
1155. 436 U.S. at 18. 
1156. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
1157. 436 U.S. at 18 n.21. 
1158. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 593 P.2d 226, 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979). 
1159. E.g., CAL. C1v. CODE § 7012 (West 1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1982); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-171, 42b-215, 53.304 (West Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE§ 48·8· 
1 (1980). See also H. KRAUSE, ILLEGmMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 153 (1971). But see 
Walker v. Stokes, 54 Ohio App. 2d 119, 375 N.E.2d 1258 (1977). 
1160. The support duty may be satisfied from life and health insurance, survivor's and 
wrongful death benefits, and workers' compensation, see Krause, Child Welfare Parental Respon· 
sibi/ity and the State, 6 FAM. L.Q. 377, 388-89 (1972), and is more easily secured by garnishment 
than most ordinary civil judgments. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(l) (1982); INT. REV. CODE 
§ 6103(1)(6) (1984). Since child support responsibility is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, see 11 
U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1982), it applies to income generated and property acquired during all of the 
youth's minority. Indeed, "the consequences of a paternity judgment ... [even] reach beyond 
the grave - the child will succeed to the estate of the father if he dies intestate • • • or share in 
the father's estate by will unless affirmatively excluded." Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28 n.3, 
593 P.2d 226, 230, 54 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533 n.3. 
1161. See D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 77-78 (1979). 
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tablished family and damage reputations."1162 
Despite these potentially disastrous consequences, which argue for 
care in application of the cause of action, paternity suits - historically 
designed to relieve welfare authorities of the burden of supporting ille-
gitimate offspring1163 - have been widely characterized as being un-
fair to the defendant. For example, such actions have been called "the 
widest area of legal 'shakedown' that is known to exist."1164 Unwed 
mothers obviously have a powerful economic incentive to establish pa-
ternity, an incentive which is generally reinforced by the state's provi-
sion of special assistance by the district attorney1165 and subsidized by 
the federal govemment.1166 Since 1975, the Social Security Act has 
required states, as a condition of receiving AFDC funds, to undertake 
to identify the father of a dependent child born out of wedlock and to 
impose on him a duty of support.1167 States, in response, have refused 
to provide welfare assistance to the mother of an illegitimate child un-
less she discloses the name of the putative father and cooperates in 
establishing his paternity.116s 
There are various reasons why the mother may either erroneously 
identify the father of her child or deliberately name an innocent man. 
She may not really kµow which of several men is actually the father; 
she may wish to shield the true father from the consequences of his 
action or to protect herself from retribution as a result of naming 
him; 1169 or economic necessity may lead her simply to supply a plausi-
ble candidate in order to obtain direct support or welfare benefits. The 
results of a six-year study by lie detector experts of over 300 disputed 
paternity suits in Chicago in which the mothers took polygraph tests 
after the trial showed that, in nearly half of the cases, the complainant 
was "lying when she denied having interqourse with anyone else but 
the defendant during the conception period. In the great majority of 
cases the lying mother confessed to the lie-detector examiner that she 
1162. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28; 593 P.2d 226, 230, 54 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533. 
1163. See Krause, Scientific Evidence and the Ascenainment of Paternity, 5 FAM. L.Q. 252, 
252-53 (1971). 
1164. Schatkin, Should Paternity Cases Be Tried in a Civil or Criminal Coun?, 1 CRIM. L. 
REV. (N.Y.) 18, 24 (1954). 
1165. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 1159, at 115-16. An example of such a provision is CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE§ 11350.1. 
1166. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(A),(B) (1982) (Deering 1979). 
1167. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(4) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(a)(2)-(4) (1983). 
1168. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11477(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-169 (West Supp. 1984). 
1169. See Poulin, I/legitimacy and Family Privacy: A Note on Maternal Cooperation in Pater-
nity Suits, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 910, 923-24 (1976). 
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had lied in court."1170 Moreover, as Justice Stanley Mosk of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court observed, "[i]n the emotional atmosphere gener-
ated in the courtroom by the spectacle of the unwed mother and the 
unwanted baby, it will often not be enough for an unjustly accused 
man to simply deny paternity, especially when ... he concededly has 
had sexual intercourse with the mother at an earlier date." 1171 This 
emotional atmosphere helps to explain why, in paternity suits, "accu-
sation is often tantamount to conviction"1172 and defendants not un-
commonly are reported in surveys as losing as many as ninety-five 
percent of the cases.1113 
Fortunately, the recent development of extremely sophisticated 
blood grouping tests - which conclusively negate paternity for 
ninety-three percent of falsely accused whites and ninety-one percent 
of falsely accused blacks1174 - has provided a solution to much of the 
problem. Even before the latest advances in genetic testing, scientific 
studies demonstrated the tendency toward gross inaccuracy in pater-
nity charges. Blood samples in 1,000 disputed paternity actions in a 
New York City survey disclosed that nearly forty percent of the ac-
cused fathers were innocent. 1175 Indeed, it has been found in another 
study that almost twenty percent of the men who actually admitted 
paternity were not the fathers of the children they acknowledged.1176 
Of those cases that were finally adjudicated, it has been reliably esti-
mated that more than one in seven defendants were erroneously held 
liable. 1177 
1170. Arthur & Reid, Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to Determine the Truth in Dis-
puted Paternity Cases, 45 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 213, 217 (1954). This evi-
dence may, of course, be discounted depending on the faith one places in polygraph results. 
1171. Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 651, 414 P.2d 382, 386, SI Cal. Rptr. 254, 258 
(1966). 
1172. Krause, supra note 1163, at 255. 
1173. See Glazer, Blood Grouping Tests in the Proof of Non-Paternity, MICH. ST. B. J. Vol. 
33, No. 1, at 12, 17 (1954); Sussman, Blood Grouping Tests-A Review of 1000 Cases of Disputed 
Paternity, 40 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 38 (1963). 
1174. Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of 
Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976). For discussion of the possible use of such tests 
actually to prove, rather than merely disprove, paternity, see Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Test· 
ing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1977-78); Note, 
Paternity Testing with the Human Leukocyte Antigen System: A Medicolegal Breakthrough, 20 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 511 (1980). 
1175. Sussman, supra note 1173, at 38, 40. A study of 6665 paternity suits in several Euro-
pean countries concluded that "half of the defendants in these cases were falsely accused." A. 
WIENER, BLOOD GROUPS AND TRANSFUSION 383 (3d ed. 1943). 
1176. Sussman & Schatkin, Blood Grouping Tests in Undisputed Paternity Proceedings, 164 J. 
A.M.A. 249, 250 (1957). 
1177. Sussman, supra note 1173, at 41. A similar study led to the conclusion that "of the 
bastardy cases coming to trial in •.. [Wayne County, Michigan], the defendant is wrongfully 
found guilty in over 25% of the cases." Glazer, supra note 1173, at 17. 
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In Little v. Streater, 1178 the Court held that due process required 
Connecticut to pay the expense of blood grouping tests for indigent 
defendants in paternity suits - a cost of $460 in 1980.1179 Although 
the Court limited its ruling to the "specific circumstances"I I80 sur-
rounding paternity proceedings in Connecticut, it is unlikely that the 
factors highlighted by the Court can distinguish Connecticut from 
other jurisdictions. First, the "quasi-criminal overtones"l18I associated 
with Connecticut's paternity action - e.g., the defendant's being sub-
ject to imprisonment for noncompliance with a support order1182 -
are not meaningfully different from those that exist in other states.1183 
Second, Connecticut's extensive involvement in paternity suits - its 
requirement that the mother identify and sue the father as a condition 
for receipt of welfare, its legal and financial assistance in her prosecu-
tion of the case, and its economic interest in the outcome - is sub-
stantially similar to the general practice1184 and would seem to have 
been emphasized by the Court more to differentiate the claim before it 
from the contention "that Connecticut has a constitutional obligation 
to fund blood tests for an indigent's defense in ordinary civil litigation 
between private parties"1185 than to narrow the holding to the specific 
Connecticut case. It is true that the third factor discussed by the 
Court - the Connecticut rule that the defendant's testimony denying 
fatherhood is itself insufficient to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case 
which is "made out by constancy in her accusation"1186 - appears to 
be limited to that state. However, the special circumstances and ex-
traordinary conviction rates in paternity actions referred to above 
strongly indicate that Connecticut's formally stated presumption in 
fact operates generally. This inference is confirmed by an Illinois 
Family Study Commission which reported that "[t]estimony from the 
sitting judiciary hearing paternity cases revealed . . . that the evidence 
in most cases consists of an accusation by the woman and a denial by 
the defendant. Under such circumstances, the judges feel constrained 
to enter a finding of paternity."1187 
1178. 452 U.S. 1 (1981). 
1179. 452 U.S. at 14 n.10. 
1180. 452 U.S. at 16, 17. 
1181. 452 U.S. at 10. 
1182. 452 U.S. at 10. 
1183. See note 1159 supra and accompanying text. 
1184. See notes 1165-68 supra and accompanying text. 
1185. 452 U.S. at 9, 10. 
1186. Mosher v. Bennett, 108 Conn. 671, 674, 144 A. 297, 298 (1929). 
1187. ILLINOIS FAMILY STUDY CoMMISSION ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND PARENTAL 
REsPONSIBILITY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55 (1969). 
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Since only a handful of jurisdictions had a clearly articulated posi-
tion on the issue in Little, the full scope of the impact of the Justices' 
ruling cannot be precisely measured. On the one hand, only Connecti-
cut and North Carolina explicitly required all those accused in pater-
nity suits, irrespective of means, to bear the cost of their blood 
tests. 1188 On the other hand, nearly three-quarters of the jurisdictions 
either expressly allowed the expense to be charged to some public 
agency or gave the courts some degree of discretion to do so. 1189 In at 
least some of these states, however, it is plain that the authorization 
afforded no guarantee to indigent defendants. 1190 In a few states, 
either lower court decisions, attorney general opinions, or administra-
tive policies provided for payment, but about one-fifth of the jurisdic-
tions had no relevant statutory judicial or administrative 
pronouncement.119 1 Most significantly, in the three states whose high-
est courts had presaged the edict in Little, 1192 explicit reliance was 
placed on the Court's earlier reasoning in Griffin v. Illinois, 1193 where 
it held that states must afford indigent criminal defendants the means 
for adequate and effective appellate review. 1194 This underlines the 
value of the Justices' efforts to protect indigent paternity 
defendants. 1195 
D. Free Speech, Press and Association 
1. Commercial Advertising 
Two Supreme Court rulings in the mid-1970's - Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 1196 and 
1188. 452 U.S. at 15 n.11. 
1189. For a detailed listing, see Brieffor Appellant at 16-18 n.17, Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 
1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. 
1190. See, e.g., Bigsby v. Bates, 59 Ohio Misc. 51, 391 N.E.2d 1384 (1978) (no free blood 
tests). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-131, 23-132 (1981) (cost may be truced to losing party), 
1191. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1189, at n.17. 
1192. Franklin v. District Court, 194 Colo. 189, 571 P.2d 1072 (1977); Commonwealth v. 
Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N.E.2d 667 (1969); State ex rel. Graves v. Daugherty, 266 S.E.2d 
142 (W. Va. 1980). 
1193. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
1194. 351 U.S. at 18, 20. 
1195. The possible prejudice that may occur to an indigent accused of fatherhood was dra-
matically illustrated in the case of Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 
529, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979). The district attorney first "brought a suit on behalf of the 
same minor child against another man. That man secured counsel, and a request for temporary 
support was denied for lack of evidence. Suit was then filed against Mr. Castellanos, alleging that 
he was the father of the child. Mr. Castellanos did not attend the hearing on temporary support 
and was found to be the child's father partially on the basis of testimony given at that hearing." 
24 Cal. 3d at 31 n.8, 593 P.2d at 232, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 535 (emphasis in original). Clearly, the 
Court's holding in Little might have aided Mr. Castellanos. 
1196. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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Bates v. State Bar of Arizona1197 - afforded some constitutional pro-
tection to commercial advertising by druggists, lawyers and (by plain 
implication) members of other professions. It is difficult to estimate 
the extent to which the decisions were themselves critical in forging 
the substantial consequences that have resulted, because before the 
first of the Justices' major rulings in 1976, both the Justice Depart-
ment and the Federal Trade Commission had launched challenges 
under the federal antitrust laws against restrictions imposed by state 
statutes and professional organization canons respecting advertising 
by attorneys, 119s dentists, 1199 physicians, 1200 druggists, 1201 and suppli-
ers of ophthalmic goods and services.1202 Indeed, just five weeks after 
the Court's pronouncement in Virginia Pharmacy, the FTC postponed 
indefinitely its proposed rules governing disclosure of retail prices for 
prescription drugs.1203 However, given the existing "state action" 
doctrine under the antitrust laws, which exempted regulations with 
which the state was intimately involved from the reach of antitrust 
actions, 1204 the Justices' interpretation was necessary to invalidate 
those advertising restrictions that were closely regulated by state agen-
cies12os and to eliminate the theoretical possibility that "private" pro-
fessional codes held to be contrary to the antitrust laws could be 
resuscitated either by state legislative or administrative rule or 
through broader congressional grant of immunity from antitrust 
coverage. 
The obstacles to professionally related advertising were widespread 
prior to the Court's constitutionally grounded intervention. Approxi-
mately two-thirds of the states posed significant barriers to disclosure 
of prescription drug prices in the print or broadcast media, 1206 thus 
greatly diminishing consumer access to information about the extreme 
1197. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
1198. See Devine, Lawyer Advertising and the Kutak Commission: A Refreshing Return to the 
Past, 18 WAKE FoRESr L. RE.v. 503, 514 (1982); Justice Department Charges Code Advertising 
Provisions Violate Federal Antitrust Laws, 62 A.B.A. J. 979 (1976); see also Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
1199. See Swerdlow & Staples, Dentists' Views on Advertising in Their Profession, AKRON 
Bus. & EcoN. R.Ev. Summer 1980, at 33, 34. 
1200. See In re American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979). 
1201. See United States v. American Pharmaceutical Assn., No. G75-558-CA5 (W.D. Mich. 
filed Nov. 24, 1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 24031 (1976). 
1202. See 41 Fed. Reg. 2,399 (1976). 
1203. See 41 Fed. Reg. 27,391 (1976). 
1204. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 
(1976). 
1205. Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-63. 
1206. STAFF REPORT TO FIC, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICE DISCLOSURES 34 (1975). 
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variances in drug costs documented throughout the nation 1201 and 
markedly increasing the prices paid.1208 Virtually all lawyers were 
prohibited by the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility from mak-
ing "any form of public communication . . . calculated to attract lay 
clients."1209 Although the American Medical Association condoned 
"tasteful" ads by doctors, 1210 this authorization was applied to ban 
any mention of price, an announcement of extended office hours, and 
communication of most relevant data about health maintenance orga-
nizations and prepaid medical care plans.1211 In any event, two-thirds 
of the states flatly barred advertising by the medical profession. 1212 
The American Dental Association excluded any dentist from its mem-
bership who advertised, 1213 a prohibition supported by statute in 
thirty-eight states.1214 The American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants also forbade all advertising by members1215 as did the 
American Institute of Architects. 1216 As for eyeglasses, over seventy 
percent of the states outlawed price advertising by optometrists and 
about forty percent by opticians as well.1211 
1207. In the Virginia Pharmacy case, it was stipulated that in "Richmond the cost of 40 
Achromycin tablets ranges from $2.59 to $6.00 ..• and that in the Newport News-Hampton 
area the costs of tetracycline ranges from $1.20 to $9.00, a difference of 650%." 425 U.S. at 754. 
The Court further noted that 
(t]he American Medical Association conducted a survey in Chicago that showed price dif-
ferentials in that city of up to 1200% for the same amounts of a specific drug. A study 
undertaken by the Consumers Union in New York found that prices for the same amount of 
one drug ranged from $.79 to $7.45, and for another from $1.25 to $11.50 .••• Amici 
American Association of Retired Persons and National Retired Teachers Association state 
that in 1974 they participated in a survey of three prescription drug prices at 28 pharmacies 
in Washington, D.C., and found pharmacy-to-pharmacy variances in the price of identical 
drugs as great as 245% ..•• The prevalence of such discrepancies "throughout the United 
States" is documented in a recent report. 
425 U.S. at 754 n.11. 
1208. In a survey of 131 senior citizens, 87% responded that they "would shop for the 'best 
buy' in drugs if the stores advertised their prices." Anderson & Klippel, An Empirical Test of a 
Public Policy Decision Model: The Evaluation of Prescription Drug Price Advertising, in CoNTEM· 
PORARY MARKETING THOUGHT 280, 283 (B. Greenberg & D. Bellenger eds. 1977). A Federal 
Trade Commission study concluded that by eliminating restrictions on drug price advertising, 
consumer savings would be "of a very substantial magnitude, amounting to many millions of 
dollars per year." STAFF REPORT TO FTC, supra note 1206, at 181. 
1209. MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, DR 2-lOl(A) (1975). 
1210. ADVERTISING AGE, July 4, 1977, at 51. 
1211. See In re American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701, 815-36 (1979). 
1212. ADVERTISING AGE, supra note 1210, at 51. 
1213. Swerdlow & Staples, supra note 1199, at 34. 
1214. Brief of American Dental Association as Amicus Curiae 3, Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (price advertising). 
1215. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Rule 502 (American Institute of Certified Public Ac· 
countants, 1973). 
1216. Veraska, Architects, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 24, 1979, at S-7. 
1217. Veraska, Regulations: Straightening Out a Legal Tangle, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 24, 
1979, at S-2. 
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It is, of course, still too early to measure the full and multifaceted 
impact of the Court's extension of first amendment coverage to com-
mercial advertising by professionals. The contours of the doctrine are 
still evolving and the consequences for the marketplace remain to be 
better examined and understood. But certain matters have been fairly 
clearly established. 
First, all official restraints on price advertising of drugs and eye-
glasses are now invalid 1218 and the consumer has been the financial 
beneficiary. Several surveys in the optometrical and prescription drug 
areas have shown that "retail prices often are dramatically lower than 
they would be without advertising."1219 Probably the most widely 
cited empirical study of the effect of advertising prohibitions on con-
sumer costs and behavior concerned eyeglasses - one of the few pre-
scription items for which advertising regulations varied 
significantly.1220 It concluded that "advertising restrictions in this 
market increase the prices paid by 25 percent to more than 100 per-
cent."1221 It also reported that large commercial optometric firms 
stated that "the presence or absence of advertising restrictions affected 
their decision to move into new market areas" and that two firms de-
clared that their prices "varied across states, with the higher prices in 
the states with advertising restrictions."1222 In the year following the 
FTC's removal of advertising prohibitions for eyeglasses, the Commis-
sion claimed partial credit for holding the increasing price to 5.7%, 
while the cost of all consumer goods rose by 11.3%, and that of medi-
cal care by 9.3%.1223 Of at least equal importance, an independent 
investigation of the quality of ophthalmic examinations - which con-
trolled for such variables as capital investment ( o~ce equipment tech-
nology) and labor (length of examination) - found that prices for the 
same quality service were sixteen percent higher in states that banned 
optometric and optician price advertising.1224 
Second, the evidence accumulated thus far suggests that the Jus-
tices' rejection of restraints on truthful advertising of the availability 
1218. In June 1978, the FTC adopted a final regulation preempting all state laws against 
advertising of eye care and eyeglass prescriptions. See 16 C.F.R. § 456.9 (1984). 
1219. Bates, 433 U.S. at 377 (citing J. CADY, REsTiuCTED ADVERTISING AND CoMPETI-
TION: THE CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS (1976); Benham, The Effect of Advenising on the Price of 
Eyeglasses, 15 J. L. & EcoN. 337 (1972)). 
1220. Benham, supra note 1219, at 338. 
1221. Id. at 344. 
1222. Id. at 346. 
1223. Eyeglasses and Prices, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 24, 1979, at S-2. 
1224. Feldman & Begun, The Effects of Advenising: Lessons From Optometry, 13 J. HUMAN 
REsOURCES 247 (Supp. 1978). 
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and price of routine legal services - an edict rapidly implemented by 
regulatory officials in virtually all states1225 - has also produced im-
portant results. A series of earlier ABA studies had concluded that 
there was a serious underutilization of the services of lawyers - e.g., 
"the middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served 
adequately by the legal profession."1226 The major reasons usually ad-
vanced for this perceived unfulfilled need were insufficient consumer 
information about attorneys competent to handle the particular prob-
lem 1227 and feared cost of the services.1228 
Several surveys strongly indicate that lawyer advertising can do 
much to remedy the public awareness problem. For example, a survey 
of the results of a 1977 Illinois Bar Association publicity campaign to 
alert consumers to the existence of certain types of legal services "indi-
cated high degrees of consumer recall . . ., a favorable attitude shift in 
respondents' confidence in lawyers and a significant increase in behav-
ioral intentions to have a will prepared."1229 In addition, the public's 
use of bar association lawyer referral services has been found to be 
"strikingly responsive to publicity."1230 Moreover, although sample 
polls revealed that in the first two years after the Bates decision, only 
about seven percent of the bar had engaged in advertising1231 (a figure 
that increased to thirteen percent after an additional four years),1232 its 
substantial use by at least some legal clinics suggests an expanded cli-
entele "from the segment of the population which has not used an 
1225. See Some Developments in Lawyer Advertising. ABA GENERAL PRACTICE SECTION, 
1979 SURVEY OF THE LAW 40, 40 (July 1979); Tokarz, To the Association, There's No Rush, 
ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 24, 1979, at S-2, S-4. For a summary of different types of state rules, 
see R. BILLINGS, PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 168-71 (1981). 
1226. ABA, REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1972); see also ABA 
SPECIAL COMMrrrEE ON AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES 19 (Aug. 1969); B. CURRAN & F. 
SPAULDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 8()..81 (1974). 
1227. Bates, 433 U.S. at 370 n.23 and studies cited therein. 
1228. 433 U.S. at 370 n.22 (citing ABA, Legal Services and the Public, 3 ALTERNATIVES 15 
(1976); B. CURRAN & F. SPAULDI~G, supra note 1226, at 96). 
1229. Smith & Meyer, Attorney Advertising: A Consumer Perspective, 44 J. OF MARKETING 
Spring 1980, at 56, 58; see also Middleton, Ads Pay Off- In Image And Income, NATL. L.J., 
Mar. 5, 1984, at l, col. 4, at 22, col. 1 (reporting on a 1983 A.B.A. study which found that 
advertising improved the public's image of lawyers). 
1230. Walsh, President's Page, 62 A.B.A. J. 405, 405 (1976). A 1974 survey found that 
in areas where there was no publicity, referral averaged 1.29 per 10,000 population; where 
the service was advertised in the yellow pages of the classified telephone directory, the rate 
increased to 10.36 per 10,000; in Burbank, California, where there was an extensive public-
ity campaign in newspapers and otherwise, the rate jumped to 87.3 per 10,000. 
Id. See also Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A Good Beginning But Not Enough, 62 A.B.A. J. 735 
(1976). 
1231. Law Poll, 65 A.B.A. J. 1014 (1979); see also Note, The Wisconsin Experience With 
Advertising Legal Services, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 1251, 1265. 
1232. Law Poll, 70 A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1984). 
October 1984] The Supreme Court and Individual Rights 167 
attorney before."1233 Thus, in the first six months following the 
Court's approval of lawyer advertising, it was estimated that the 
number of legal clinics had tripled 1234 and within about two years had 
multiplied thirty-five times. 1235 By 1979, it was reported that "[t]here 
are more legal clinics now in Boston than there were in the entire 
country three years ago."1236 
Moreover, data from scattered sources1237 tends to confirm the 
Justices' cautious prediction that advertising by lawyers might well 
lower the price of legal services.1238 For example, at the time of the 
Bates decision in 1977, the Bates & Steen clinic's fee for an uncon-
tested divorce was $195 as compared to the Arizona State Bar's Legal 
Services Program rate of $250.1239 A year later it was reported that in 
Phoenix the cost of an uncontested divorce dropped "from $350 to as 
low as $125"; "'the inability to advertise kept prices artificially 
high,' " said O'Steen.1240 Similar experiences abound.1241 
1233. Note, supra note 1231, at 1276. 
1234. Slavin, Lawyers and Madison Avenue: How Attorneys are Handling the Freedom to 
Advertise, 6 BARRISTER 46, 47 (Summer 1979); Auerbach, The Case for Lawyers' Advertising: It 
Wins Clients, Wash. Post, June 20, 1978 at Al, col. 2. 
1235. Bodine, Proliferation of Legal Clinics Continues; 550 More Were Born in Last JO 
Months, NATL. L.J., Dec. 31, 1979, at 5, col. 1. 
1236. Bodine, Legal Clinics: The Bargain Bar, NATL. L.J., Feb. 12, i979, at 27, col. 2. As 
further examples, in the first year following Bates, Jacoby & Meyers, "the oldest and one of the 
most successful clinics," increased its number of offices from 4 to 16 and its annual receipts per 
lawyer from $55,000 to $85,000. "Much of this gain can be attributed to the firm's reliance upon 
advertising, particularly via television. Since the clinic began a heavy television campaign, it bas 
attracted about 2,500 new clients per month." Muris & McChesney, Advertising and the Price 
and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. REsEARCH J. 
179, 194-95. See generally Middleton, supra ilote 1229. The Baltimore-Washington-based Caw-
ley & Schmidt clinic-tripled its branches from 6 to 18 and extended it$ operations into another 5 
states; " 'advertising is 100 percent responsible for our expansion,' said Cawley," Auerbach, 
supra note 1234, at AS, col. 2, echoing a widely shared judgment as to cause and effect. See, e.g., 
Slavin, supra note 1234, at 47; Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing 
Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122, 127, 131 (1980), and authorities cited therein; Bodine, 
supra, at 27 ("advertising is essential," according to the president of the American Legal Clinic 
Association). 
1237. See generally ABA CoMMISSION ON ADVERTISING, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DEL-
EGATES 8 (Feb. 1979). 
1238. Bates, 433 U.S. at 377. 
1239. 433 U.S. at 382. 
1240. Auerbach, supra note 1234, at AS, col. 2. 
1241. In 1975, the average cost of an uncontested divorce in Maryland was $344. A year 
later "Cawley, Schmidt & Sharrow's Maryland Clinic was offering uncontested divorce services 
for $150." Muris & McCbesney, supra note 1236, at 196. In Washington, D.C., the standard fee 
for an uncontested divorce bad ranged between $350 and $500; in 1978, such divorces were 
"widely advertised at prices from $125 to $150." Auerbach, supra note 1234, at AS, col. 2. In 
1978, Jacoby & Meyers' southern California clinics declared that "[a]n ordinary will can be 
drawn up for $40, whereas the traditional law office will charge about $70." Lawyer Advertising: 
The Jury's Still Out, EVERYBODY'S MONEY, Summer, 1978, at 8. Thus, in early 1979, it was 
reported that "when a clinic opens up, legal fees in the surrounding business co=unity sink." 
Bodine, NATL. L.J., supra note 1236, at 1, col. 1. In 1981, an A.B.A. national survey on legal 
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It is especially difficult to determine whether reduced fees attribu-
table to lawyer advertising also result in diminished quality of service. 
In the most comprehensive impartial study to date, the authors "de-
vised two tests to evaluate the assertion that clinics must provide lower 
quality services if they charge lower prices."1242 Their "subjective" 
measure was based on a mail questionnaire to Los Angeles consumers 
concerning their satisfaction with the legal services they had received 
either from traditional law firms or from the Jacoby & Meyers legal 
clinic. Factors included promptness in delivering services, interest in 
the problem, honesty, full explanation of matters, progress reports, at-
tentiveness to clients' statements and fairness of fees. 1243 Although the 
survey may be subject to methodological criticism - particulary be-
cause the sample was drawn from the clinic's mailing list1244 - its 
results disclosed that in all categories, users of the legal clinic showed 
greater satisfaction than users of traditional firms, the most significant 
difference concerning fairness of prices.1245 The "objective" measure 
involved child support cases, a substantial part of the clinics' business. 
To determine objective quality, support awards were compared with 
the income and expenses of the wife (who always had custody) and the 
husband. The results showed that child support decreased for hus-
bands when represented by the clinic (though not to a statistically sig-
nifi.cant degree) and increased for wives (to a statistically significant 
degree) when they had clinic representation.1246 Overall, it is fair to 
conclude that "[i]n both sets of tests, it appears that, to the extent that 
a difference exists, the quality of services of the Legal Clinic of Jacoby 
& Meyers is superior to that of the traditional firms."1241 
It is as yet unknown whether similar consequences respecting con-
sumer information and price of services will occur in other professions 
- such as accounting1248 and architecture1249 - where longstanding 
clinics found that "the average set fees and/or the stated hourly rate for ••• [divorce and bank-
ruptcy] services [of clinics] appear to be below what one might expect for a traditional law firm." 
ABA SPECIAL CoMMrITEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, LEGAL CLINICS: MERELY 
ADVERTISING LAW FIRMS? 7-8 (1982). See also id. at 48. Finally, a 1984 Federal Trade Com-
mission study of 3200 lawyers in 17 cities concluded that the price of many routine legal services 
was from 5% to 13% lower where lawyer advertising was more extensive. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 
1984, at A24, col. 3. 
1242. Muris & Chesney, supra note 1236, at 196. 
1243. Id. at 199. 
1244. For the authors' fuller explanation and justification, see id. at 197 n.57. 
1245. Id. at 199. 
1246. Id. at 205. 
1247. Id. at 196. 
1248. See Osterlund, Advertising - In the Public Interest?, 145 J. Acer. 59 (Jan. 1978); 
Smith, Reaching the Public: The CPA's New Image, 149 J. Acer. 47 (Jan. 1980); Wood & Ball, 
New Rule 502 and Effective Advertising by CPAs, 145 J. Acer. 65 (June 1978). 
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ethical bars against advertising have been relaxed in response to the 
Justices' pronouncements. However, fragmentary evidence from the 
area of dentistry, 1250 which has modified its prohibition to conform to 
the Bates ruling, 1251 suggests the same meaningful effects for patients 
and practitioners as has come about in the fields oflaw and pharmacy. 
2. Patronage 
At the end of the 1970's, employees of state and local governments 
comprised nearly fifteen percent of the nation's work force.1252 
Although, at the beginning of the decade, virtually every state had 
some form of civil service system,1253 1978-1979 statistics disclose that 
more than one-third of the 3.5 million state employees fell outside 
their coverage.1254 Moreover, some counties and cities had no civil 
service systems at all, 1255 thus suggesting that the positions of an even 
larger percentage of their 9.2 million jobholders1256 potentially de-
pended on their partisan political affiliation. 
In states such as Oregon and Wisconsin, the governor possessed 
just a handful of patronage jobs, and in California, only a few hun-
dred.1257 However, the partial information and anecdotal data col-
lected from other states indicated that a great many people were, in 
fact, affected by the tradition of political spoils. In Pennsylvania, it 
was estimated that the governor was capable of making up to 50,000 
political appointments.1258 In New York, the governor has approxi-
1249. See Tokarz, supra note 1225, at S-2; Veraska, supra note 1216, at S-7. 
1250. "Advertising by dentists is particularly widespread in California where it is estimated 
that as much as five percent of the state's 14,000 dentists have advertised at some time." Swerd-
low & Staples, supra note 1199, at 34. (footnote omitted) 
After three months of television advertising, a Philadelphia dentist named Stanley Wasko 
reported that he had "expanded his staff of dental technicians from one to six, and he plans to 
employ another dentist to handle nondenture work. Wasko says that the dentures he sells for 
$155 cost as much as $450 from other Philadelphia dentists." BUSINESS WEEK, July 24, 1978, at 
122. After nine months of newspaper advertising, a Westchester County, N.Y. dental group 
claimed that "across the board [its] fees are 30% to 40% lower than those charged by private 
practitioners in Westchester" and that since the ads began running business has risen 20%. Id. 
1251. Swerdlow & Staples, supra note 1199, at 34. 
1252. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL AllsrRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 319, 421 (1980) (13,102,000 state and local government employees; 
96,945,000 employed persons). 
1253. Peirce, Civil Service Systems Experience "Quiet Revolution'~ 7 NATL. J. 1643, 1644 
(1975). 
1254. 23 BOOK OF THE STATES 248-49, 271 (1980) (2,247,309 employees covered in 50 states 
and District of Columbia; 3,539,325 total state employees). 
1255. Peirce, supra note 1253, at 1644. 
1256. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1254, at 271. 
1257. R. WOLFINGER, M. SHAPIRO & F. GREENSTEIN, DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN PoLmCS 
177 (1976). 
1258. Id. "During the early 1960's Pennsylvania Republicans under Governor William 
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mately 39,000 positions at his disposal1259 and the mayor of New York 
City has more than twice that amount. 1260 In Illinois, when Richard 
Daley was both mayor of Chicago and Chairman of the Cook County 
Democratic Committee, he controlled 35,000 patronage jobs.1261 In 
Indiana, nearly 8,000 state employees are subject to the spoils sys-
tem.1262 In West Virginia, when a Republican succeeded a Democrat 
in the statehouse in 1969, about 3,400 of the roughly 4,000 mainte-
nance employees were replaced on the basis of political criteria. 1263 
Since many American cities, especially the larger ones, have civil 
service requirements for most employees, 1264 it may be inferred that 
the issue of political patronage was of limited consequence. But, as the 
figures from New York and Chicago reveal, political realities and ad-
ministrative loopholes have greatly diluted the impact of the formal 
rules. 1265 Furthermore, the reach of patronage tentacles extended be-
yond the state and locally funded positions to many federal jobs when 
they were assigned from Washington through mayors with national 
clout. 1266 Finally, the magnitude of the subject was compounded by 
the fact that public jobholders in a number of states - such as Illinois, 
Indiana, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania - were 
required to pay a kickback for continued employment.1267 
Scranton 'laid off' some 7,800 Democrats in the Department of Transportation and replaced 
them with Republicans ..•• The 1970 Pennsylvania election of Democrat Milton Shapp was 
followed by the dismissal of some 3,500 Republicans in a 'highway department reorganization.' " 
Recent Cases, Public Employees - Freedom of Association - Discharge of Non-policymaking 
Public Employees on Ground of Political AffiliationJnfringes Employees' Freedom of Association, 
26 v AND. L. R.Ev. 1090, 1091 n.8. (1973). 
1259. R. WOLFINGER, M. SHAPIRO & F. GREENSTEIN, supra note 1257, at 177. 
1260. "During the first three years of Mayor Lindsay's regime the number of 'provisional' 
employees increased from 1,500 to 12,800. Under Mayor Wagner the City of New York also had 
50,000 'noncompetitive' jobs; 24,000 more such positions were added after Lindsay took office." 
R. WOLFINGER, THE PoLmcs OF PROGRESS 90 (1974) (footnote omitted). 
1261. Id. at 91. When Richard Ogilvie, a Republican, became Governor of Illinois, he dis-
missed 10,000 state employees who had been appointed by prior Democratic administrations. M. 
TOLCHIN & s. TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR 97 (1971). The Illinois Secretary of State reportedly 
commands the destinies of some 4,000 workers. See Recent Cases, supra note 1258, at 1091 n.8. 
Within six months of a Democrat's ousting the Republican sheriff in Cook County, Illinois {Chi· 
cago) in 1970, all but 240 of the more than 1,500 non-civil servants in that office - including 
window washers, janitors, clerks, elevator operators and caseworkers - were fired for political 
reasons. Brief of Independent Voters of Illinois, et al. as Amici Curiae at 4 & Amicus Curiae 
Brief of Public Citizens at 11-12 [hereinafter cited as Brief of Public Citizens], Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
1262. M. TOLCHIN & s. TOLCHIN, supra note 1261, at 118. 
1263. Brief of Public Citizens, supra note 1261, at 9-10. 
1264. U.S. CoMMN. ON CJVJL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE ... BY ALL THE PEOPLE 
63-64 (1969). 
1265. See R. WOLFINGER, supra note 1260, at 89. 
1266. See M. TOLCHIN & s. TOLCHIN, supra note 1261, at 72. 
1267. See id. at 116-17. 
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Although all of the adverse consequences of patronage are beyond 
measurement, it is clear that they have been substantial. For example, 
it has been urged that the operation of the patronage system in Chi-
cago's courts, jails, sheriff's office and hospitals caused their functions 
to deteriorate, "as employees with backgrounds of political service 
take precedence over those with technical training."1268 Critics of 
Mayor Lindsay's use of patronage in the New York City Corporation 
Counsel's office claimed that "due to its inexperienced legal staff, the 
city has lost many cases in court,"1269 and it is common knowledge 
that lawmakers' votes often turn on the rewards of patronage rather 
than on the merits of the issue at stake.121o 
Whether the Court's rulings in Elrod v. Burns1271 and Branti v. 
Finke/ 1272 -forbidding the discharge of public employees on the sole 
ground of their political affiliations unless "the hiring authority can 
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the public office involved"1273 - will remedy 
all the abuses is highly uncertain. It is equally unclear whether the 
strictures of these decisions will be held applicable to other patronage 
practices such as the use of partisan criteria for awarding government 
contracts; for promotions, demotions, initial hirings, and reappoint-
ments in general;1274 for application to such persons as police, 
firefighters, teachers, referees, trustees, guardians and receivers; 1275 
and for hiring the required army of federal census takers.1276 Indeed, 
it may well be that, on balance, extensive judicial prohibition of the 
patronage scheme, which has been a basic prop of the nation's tradi-
tional political party system, is a naive act of reformism that will fur-
ther contribute to the widely perceived crisis in American democracy 
resulting from the decline of our two major political parties.1277 How-
1268. Id. at 43. 
1269. Id. at 65. 
1270. As a single example, when a Georgia legislator had announced his intention to vote 
against a bill sought by the governor, the latter "sent back word that ... [the legislator's] brother 
would lose his job in the state highway department unless the legislator complied." Id. at 92-93. 
1271. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
1272. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
1273. 445 U.S. at 518. 
1274. For discussion of recent lower court rulings, see Note, First Amendment Limitations on 
Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 181 (1982). 
1275. See R. WOLFINGER, supra note 1260, at 79-80, 90-91. 
1276. See Keegan, House Democrats Want to Be In On the 1980 Census 'Dole~ 11 NATL. J. 
1681 (1979). 
1277. See, e.g., Ranney, The Political Parties: Reform and Decline, in THE NEW AMERICAN 
PoLmCAL SYSTEM (A. King ed. 1978); Burnham, American Politics in the 1970's: Beyond 
Party?, in THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS: STAGES OF PoLmCAL DEVELOPMENT (W. Cham-
bers & W. Burnham eds. 2d ed. 1975). 
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ever, there can be little disputing that the Court's condemnation of the 
soul of the political spoils system promises to remove substantial re-
straints on the freedoms of belief and association of a significant 
number of citizens, even if its import is not brought fully to bear. 
3. Access to Criminal Trials 
Although there had been a small handful of reported cases in 
which designated classes of persons had been excluded from limited 
parts of a criminal trial in special circumstances, 1278 in 1948 the 
Supreme Court said that it was "unable to find a single instance of a 
criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal 
court during the history of this country."1279 Three decades later, the 
American Civil Liberties Union found that "never, to ... [its] knowl-
edge, had any American court undertaken to close an entire criminal 
trial to the public" prior to 1979.128° While there may be isolated 
cases that could be cited as contrary to these unqualified state-
ments, 1281 it is undisputed that "if any . . . exist, which is doubtful, 
they are few indeed."1282 
Nonetheless, within only a year following the Court's suggestion in 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale1283 that neither the public nor the press has 
any first amendment right to observe criminal trials, 1284 there were 
nearly fifty attempts to close such proceedings, nearly two-thirds of 
which were successful, 1285 a number that promised to grow signifi-
cantly unless abated by the Justices. The Court's ruling in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 1286 explicitly did not hold that the Consti-
tution grants the public and representatives of the press an absolute 
first amendment right of access to criminal trials. 1287 Nor, though 
1278. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 388 n.19, 430-32 n.11 (1979). 
1279. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948). 
1280. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Jurisdictional Statement as 
Amicus Curiae at 3, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see also Brief 
of Washington Post et al. as Amici Curiae at 14, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. 555 (1980). 
1281. See, e.g., Gannett, 443 U.S. at 430 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kirstowsky v. Supe· 
rior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 
(1914). 
1282. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 431 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
1283. 443 U.S. 368, 391-93 (1979). 
1284. The Court did not reach the issue of whether such a right reposed in the first amend· 
ment although one of the concurrences argued that it did not. See 443 U.S. at 403-06 (Rehn· 
quist, J., concurring). But see 443 U.S. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring). 
1285. REPORTERS CoMMlTIEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, CoURT WATCH SUMMARY 
(Nov. 1980). 
1286. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
1287. 448 U.S. at 581 n.18. 
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Richmond Newspapers may be a "watershed case,"1288 may it be pre-
dicted with full confidence that its constitutionally based "right to at-
tend criminal trials"1289 will extend to civil trials, 1290 much less to 
public access to other governmental proceedings or information.1291 
However, it is clear beyond peradventure that the decision's recogni-
tion that "a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a 
criminal trial under our system of justice"1292 will markedly advance 
the first amendment's "core purpose of assuring freedom of communi-
cation on matters relating to the functioning of government"1293 and 
will provide protection to the individual rights of the press and public 
arising therefrom.1294 
4. Right of Reply Laws 
At the time of the Court's 1974 decision in Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo 1295 - holding that Florida's "right of reply" stat-
ute, which obliged "newspapers" to print without charge the reply of 
any political candidate "assailed" by the newspaper, 1296 violated the 
first amendment - only North Carolina had such a law. 1297 How-
ever, there was a real possibility of additional moves in this direction, 
particularly if the Justices had reached a different result. A "number 
1288. 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Press Hails Court's Richmond 
Ruling. PRESSTIME, Aug. 1980, at 10. 
1289. 448 U.S. at 580. 
1290. 448 U.S. at 580 n.17. 
1291. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMlSAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DE-
VELOPMENTS, 1979-1980, at 145-96 (1981); Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institu-
tions: The First Amendment as Sword, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 19-25. 
1292. 448 U.S. at 573. 
1293. 448 U.S. at 575. 
1294. The Court has further extended and clarified the scope of these rights in Globe News-
papers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
1295. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
1296. The statute was applied "[i]f any newspaper in its columns assails the personal charac-
ter of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with 
malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another 
free space for such purpose." FI.A. STAT. § 104.38 (1973). 
1297. Bagdikian, First Amendment Revisionism, CoLUM. JouR. REv. May-June 1974, at 39, 
42. Mississippi's statute had been construed to apply only when the newspaper's original publi-
cation was actually defamatory. See Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So. 2d 91 (1953). 
Nevada's provision had been replaced by a retraction statute in 1969. Act of Mar. 29, 1967, ch. 
211, § 71, 1967 Nev. Stat. 458, 473, repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1969, ch. 310, § 10 1969 Nev. 
Stat. 553, 554 (codified as replaced at NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.336 (1969). In Miami Herald, 
Justices Brennan and Rehnquist wrote separately to emphasize their understanding that the 
Court "implies no view upon the constitutionality of 'retraction' statutes affording plaintiffs able 
to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to require publication of a retraction." 418 
U.S. at 258. 
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of other states ha[d] introduced similar bills" in 19741298 and Senator 
John McClellan, then the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, had stated on the Senate floor that if the Court upheld Florida's 
regulation he would propose federal legislation affecting the press 
throughout the country.1299 
Although the Florida law had itself been virtually unenforced over 
its sixty-one-year life, 1300 the potential chill of its gestating progeny on 
an independent and informative press appeared to be substantial. In 
addition to "the cost in printing and composing time and materials 
and in taking up space that could be devoted to other material the 
newpaper may have preferred to print,"1301 the possibility of these 
burdens might lead editors - as a similar rule has reportedly influ-
enced broadcasters1302 - to modify drastically their normal coverage 
of electoral affairs. Thus, the New York Times and Wall Street Jour-
nal contended that, under the Florida regime, 
[e]very politically oriented editorial or letter to the editor will be pub-
lished with the fear that, as a result of its publication, part of the content 
of tomorrow's editorial page will be dictated by a politician seeking of-
fice. Every page-one story about legislators or other elected officials may 
carry with it the possibility that the legislator or official will be the au-
thor of a portion of a future front page. It is painfully clear that those 
conditions will lead not to debate, but to a stifling degree of restraint in 
political reporting by newspapers.1303 
The Washington Post believed that "[a]ny newspaper worthy of the 
First Amendment trust vested in it by the Founding Fathers will think 
twice before opening its pages to an invasion of self-serving press 
releases." 1304 
Although an increasing number of prominent dailies had volunta-
rily opened access to opposing views, 1305 the dilemma faced by "mar-
ginal or ideologically oriented newspapers"1306 {and other journals of 
1298. Bagdikian, supra note 1297, at 42; see also W. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND 
REGULATION 513 (2d ed. 1978) (right of reply law proposed in Hawaii). 
1299. See 120 Cong. Rec. 1855-59 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1974). 
1300. Prior to the Miami Herald litigation, "the law had been invoked only once before, in 
1971 in a case involving the Daytona Beach Morning Journal. The judge in that case said that 
the law was 'clearly unconstitutional' and dismissed the case." Stencel, Access to the Media, 1 
EDITORIAL REsEARCH REP. 449, 450 n.3 (1974). 
1301. 418 U.S. at 256. 
1302. See, e.g., E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 69-72 (1974). 
1303. Brief of Dow Jones & Co., and The New York Times Co. as Amici Curiae at 3, Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
1304. Brief of The Washington Post Co. as Amicus Curiae at 4, Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
1305. See Chatzky & Robinson, A Constitutional Right of Access to Newspapers: Is There 
Life After Tomillo?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 453, 492 (1976). 
1306. Brief of The Washington Post Co., supra note 1304, at 10. 
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opinion) posed an even greater threat to the vigorous public debate 
promised by a free press. On the one hand, "many of these newspa-
pers cannot afford to print free extra copy."1307 But neither 
can they afford to eliminate the critical viewpoints which are the basis of 
their appeal to a select audience. Journals with a recognized political 
viewpoint, like the National Review or the New Republic, may lose their 
readers if they are forced to fill their pages with self-serving responses 
from criticized candidates.13os 
Finally, there was good reason to believe that if Florida's right-of-
reply for political candidates had been held to pass constitutional mus-
ter, extensions of its policy to press criticism of incumbent officials and 
ultimately to news coverage of all subjects would follow. Thus, de-
spite the definite doctrinal limits of the Miami Herald principle, 1309 
the Justices' mandate promised to deter further compounding the dan-
ger to robust and uninhibited reporting and commentary. 
5. Compulsory Unionism 
Although the Taft-Hartley Act specifically excludes governmental 
employees from its protective coverage for labor union organization 
and activities,1310 as of the mid-1970's over one-third of the states had 
enacted comprehensive statutes authorizing collective bargaining for 
all state and local government workers, and nearly a dozen more 
states made some type of more limited provisions.1311 As a result, in 
1976, almost half of all full-time nonfederal public employees belonged 
to some union organization1312 which had power to act as the exclu-
sive bargaining agent for any bargaining unit in which the union repre-
sented a majority of employees. The union's duty to represent fairly 
all workers in the bargaining unit1313 carries "a corresponding duty on 
the part of everyone in that bargaining unit to bear a proportionate 
share of the cost of fair representation, giving rise to various forms of 
1307. Id. 
1308. Id. 
1309. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding right of reply 
obligation for broadcast media). 
1310. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982). 
1311. See Zwerdling, The Liberation of Public Employees: Union Security in the Public Sec-
tor, 11 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. REV. 993-94 n.5 (1976). A presidential order also granted federal 
executive branch employees some collective bargaining rights. See Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 
C.F.R. 957 (1975). 
1312. U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE & U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS IN STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENTS: 1980, at 1 (State and Local Government, Special 
Studies No. 102, 1981). 
1313. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
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union security arrangements"1314 - the usual being either the em-
ployee's obligation actually to become a union member (union shop); 
or, without joining the union, to pay a sum equal to union dues 
(agency shop); or to pay a service fee in an amount less than union 
dues (fair share agreement). 1315 Although the examples of highly suc-
cessful political action by labor groups in states without provisions for 
public employee collective bargaining1316 demonstrate that legal secur-
ity for the union is not a prerequisite to effectiveness, the financial sig-
nificance of the nonunion members' responsibility to contribute may 
be gleaned from a recent - albeit perhaps atypical - case in which 
the additional revenue generated by the representation fee roughly 
doubled the local's annual income.1317 
Primarily for two reasons,1318 the precise scope of the Court's 1977 
decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 1319 - holding that the 
first amendment forbids the exclusive bargaining representative from 
spending the public employees' fees for any political or ideological 
causes unrelated to collective bargaining without the consent of the 
worker - remains somewhat indefinite. First, the Justices have not 
yet authoritatively determined whether the employees' constitutional 
rights are adequately safeguarded by a rebate procedure1320 - re-
quired by a number of states1321 and adopted by such powerful public 
employee unions as AFSCME1322 and the NEA 1323 - under which 
1314. Note, Union Security in the Public Sector: Defining Political Expenditures Related to 
Collective Bargaining, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 134. 
1315. Id. at 134 n.4. 
1316. See, e.g., Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences Between Public and Private Sector 
Co//ective Bargaining, 19 UCLA L. REV. 867, 951, 953-54 (1972) (Arkansas & District of 
Columbia). 
1317. Robinson v. New Jersey, 547 F. Supp. 1297, 1304 (D.N.J. 1982), revd., 741 F.2d 598 
(3d Cir. 1984). 
1318. Although both issues were recently presented in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & 
S.S. Clerks, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984), the Court construed the Railway Labor Act to avoid having 
to decide any significant issues of constitutionality. 
1319. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
1320. See 431 U.S. at 242 n.45. For varied resolutions by lower courts, see Perry v. Interna-
tional Assn. of Machinists, 708 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. New Jersey, 547 F. Supp. 
1297 (D.N.J. 1982), 565 F. Supp. 942 (D.N.J. 1983), revd .. 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1984); White 
Cloud Educ. Assn. v. Board of Educ., 101 Mich. App. 309, 300 N.W.2d 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1980). In E//is, the Court held that a rebate scheme was not permitted by the Railway Labor 
Act. 
1321. See e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS c. !SOE§ 12 (Michie/Law Coop. Supp. 1984); N.J.STAT, 
ANN. § 34:13-A-5.5-5.6 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. CJv. SERV. LAW § 208(3)(a) (McKinney 
1983); see generally Note, New York Legislative Response to Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion: Agency Shop and Public Employees' Rights to Freedom of Association, 43 ALB. L. REV. 567 
(1979). 
1322. See Zwerdling, supra note 1311, at 1036-37. 
1323. See Federal Election Commn. v. NEA, 457 F. Supp. 1102 D.C. 1978). 
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the union collects an amount (usually through payroll deduction) that 
includes political action fees and then offers a partial refund on re-
quest. Although the number of dissenters that recover under this 
scheme is not insubstantial, 1324 the dynamics of inertia would appear 
to make it only a relatively small fraction of those who would with-
hold if asked affirmatively to contribute.1325 Second, the line between 
the union's engaging in "collective bargaining activities"1326 (for 
which it may assess) and spending funds "for the expression of polit-
ical views, on behalf of political candidates, or towards the advance-
ment of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-
bargaining representative"1327 (for which it may not charge without 
consent) remains relatively ambiguous and extremely difficult to draw 
satisfactorily.1328 Obviously, both of these factors will greatly affect 
the full sweep of Abood's protection for the personal right of public 
employees against having their compulsory fees expended for causes 
with which they disagree. 
Although the Justices' constitutional holding will have a capacious 
impact on individual liberty even if ultimately applied minimally as to 
public employees, its doctrinal implications potentially extend to the 
private sector as well where, at present, the issue is largely regulated 
by federal statutes. First, in several earlier decisions, 1329 the Court 
construed the Railway Labor Act's guarantee of a union shop for rail-
way employees1330 to avoid the first amendment questions "of utmost 
gravity"133l that were presented in Abood. On the premise that con-
gressional authorization and judicial enforcement of union security de-
vices represented "governmental action"1332 subject to constitutional 
constraints, the Court interpreted the statute to prohibit the use of 
compulsory union fees "to finance the campaigns of candidates for fed-
eral and state offices whom [the plaintiffs] opposed, and to promote the 
propagation of political and economic doctrines, concepts and ideolo-
1324. See Olsen v. Communications Workers of Am., 559 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D.N.J. 1983), 
revd. sub nom. Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1984). 
1325. See Federal Election Commn. v. NEA, 457 F. Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (D.D.C. 1978). 
1326. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236. 
1327. 431 U.S. at 235. 
1328. For contrasting approaches, see Nelson, Union Dues and Political Spending, 28 LAB. 
L.J. 109 (1977); Note, supra note 1314, at 142-48; Robinson v. New Jersey, 547 F. Supp. 1297, 
1316-17 (D.N.J. 1982). See generally Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1890-97. 
1329. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); Railway Employ-
ees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235-38 (1956). 
1330. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1982). 
1331. International Assn. of Merchants v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961). 
1332. Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 & n.4 (1956). 
178 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1 
gies with which [they] disagreed."1333 Second, the federal courts of 
appeals have construed a virtually identical provision of the National 
Labor Relations Act1334 (which governs most nonrailroad private em-
ployees)1335 as imposing the same restriction,1336 and labor unions ac-
cordingly adopted a rebate procedure. 1337 Third, the Federal Election 
Campaign Act1338 forbids labor unions from using compulsory fees to 
make any contributions or expenditures in support of any federal elec-
tion campaign (as distinguished from state or local elections and fed-
eral lobbying activities ).1339 
In sum, the interpretation of existing federal legislation by courts 
appears to be at least as solicitous of dissenting private employees' 
rights as the Court's constitutional ruling in Abood. Moreover, if Con-
gress were to repeal the pertinent sections of the Railway Labor Act 
and the National Labor Relations Act and enact a national right-to-
work law, the influence of (and need for) the Abood doctrine in the 
private sector would be totally eliminated. Short of this fundamental 
change of policy, if Congress were to overturn the judicial interpreta-
tion of either or both of these statutes, there is no assurance that the 
result would be invalid under Abood, for the Court's assumption of 
"governmental action" under the Railway Labor Act does not consti-
tute a square holding. Some federal courts of appeals have declined in 
any event to extend it to the National Labor Relations Act (judgments 
seemingly based more solidly on the Burger Court's conservatism in 
respect to the "state action" concept than on the logic of the Justices' 
earlier reasoning). 134-0 Apart from these quite unlikely contingencies, 
1333. International Assn. of Merchants v. Street, 367 U.S. 743, 744 (1961). 
1334. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). 
1335. Unlike the Railway Labor Act, which preempts state right-to-work laws, the National 
Labor Relations Act does not guarantee union security schemes when a majority in the bargain-
ing unit opt for representation, but rather allows states to proscribe union shop agreements. 29 
U.S.C.§ 164(b) (1982). Since fewer than half the states (largely those in the south and southwest) 
have adopted right-to-work legislation, a substantial majority of American workers are subject to 
the NLRA's authorization of compulsory union fees. See Kovach, National Right to Work Law: 
An Affirmative Position, 28 LAB. L.J. 305, 305 (1977). 
1336. See, e.g., Reid v. McDonell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir. 1971); Seay v. 
McDonnnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1970). For a contrary read-
ing of the legislative history, see Note, The National Labor Relations Board's Role in Exemption 
of the Use of Union Dues Collected Pursuant to a Union Security Agreement, 61 MICH. L. REV. 
152, 159 (1968). 
1337. See Nelson, supra note 1328, at 113. 
1338. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441b (1982) (amending 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1971)). 
1339. See discussion in Pipefitters Local Union v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972). 
1340. Compare Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 476-80 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Reid v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410-11 (10th Cir. 1971), with Linscott v. Miller Falls 
Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971), and Seay v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1970). 
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however, there is no disputing the fact that the Court's constitutional 
principle has generated the current significant protection for the asso-
ciational rights of private employees and stands powerfully against any 
congressional reversal or diminution of those rights. 
Finally, whatever the ambiguities of Abood's application to private 
employment, there appears to be little room for disagreement with the 
conclusion of every state and federal court addressing the question 1341 
that the rule covers the integrated (or unified) bar requirement - ex-
isting in nearly sixty percent of jurisdictions and affecting more than 
two-thirds of the nation's attomeys1342 - that all practicing lawyers 
pay dues to the state bar association.1343 Although, again, the exact 
reach of the Abood doctrine in this context is still unsettled, 1344 the 
fact that, as of 1980, two-thirds of these bar associations employed 
paid full time lobbyists and almost one-sixth funded political action 
committees1345 discloses the importance of the Justices' edict for indi-
vidual liberty even in much smaller groups than those involved in pub-
lic employee unions. 
E. Religious Freedom 
1. Compulsory Education Laws 
In 1971, members of the Old Order Amish could be found in 
nineteen states in the United States.1346 According to the tenets of 
their faith, Amish parents believed that formal education of their off-
spring beyond the eighth grade would "endanger their own salvation 
and that of their children."1347 They feared that "the public schools 
will melt all men into one and thereby destroy or fatally weaken the 
1341. See, e.g., Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 565 F. Supp. 963 (D.P.R. 
1983), vacated sub nom. Romany v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 742 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 
1984); Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.M. 1982); In re Amendment to the Integration 
Rule of the Florida Bar, 439 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1983); Falk v. State Bar, 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d / 
201 (1981); see also Report of the Committee to Review the State Bar, 334 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. 
1983) (assuming arguendo Abood applicable). Cf. Reynolds v. State Bar of Montana, 524 F. 
Supp. 1003 (D. Mont. 1981). 
1342. ABA, DIRECTORY OF BAR ACTIVITIES 4 (J. Sweeney ed. 1980). 
1343. The constitutional issue was left unresolved in Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 
(1961). The same logic would seem to apply to mandatory fees from state college students to 
support the student government association. 
1344. See text at notes 1320-28 supra. See also Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 418 Mich. 270, 
342 N.W.2d 504 (1983) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 315 (1984). 
1345. See ABA, supra note 1342, at 20-21. 
1346. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1971, § 1, at 43, col. 1. They resided "principally in the rural 
areas of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, and in smaller settlements in Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, 
Tennessee, Missouri, Maryland, Kansas, and New York." J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, 
CHILDREN IN AMISH SOCIETY 3 (1971). 
1347. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
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Amish church."1348 As a result, despite state compulsory education 
laws, in 1970 there were approximately 10,000 Amish youngsters en-
rolled in Amish schools outside the public education system 1349 (in-
cluding many high-school-age children in "vocational schools"1350) in 
addition to an unknown number of secondary-school-age children who 
attended no school at all.13s1 
Over the years, in as many as nine states, 1352 the Amish had been 
"repeatedly prosecuted for their failure to submit to compulsory at-
tendance laws."1353 In Ohio, during the first third of the twentieth 
century, Amish parents frequently suffered fines and jail sentences. 1354 
In Pennsylvania, between the mid-1930's and the mid-1950's, Amish 
fathers were convicted in several judicial decisions. 1355 In Indiana, in 
1948, a father's sixty-day prison sentence was affirmed on appeal1356 
and, although the state had no teacher certification requirement for 
nonpublic schools, the state closed an Amish school because of teacher 
qualifications.1357 In Kansas, in the mid-1960's, a father whose con-
viction had been affirmed by the state supreme court1358 "was harassed 
out of the state . . . for not enrolling his daughter in a public high 
school. Another Kansas Amishman, Adin Yutzy, paid a large fine, 
sold his farm, and moved to Wisconsin to get away from 'school 
trouble.' When Wisconsin began prosecuting the Amish for not send-
ing their ninth-grade children to public high school, the Yutzy family 
moved to Missouri.''1359 In 1965, the national media carried pictures 
of Amish children in Iowa scrambling through cornfields to escape 
sheriff's deputies who had come to the Amish school to remove the 
pupils to the town school.1360 
1348. Keim, From Erlanbach to New Glarus, in CoMPULSORY EDUCATION AND THE AMISH 
1, 14 (A. Keim ed. 1975). 
1349. J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1346, at 34. 
1350. Id. at 71. 
1351. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208.09 n.3 (1972). 
1352. Kirk, The Amish Case, NATL. REV., July 7, 1972, at 747. 
1353. Keim, A Chronology of Amish Court Cases, in CoMPULSORY EDUCATION, supra note 
1348, at 93. 
1354. Keim, supra note 1348, at 14-15; Keim, supra note 1353, at 94, 96; Note, The Right 
Not to Be Modem Men: The Amish and Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 925, 941-42 
(1967). 
1355. Keim, supra note 1353, at 94-96. 
1356. Gingerich v. State, 226 Ind. 678, 83 N.E.2d 47 (1948). 
1357. J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1346, at 103. 
1358. State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 51 
(1967). 
1359. J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1346, at 98. 
1360. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1965, at 38; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 1965, at 15. See 
generally J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1346, at 97-98. 
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Some states simply left the Amish alone; 1361 others - including 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas and Pennsylvania - made compromise settle-
ments with them. 1362 In Ohio, law enforcement officers desisted when 
public support for continued prosecutions was less than they had 
hoped. 1363 However, the dominant response of the Amish was to with-
draw in the face of legal opposition. When it was not possible to have 
their own schools, they moved to other states and even to Canada and 
Central and South America.1364 Just prior to the Supreme Court's 
1972 decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1365 the leading chronicler of the 
Amish saga concluded that "[i]n the United States the Old Order 
Amish are granted a tenuous permission, revokable virtually at the 
whim of the state superintendents, to maintain their own schools."1366 
The Court's ruling ended this. It recognized that "[f]orced migration 
of religious minorities was an evil that lay at the heart of the Religious 
Clauses,"1367 and remedied this situation by constitutionally removing 
a serious danger "to the continued existence of an ancient religious 
faith." 1368 
2. Financial Aid to Parochial Schools 
For two reasons, it is impossible to calculate the full extent to 
which the series of Supreme Court decisions commencing with Lemon 
v. Kurtzman in 1971,1369 which prohibited most allocations of public 
funds for church-related elementary and secondary education, have se-
cured the "personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support 
of a religious institution."137° First, recent opinions make painfully 
clear that the line between permissible and forbidden public expendi-
tures is at best hazy. 1371 Second, there is no reliable way even to esti-
1361. J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1346, at 99. 
1362. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208-09 n.3 (1972). 
1363. J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1346, at 103. 
1364. Id. at 104. 
1365. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
1366. J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1346, at 104. 
1367. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 n.9. 
1368. 406 U.S. at 218 n.9. 
1369. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Marburger v. Public Funds for Pub. Schools, 417 U.S 961 (1974); 
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 
(1973). 
1370. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). See generally 
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260 (1968). 
1371. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); see also Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 679-81 (1980). 
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mate how many tax dollars would have been used to aid parochial 
schools had the Court not ruled as it did. Nonetheless, the existing 
evidence from which inferences may be drawn reveals that the cases 
have greatly served the individual liberty at issue. 
In 1970, more than ten percent of all children in the United States 
(approximately 6.5 million students) attended nonpublic schools and 
ninety-three percent of these went to church-related institutions. 1372 
The highest concentrations were found in those states - e.g., New 
York (19%), Pennsylvania (19%), Ohio (15%), Providence, R.I. 
(30%)1373 - that had recently adopted substantial programs of public 
assistance. In all, as of 1971 (the year of the Lemon decision) over 
three-quarters of the states - as well as their subdivisions and the 
national government - provided some form of aid to nonpublic edu-
cation totalling $650,000,000 annually.I374 Because the Court's uncer-
tain interpretation of the first amendment's prohibition against laws 
respecting an establishment of religion has not interdicted all forms of 
public assistance for parochial school pupils, not all of these expendi-
tures abridged the individual constitutional right to be free of compul-
sory support of sectarianism. For example, about $50,000 of the 1971 
appropriations was for transportation, 1375 a type of expenditure held 
permissible by the Justices. I376 However, the majority of the tax-
funded programs in 1971 - such as purchase of secular services, 
teacher salary supplements, tax benefits, equipment grants, and ad-
ministrative service reimbursements1377 - could no longer be 
undertaken. 
Of much greater importance in terms of impact, however, are the 
possible amounts that might well have been paid in the indefinite fu-
ture in the absence of the Court's rulings. Although substantial public 
support for church-related elementary and secondary education was a 
very recent development, 1378 it promised to increase dramatically. For 
example, in 1971-1972 alone, over 100 proposals were introduced in 
the House of Representatives just to provide some form of tax relief to 
1372. See D. SULLIVAN, PUBLIC AID TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 17 (1974); Brieffor Appellee 
at 10, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. 
1373. See D. SULLIVAN, supra note 1372, at 19; Supplement A to Brief for Appellee, supra 
note 1372, at S-14. 
1374. See D. SULLIVAN, supra note 1372, at 92-93. 
1375. Id. at 93. 
1376. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
1377. See D. SULLIVAN, supra note 1372, at 93. 
1378. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 
664, 714 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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parents of parochial school children.1379 An analysis of one of these 
plans showed an annual cost to the federal treasury of 
$350,000,000. t380 As an example of the scope of activity at the state 
level, as of 1970, about six states had already enacted purchase of ser-
vices programs similar to those of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island in-
validated in Lemon and more than a dozen additional states were 
actively considering such plans.1381 Another ten states had either 
passed or proposed a system of tuition grants or tax credits. 1382 
The sum total of future public expenditures in violation of individ-
ual constitutional rights is obviously incalculable but just as obviously, 
substantial. Moreover, the Justices' most recent pronouncement on 
the subject1383 may open up "a whole new ball game for aid to paro-
chial schools"1384 - perhaps making the grant of "large amounts ... 
just a matter of form." 1385 Nonetheless, the fragmentary data above 
demonstrates a gigantic potential for financial support that seemingly 
will not be fully realized because of the Court's intervention. 
F. Sexual Conduct: Abortion 
Few decisions of the Supreme Court have invalidated as many 
state regulations as those dealing with the constitutional right to abor-
tion. As recently as 1967, just six years before the foundation ruling in 
Roe v. Wade, 1386 no state in the nation permitted an abortion except to 
save the life of the mother. 1387 By 1973, in response to positions es-
poused by several national professional groups (including both the 
American Medical Association and the American Bar Association) 
and to a rapidly growing public attitude favoring liberalized abor-
tion, 1388 four states - Alaska, Hawaii, New York; and Washington -
1379. See Hearings on H.R. I614I and Other Pending Proposals Before the Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972). 
1380. See D. SULLIVAN, supra note 1372, at 101. 
1381. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 1372, at 35; see also Comment, Constitutional Law: 
State Aid to Parochial Schools-Excessive Entanglement Revisited, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 378, 383-
84 (1972). 
1382. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 1372, at 35. This count does not include New York, 
whose 1972 statutes were struck down in Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, or Illinois, whose 1971 legisla-
tion was modified after Lemon was handed down. See Sutor, Illinois Probes the State Aid Ques-
tion, 126 AMERICA 84 (Jan. 29, 1972). 
1383. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
1384. J. CHOPER, Y. ICAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVEL-
OPMENTS 1982-1983, at 53 (1984). 
1385. Id. 
1386. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
1387. See Note, Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution and Its Impact, 3 EcoLOGY L.Q. 311, 
313 (1973). 
1388. See id. at 317-18. 
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enacted statutes that effectively legalized abortion on request and 
twelve other jurisdictions followed the Model Penal Code's proposal 
to authorize therapeutic abortions for the mental health as well as for 
the life or physical health of the pregnant woman. 1389 Indeed, Califor-
nia might well be classed in the most lenient group - at least for those 
women who could afford a psychiatric opinion attesting to the emo-
tional damage that childbirth would bring.139o 
On the other side of the spectrum, the laws of five states - Con-
necticut, Louisiana, Massachustts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania -
prohibited abortions under all circumstances (although there were 
mitigating court rulings in each jurisdiction), and about half the states 
continued to follow the traditional pattern by allowing an abortion 
only to preserve the mother's life - Mississippi extending its excep-
tion to pregnancies caused by rape. 1391 Even many of the permissive 
statutes limited abortions to a period of gestation which fell short of 
that prescribed by the Justices in Roe. 1392 A substantial majority of 
these more tolerant jurisdictions also imposed residency requirements 
and other sundry restrictions on abortions1393 that were struck down 
by the Court in the companion case to Roe, Doe v. Bolton. 1394 In the 
subsequent decision of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 239s the Court 
invalidated additional barriers to abortion that existed in about fifteen 
states,1396 such as the need for spousal consent and for parental con-
sent in the case of an unmarried minor. The Danforth ruling also re-
jected the express or implied prohibition of five jurisdictions against 
use of the saline amniocentesis method of abortion. 1397 Finally, in Co-
lautti v. Franklin, 1398 the Justices cast a considerable cloud on the va-
lidity of statutes in approximately one-third of the states1399 that 
1389. See id. at 313-14, 345. 
1390. See Moyers, Abortion Laws: A Study in Social Change, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 237, 241 
(1970); Comment, Roe- Doe- Where Are You?: The Effects of the Supreme Court's Abortion 
Decisions. 7 U.C.D. L. REv. 432, 440-41, 445 (1974). 
1391. See Note, supra note 1387, at 314, 345. 
1392. See id. at 314, 346. 
1393. For example, restrictions commonly included a requirement that abortions be per-
formed in a hospital licensed by the state or approved by the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Hospitals, or concurred in by a second physician or hospital staff committee. See id. at 315, 
346. 
1394. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
1395. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
1396. See Note, Abortion Statutes after Danforth: An Examination, 15 J. FAM. L. 537, 556-
58 (1976-77). 
1397. See id. at 548-49. 
1398. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
1399. See ALAN GUTIMACHER INSTITUTE, PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDN. OP AMERICA, 
ABoRTION 1974-1975: NEED & SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, EACH STATE & METRO· 
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oblige doctors who perform abortions to take measures to preserve the 
life and health of the fetus if it appears to be viable. 
The consequences for individuals, while not precisely calculable, 
have, nonetheless, been momentous. As a statistical matter, the 
number of reported legal abortions in the United States has grown 
from an estimated 50,000 in 19691400 (before New York's reform) to 
just under 600,000 in 19721401 (the final pre-Roe year) to nearly 
1,000,000 in 19761402 and over 1,500,000 in 1980.1403 This phenome-
non has several ramifications. 
First, although estimates of criminal abortions prior to Roe and 
Doe vary drastically (ranging from 48,000 to 1,200,000 annually), 1404 
there is no doubt that their number has decreased sharply. Perhaps 
seventy percent of legal abortions would have been performed illegally 
otherwise.1405 While liberalization has by no means eliminated all in-
ept and malign abortion services, 1406 the fact remains that the risk of 
death from an illegal abortion is twelve times greater than from a legal 
one1407 and that mortalities resulting from abortion have diminished 
markedly.1408 Nationally, although it has been asserted that 8,000 
women were killed each year in criminal abortions, 1409 more conserva-
tive estimates prior to the advent of reform in 1967 placed the figure at 
between 250 and 500.141° From 1968 to 1970, an average of fifty-seven 
women died annually from illegal abortions; 141 1 the figures subsequent 
POLITAN AREA, app. III, at 122-23 (1976), reprinting A Review of State Abortion Laws Enacted 
Since January, 1973, 4 FAM. PLAN./POP. REP. 108 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GUTTMACHER 
INSTITUTE]; Note, supra note 1396, at 563-66. 
1400. Tietze, The Effect of Legalization of Abortion on Population Growth and Public Health, 
in GUTIMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 1399, app. I, at 110, 111. 
1401. GUTIMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 1399, at 7. 
1402. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ABORTION SURVEILLANCE 1976, at 1 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as ABORTION SURVEILLANCE 1976]. 
1403. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1982, at A14, col. 6. 
1404. See Louisell & Noonan, Constitutional Balance. in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION 220, 
241-43 (J. Noonan ed. 1970); Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and 
Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REv. 730 (1968). 
1405. Tietze, supra note 1400, at 110. 
1406. See C~icago Sun-Times, The Abortion Profiteers (Special Reprint 1978). 
1407. Tietze, supra note 1400, app. I, at 111. 
1408. In New York, whereas maternal death from criminal abortions comprised nearly half 
of all maternal mortalities in 1961, only one such death was recorded in the first six months 
under the liberalized regime. See Pakter & Nelson, Abortion in New York City: The First Nine 
Months, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., July 1971, at 5, 10. In California, death from illegal abortions 
declined from 27 in 1960 to none in 1976. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, CALIFOR-
NIA HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCY, ABORTION IN CALIFORNIA, 1968-76, at 52 (table 71). 
1409. Louisell & Noonan, supra note 1404, at 231. 
1410. See id. at 231-32. 
1411. See Tietze, supra note 1400, app. I, at 112 (table 1). 
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to Roe were nineteen in 1973, six in 1974, four in 1975, three in 1976, 
seven in 1978, none whatever in 19791412 and one in 1980.1413 Be-
tween 1976 and 1980 less than twenty maternal deaths annually were 
associated with legally induced abortions.1414 
Apart from mortalities, since legal abortions are indisputably safer 
than criminal ones, an untold number of women have also avoided 
being permanently maimed, becoming sterile, or suffering other seri-
ous illness as a result of the Court's mandate. Further, since it is gen-
erally agreed that the availability of lawful abortions will result in 
most being performed in the early stages of pregnancy, and since med-
ical complications from abortion vary directly with the gestation pe-
riod, all statistics imply a lower complication rate as the product of 
legalization.1415 
Second, the Court's recognition of an individual's constitutional 
right to an abortion has meant that a great many women, either un-
willing or afraid to violate the law, have been able to forego unwanted 
pregnancy and childbirth. Whereas over 1,000,000 women who 
sought an abortion in 1973 could not obtain one, by 1977 this figure 
had been reduced by nearly fifty percent. 1416 This has resulted in sub-
stantial benefits for maternal life and physical health since it has been 
found anywhere from four to eight times more dangerous for a woman 
to complete a pregnancy than to have a legal abortion. 1417 Indeed, in 
1976 there were nearly fifteen times more deaths per 100,000 births 
than per 100,000 legal abortions.1418 The extent to which undesired 
1412. ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1976, supra note 1402, at 9; Center for Disease Control, 
Annual Summary 1980: Reported Morbidity & Mortality in the United States, 29 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Sept. 1981, at 104 (hereinafter cited as Morbidity and Mortality], 
1413. CENTER FOR DISEASE CoNTROL, ABORTION SURVEILLANCE 1979-1980, at 12 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1979-1980). 
1414. ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1976, supra note 1402, at 4~ (IO in 1976); Morbidity and 
Mortality, supra note 1412, at 104 (17 in 1977, 11 in 1978, 20 in '1979); ABORTION SURVEIL· 
LANCE, 1979-1980, supra note 1413, at 10 (8 in 1980). 
141S. See Note, supra note 1387, at 338-39. For example, the number of women admitted to 
New York hospitals for abortion-related affiictions was cut in half between 1969 and 1973; see 
also Cates, Legal Abortion: Are American Black Women Healthier Because of It?, 38 PHYLON 
267, 272-80 (1977). 
1416. See Forrest, Tietze & Sullivan, Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 271 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Forrest, 1976-1977). 
1417. See Lamm & Davison, Abortion Reform, YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION, Spring 1971, 
at SS, S6; Tietze, supra note 1400, app. I, at 111. 
1418. Forrest, 1976-1977, supra note 1416, at 27S-76. Statistics from 1977 show 11.2 mater-
nal deaths per 100,000 births, 2 PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERV., VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1-73, 74 (1981), and 1.4 maternal 
deaths per 100,000 legal abortions, CENTER FOR DISEASE CoNTROL, ABORTION SURVEIL· 
LANCE, 1977, at 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1977). After New 
York removed its prohibition, maternal mortality associated with childbirth fell nearly 60% -
"[t]he most logical explanation for this dramatic improvement in public health is that a large 
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pregnancies and children impair the mental health and stability of 
mothers and their families is less ascertainable, but psychiatric studies 
attest to the general phenomenon.1419 And the existence of children 
with mutilated minds and bodies attributable to such causes as 
thalidomide and rubella 1420 strongly indicate these problems, too, have 
been greatly relieved. 
Finally, by making legal abortions obtainable throughout the 
country, the Court's rulings have significantly eased the burden, peril, 
· and expense of obtaining one. In 1972, forty-four percent of all 
women who received lawful abortions were forced to travel outside 
their state of residence to do so, 1421 thus frequently delaying the proce-
dure "to a later and riskier period of gestation. Distance also makes 
rapid diagnosis and treatment of any post-abortion complications cliffi-
cult." 1422 By 1977, under ten percent of the pregnant women were so 
encumbered1423 (though about twenty-five percent did have to go to 
another county within their state),1424 and the figure dropped to 7.4% 
in 1980.1425 
It is still impossible to know at this time the full extent to which 
the Court's more recent decisions in Maher v. Roe, 1426 and Harris v. 
McRae, 1427 which permitted the government to withold Medicaid ben-
efits from indigent women for both elective and therapeutic abortions, 
will diminish the impact of Roe v. Wade and its earlier progeny. In 
1976, nearly one-third of all legal abortions were financed by Medi-
caid, 1428 and within just over a year of Maher, only sixteen jurisdic-
number of abortions are being performed on women in high-risk age and health groups, thus 
significantly lowering childbirth fatality." Note, supra note 1387, at 341. 
1419. See studies cited in Comment, supra note 1390, at 441 n.47. 
1420. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, 17 CASE W. REs. L. R.Ev. 
403, 412 (1965) (30,000 rubella-affected babies born in the United States during the 1964 rubella 
epidemic). · 
1421. ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1976, supra note 1402, at 40. 
1422. Forrest, 1976-1977, supra note 1416, at 273 (footnote omitted). 
1423. ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1977, supra note 1418, at 30 (6.5%); Forrest, Tietze & 
Sullivan, Abortion in the United States, 1977-1978, 11 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 329, 332 (1979) (9%) 
[hereinafter cited as Forrest, 1977-1978]. 
1424. See Forrest, 1976-1977, supra note 1416, at 271; Forrest, 1977-1978, supra note 1423, 
at 330. 
1425. ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1979-1980, supra note 1413, at 4. Similarly, in 1970, after 
California and New York had removed their barriers to abortion but before the Justices man-
dated this system for the nation, 81 % of all legal abortions performed in the United States took 
place in those two states (where only approximately one-fifth of all women between the ages of 15 
and 44 lived. Forrest, 1976-1977, supra note 1416, at 272.). ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1976, 
supra note 1402, at 2. By 1976 and 1977, this number had fallen to below 30%. Id., at 1-2; 
Morbidity and Mortality, supra note 1412, at 103 (27.5% in 1979). 
1426. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
1427. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
1428. 35 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1199, 1200 (1977). 
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tions continued to pay for all or most abortions for poor women, 1429 
In some "states where medicaid dollars have been cut off, the impact 
on abortion services has been dramatic. In Arkansas, for example, the 
number of abortions paid for by these funds has dropped from 500 in 
1976 to 5 during the period of August 1977 to June 1978; in South 
Carolina from 1,400 to 14; in Texas from 13,300 to 59."1430 Although 
there is no doubt that many indigent women resigned themselves to 
completing their pregnancies and that "through its monitoring sys-
tem," the Center for Disease Control "linked four deaths of indigent 
women from illegal or self-induced abortions to the unavailability of 
Medicaid financing,'' 1431 many others managed to gain assistance 
without reverting "to dangerous back-alley or coat-hanger abor-
tions."1432 Some county governments granted funds despite their 
elimination by the state.1433 Many private clinics either reduced their 
fees or abandoned them altogether1434 and "[s]ome large metropolitan 
public hospitals in non-funded states [continued] to provide inexpen-
sive legal abortion services for their low-income patient popula-
tions." 1435 While private physicians often declined to provide services 
without assurance of their fees, 1436 a number have been willing to 
make special arrangements for payment. 1437 Moreover, "[s]everal pri-
vate family planning agencies and philanthropic donors have estab-
lished funding sources to finance legal abortions for women who 
otherwise could not afford them."1438 Once again, a growing number 
of women pursued the riskier and burdensome route of crossing state 
lines to satisfy their needs - an estimated 2,000 from Maine alone in 
less than a year after Maher. 1439 Thus, in mid-1978, it was reported 
1429. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 24, 1978, at 63. 
1430. Id. 
1431. Trussell, Menken, Lindheim & Vaughan, The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financ-
ing for Abortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 120, 121 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Trussell]. 
1432. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1978, at 32. 
1433. Id. 
1434. "For example, the Cullen Women's Center in Houston, Tex., where more than half the 
women requesting abortion services cannot pay, has spent $15,500 for abortions that used to be 
covered by public-assistance funds." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 24, 1978, at 63. See also 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1978, at 32. 
1435. Gold & Cates, Restriction of Federal Funds for Abortion: 18 Months Later. 69 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 929, 930 (1979). "[Flor example, Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta performed 
about the same number of legal abortions to terminate pregnancies up through 12 weeks gesta· 
tion after the funding restriction in Georgia, as it had before." Id. 
1436. See Digest, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 359, 362 (1978). 
1437. See NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1978, at 32. See also Rubin, Gold & Cates, Response of Low 
Income Women and Abortion Facilities to Restriction of Public Funds for Abortion: A Study of a 
Large Metropolitan Area, 69 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 948-50 (1979). 
1438. Gold & Cates, supra note 1435, at 930. 
1439. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1978, at 32. 
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that Maher's adverse consequences to women's abortion rights were 
still relatively limited in that "70 percent of all medicaid-supported 
abortions are performed in a few major states such as New York, Cali-
fornia and Pennsylvania, and up until now these states have continued 
liberal funding." 1440 In early 1979, a survey disclosed that eighty-five 
percent of Medicaid-eligible women "resided in states that were pro-
viding public funds for abortion, albeit not using federal funds." 1441 
In late 1979, "10 states and the District of Columbia had enacted laws 
or established policies to pay for all or most of the abortions of Medi-
caid-eligible women, and another 12 states are under court order to do 
so" - thus accounting for ninety percent of the Medicaid abortions 
previously performed.1442 More precise figures from varied localities 
tend to confirm these projections.1443 Overall, although "almost no 
federally financed abortions were performed" during the two and one-
half years beginning in mid-1977 after the Hyde Amendment went 
into effect, "an estimated 94% of pregnant, low-income women 'at 
risk' obtained a legal abortion, 65% with State funds and 29% with 
other sources of funding."1444 
Because the liberalizing statutory trend began several years before 
the Burger Court's abortion rulings in 1973, not all the imposing de-
velopments that have since occurred may be fairly attributed to the 
Justices' intervention. However, especially because of the many hos-
tile state legislative reactions, it is equally fair to conclude that Roe v. 
Wade greatly hastened the drive toward abortion legalization and dra-
matically affected the lives and liberties of an enormous number of 
women.1445 It is this impact of the Supreme Court's abortion deci-
sions, rather than the question of whether as a matter of substantive 
1440. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 24, 1978, at 63. 
1441. Gold & Cates, supra note 1435, at 930. 
1442. Forrest, 1977-1978, supra note 1423, at 340-41. 
1443. Whereas about 295,000 eligible women obtained publicly funded abortions in 1977 (the 
year prior to the Court's validation of the new restrictions), the number for 1978 decreased by 
only about one-third to 194,000. Gold, After the Hyde Amendment: Public Funding for Abortion 
in FY1978, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 131, 133 (1980). Specific "[r]ecent studies indicate that de-
spite cut-off of both federal and state funds, the rate of abortions in 1978 among Medicaid-
eligible women in Texas was 65 percent of 1977 Medicaid abortions, the rate in Ohio 77 percent 
of 1977 Medicaid abortions, and the rate in Georgia 82 percent of 1977 Medicaid abortions." 
Regan, Supreme Court Roundup: 1979 Term, 55 TuOUGHT 487, 492 (1980). For details, see 
Trussell, supra note 1431, at 127-28; Rubin, Gold & Cates, supra note 1437, at 948. A more 
limited survey in Hartford, Connecticut disclosed that 63% of indigent women desirous of a legal 
abortion managed to obtain ~ne, see Women's Health Servs., Inc. v. Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725, 
731 (D. Conn.), vacated, 636 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1980), and an inquiry in Maricopa County, Ari-
zona concluded that funding restrictions had no appreciable effect on the abortion rate, Survey of 
Abortion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 213 (1980). 
1444. ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1979-1980, supra note 1413, at 15. 
1445. Unquestionably, opponents of abortion who focus on the rights of the child rather than 
on those of the woman have a markedly different perspective on whether the Court's decisions 
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constitutional doctrine the Court overstepped its proper bounds, that 
is the critical issue here. The longevity of the decisions' effect, as we 
have seen, is highly uncertain at present, particularly because the issue 
of public funding for the indigent is in such a state of flux - a matter 
further complicated by the series of cases on state constitutional 
grounds, that have reached a conclusion opposite to that of the 
Supreme Court in Maher and Harris. 1446 However, even if the statisti-
cal increases are reversed and eventually return to near their original 
position, the powerful consequences for women's personal liberty that 
have already taken place cannot be undone. 
G. Just Compensation 
It has long been undisputed that if government "takes" private 
property for public use - by actual appropriation or physical inva-
sion 1447 (or regulatory action designed to facilitate such subsequent 
appropriation or invasion 1448) - the fifth amendment's requirement of 
just compensation, applicable to states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, 1449 entitles the injured property owner to money damages. 
However, although it was equally clear that government action which 
imposed oppressive economic burdens on private property by limiting 
or requiring its use could also constitute a "taking" even though 
adopted for regulatory purposes, 1450 prior to 1981 the question of 
whether this type of "taking" also entitled the owner to monetary 
compensation remained unresolved. In modern times, the principal 
species of such legislation has been zoning and similar land use regula-
tions, but its wide range of diversity may be illustrated by an ambu-
lance permit provision requiring that the licensee respond to "any 
emergency call, whether initiated by the police or fire department or a 
private individual,"1451 irrespective of any promise to pay for the 
service. 
were beneficial to individual liberty. However, in this instance and for the present, the Court has 
defined individual liberty as the woman's right. See text at notes 27-28 supra. 
1446. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 
P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); Doe v. Maher, [1981-1982] 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2006 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 
(1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982). 
1447. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 166 (1871). 
1448. See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Assn. v. Richmond Dev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
1449. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
1450. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978). 
1451. Mountain Med., Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 43 Colo. App. 391, 608 P.2d 821, 
823 (1979). 
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Several state supreme courts had authoritatively ruled that unduly 
severe exercises of state regulatory power do permit the victimized 
property owner to bring an "inverse condemnation" action for money 
damages.1452 A number of others, including California and New 
York, 1453 however, had reached the opposite conclusion, holding that 
"[i]f the legislative body acts wrongfully in its legislative capacity the 
judicial remedy is the undoing of the wrongful legislation and not 
money damages."1454 Although most states had no clearly established 
view on the matter, 1455 the trend - understandably supported by state 
and local government agencies that feared extensive financial liability 
resulting from any judicial invalidations of their land use plans - ap-
peared to favor the restrictive approach of California and New York, 
at least in the absence of extreme circumstances.1456 Indeed, a federal 
court of appeals said that, as of 1980, its "research has disclosed no 
case in which a federal court has ordered a state or local government 
unit to pay for a diminution of the value of a piece of property caused 
by a zoning regulation."1457 
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 1458 a majority 
of the Justices indicated that they rejected the California-New York 
position, 1459 reasoning that 
1452. See, e.g., Lamarch Corp. v. Mayor & Common Council of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 
237 A.2d 881 (1968); Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978); see also Ventures in Prop-
erty I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979); Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 
Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658 (1972); cf State v. Mayhew Prods. Corp., 204 Neb. 266, 281 
N.W.2d 783 (1979). 
1453. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), ajfd., 
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Charles v. Diamond, 41 
N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977); Jensen v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 
1079, 369 N.E.2d 1179, 399 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1977). 
1454. Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 345, 590 P.2d 459, 461 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. 
denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); see also Mountain Med., Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 43 Colo. 
App. 391, 608 P.2d 821 (1979); Gold Run Ltd. v. Board of County Commrs., 38 Colo. App. 44, 
554 P.2d 317 (1976). 
1455. For conflicting intimations in Florida, see Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 
286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Askew v. Gables-by-
the-Sea Inc., 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977). 
1456. See, e.g., DeMello v. Town of Plainville, 170 Conn. 675, 368 A.2d 71 (1976); Holaway 
v. City of Pipestone, 269 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1978); Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193 
(N.D. 1979); see also Gary D. Riehart, Inc. v. Township of Carroll, 487 Pa. 461, 409 A.2d 1167 
(1979). 
1457. Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1980) (footnote 
omitted). 
1458. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
1459. The opinion of the Court did not reach this issue. The matter was addressed by Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell, in dissent. 450 U.S. at 647-60. Justice 
Rehnquist joined the Court's opinion but added that he "would have little difficulty agreeing 
with much of what is said" on this issue in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. 450 U.S. at 633-
34. Further, it is fair to infer from other recent decisions on the subject that most of the remain-
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once a court establishes that there was a regulatory "taking," the Consti-
tution demands that the government entity pay just compensation for 
the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the "tak-
ing," and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or 
otherwise amend the regulation. 
. . . Invalidation unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly 
compensate the landowner for any economic loss suffered during the 
time his property was taken.1460 
Although the full scope of what constitutes a "regulatory taking" 
remains to be determined, 1461 the consequences of this constitutional 
requirement of "interim damages" are obviously substantial. 
Although most of the leading appellate decisions do not reach the is-
sue of detailed calculation of monetary relief, 1462 those that contain 
such data illustrate the potential injury that may be rectified by the 
Court's rule.1463 
Unlike those decisions in which the trial court's finding of uncon-
ing Justices share this view. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (opin-
ion of the Court joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, White, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City 438 U.S. 104, 138-53 (1978) (dissenting opinion joined by Burger, 
C.J. and Stevens, J.). 
For recent lower court decisions interpreting San Diego Gas & Electric as establishing this 
rule, see Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1199-200 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 907 (1982); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 599, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981). But 
cf. Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) 
("taking" may not co=ence until some "reasonable time" after zoning regulation is enacted). 
1460. 450 U.S. at 653-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
1461. For limiting applications of the doctrine despite dicta suggesting broader potential, see 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255 (1980). One can only speculate about the extent to which the Justices' views in the San 
Diego Gas & Electric case were affected by the fact that the city had first proposed a bond issue 
for funds to acquire the company's realty for preservation as parking and then, after the voters 
disapproved the bond issue, continued to zone the property as "open space area." 450 U.S. at 
625. 
1462. For example, in Lamarch Corp. v. Mayor & Common Council of Englewood, the 
court invalidated a zoning ordinance whose effect was to impose a one-year "freeze" on any 
development of complainant's land. On the question of remedy for this "temporary taking," the 
court stated that the landowner should receive "the value of an 'option' to purchase the land for 
the year." 51 N.J. 108, 114, 237 A.2d 881, 884 (1968). 
1463. For example, in the ambulance license case, see text at note 1451 supra, during the 
relevant four-year period between the first application of the ordinance to the ambulance com· 
pany and the state trial court's holding that it was unconstitutional, the complainants "provided 
ambulance services to some 6,185 individuals within the city of Colorado Springs for which they 
were not paid either in whole or in part. The unpaid amount totaled $217,375.74." Mountain 
Med. Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 43 Colo. App. 391, 608 P.2d 821, 823 (1979). In the 
Arizona decision that established the state's adherence to the "no money damages" principle, the 
court invalidated the challenged zoning provision but refused to honor the aggrieved property 
owners' claimed damages "in the sum of $67,035 for loss in the property value because of the 
delay in securing their right to build on the property and the sum of $95,180 for the loss of an 
aid-in-construction agreement which would have been available had the board changed the zon· 
ing." Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 345, 590 P.2d 459, 461 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 
442 U.S. 942 (1979). 
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stitutional regulation is affirmed on appeal, thus confining the time 
that the property was "taken" and limiting the resulting injury, the 
San Diego Gas & Electric case illustrates how the amount of damage 
may be compounded by the duration of the litigation process. The 
challenged zoning provision, which frustrated the complainant's plan 
to develop its property as a nuclear power site, was enacted in 1973. 
Although the state trial court found a "taking" in 1976, as of 1982 
there had been no final judgment on the merits, the Supreme Court in 
1981 returning the case to the trial court for resolution of disputed 
factual issues. Indeed, under the California-New York approach, even 
if the trial court on remand reaffirmed its original conclusion of inva-
lidity and this were to remain undisturbed through the state (and fed-
eral) appellate process, there would still be no guarantee that the 
utility company could then proceed with its construction plans. Since 
the regulatory agency could then simply promulgate a modified zoning 
provision, the property owner's only course would be to raise new 
legal objections to the amended ordinance.1464 While the Justices' San 
Diego Gas & Electric principle prevents neither the inevitable delays of 
litigation nor what has come to be known as the "zoning-amendment 
shuftle,"1465 it does at least assure some meaningful remedy for many 
otherwise uncompensated constitutional injuries. 
1464. As observed by Justice Brennan in his dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric: 
At the 1974 annual conference of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in Cali-
fornia, a California City Attorney gave fellow city attorneys the following advice: 
"IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START OVER 
AGAIN. 
If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a claim attacking the 
land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, don't worry about it. All is not lost. One 
of the extra 'goodies' contained in the recent [California] Supreme Court case of Selby v. 
City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, [514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973)] appears 
to allow the City to change the regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make it 
more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over again. 
See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and still win the 
war. Good Luck." Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use 
Regulations (Including Inverse Condemnation), in 38B NIMLO MUNICIPAL LAW REVIEW 
192-93 (1975) (emphasis in original). 
450 U.S. at 655, n.22. 
Subtle and complex issues as to the amount of interim damages - e.g., whether it should be 
the difference between the value of the property as subject to the invalid regulation and (1) its 
value suject to a hypothetical constitutional regulation, or (2) its value subject to no regulation at 
all - are explored in Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes 
for Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1975); Hagman, Tem-
porary or Interim Damage Awards in Land Use Control Cases (pt. II), 4 ZoNING & PLANNING L. 
REP. 137 (1981). 
1465. Mytelka, Judicial Remedies, in AFrER MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEW SUBURBAN ZoN-
ING 150, 153-54 (J. Rose & R. Rothman eds. 1977) (The "zoning amendment shuffie" is "the not 
uncommon municipal tactic of avoiding an adverse trial decision by rezoning on appeal."). 
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As of 1977, there were no published statistics describing the extent 
of racial imbalance in publicly assisted housing projects across the 
country. 1466 The data that was available strongly implied, however, 
that government efforts to promote neighborhood integration had 
largely failed. Nationwide, between 1970 and 1976, blacks had "in-
creased their share of suburban population only modestly - from 4.5 
per cent to 5.l,"1467 and even here it appears that the overwhelming 
percentage of blacks living beyond the center city ghettos resided in 
virtually all-black suburbs. 1468 In Chicago, the site of the landmark 
Gautreauxl469 litigation, where 40,000 families were affected, 1470 
"[u]ncontradicted evidence ... established that the public housing 
system operated by [the Chicago Housing Authority] was racially seg-
regated, with four overwhelmingly white projects located in white 
neighborhoods and with 99-1/2% of the remaining family units lo-
cated in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units occupied by 
Negro tenants." 1471 
It may be impossible ever to determine the full impact of the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Hills v. Gautreaux1472 on racial segregation 
in housing, but some concrete accomplishments have occurred in its 
wake. First, the Gautreaux suit resulted in "an order requiring that at 
least 3 units of future public housing be located outside areas of minor-
ity concentration for each one constructed within a minority area 
throughout the metropolitan area."1473 More specifically, within two 
months after Gautreaux was handed down in April 1976, plaintiffs 
and HUD executed an agreement providing that HUD, pursuant to 
section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 
1974,1474 would subsidize rents for low-income black families in pri-
vately owned apartment buildings in the predominantly white Chicago 
1466. Confirmed by telephone conversations in December 1977 with HUD Regional Office in 
San Francisco. 
1467. Maloney, Housing: Next Integration Battleground?. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 
29, 1976, at 47. 
1468. See A. POLIKOFF, HOUSING THE POOR: THE CASE FOR HEROISM 100 (1978). 
1469. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
1470. Dillard, Rent-Aid Plan Shatters Myths, Suburban Trib (Southwest Cook County, Ill.), 
Nov. 28, 1977, at l, col.3. 
1471. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 287-88. 
1472. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
1473. HOUSING AFF. LEITER, Feb. 17, 1978, at 4, col. I. 
1474. Housing and Community Development Act § 20l(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1437F (1982). 
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suburbs.1475 By 1979, 455 such families had been placed in apartments 
there or in other white areas of Chicago.1476 Although about one-fifth 
of these families subsequently withdrew - primarily because they de-
cided that they did not want to live outside the central city1477 - the 
overwhelming majority reported "an overall improvement in their 
quality of life."1478 
Benefits of the program for the families involved include better 
schools for the children, education and employment opportunities for 
the parents, and a living environment in which they no longer have to 
fear for their lives. 
Benefits for taxpayers are more long range. Families on the program 
have been reunited because husbands who were absent from home be-
cause of welfare regulations have been able to find jobs in the suburbs, 
move back with their families, and get the families off the welfare 
rolls.1479 
In mid-1981, HUD entered into a consent decree with the Gautreaux 
litigants, agreeing to provide some form of "assisted housing" to eligi-
ble persons in either "predominantly non-minority areas" of the Chi-
cago metropolitan district or in minority areas "undergoing 
substantial physical development" until the number of occupancies 
equals 7,100.1480 . 
Beyond Chicago, the results of Gautreaux are less clearly defined. 
The earliest predictions regarding the effectiveness of the decision were 
extremely pessimistic.1481 As a matter of nationwide impact, its thrust 
plainly was only "to emphasize, in a general way, that housing 
problems were metropolitan problems, rather than actually to produce 
suburban housing for inner city residents."1482 Nonetheless, a few 
months after the Court's verdict, it was reported that Gautreaux was a 
"major catalyst" in the government's "taking a tougher line on the 
housing-assistance plans for the poor that communities must prepare 
in order to get special grants from HUD. The agency is also pressur-
ing builders and brokers to establish better sales programs to lure 
1475. Letter from General Counsel, HUD to Alexander Polikoff, June 7, 1976. 
1476. See K. PEROFF, c. DAVIS & R. JONES, GAUTREAUX HOUSING DEMONSTRATION: 
AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS i, 7 (U.S. Dept. of Housing 
and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development & Research, Div. of Policy Studies, Dec. 
1979); see also Dillard, supra note 1470, at 1. 
1477. See K. PEROFF, c. DAVIS & R. JONES, supra note 1476, at i. 
1478. Id. at 140. See generally id. at 130-63. 
1479. Dillard, supra note 1470, at 8. 
1480. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 672-83 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd. sub nom. 
Gautreaux v. Price, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). 
1481. See, e.g., Welfeld, The courts and desegregated housing: The meaning (if any) of the 
Gautreaux case, THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1976, at 123. 
1482. A. POLIKOFF, supra note 1468, at 92. 
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black buyers."1483 In mid-1977, the HUD Assistant Secretary for Fair 
Housing and Equal Opportunity announced "that opening up the sub-
urbs to low-income housing is one of the highest priorities within 
HUD, and that the Gautreaux ruling mandates HUD to act through-
out a whole metropolitan area to deconcentrate low-income housing 
now predominantly in the inner cities."1484 Several months later, a 
HUD task force created to implement Gautreaux proposed a new sec-
tion 8 development program for metropolitan cities throughout the 
country fashioned on the Chicago model that grew out of Gau-
treaux. 1485 As a result of the Justices' edict, revised regulations gov-
erning site selections for all HUD programs added three criteria that 
respond directly to integration goals: sites are not to be located in areas 
of minority concentrations (two exceptions to this rule are allowed); they 
must not significantly increase the proportion of minority residents in 
the neighborhoods; and the sites are to promote greater choices of hous-
ing but avoid undue concentrations of subsidized families in low-income 
areas.1486 
Regardless of good intentions, however, there is a substantial gap 
between ambitious planning and actual problem solving. Initial statis-
tics in 1978 disclosed that the section 8 rentals assistance program im-
proved racial integration of neighborhoods in only one of the three 
sections into which the nation had been divided. 1487 A later study of 
federally aided housing programs in the suburbs of five metropolitan 
areas for the period between 1975 and 1979 reveals that in only one 
(Minneapolis-St. Paul) had significant numbers of central city poor 
people moved to assisted housing in the suburbs. 1488 In May 1979, 
when HUD invited planning agencies from the twenty-two regions of 
the country with the highest concentrations of urban blacks as com-
pared to suburban whites to discuss this situation, various objections 
were raised. 1489 Protesters from St. Louis 
argued that although such a program would foster integration, it would 
1483. Maloney, supra note 1467. 
1484. 5 Hous. & DEV. RPTR. No. 4, June 27, 1977, at 64. 
1485. 5 Hous. & DEV. RPTR. No. 12, Aug. 22, 1977, at 220-21. 
1486. Mitchell & Smith, Race and Housing: A Review and Comments on the Content and 
Effects of Federal Policy, 441 ANNALS 168, 179 (1979); see also Karadbil, Housing Opportunity 
Plans: A Metropolitan Housing Strategy, HUD CHALLENGE, Apr. 1977, at 22, 27 (citing seven 
housing programs sponsored by HUD designed to provide housing opportunities for low-income 
persons outside of traditional low-income areas). 
1487. Mitchell & Smith, supra note 1486, at 175. 
1488. Christensen & Teitz, The Housing-Assistance Plan: Promise and Reality, in HousJNO 
POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at 185-98 (R. Montgomery & D. Marshall eds. 1980). 
1489. For discussion of contrary views on the benefits of greater racial integration in subur-
ban housing versus improvement of housing in the central cities, see Phillips & Agelasto, Hous-
ing and Central Cities: The Conservation Approach, 4 EcOLOGY L.Q. 797 (1975). 
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isolate black, low-income households in suburban neighborhoods which 
do not have the social services of the central city .... Nationally, some 
members of the black community [opposed] the program arguing that it 
is a deliberate attempt to scatter blacks among the white suburbs and 
dilute black political power.1490 
In sum, Gautreaux produced vastly improved living conditions for 
more than a few black Americans in Chicago and in certain other 
areas as well. Further, its long-range promise, if fulfilled in the face of 
enormous social complexities and economic restraints, extends well 
beyond housing. For example, if it contributes to greater racial bal-
ance in metropolitan areas, then it carries the potential of achieving 
racially integrated neighborhood schools without resort to busing and 
the concomitant problem of white flight, thus many times multiplying 
its existing beneficial effect on personal liberty. 
2. Aliens 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, diverse laws began impos-
ing serious and wide-ranging disabilities on aliens lawfully resident in 
the United States in virtually all jurisdictions. The bulk of these 
prohibitions restricted employment opportunities for all aliens or for 
those who had not declared an intention to become United States citi-
zens. The scope of these restraints was extensive. In 1946 - two 
years before Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 1491 when the 
Supreme Court effectively began its invalidation of almost all state dis-
criminations against aliens, an effort that culminated with a group of 
rulings in the 1970's1492 - Milton Konvitz listed about seventy differ-
ent occupations that were legally closed to noncitizens in one or more 
states.1493 Moreover, as late as 1962, nearly one-third of the states had 
1490. Fleming, Housing Discrimination: One Step Forward and Two Backward, ILLINOIS 
lssUES, Sept. 1980. at 15, 18. 
1491. 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
1492. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); see also Bernal v. Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984); 
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd. of Engrs., Architects & Surveyors v. 
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976). 
1493. M. KONVITZ, THE A.LIEN AND THE AsIATIC 1N AMERICAN LAW 201-07 (1946). See 
also D. CARLINER, THE RIGHTS OF A.LIENS 205-55 (1977). Aliens were invariably denied em-
ployment in all government civil service positions and in police, fire, education and sanitation 
departments, and on public works projects, M. KONVITZ, supra, at 207. As of 1967, it was 
reported that 22 states had "conditions for employment on public works projects which deny or 
grossly restrict employment of aliens." Comment, Equal Protection & Supremacy Clause Limita-
tions on State Legislation Restricting Aliens, 1970 UTAH L. RE.v. 136, 141 n.25 [hereinafter cited 
as Comment, State Legislation]. All states forbade them from practicing law. M. KoNVITZ, 
supra, at 188. In 1974, a comprehensive survey revealed essentially the same state of affairs, 
although some jurisdictions had relaxed the prohibtion in some instances. Knoppke-Wetzel, 
Employment Restrictions and the Practice of Law by Aliens in the United States and Abroad, 1974 
DUKE L.J. 871, 890-91. Forty-seven states prohibited aliens from being certified public accoun-
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significant statutory limitations on aliens' acquisition and retention of 
real property. 1494 In addition, a number of state laws made many 
noncitizens ineligible for such benefits as public housing, state scholar-
ship funds, criminal victim compensation, AFDC, and aid to the aged, 
disabled, blind and medically indigent.1495 
The Burger Court's decisions1496 holding alienage ordinarily to be 
a "suspect" classification subject to "strict scrutiny" under the equal 
protection clause, render almost all of these restrictions invalid. 1497 
Just how difficult these sorts of laws have made the lives of foreigners 
resident in the United States is neither known or knowable. On the 
one hand, some data implies that several of the specific rulings of the 
Court involved the interests of relatively small numbers of aliens. In 
Graham v. Richardson, holding that state denials of welfare to aliens 
was unconstitutional, it was stipulated that Pennsylvania's refusal to 
grant public aid to noncitizens affected only sixty-five to seventy per-
sons annually.1498 In the five years preceding the Court's invalidation 
of citizenship requirements for bar admission in In re Griffiths, an em-
pirical study showed that "a total of only ten alien lawyers were ad-
mitted in the twelve states which openly admitted resident aliens into 
their bars under publicized liberal admission rules."1499 In Nyquist v. 
Mauclet, condemning state withholding of scholarship assistance for 
higher education from aliens who did not declare an intent to become 
citizens, it was suggested that the number of persons thereby disquali-
fied "may be exceedingly small."1500 
tants; 39 from engaging in the manufacture or sale of liquor; 26 from being dentists; 25 from 
practicing medicine; 22 from being architects or pharmacists; 18 from being optometrists and 
teachers; 17 from being embalmers or funeral directors; 14 from being engineers, surveyors or 
mining employees; 12 from being registered nurses; 10 from being chiropractors, osteopaths or 
chiropodists; 9 from being barbers and guides; and 8 from being private detectives, vessel pilots, 
bank directors and realtors. M. KoNVITZ, supra, at 210-11. Aliens have also been barred from 
such varied vocations as plumbing, peddling, hunting and fishing, driving vehicles for hire, sell-
ing insurance, and hairdressing and cosmetology. See generally id. at 210-11; Note, Constitution-
ality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work. 57 CoLUM. L. REV. 1012 n.3 (1957); Rosales, 
Resident Aliens and the Right to WQrk: The Quest for Equal Protection, 2 HAsr. CONST. L.Q. 
1029, 1036-38 (1975); Comment, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45 
FORDHAM L. REv. 835, 836-37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Right to Work]. 
1494. See Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15, 21-26 (1962). 
1495. See Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens - The Impact of the Constitu· 
tion and Federal Civil Rights Laws. 35 U. Prrr. L. REV. 499, 501-02 (1974); Note, Residence 
Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 134, 140-41 (1970). 
1496. See note 1492 supra. 
1497. Three exceptions involve police officers, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); teach-
ers in public elementary and secondary schools, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); and 
probation officers, Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982). 
1498. 403 U.S. 365, 369 n.4 (1971). 
1499. See Knoppke-Wetzel, supra note 1493, at 894. 
1500. 432 U.S. 1, 11 n.15 (1977). 
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On the other hand, the number of people potentially prejudiced by 
the multitude of restrictions on the activities of noncitizens is very 
large-in 1973, there were over 4.1 million permanent resident aliens 
in the country and over a half million legally admitted nonresident 
aliens.1501 It has been estimated that the effect of statutes barring 
aliens from working in state and local government - held violative of 
equal protection in Sugarman v. Douga/1 15°2 - alone circumscribed 
employment "in occupations comprising three percent of the total 
nonagricultural labor force." 1503 In all, it appears fair to conclude that 
state discriminations against aliens have seriously damaged the per-
sonal liberties of some and measurably interfered with the well-being 
of a great many. 
It is surely not true that the Justices' edicts have caused the formal 
repeal of every state and local regulation that falls within their ration-
ale. Indeed, it is likely that many administrators will continue to ap-
ply such laws against aliens until instructed otherwise by the courts. 
Particularly in the employment area, as the massive number of opera-
tive restrictions decreases (as evidenced by the rulings of many courts 
that have followed the Supreme Court's lead), 1504 thus reducing the 
number of job opportunities foreclosed to noncitizens, an alien's incen-
tive to challenge a particular one (rather than simply to take different 
work) also diminishes. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional mandates operate only against the action of state and local gov-
ernment. Although the Justices also temporarily forbade exclusion of 
aliens from the federal civil service, 1505 that result has been reversed by 
executive order.1506 There is alsf) abundant evidence of extensive pri-
vate employment discrimination against aliens.1507 This, however, 
demonstrates only that in substantially advancing individual rights 
neither the Court nor the Constitution can eradicate all perceived 
inequities. 
3. Gender 
The subject of gender discrimination and its amelioration promi-
nently illustrates the complexities in isolating the Court's contribu-
1501. 1973 INS ANN. REP. 98 (table 35). 
1502. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
1503. Comment, State Legislation, supra note 1493, at 141 (footnote omitted). 
1504. See cases collected in Das, supra note 1495, at 501-02; Comment, Right to Work, supra 
note 1493, at 839. 
1505. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
1506. See Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37301 (1976). 
1507. See, e.g., Parlin, Immigrants, Employers, and Exclusion, 14 SOCIETY 23 (Sept.-Oct. 
1977). 
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tions in producing political and social change. 1508 Nearly a decade 
before the Court's condemnation of most sex-based discrimination by 
government began in the early 1970's,1509 Congress - catalyzed by 
the growing feminist movement as well as more widely based egalitar-
ian forces in society (let loose in part, at least, by the Court itself) -
had, in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
already moved to outlaw adverse treatment of women in the market-
place.1510 Thus, it is fair to question the extent to which the Justices' 
heightened scrutiny of gender discrimination under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause1511 was either necessary to, or in fact did, hasten the de-
mise of such discrimination. Nonetheless, the huge number of sex-
based rules that continued in force at the end of the 1960's - a 1972 
. computer list revealing nearly 900 such federal laws alone1512 -
which are either plainly invalid or extremely vulnerable under subse-
quently articulated judicial standards, strongly suggests that the 
Court's pronouncements have significantly accelerated the pace. 
There appears to have been no systematic compilation of all state 
laws that classified on the basis of sex, 1513 but data gleaned from a 
variety of sources dramatically portray the scope of the problem. The 
Court's edicts in Stanton v. Stanton 1514 (invalidating a statute that re-
quired child support for males to age twenty-one but for females only 
to age eighteen) and Craig v. Boren 1515 (rejecting a law permitting sale 
of near-beer to females at age eighteen but not to males until age 
twenty-one) directly overturned only a tiny handful of rules-Arkan-
sas' as well as Utah's in Stanton, 1516 and only Oklahoma's in Craig. 
However, the decisions' core rationale clearly called into question a 
large number of other sex-based differences - e.g., the minimum age 
to marry in about three-quarters of the states, the requirement of pa-
rental consent to marry in about one-quarter, the removal of infancy 
disability on marriage in about another one-quarter, 1517 and the maxi-
1508. See notes 18-24 supra llJ?.d accompanying text. 
1509. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
1510. See generally Ginsburg, Women, Men, and the Constitution: Key Supreme Court Rul-
ings, in WOMEN 1N THE CoURTS 21, 25-26 (W. Hepperle & L. Crites eds. 1978). 
1511. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and cases cited therein. 
1512. Brief of Appellees at 20 n.17, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
1513. Cf. L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNIFlNISHED REVOLUTION (1969) 
(identifying numerous examples of sex-based discrimination in the law); J. ROBINSON, AN 
AMERICAN LEGAL ALMANAC 334-36 (1978) (listing states which adopted a state ERA amend-
ment or ratified the proposed federal constitutional amendment). 
1514. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
1515. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
1516. 421 U.S. at 15. 
1517. J. ROBINSON supra note 1513, at 46-49, 111-15. 
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mum age in some juvenile court laws in regard to delinquency and 
status offenses.1518 
The Court's seminal decision in Reed v. Reed, 1519 invalidating a 
law preferring males to females when two persons were otherwise 
equally entitled to administer an estate, directly concerned only the 
state of Idaho - indeed, the offending statute had been repealed by 
the time the case was argued in the Supreme Court. The Justices' rul-
ing in Orr v. Orr, 1520 however, had greater immediate impact. Despite 
a marked trend to remove sexual distinctions in alimony obliga-
tions, l521 approximately one-third of the states continued to provide 
such maintenance solely for divorced wives prior to that decision.1522 
Moreover, even Orr's narrow reasoning plainly endangers a host of 
analogous regulations.1523 
The Justices' responses to sex-based classifications in the Social Se-
curity Act - governing benefits for elderly surviving and divorced 
spouses1524 - has also had great impact. After Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld 1525 held that the Act's provision of payments to the wife, but not 
the husband, of a deceased wage earner with minor children violated 
equal protection, over 4, 700 widowed fathers were awarded sums to-
taling almost $500,000 per month.1526 Much greater assistance -
1518. s. Fox, THE LAW OF JUVENILE CoURTS IN A NUTSHELL 34-35 (1984). 
1519. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
1520. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
1521. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Outline, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297, 309-10 
(1977). 
1522. Comment, Male Alimony in Light of the Sex Discrimination Decisons of the Supreme 
Court, 6 CUM. L. REV. 589, 591 n.23 (1976). 
1523. For example, as of 1978, two-thirds of the states imposed spousal support obligations 
on husbands only. J. ROBINSON, supra note 1513, at 5. Nearly one-half the states continued to 
place the primary duty of child support on the father. Id. at 5. In respect to inheritance, eight 
states had sex-based distinctions for devolution of real property from a deceased spouse. Id. at 
107-10. Five states had distinctions for the spouse's right of election under a will. Id. at 139-45. 
As for divorce, many more states permitted a wife to dissolve her marriage for her husband's 
nonsupport than allowed a husband to do so for his wife's similar failure. Cook, "Why Can't a 
Woman Be More Like a Man," or Vice Versa?, 35 ALA. LAW. 409, 416 (1974). On related issues, 
several states afforded a homicide defense to a husband who had killed his wife's lover on discov-
ering the two engaged in sexual conduct but none gave a wife a similar justification. See L. 
KANowrrz, supra note 1513, at 92. Only a minority of states granted wives actions for loss of 
consortium. See Cook, supra, at 414-15. About 10% of the states required judicial approval 
before a married woman could open her own business, see L. KANowrrz, supra note 1513, at 56-
57; a few states forbade wives to change their names without their husbands' consent, id. at 43-
44; and many states provided that a wife's domicile followed that of her husband, id. at 47. The 
vulnerability of all these regulations is confirmed by the Court's unanimous and quite effortless 
rejection of the rule in about five states, see Cook, supra, at 416, granting husbands exclusive 
control over the disposition of community property. See Kirschberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 
(1981). 
1524. See Martin, Social Security Benefits for Spouses, 63 CORNELL L. R.E.v. 789, 809 (1978). 
1525. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
1526. Widowed-Father Beneficiaries, Soc. SEC. BULL., Feb. 1977, at 26. 
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$3.2 billion through 19821527 -was estimated by the government as a 
result of Califano v. Goldfarb, 1528 which invalidated a requirement 
that husbands, but not wives, must prove actual dependency on their 
wage earner spouses in order to obtain old-age and survivor benefits, 
and the series of lower federal court decisions that followed the 
Supreme Court's lead by rejecting additional gender distinctions in the 
Social Security Act.1529 In response, the Carter Administration imme-
diately proposed legislative elimination of all sex discrimination in the 
social security system and a congressionally ordered study calculated 
that the additional benefits for approximately 2,500 men would 
amount to over $20 million for the first five years.1530 
After the Justices' ruling in Rostker v. Goldberg, 1531 upholding 
draft registration for males principally on the ground that the Court 
owes great deference to Congress in the areas of "national defense and 
military affairs,"1532 it could not be said with confidence that all of the 
myriad military regulations that discriminated on the basis of gender 
were invalid. 1533 As the quite narrow reach of the Rostker ration-
alel534 and the Court's unhesitating disapproval of an armed services 
provision in Frontiero v. Richardson 1535 make clear, however, a great 
many of the military's sex-based rules were exceedingly vulnerable if 
not plainly violative of equal protection. Thus, the federal statute au-
thorizing the appointment of sons (but not daughters) of certain veter-
ans to the service academies was amended in 1975 to eliminate the 
gender distinction 1536 and a variety of army regulations have been al-
tered or are no longer in force.1537 
Since the Court has made clear that not every gender discrimina-
1527. StaffofSubco=. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Background Materials for Hearings on Social Security 33 (Comm. Print 1977). 
1528. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
1529. See H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 110-11 (2d ed. 1981). 
1530. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE 
CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN 129-30 (1979). For a description of a "pension effect" 
provision enacted by Congress to reduce this sum, see Martin, supra note 1524, at 814-15. 
1531. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
1532. 453 U.S. at 64. 
1533. See generally Beans, Sex Discrimination in the Military, 67 MIL. L. REv. 19 (1975). 
1534. See generally J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-1981, at 40 (1982). 
1535. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
1536. Pub. L. No. 94-106 (1975) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 4342(a)(l}, (b}(l}, (c) (1982)). 
1537. Examples include such sundry U.S. Army regulations as those prohibiting branch 
transfers for female officers, Army Reg. No. 64-100; requiring greater educational achievements 
for women OCS applicants, Army Reg. No. 135-100; imposing a lower age of minority for dis-
charge of females, Army Reg. No. 635-200; authorizing the discharge of women who marry, 
Army Reg. No. 635-200; and allowing shorter overseas duty tours for single females, Army Reg. 
No. 614-30. 
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tion by government is invalid, particularly those whose purpose is "re-
dressing our society's longstanding disparate treatment ofwomen,"1538 
some regulations will likely continue in force. For example, it may be 
that under the Court's rationale in Michael M. v. Superior Court1539 -
upholding criminal sanctions for men (but not for women) for statu-
tory rape - the rule in almost all states making only males criminally 
liable for "enticement"1540 (persuading a female of tender years to 
elope) may survive. In all, however, most gender-based classifications 
will not pass constitutional muster, thus dramatically advancing the 
interest in sexual equality to countless numbers of men and women. It 
is clear that the Court has played a substantial, if not necessarily lead-
ing, role in advancing this interest. 
4. Illegitimate Children 
Beginning in 1968, the Supreme Court has held that most, 
although not all, government discriminations against illegitimate off-
spring violate equal protection. This has resulted in the removal of a 
host of legal disabilities that had been imposed on many children born 
out of wedlock, 1541 of whom there were nearly 600,000 born in 1979 
alone, amounting to seventeen percent of all births in the United States 
for that year.1542 
The seminal decision in Levy v. Louisiana1543 directly affected only 
two states. It invalidated Louisiana's fiat prohibition against illegiti-
mate children recovering for the wrongful death of their mother and 
required Georgia to delete its provision that illegitimates be dependent 
on their mother in order to obtain a judgment for her wrongful 
death.1544 The next significant ruling advancing the personal rights of 
illegitimate children, however, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 1545 overturned a policy in force in more than twenty statesl546 
which excluded such children from worker's compensation benefits on 
1538. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 
199, 209 n.8 (1977)); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 
U.S. 351 (1974). 
1539. 450 U.S. 464 (1981); see also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). 
1540. L. KANowrrz, supra note 1513, at 1. 
1541. Statutes that burden "illegitimate" children contain particularized definitions of the 
term that usually recognize certain criteria for "legitimacy" beyond the parents' marital status. 
1542. 103 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISflCAL ABsfRACT 
OF THE U.S. 1982-1983, at 66 (1982). 
1543. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
1544. GA. CoDE ANN. § 105-1306 (1968) (am.ended 1971). 
1545. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
1546. See H. KRAUSE, ILLEGffiMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 36-37 (1971). 
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the death of their father. And one year later, in Gomez v. Perez, 1s41 
the Court rejected the laws of three states depriving illegitimates of the 
right to be supported by their father. 1548 Although none of these 
Supreme Court decisions specifically considered the rule in many juris-
dictions that denied illegitimates recovery for their fathers' wrongful 
death, 1549 almost all state and lower federal cases that addressed the 
problem thereafter (involving at least thirteen states) recognized such 
a right, many specifically basing their conclusion on the Levy ration-
ale.1550 Moreover, there appears to be little question that the Justices' 
reasoning in these opinions also invalidates other miscellaneous disad-
vantages for illegitimates - such as some state pension laws that have 
been interpreted to omit them 1551 and several state inheritance tax pro-
visions that discriminate against them.1552 
The area of greatest uncertainty concerning the constitutional per-
missibility of disadvantaging illegitimate offspring is intestate succes-
sion. As of 1970, Louisiana was the sole jurisdiction that refused to 
treat an illegitimate child as an heir of its mother,1553 but only eleven 
states expressly extended the right of inheritance from the mother to 
descendants of illegitimates.1554 It seems clear that all such statutes 
disfavoring illegitimates in respect to inheritance from their mothers 
are no longer valid. A trilogy of Supreme Court decisions on the ques-
tion of inheritance from the father, 1555 however, reveals that under 
current doctrine at least some discriminations in this regard survive 
constitutional challenge. After Trimble v. Gordon, 1556 a state may no 
longer effect such a disinheritance for all children born out of wedlock 
who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents; 
1547. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). The Missouri judiciary had already reversed that state's position 
in response to Levy. R. v. R., 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968). 
1548. See also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), and Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 
(1982), holding violative of equal protection one- and two-year state statutes of limitations for 
suits by illegitimate children to establish paternity in order to obtain support. 
1549. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 1546, at 36; Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 1230, 1237 (1977). 
1550. See Annot., supra note 1549, at 1238-44. 
1551. See generally H. KRAUSE, supra note 1546, at 37. 
1552. See generally id. at 41-42. The question remains open as to whether Fiallo v. Bell, 430 
U.S. 787 (1977), which upheld congressional power to disfavor illegitimates in respect to alien 
immigration, extends to permitting Congress to discriminate against such children regarding citi-
zenship obtained by being born the child of an American citizen abroad. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(a),(b) (1982). 
1553. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 556-57 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
1554. Casenote, Constitutional Law -Equal Protection of Illegitimate Children, 11 LoY. L. 
REV. 170, 173 (1970-71). 
1555. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Labine v. 
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
1556. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
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statutes of this kind, as of 1970, existed in about one-third of the 
states,1557 although by the mid-1970's some had already been al-
tered.1558 In Lalli v. Lalli, 1559 however, the Court sustained a law, 
operative in New York and Tennessee, 1560 which permitted illegiti-
mates to inherit from their fathers only if there had been a judicial 
finding of paternity during the father's lifetime. Lalli apparently also 
gives credence to the rule in approximately a half-dozen additional 
states1561 that restricts paternal inheritance to instances in which the 
father has in some formal way acknowledged the child as his own. 
Thus, although the Court has not removed all disabilities imposed on 
illegitimate children in succeeding to the property of their deceased 
fathers (or other paternal ancestors),1562 many such barriers have 
fallen as a result of the Justices' mandates. 
The last significant area of the law that has disadvantageously clas-
sified illegitimate children concerns benefits under the Social Security 
Act. In Mathews v. Lucas, 1563 the Court sustained a discrimination 
against illegitimates which required them (but not legitimate offspring) 
to prove their dependency on the deceased parent before they could 
obtain insurance payments. In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 1564 however, 
the Court had held that the Act's conclusive denial of benefits to some 
classes of illegitimate children (but not other classes), even though 
they could establish that they were dependent on a disabled parent, 
violated equal protection. While the Jimenez ruling would not appear 
to involve a large number of recipients, the Court's affirmances in Da-
vis v. Richardson 1565 and Griffin v. Richardson 1566 - invalidating pro-
visions reducing (and often totally denying) death benefits to 
illegitimates - affected nearly 15,000 children annually1567 in 
amounts typically ranging from $30 to $50 per month.1568 Moreover, 
1557. See 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 392, 398-99 (1971). 
1558. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Rudolph, 556 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); HAWAll REV. 
STAT. § 560:2-109(2) (1976). 
1559. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
1560. See NOTRE DAME LAW., supra note 1557, at 398-99. 
1561. See id. 
1562. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 1546, at 25-28; Note, Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate 
Children Under the Equal Protection Clause, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1336, 1338 (1970). 
1563. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
1564. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
1565. 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), affd., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). 
1566. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.), affd., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). 
1567. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at 7 n.10, Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 
(1972). 
1568. See, e.g., Morris v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 494, 497 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated, 409 
U.S . .464 (1973). 
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several other Social Security Act provisions that exclude illegitimate 
children as beneficiaries, also with an apparently wider ranging im-
pact, seemingly fall within the reach of the Court's condemnatory 
rationale. 1569 
Overall, on many important fronts, the Justices have alleviated po-
litically imposed hardships on these "hapless children" that bear no 
"relationship to [their] individual responsibility or wrongdoing."1510 
I. Right to Vote 
1. Fees for Filing in Primaries 
As of the early 1970's, about three-fifths of the states required that 
candidates for public office pay a filing fee in order to be listed on a 
primary election ballot. 1571 Further, even if an office seeker chose to 
forego the party primary, which is the predominant route to election 
for most positions, nearly half of this group of states also demanded 
payment of a fee in order to have the candidate's name appear on the 
general election ballot. 1572 Although many of the fifty states permitted 
write-in candidacies for primaries and almost all states had write-in 
provisions for the general election, 1573 since this method for winning is 
dubious at best, the fact was that payment of a filing fee at some stage 
of the process was a prerequisite for election to a majority of the public 
offices in the United States.1574 
The size of these fees varied considerably among the states, and 
within individual states as to particular offices. 1575 In quite a few, the 
amount could not exceed $100, 1576 while in others, the levy was 
1569. One such provision, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(l) (1982) (denying mother's benefits to women 
who have never been married to the deceased fathers of their illegitimate children), has nonethe-
less been upheld by a sharply divided court. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979). Another is 
42 U.S.C. § 403(a)(3) (1982) (providing that if the statutory maximum for benefits to an eligible 
worker's family is exceeded, payments to illegitimate children are the first to be eliminated). See 
generally Samuel, Social Security Benefits for Illegitimate Children After Levy v. Louisiana, 19 
BUF. L. REV. 289 (1970). 
1570. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76. 
1571. For slightly different tabulations, see Developments in the Law- Elections, 88 HARV. 
L. REv. 1111, 1144-45 (1975); Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political 
Candidates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 138-39 (1971); Brief for Petitioner at 19, Lubin v. Panish, 
415 U.S. 709 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner]. 
1572. See Developments in the Law - Elections, supra note 1571, at 1144-45; Comment, 
supra note 1571, at 138-39. 
1573. See Comment, supra note 1571, at 138-39. 
1574. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 n.5. See Ireland & Ireland, The Political Arena: 
Revolution in the Barriers to Entry, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORD. 213, 214 n.8. 
1575. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 23-33, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 
(1972). Seventeen states apparently had no fees. Id. 
1576. Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan ($100 filing fee in lieu of nomination 
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greater but still relatively modest. 1577 In a number of states, however, 
the assessment was substantial - e.g., Texas (up to 15% of annual 
salary), New Mexico (up to 6%), Connecticut (5%), Florida (3%), 
Virginia (2%), California (up to 2%), Louisiana ($5,000 for any office 
in a municipality of more than 300,000 persons, except for the Orleans 
Parish School Board).1578 
The Court's 1974 decision in Lubin v. Panish 1519 (relying on Bul-
lock v. Carter, 1580 handed down two years earlier) removed many of 
these impediments to election, which realistically amounted to an ex-
clusion for impecunious entrants. It held that "in the absence of rea-
sonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not, consistent 
with constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate fil-
ing fees he cannot pay."1581 
There appear to be no figures revealing the extent to which these 
rulings have actually resulted in persons attaining public office who 
would otherwise have been barred from doing so, but there is at least 
some data showing that the decisions have had some meaning for poor 
persons in the political process. For example, in the first election fol-
lowing Lubin in California, "forty-four indigent candidates from the 
state's four balloted parties - the American Independent, Demo-
cratic, Peace and Freedom, and Republican - [were] certified, with-
out having to post a filing fee." 1582 Further, there is some additional 
evidence that indigent candidacies are not merely futile endeavors. 
Thus, in the 1972 Los Angeles County Primary, an indigent contes-
tant for the Democratic congressional nomination - who obtained a 
place on the ballot by court order without paying the $425 filing fee -
received thirty-four percent of the vote despite only $178 campaign 
expenditures.1583 Similarly, in the 1970 Democratic primary in El 
Paso County, Texas, an impoverished contender for the post of 
County Commissioner - who also got on the ballot through a federal 
injunction without having to pay the $1425 assessed against his two 
opponents - was endorsed by one of the two major local newspapers 
petition - returned if candidate is nominated or places second), Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Wyoming. Id. 
1577. Examples include Nevada (up to $250), Maryland (up to $290), Mississippi (up to 
$300), and Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia (up to 1 % of the 
annual salary for the office). Id. 
1578. Id. 
1579. 415 U.S. 709 (1974). 
1580. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
1581. 415 U.S. at 718. 
1582. McClellan & Anderson, Filing Fees and Poor Candidates, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 
1974, at 10. 
1583. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1571, at 18. 
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and won close to thirty percent of the vote (nearly twice as much as 
the other losing candidate).1584 
Finally, even if those indigents who obtain ballot positions as a 
result of the Court's edict fail to capture public office, they may none-
theless make valuable contributions to the political system. 
Frequently they raise issues and develop policies long before established 
parties are prepared to act, and their presence on the general election 
ballot and participation in election campaigns permits voters to demon-
strate support for new or unorthodox ideas. Major party nominees may 
respond to popular support for other candidates by reformulating their 
policies and programs. Thus, despite a general lack of electoral success, 
minor parties and independent candidates may eventually see substantial 
portions of their programs implemented. 
[They] may also serve a legitimizing function, by providing disaf-
fected voters with an outlet for their frustration with established parties. 
Without this alternative, dissatisfied voters who find themselves repeat-
edly confronted with unattractive policies and candidates may come to 
doubt the legitimacy of the entire electoral process.1585 
2. Restrictions on Crossovers 
As of the early 1970's, at least four states - Illinois, Louisiana, 
New Jersey and Rhode Island1586 - had statutes of the kind held in-
valid by the Supreme Court in Kusper v. Pontikes. 1587 These provisions 
required that persons who wished to vote in the primary election of a 
political party must declare their affiliation with that party as much as 
one year or more before the primary. The principal impact of these 
laws was effectively to destroy the significance of crossover voting. 
This is the practice of electors ordinarily associated with one political 
party voting in the primary of another - often (but not always)158s 
because it "presents candidates and issues more responsive to their im-
mediate concerns and aspirations."1589 
That this phenomenon occurs on a substantial basis and produces 
important consequences for the democratic process has been attested 
to by the studies of several prominent political scientists.159o For ex-
1584. See Brief of Appellees, Pate et al, at 10-11, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
1585. Developments in the Law - Elections, supra note 1571, at 1123 (footnotes omitted). 
1586. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Walters v. Edwards, 396 F. Supp. 808 
(E.D. La. 1975); Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1972); Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 
447 (D.R.I. 1972). 
1587. 414 U.S. SI (1973). 
1588. See text following note 1600 infra. 
1589. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
1590. See, e.g., Adamany, Cross-over Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, 70 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 536 (1976); Ranney, Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary 
Elections, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 21, 34-36 (1972). 
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ample, crossover voters comprised between a quarter and a third of 
the participants in Wisconsin's vigorously disputed Democratic Party 
presidential primaries in 1964, 1968 and 1972.1591 In the 1978 Demo-
cratic gubernatorial primary in Massachusetts, the incumbent suffered 
defeat despite the appearance of an easy race, seemingly because many 
Democrats "changed their party affiliation, at least temporarily, so as 
to participate in the hotly contested Republican primary" for the Sen-
ate.1592 Within weeks of the federal judiciary's condemnation of Illi-
nois' burdensome "lock-in" feature, the favored Daley-machine 
candidate for governor lost in the Democratic primary, a result gener-
ally attributed to Republican crossovers who preferred the alternative 
Democratic contender.1593 More generally, regardless of the impact 
that crossovers may have on the winners of party contests, the fact is 
that "the primaries have effects quite distinct from allocating dele-
gates" in that they influence the national standings of candidates, the 
development of party platforms, and the "wooing [of] campaign work-
ers and financial support."1594 Further, prohibition of an unduly long 
preregistration period as a condition of voting in a primary insures a 
fuller and more effective voice in a major step of the political process 
for the large number of American voters who label themselves as 
"independent." 1595 
Although the Court's contemporaneous decision in Rosario v. 
Rockefeller1596 would appear to permit durational voter affiliation 
rules of as long as eight months, thus still allowing states realistically 
to frustrate most crossover voting desires1597 (which rarely mature 
that long before the primary), the fact is that - at least to date -
those states whose procrustean laws have been struck down have not 
responded in this way.159s 
1591. See Adamany, supra note 1590, at 538. 
1592. Note, The Party Affiliation Requirement, 16 NEW ENG. L. RE.v. 71, 71 (1980). 
1593. Note, The Right to Vote and Restrictions on Crossover Primaries, 40 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 
636, 636 (1973). 
1594. Adamany, supra note 1590, at 540. 
1595. See LeBlanc & Merrin, Independents, Issue Partnership and the Decline of Party, 7 AM. 
POL. Q. 240, 244 (1979) (one-third of the electorate "independent" as of 1976). 
1596. 410 U.S. 752 (1973). 
1597. This would not be true if the Court's decisions in Rosario and Kusper were to be ratio-
nalized on the ground that "eight months prior to the primary election the plaintiffs in Rosario 
knew or ought to have realized that they would want to vote in the primary election" of a 
particular political party. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 792 (1978). 
1598. New Jersey and Rhode Island enacted new regulations requiring preregistration of 
only 50 and 90 days respectively. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-45 (West 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 17-9-27 (1984). Illinois rejected a four-month preregistration requirement despite the urgings 
of distinguished party leaders to the contrary. See Comment, Open Versus Closed Primaries: A 
Dilemma in the Illinois Election Process, 1977 So. ILL. U. L.J. 210, 223-24 (1977). Louisiana 
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Overall, the oft-stated justification for discouraging crossover vot-
ing of inhibiting "raiding" - the "organized attempt on the part of 
one party to send its partisans into the primary of the other in order to 
foist the least attractive candidates on it"1599 - has been largely dis-
credited.1600 On the other hand, there has been no authoritative con-
clusion on the extent to which individual voters may use the crossover 
opportunity to engage in "strategic" voting - casting their ballots for 
a candidate whom they have no intention of supporting in the general 
election. Moreover, it has been forcefully argued that extensive cross-
over voting threatens the role of American political parties in mini-
mizing the divisiveness inherent in one-issue factionalism and molding 
pluralities of interests into the durable coalitions needed for both soci-
etal and governmental stability.1601 Wholly apart from any evaluation 
of the large and imponderable issues of fact and policy comprehended 
by these issues, however, it in no way refutes the significance for indi-
vidual rights described above of the Court's mandate in Kusper. 
POSTSCRIPT 
All the decisions chosen for discussion in this Article have been the 
product of the United States Supreme Court and almost all have in-
volved statutes or other government regulations that dealt with spe-
cific conduct and that existed on a relatively broad scale (either 
nationally or at least in several states). It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that this by no means exhausts the Justices' achievements for 
personal liberty. 
For example, in a series of rulings in the 1960's, the Warren Court 
upheld the right to free expression of various political dissidents and 
members of minority racial groups. 1602 These decisions have not been 
made the subject of study herein because they usually concerned only 
trifling segments of the populace whose discrete activities were subject 
to general prohibitions. It is fair, though, to speculate that their cu-
mulative force has retarded further popular repression of advocacy 
went even beyond the spirit of the Justices' ruling by authorizing unlimited crossing over. LA. 
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. II § 18:521 (West 1984). 
1599. Adamany, supra note 1590, at 538. 
1600. See Ranney, supra note 1590, at 35-36. 
1601. See Note, supra note 1593, at 654-57; see also Adamany, supra note 1590, at 536. 
1602. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 
U.S. 147 (1969); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
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critical of official policy. Thus, it has been urged that "tolerance for 
dissent over the war in Vietnam was in large measure a product of the 
Supreme Court's decisions in the area of freedom of speech."1603 Such 
large judgments are extremely difficult to substantiate, but there is less 
doubt that the Justices' approval, in over ninety percent of the cases 
during the period before the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1604 of the first 
amendment claims of demonstrators seeking integration of public ac-
commodations contributed signifcantly to their ultimate legislative 
victory.1605 
Moreover, the fact that an invalidated rule was the law in only one 
state does not necessarily demean either the quantitative or qualitative 
significance of the Court's judgment for individual rights. For one 
thing, the actual number of people directly and meaningfully affected 
may still be quite substantial.1606 For another, in many instances, 
there is strong reason to believe that if the Justices were to have up-
held the regulation in the single state where it was in effect, other juris-
dictions would soon have promulgated their own versions of the 
liberty-denying prohibition.1601 
Finally, both the lower federal courts and state tribunals have 
seized principles first articulated by the Supreme Court in confined 
factual settings and applied them elsewhere, often quite aggressively. 
This may take the form of extensions of the Justices' precepts to analo-
gous situations a step or so beyond their origins, 1608 of federal courts 
charting territory largely undirected by specific Supreme Court prece-
1603. S. W ASBY, supra note 18, at 234. 
1604. See Grossman, A Model for Judicial Policy Analysis, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RE-
SEARCH 446-49 (J. Grossman & T. Tanenhaus eds. 1969). 
1605. See generally J. CASPER, THE.POLmcs OF ClvIL LIBERTIES 183-84 (1972). 
1606. Thus, New York appeared to be the only state that prohibited anyone other than a 
physician from distributing contraceptives to minors under the age of 16 when the practice was 
invalidated in Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Brief of Planned 
Parenthood Fedn. of America, Inc., et al, as Amici Curiae at 13-14, Carey v. Population Servs. 
Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The conclusion of several contemporary studies of teenage sexuality 
"that a large number of young teenagers appreciate the serious consequences of out-of-wedlock 
birth and would and do use contraception if and when it is available," Brief of ACLU as Amicus 
Curiae at 15, Carey (footnote omitted}, was confirmed by comparative statistics from New York 
before and after the judicial action. These showed that from 1971to1974-the period between 
the statute's enactment and its condemnation by a three-judge federal court, Population Servs. 
Intl. v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd. sub nom. Carey v. Population Servs. 
Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) - pregnancy among 13- to 15-year-old girls in New York increased 
dramatically, Brief for Planned Parenthood at 13-14, and then dropped markedly, Communica-
tion from N.Y. State Dept. of Health, Bureau of Family Planning, to author. See also text at 
notes 949-51 supra. 
1607. See, e.g., note 29 supra and text at notes 1283-85, 1298-99, 1378-82 supra. 
1608. See, e.g., the collection of state and lower federal court decisions listed in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 & n.6 (1981} (extending the unqualified right to 
appointed counsel from most criminal prosecutions to parental termination proceedings and 
child-dependency and child-neglect hearings). 
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dents, 1609 or of state courts - both recently and historically161° -
interpreting their own constitutions more sympathetically to claims of 
individual rights than have the Justices construing the national 
charter.1611 
1609. See, e.g., text at notes 1047-51 supra. For a brief, but revealing description of the 
powerful radiations for mental patients and prisoners of the landmark "institutional reform" 
decisions of Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), ajfd. sub nom. Wyatt v. 
Aderholt, 403 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), and Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), 
affd. sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), see M. PERRY, THE CONSTI-
TUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 155-58 (1982). 
1610. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 
Nw. U. L. REv. 226 (1958); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 
MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950). 
1611. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); 
State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976); text at note 1446supra. See generally Howard, 
State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 
(1976); Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties: State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 
10 GA. L. REV. 533 (1976). 
